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Purpose: This study explores the intersection of gender and place with agricultural extension services to understand disparities in resource and information access and build community resilience in post-conflict Liberia. It emphasizes how such intersections may be further compounded by climate change and provides possible solutions. Methodology: Using a community-based research approach, 352 surveys and 44 focus groups were conducted in 22 communities in 3 counties in north-central Liberia. Subsequently, qualitative, quantitative, and spatial analyses were done to explore gender and place-based differences in farmer access to agricultural resources and household agency. Findings: Study results show that women farmers have less access to technology, agricultural resources and information; higher, combined productive and domestic, labor burdens; and that farmers of both genders want more female extension officers. Practical Implications: This study provides critical data to help effectively target limited expenditures on national extension services to smallholder farmers in post-conflict settings. Further, solutions for practitioners to adaptively mitigate farming challenges enhanced by climate change. Theoretical Implications: Studying the intersection among gender, rural isolation and diminished capacity in post-conflict countries will enhance understanding of (extension service) capacity in settings with multiple drivers affecting gender inequalities. Originality: Improve the overall understanding of how compounding factors such as gender and place effect extension service access and the ability of farmers to adapt to change, in Liberia and other post-conflict settings.

As a pharmaceutical intervention, vaccines remain a major public health strategy for mitigating the effects of COVID-19. Yet, vaccine intake has been affected by various cognitive and cultural factors. We examine how a selected set of factors (i.e., knowledge, concern, media, peer influence, and demographics) shaped COVID-19 vaccination intention in the early phase of the pandemic (Fall 2020). Using a survey conducted in three US states (Idaho, Texas, and Vermont) just prior to the rollout of the first vaccines against COVID-19, we find that COVID-19 concern was the primary driver of vaccination intention. Concern was shaped mainly by two factors: political ideology and media sources. Yet, ideology and media were much more important in affecting concern for those who leaned politically conservative, as opposed to those who leaned liberal or remained moderate. The results from our structural equation models affirm that the information politically conservative respondents were receiving reinforced the effects of their ideology, leading to a greater reduction in their concern. We discuss the potential implications of these findings for future pandemic preparedness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Resistance to clean energy policy in the United States stems partly from public hesitancy and skepticism toward anthropogenic climate change. This article examines self-declared climate change skeptics' views of clean energy policy along a continuum of skeptical thought, spanning from epistemic denial to attribution doubt. To perform this, we use data from an online survey administered in the US Pacific Northwest and a series of pilot interviews conducted with skeptics in the same region. Results reveal that skeptics' support for clean energy policy is consistently linked with their environmental concern across the skepticism continuum. Conspiracy ideation and distrust in science lead to a reduction in support. However, the positive effect of environmental concern trumps the effects of these beliefs. Important and hopeful implications of these findings for climate change communication and policy are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have recognized a need for educational programs that prepare scientists, Extension practitioners, and other stakeholders to communicate science effectively. Such programs have the potential to increase public awareness and aid policy development. Having recognized this need, faculty at Michigan State University (MSU) developed an "international short course in science and technology communication" that was offered at MSU from 2010 to 2012. This article provides an overview of the design, implementation, and impact assessment of the course. We also share lessons learnt from this program and provide suggestions for other similar programs.

Prior research has found that white people are more likely to be climate change skeptics. In much of this prior work, white identity is treated as a categorical label, limiting the theoretical and empirical understanding of this relationship. Drawing on survey data from a US national sample of 933 white young adults, we theorize that white identity is a developmental process where people explore the meanings of their racial identity and commit to a white identity marked by enhanced levels of social dominance orientation and conspiratorial ideation, two social-psychological constructs consistently associated with climate change skepticism. Using regression analyses, we tested a mediation model that a strong white identity would increase climate change skepticism by enhancing one's social dominance orientation and conspiratorial ideation. We found partial support for our model. While a strong white identity was positively associated with social dominance orientation and conspiratorial ideation, only social dominance orientation increased climate change skepticism. Conspiratorial ideation reduced climate change skepticism. We discuss the implications of our findings for the climate change literature as well as how our findings can inform policies that could reduce climate change skepticism among white people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses interview data with people who were once skeptical about climate change but have come to accept climate science to assess the factors that contribute to their shifts in perspectives. Our findings show two trajectories of change for skeptics, depending on the nature of their skepticism. For those who move from actively denying climate change, shifting beliefs about climate change occur via a profound need to reconcile what emerges as cognitive dissonance due to challenges to their religious identities. For skeptics who move from being unsure about climate change, moving to accept climate science happens through either encountering new information from a trusted source or personally observing the effects of climate change. This extends existing scholarship on the factors that contribute to changing minds on climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the existing scholarship on climate change uses religiosity to measure the effects of religion on climate skepticism and results in inconsistent findings. Drawing on insights from the study of religion and environmentalism more broadly, we suggest that scholars should seek a deeper understanding of religion's impacts by considering the influence of specific religious beliefs on perceptions of climate change. We further contend that researchers should consider how these factors shape attitudes within and between segments of the public who hold varying positions on climate change. We test these contentions using a novel sample of 1,000 self-declared "climate skeptics" in the U.S. Pacific Northwest. We find that, among skeptics, specific religious beliefs are more strongly associated with a range of selected climate/environmental attitudes (i.e., conspiracy ideation, trust in climate science, proenvironmentalism, emotions about climate change) than is religiosity. We discuss these findings and their implications for future scholarship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Early public health strategies to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in the United States relied on non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) as vaccines and therapeutic treatments were not yet available. Implementation of NPIs, primarily social distancing and mask wearing, varied widely between communities within the US due to variable government mandates, as well as differences in attitudes and opinions. To understand the interplay of trust, risk perception, behavioral intention, and disease burden, we developed a survey instrument to study attitudes concerning COVID-19 and pandemic behavioral change in three states: Idaho, Texas, and Vermont. We designed our survey (n = 1034) to detect whether these relationships were significantly different in rural populations. The best fitting structural equation models show that trust indirectly affects protective pandemic behaviors via health and economic risk perception. We explore two different variations of this social cognitive model: the first assumes behavioral intention affects future disease burden while the second assumes that observed disease burden affects behavioral intention. In our models we include several exogenous variables to control for demographic and geographic effects. Notably, political ideology is the only exogenous variable which significantly affects all aspects of the social cognitive model (trust, risk perception, and behavioral intention). While there is a direct negative effect associated with rurality on disease burden, likely due to the protective effect of low population density in the early pandemic waves, we found a marginally significant, positive, indirect effect of rurality on disease burden via decreased trust (p = 0.095). This trust deficit creates additional vulnerabilities to COVID-19 in rural communities which also have reduced healthcare capacity. Increasing trust by methods such as in-group messaging could potentially remove some of the disparities inferred by our models and increase NPI effectiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing literature on perceptions of climate change skeptics does not include a direct examination of skeptics who are members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter‐day Saints (LDS), likely because they make up a small percentage of the U.S. population (1.6%). However, the LDS church is one of the fastest growing religious sects in the nation and world and is acquiring more political power, especially in the western United States. Our research note presents a preliminary look at Latter‐day Saint skeptics. We find evangelical and Latter‐day Saint skeptics align on measures of religious ideation and the belief that "humans are meant to rule over the rest of nature." Yet, on measures of environmental concerns and values, Latter‐day Saint skeptics appear to be somewhere between evangelical and mainline Christian skeptics. This pilot project provides a foundation for future work regarding LDS perceptions of climate change, environmental policy, and climate communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use data from 33 in‐depth interviews conducted with residents in the rural inland Northwestern state of Idaho who self‐identify as skeptical about anthropogenic climate change, to examine the nuance within the narratives that skeptics employ to voice their skepticism. Our findings show that the arguments employed by those who are skeptical of climate change do not constitute a clear typology of skepticism or "skeptics." Rather, individuals weave together unique stories—shaped by their social locations, personal experiences, and underlying ideological beliefs—and, through combining different argument threads, explain why they believe climate change is a fictitious problem. Our findings suggest that while some skeptics may lean on religion‐based or conspiracy‐based narratives to rationalize their skepticism, others may rely on science attitudes, personal experiences, or a range of additional reasons to be skeptical of climate change. In short, climate skepticism is not uniform nor accurately typologized, but a complex tapestry of socially shaped beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Munich Re (Munich, Germany: Munich Re, 2004), 76-83. 7 A. Engels, O. Hüther, M. Schäfer, and H. Held, "Public Climate-Change Skepticism, Energy Preferences, and Political Participation", I Global I Environmental i Change i 23 (2013): 1018-27; A. McCright and R. Dunlap, "Cool Dudes: The Denial of Climate Change Among Conservative White Males in the United States", I Global Environmental Change i 21 (2011): 1163-72. 8 K. PHOTO (COLOR) On March 6, 2012, future President Donald Trump tweeted: "The concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive." Second, we present what we call a "conspiracy gap,"[10] in which skeptics who believe that climate change is a hoax hold significantly lower levels of environmental concern and policy support as compared to skeptics who do not. [Extracted from the article]

Using interviews with residents of Idaho (a rural northwest US state) who identify as skeptical of climate change, we examine how skeptics rationalize their doubts about climate science. Skeptics tend to question the reality and human causes of climate change by (1) raising concerns about incentive structures in science that could bias climatology, (2) doubting the accuracy of data and models used by climate scientists, and (3) perceiving some practices of climate science and scientists as exclusionary. Despite these concerns, skeptics exhibit deference to scientific authority when using scientific assessments to make policy decisions, including environmental policy. Understanding skeptics' concerns about climate science and areas where they support science-based policy, will lead to better dialogue between scientists, interest groups, policy makers, and the skeptical public, potentially clarifying avenues to communicate climate information and enact climate policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on sources related to psychological understanding for climate change skepticism including article "Climate change skepticism and denial: an introduction"; the book "Climate Change and Society: Sociological Perspectives"; and "Energy Research & Social Science".

Abstract: This article explores current sociological scholarship on climate skepticism and, drawing on recent literature in social psychology and behavioral science, presents an argument for future research on the relationship between emotion, information aversion, and climate denial. We extrapolate and unite these disconnected bodies of scholarship to argue that strong emotions such as fear may drive climate change skepticism and denial among some adherents. By partnering the scholarship outlined above with advances in research on conspiracy ideation, we argue that climate change skepticism and denial is, at least in some cases, a form of an exaggerated ostrich effect, whereby adherents are so driven to avoid learning about a specific problem; they actively seek to construct an alternative, safer, narrative. Given this predisposition, attempting to challenge such skepticism with information is counterproductive. As such, this paper presents alternative possibilities for communicating research findings on climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) disciplines, the percentage participation of women in engineering has shown significant gains over the past few decades. However, women are still largely absent (or exist in very small numbers) in tenured academic ranks in several engineering sub-fields. In this study we present female and male engineers' varying understandings of 'scientific success' as a potential contributor to women's retention and success in their (sub)fields. Using in-depth interviews conducted among engineering graduate students and faculty at two U.S. Northwest land-grant research universities, this study demonstrates the 'dual' nature in accounts of scientific success, where formal measures of success operate in tandem with informal measures. While both men and women attribute their success to formal and informal measures, gender-based variations tend to be more prevalent among informal measures. By examining these informal measures, this study highlights the context surrounding success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past decade the U.S. public has expressed varying degrees of skepticism about certain factual claims, and of "expertise" more broadly. Ideological and partisan belief polarization seems to have elevated public anxiety about topics ranging from climate change and vaccines to immigration and healthcare policy. Furthermore, polarized narratives about scientific, medical, and political topics have encouraged "directionally motivated cognition", leading to a decline in institutional trust among some fractions of the U.S. political spectrum. Our case study of the Tea Party Patriots (TPP) (i.e. a political organization that promotes the Tea Party goals) uses data from 45 interviews, 80 hours of participant observation, and content analysis of movement literature, to examine the nature and nuance of health narratives employed by the Tea Party. Specifically, we explain a central narrative in TPP organizing that features "a villainous Left covertly seeking to harm U.S. citizens" as the root of three key TPP health care narratives: (1) Democratic health initiatives enslaving youth; (2) the political left profiting from covertly making Americans dependent on state's health care programs; and (3) the left clandestinely seeking to violate the constitution as represented by their efforts to "kill grandma". These narratives reflect the increased polarization of attitudes towards healthcare, as well as a broader distrust of the political left who, activists believe, are advancing a political agenda of social control. Ultimately, we argue that culturally driven healthcare narratives of the Tea Party have had a significant impact on right-wing public opinion and Republican politics regarding U.S. healthcare policy. Many Tea Party concerns are reflected in the Republican policy positions, including those related to the Affordable Care Act of 2010. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scientists’ risk perceptions play a critical role in determining the risks that they are willing to accept in their work. This study investigates academic bioscientists’ risk perceptions by examining the judgments working scientists employ in day-to-day research decisions. The study draws from theoretical and methodological underpinnings of Sociology of Science and Risk Analysis. Using data gathered from 694 survey responses of bioscientists at a land grant research university in the U.S. Midwest, this study identifies four dimensions of perceived risk (i.e., intellectual challenges, competition, career risks, and societal risks) and demonstrates how these dimensions are associated with a series of demographic, life-course, and contextual factors. Findings indicate that university bioscientists’ subjective risk judgments are shaped by their professional experience, sources of funding, research orientation, professional networks, and perceived significance of research, which in turn may affect their research decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past few decades, public anxiety about how people interact with science has spawned cycles of discourse across a wide range of media, public and private initiatives, and substantial research endeavors. National and international STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) education initiatives and research have addressed how students interact with science and pursue careers in STEM fields. Researchers concerned with adult interaction with science have focused on factors that influence how citizens gather and interpret scientific knowledge and form positions on scientific issues, applications, and/or policy in a politicized democratic milieu. Building from research on how the public interacts with science in and outside of formal education, this study focuses on attitudes toward science among students in 4th, 7th, and 10th grades and their parents. Little research to date has paired the STEM experiences of adults with their children. We find that the extent to which parents are positively oriented toward science significantly shapes their children’s attitudes toward science. Furthermore, between 7th and 10th grades, students with parents holding positive orientations toward science are more likely to sustain positive attitudes toward science. Since the foundation for most adults’ interactions with science develops in the K-12 environment, we demonstrate that the foundation, as expressed in adulthood, may directly affect the ways the next generation of students interacts with science. We offer insights into the importance of developing student learning into the social scientific research on public understanding of science and how important scientific issues of today interplay with society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding the intersections of science and publics has led to research on how diverse publics interpret scientific information and form positions on science-related issues. Research demonstrates that attitudes toward science, political and religious orientation, and other social factors affect adult interactions with science, which has implications for how adults influence K-12 STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) education. Based on a statewide survey of adults in Idaho (n = 407), a politically and religiously conservative western state, we demonstrate how attitudes toward science, measured through a composite measure “orientation toward science,” and other social factors are correlated with support for STEM education. Results show that “orientation toward science,” along with political orientation and respondents’ perceptions of feeling informed about science, predicts behavior intentions to support STEM education. Our findings suggest that a nuanced and localized approach to fostering support for K-12 STEM education would resonate with populations regardless of political orientation, and they illuminate new ways of thinking about how political orientation more generally impacts thinking about science in the context of complicated “socio-scientific relations.” In exploring how people think about science in a politically and religiously conservative state, we provide insights on potential outcomes in other states, should conservative ideology spread. We argue that the publics’ relationship with science and, by extension, support for science education, is more fluid, as many of us suspect, than ideological polemics suggest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abortion is a topic and practice with deep socio-political undergirding. While research on attitudes toward abortions is prevalent, less is known about perceptions of the frequency of abortion in the general population. Using primary data gathered from an online survey of students, faculty and staff of two public universities in the U.S., we found that people generally underestimate the percentage of pregnancies that end in abortion. We discuss this finding and the role of demographic, attitudinal, and behavioral variables in the abortion estimates made by respondents. Additionally, we discuss the implications of these findings, taking into consideration the societal effects of a potential correction of the underestimation of abortion rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Numerous food scares have become news in recent years, a situation that could lead to questions concerning the due diligence of those supplying food to consumers. This study looks at how various actors tied to the food supply, including producers, processors, retailers and government agencies, have tried to transition news coverage of food scares into something that matches their interests or which places the blame for problems elsewhere. Using Goffman's notion of keys, we investigate the ways in which the public was portrayed during three food scares—Alar, mad cow disease and genetic engineering—to understand how claimsmakers were reshaping press coverage of these crises. Findings show that while some coverage has changed over the years and across issues—from the public needing protection in the 1980s to being concerned in the late 1990s—keys have been used by actors in these stories to highlight ivies that were necessary to protect a public that is unable to fend for itself when food becomes risky. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing survey instruments of trust in science and scientists that focus on the general public are potentially insufficient to assess climate skeptics' perspectives towards climate science. They may miss important aspects of climate science about which skeptics raise concerns, and may not accurately measure climate skeptics' distrust in climatology. We introduce a new survey instrument developed using data gathered from interviewing 33 self-identified climate change skeptics in Idaho. The survey items capture skeptics' beliefs regarding climate scientists' trustworthiness and credibility, their deference to scientific authority, and their perceptions of alienation from the climate science community. We validate our survey instrument using data from an online survey administered to 1000 residents in the U.S. Pacific Northwest who are skeptical of climate change. By employing standard survey design principles, we demonstrate how our new (dis)trust in climate science instrument performs in tandem with well-known predictors of science attitudes and pro-environmentalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose/Background: Toxic metal contamination poses public health risks in many mining-impacted communities. Improved understanding of risk perception and health protective behaviors is important to sustaining public health awareness. We co-developed a research study based on the Health Belief Model (HBM; Figure 1) and facilitated through a partnership with the health district in our study area, the Silver Valley of northern Idaho. Lead contamination caused by historical mining practices continues to impact both ecological and human health and contributes to health disparities. For this study, we assess how health belief constructs (i.e., perceived threats, expectations of behavioral outcomes, and confidence in personal knowledge) influence self-reported health protective behaviors and behavioral intentions. Materials & Methods: We conducted a drop-off pick-up (DOPU) household survey (n~300; estimated response rate~60%) to assess risk perception and self-reported health behaviors among residents in three mining-impacted communities of the Silver Valley. Informational interviews and a pilot survey informed survey instrument development. Health protective behavior variables were modified from the health district's existing public recommendations. We assessed the frequency of past health protective behaviors and likelihood of future behaviors (e.g., handwashing following contact with lead contamination). Health belief constructs were modified from other HBM studies. We performed validity and reliability tests on the survey instrument. Results: We will measure the impact of threats, expectations and confidence on health protective behaviors. We hypothesize that, overall, higher confidence in personal knowledge of lead contamination will be associated with higher likelihood of taking health protective behavior. Furthermore, confidence is mediated by perceived threat and expectations of behavioral outcomes. To test our hypothesis, we will use a structural equation model to test the relationships between constructs (Figure 1). Discussion/Conclusion: By conducting a DOPU survey, we captured a range of health beliefs and health protective behaviors that are present across the study area. The challenge in educating and protecting the health of communities impacted by a persistent but low visibility contaminant such as lead is understanding the relationship between health beliefs and health protective behaviors. Our study is an initial step in this region to identify the constructs that influence decisions and actions for health protection. We will apply these findings to continue developing tailored resources for community health interventions and communication, including a youth-oriented computer game and targeted signage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]