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Epidemiological evidence suggests that regular physical activity (PA) positively impacts individuals' mental health (MH). The PA-MH relationship may be critical among immigrants owing to psycho-social-cultural influences. This scoping review of 61 studies employed a holistic bio-psycho-socio-cultural framework to thoroughly investigate the complex relationship between PA (across life domains) and immigrants' MH in Western countries. A systematic search of five electronic databases (Medline, PubMed, Embase, PsycINFO and Anthropology Plus) was conducted to locate relevant articles. No limitations were applied to study design, age, gender, home country, MH condition or PA type. A bio-psycho-socio-cultural-informed conceptual model guided the analysis of the multi-domain PA-MH relationship. Immigrant PA-MH studies were conducted and reported most commonly in the USA (38%), Australia (18%), and Canada (11%). Overall, PA was positively related to MH. Each domain-specific PA appeared to be associated with unique MH-promoting pathways/mechanisms. Leisure-related PA may support MH by enhancing self-agency and minimizing risky behaviors, whilst travel- and domestic-related PA may promote self-accomplishment and physical engagement. Ethnic sports appeared to enhance resilience. Occupational-related PA was associated with either positive or negative MH, depending on the type of occupation. A bio-psycho-socio-cultural-informed model is required to gain an encompassing and integrated understanding of immigrants' health. The first iteration of such a model is presented here, along with an illustration of how the model may be used to deepen analysis and understanding of the multi-domain PA-MH relationship among immigrants and inform public health planners and practitioners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using hitherto unavailable archival documents, this paper reveals the so-called ‘Soviet side’ of the Warsaw Uprising, 1944. These documents reveal that the Poles had repeatedly attempted to stage similar uprisings in other towns and cities when the Red Army was approaching. Polish rebels also actively resisted Soviet domination after the Red Army had liberated these cities. Moreover, Moscow knew well that Western Allied forces secretly participated in this ultimately anti-Soviet action. The British and the US governments trained the leaders of the Warsaw and other uprisings in military bases located in their own territories, although most of the training bases were located in the US. The British also parachuted these leaders into Warsaw shortly before the uprising. These and other facts presented in my work help us understand the perverted logic of the Kremlin's decision-making process with regard to the Warsaw Uprising, which functioned in more complex ways than is usually attributed to the power-thirsty Uncle Joe. These documents also reveal attitudes on the part of the Soviet and Western governments that eventually paved the way for the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper presents an analysis of invention performance, as measured by patenting activities, of six countries (France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, USSR, West Germany) relative to the United States for 41 SIC industries over the past 20 years. It turns out that non-U.S. countries as a group have increased their (relative) invention performance in all fields of technology, including high technology fields. In a second step hypotheses which can be supposed to explain the relative decline of the United States' patenting activities are discussed and tested. There is strong evidence that catching up processes contributed most to the relative decrease of the United States; there is only little evidence that government interventions regarding research and development activities have had counterproductive effects on invention performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the emergence of management education and training in the UK, France, Germany, USA, Japan, USSR, and China. It argues that given kinds of environmental changes may lead to a wide variety of training responses, depending on the industrial and cultural contexts in which they take place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article presents information on the Anglo-American nuclear collaboration during the early Cold War. It emphasizes on the arrangement made by the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the Royal Air Force (RAF) for the joint delivery of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union and its allies. It mentions that the British government provided forward bases in Great Britain so that the U.S. Air Force (USAF) bombers could undertake a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union.

Examines the way in which members of the U.S. and British diplomatic establishments monitored developments in the Soviet Union from 1921 to 1939. Nature of diplomatic expertise; Creation of Russian affairs experts; Problem of effectiveness.

This article focuses on the American and British attitudes toward Soviet Union. The problem is also a challenging one theoretically, because of the more basic character of some of the deeper attitudes or values that may be involved, such as the attitudes toward economic justice, economic stability, racial equality, religion, freedom of speech, independence of small nations, and solidarity of the United Nations. Any systematic approach to these underlying, value-systems should throw some light upon basic elements of attitude-determination in both national and International affairs. The United Nations was a fighting alliance, with the Soviet Union carrying the heaviest burden of the actual fighting. Most of the information about the Soviet Union in the American newspapers, films, and radio programs was favorable. Books like Mission to Moscow and One World were being widely read.

The article focuses on the desire to limit or disarm nuclear weapons of U.S., Great Britain and the Soviet Union to achieve universal peace. The author has cited that a large-scale nuclear war between major powers has been possible of both sides for nuclear destruction. The U.S. has justified that its nuclear weapons would balanced the threat from the Soviet Union. The author noted that the political divisions between communist and non-communist countries has made it impossible to attain peace. British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill has stated that his country has a modest role to achieve peace through promoting disarmament of nuclear weapons.

The Second World War Anglo–American alliance was less cohesive on the political side than the military. There were widening divergences between Britain and the United States with regard to the best way to handle co-operation with the Soviet Union during 1944. Some shared assumptions about the motivations of Soviet policy existed, but British and American policy-makers not only formulated different approaches, they consistently viewed their own to be more successful than those of their ally. There was an opportunity to co-ordinate polices during American Under-Secretary of State Edward Stettinius's mission to London in April 1944 but the fact that the issue was barely discussed is symptomatic of the situation. The British Foreign Office gained the backing of Winston Churchill in an attempt to forge ahead with pragmatic arrangements with the Russians. A satisfaction with their own efforts on both sides meant that the British and American bureaucracies made no serious and sustained attempt to co-ordinate their policies towards the Soviet Union through 1944, in contrast to the closeness of co-operation in other areas. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

During the Soviet war scare of the 1980s, British intelligence shared vital information from KGB officer Oleg Gordievsky with its American partners. The US intelligence community, however, was suspicious of the message and the messenger, dismissing Soviet ‘war talk’ as disinformation. Some officials even believed that the British had tweaked their reports to influence US policy. President Ronald Reagan, however, on the advice of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, listened to Gordievsky rather than his intelligence advisors. The war scare had a profound influence on Reagan's thinking about nuclear war, Kremlin fears, and Soviet–American relations that led him to seek a new détente with Moscow and the end of the Cold War through diplomacy rather than confrontation. Subsequent events and post-Cold War revelations vindicated Gordievsky. Reagan sought his advice on the eve of his first summit meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev and later expressed his gratitude during a private meeting in the Oval Office. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The study of the Cold War has undergone a significant transformation in recent years, with new critical perspectives, sources and debates. The nuclear history of the Cold War has begun to yield new insights on fundamental questions about the stability and dynamics of the confrontation. Recent evidence about the events of 1983 provides an opportunity to explore the risk of nuclear war and the role of misperception in Soviet–American relations during the ‘Second Cold War’. Central to this is the study of intelligence. This article examines episodes in the autumn of 1983, notably the Able Archer ‘crisis’ of November 1983. Attention focuses on aspects of Soviet, American and British intelligence. Political and diplomatic consequences are also considered. A principal aim is to emphasize that we are at an early stage in researching and understanding events, and that a number of assumptions about the crisis require further exploration. Broader lessons about the role of intelligence in the Cold War are nevertheless explored and provisional conclusions reached about the performances of intelligence agencies and communities. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The launch of the Western Union in 1948 and the creation of the NATO Information Service in 1950 were important steps in the coordination of the Western response to Soviet and Soviet-inspired propaganda campaigns. By examining how the British Information Research Department worked closely with the International Organizations Division of the CIA in shaping the foundation and early activities of these intergovernmental agencies, this article offers new insight into the role of national information agencies within international organizations and contributes to explaining why, in the early Cold War, the West struggled to produce a coherent and fully coordinated propaganda response to communism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today, no one questions that criminals, minors, or those seeking to shirk their civic duties may be restricted or even barred from leaving their respective countries. However, during the 1950s, several democratic countries, including Israel, restricted foreign travel by their citizens on other grounds. This article examines the right of departure policies of Israel in comparison with three models—Soviet, British, and American—which served Israeli policy makers as criteria in this regard. The policy promulgated by a country sheds light on its character, its society, and its perception of citizenship. The article not only describes the right to travel abroad as exercised in Israel, but also opens a window onto the conceptual world of those who set such policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study compares two World War II allied military operations, VELVET and POINTBLANK, and draws lessons from them for the ROK-U.S. Alliance. The key finding is that the lack of transparency and openness in Russia's political system contributed to the difficulty in achieving cooperation between Russia and its democratic allies. Stalin feared that military and political interaction between Russian personnel and their Western counterparts might result in political contamination, and thus threaten political stability. This case stands in contrast to the successful collaboration between Great Britain and the United States in establishing a large number of military bases across Great Britain in order to implement the POINTBLANK air-bombing operation. In that case, despite friction and mutual suspicion between the two allies, Great Britain and the United States achieved cooperation by maintaining communication and openness toward each other. From these two historical cases of joint military operations among allies, this study infers the sources of conflict and cooperation between Korea and the United States, discusses theoretical implications, and more importantly proposes policy recommendations for the enhancement of the ROK-U.S. Alliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the 1950s, many observers regarded the expansion of Soviet oil exports as a serious threat to Western political and economic interests. Finland was the first non-communist European country that started to buy Soviet oil on a large scale. This made the country vulnerable to Soviet political pressure. An examination of the Finnish case indicates that Anglo-American governments adopted a much more complex attitude towards the emergence of the Soviet Union as an exporter of oil than the Cold War rhetoric would suggest. The US and British governments were not automatically willing to support their oil companies or to try to block Soviet oil exports. Instead of seeing Soviet oil exports to Finland simply as a threat to Western interests, the Foreign Office and the State Department considered the precise implications that Finnish purchases of Soviet oil would have on Western strategic interests on a case-by-case basis. Many other government departments were more interested in promoting their own departmental interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the 1950 'Ambassador's Agreement' (named after US Ambassador Lewis Douglas) about establishing long-term US air bases in the UK. During the discussions British representatives expressed resentment of American pressure and were concerned about the expense that developing the bases for American purposes might entail. There were even fears that Washington might use the airfields to launch an atomic bomb attack on the USSR without regard to the views of the UK government. The British consented to providing the bases because they wanted to enmesh the US further in UK and Western European defence. For their part American negotiators had wanted to further US atomic strategy without delay. Although the agreement imposed no restriction on the use of the airfields, some US officials believed that in a crisis the UK government might try to prevent them being used for atomic bombing missions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article compares neorealist and liberal explanations of great power interactions in order to analyze conflicts in international relations. It examines three historical great power coalitions that have prevailed against oppressors. These cases include the relations between Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia after the Napoleonic wars, the relations between Britain, Japan, and the U.S. after the First World War and the relations between the Soviet Union, Britain and the U.S. after the Second World War.

The article discusses a content analysis on the kinds of foreign news story, particularly African and Third World news, were published in the newspapers in Nigeria. It reviews the content analysis of the coverage of the Nigerian newspapers regarding the invasion of Papua New Guinea, the 1973 Middle East war, and the Angolan crisis. It says that five newspapers including the "Daily Times," "New Nigeria," and "Nigerian Chronicle" were included in the study. It was found out that one-half of the foreign news in Nigeria was allotted for the African region, while 24% of the news were on other Third World countries and one-quarter was evenly distributed for developed countries such as Great Britain, the U.S., and Russia.

The article explores on the establishment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is inferred formed by its three nuclear weapon state (NWS) signatory members including the U.S., Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Great Britain which they became the depository states for the treaty. It comprised eleven short articles and a preamble and negotiated by the superpowers within the framework of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). However, its foundation has gained criticisms from various non-governmental organizations which pointed that its mission to halt the spread of the weapons, is also the technology that can lead to its production. Details at the treaty's review conferences in 1975 and 1980 are also discussed.

The author reflects on sovereign equality on three "super-power" countries including Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the U.S. He mentions that public emphasis on sovereign equality made the position of powerful countries less important. It is mentioned that hierarchy among states is one of the political responsibility of these countries.

The article discusses certain issues related to the nuclear weapon's comprehensive test ban treaty. Trilateral negotiations between the U.S., Russia and Great Britain had agreed upon much of the text of the treaty on August 1980. The three countries had agreed to voluntary on-site inspection and installation of a network of seismic monitoring stations within the three countries. The U.S. nuclear weapon laboratories resisted conclusion of the treaty due to the issue of nuclear weapon stockpile reliability.

The article presents the author's views on the new plans of the U.S. government to design and produce about 17, 000 new nuclear weapons over the next six years. President Ronald Reagan had authorized nuclear testing and withdrew the U.S. from further participation in tripartite test ban talks with Great Britain and the Soviet Union in 1982. Officials have cited suspected Soviet violations of the threshold treaty saying that seismic technology was inadequate to verify compliance.

The article discusses the development of atmospheric testing programs for the improvement of the weapons' capability. Some of the goals of the atmospheric testing programs of the U.S. and Great Britain include further tactical weapons development, improvement of the yield-to-weight ratio of nuclear warheads, and the checkout of complete operational weapons systems. A preliminary Atomic Energy Commission analysis of the recent Soviet nuclear test series indicates that the Soviet Union has made advances in certain areas. Meanwhile, other possible weapons improvements include a pure fusion weapon and the neutron bomb.

The article reports on the announcement of Soviet Union on the resumption of nuclear testing despite of the agreement held by her, the U.S. and Great Britain on the matter. With this, the U.S. later claimed that they will also resume underground nuclear tests while suggesting the Soviet Union to eliminate all atmospheric testing due to fallout. However, the Soviet has officially rejected such offer. The reason for Soviet's assumption of the test was due to obliging military reasons. In response, the U.S. has suspected that Soviet has conducted secret testing before making it public.

Presents and charts the nuclear weapons capability of the five nuclear powers' naval forces. The naval forces of the five nuclear powers possess about 14,600 nuclear weapons, nearly 30 percent of the world's total arsenal. About 750 ships and submarines can fire naval nuclear weapons, down 100 from last year. Significant developments in the last year include the launchings of the Soviet's sixth and last Typhoon and sixth Delta IV SSBN, and the first U.S. Ohio class submarine carrying Trident II missiles. Of the major warships and submarines of the British navy, some 32 percent are nuclear capable, as are 12 percent of the French navy and 2 percent of Chinese ships.