Search

Artykuł ten analizuje ewolucję polityki bezpieczeństwa UE, czyli sfery, która była uznawana przez dziesięciolecia integracji za kompetencję państw członkowskich. Stąd rozwadze poddano z jednej strony mechanizmy zapewniające udział w procesach decyzyjnych organów reprezentujących interesy ponadnarodowe (tj. Komisja Europejska, Europejska Agencja Obrony, Komitet Polityczny i Bezpieczeństwa), przy jednoczesnej gwarancji decyzyjnej dla rządów państw członkowskich (m.in. w ramach Rady). W pierwszej części dyskusja dotyczy roli Traktatu w procesie kształtowania Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony (WPBiO) oraz dylematów dotyczących np. poszukiwania konsensusu negocjacyjnego, jak również znaczenia poziomu inwestycji w sferze bezpieczeństwa dla możliwości realizacji założonych celów. Następnie omówione są teoretyczne podstawy integracji omawianej polityki, oraz związane z tym wyzwania interpretacyjne. Trzecia część to analiza sfery instytucjonalno-agencyjnej związanej z zarządzaniem WPBiO, jak również mechanizmów decyzyjnych oraz źródeł finansowania podjętych działań i projektów. Dodatkowo, ukazana jest rola PESCO, czyli stałej współpracy strukturalnej, jako nowej koncepcji praktycznego realizowania założeń traktatowych i celów strategicznych UE w sferze bezpieczeństwa i obrony. This article analyzes the evolution of the EU security policies. It is a sphere that has been recognized for decades of integration as the competence of the Member States. Hence, the analysis includes mehanisms ensuring participation in the decision-making processes of institutions representing supranational interests (ie. the European Commission, the European Defense Agency, the Political and Security Committee), with a simultaneous decision-making guarantee for the governments of the Member States (within the Council). In the first part, the discussion concerns the role of the Treaty in the process of shaping the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and dilemmas regarding, for example, the dyplomatic attempts for a negotiating consensus, as well as the importance of the level of investments in the field of security for the possibility of achieving the assumed goals. Then, the theoretical foundations of the policy integration are discussed, as well as the related interpretative challenges. The third part is an analysis of the institutional and agency sphere related to the management of CSDP, as well as decision-making mechanisms and sources of financing for the actions and projects. Additionally, the role of PESCO - permanent structured cooperation is shown as a new concept of practical implementation of the Treaty and strategic goals of the EU in the field of security and defence.

Russlands Überfall auf die Ukraine ist für Polen Zäsur und Bestätigung: Zäsur, weil gegen Polens wichtigsten östlichen Partner ein Angriffskrieg im großen Maßstab erfolgte; Bestätigung, weil sich Warschau in seiner pessimistischen Einschätzung hinsichtlich des russischen Aggressionspotentials bekräftigt sieht. Polens außen- und sicherheitspolitische Großziele haben sich durch den Krieg keineswegs verändert, aber sie stehen in einem neuen, dramatisch veränderten Kontext. Nach wie vor geht es darum, die Sicherheit Polens im transatlantischen Geflecht zu gewährleisten und die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung des Landes im Gefüge der europäischen Integration voranzubringen. Weiterhin, wenn auch mit immenser Dringlichkeit, geht es darum, Russlands Ausgreifen zurückzudrängen sowie die Ukraine und andere östliche Nachbarn zu schützen. Und immer noch geht es darum, Polens Gewicht in der Europäischen Union und der NATO auszubauen, um beide Organisationen im Sinne Warschaus zu festigen und fortzuentwickeln. Ob dies gelingt, hängt davon ab, wie Polen sich in das Nordatlantische Bündnis, in die Ostpolitik des Westens und in die Europäische Union einfügt. Die seit 2015 in Polen regierende Partei Recht und Gerechtigkeit (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość - PiS) treibt in diesem Zusammenhang traditionelle Elemente polnischer Außenpolitik weiter, hat aber, gerade in der Europapolitik mit ihrem offensiven Kurs zur Wahrung nationaler Interessen, auch Neuausrichtungen vorgenommen.

This article aimes to shed light on the rich, but rather enigmatic relationship between Finland and the Mediterranean world. These interactions have been approached since Antiquity, but this paper’s focus has been on 19th and 20th centuries and especially on the last three decades. About thirty years ago, when Finland was preparing itself to join the European Union, it also had to build up a real Mediterranean policy of its own. It was in the Corfu European Council in June 1994 when the then-president realised that the country needed such a policy. Thus, in 1995, when Finland joined the EU, it also participated in the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Conference and signed the Barcelona Declaration that established the Barcelona Process forming the structures for European Union cooperation with the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries. The participation into this structural process was felt important for Finland mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the country wanted to be a full and active member of the EU and thus contribute to every fi eld of activity that are important for the union. Secondly, we Finns realised that if we wanted the southern European countries to understand and to cooperate with our own ambitions in the northern part of Europe, we needed to show solidarity towards the aims and needs of our southern partners in the Mediterranean. All this resulted in Finland being surprisingly active in all Euro-Mediterranean cooperation environments. This concerned not only offi cial state activities, but also other public sectors as well as civil society actors and NGOs. These EuroMediterranean activities became so many and so multiform that we can deal only with a few of them here as examples.

Access to resources by users may need to be granted only upon certain conditions and contexts, perhaps particularly in cyber-physical settings. Unfortunately, creating and modifying context-sensitive access control solutions in dynamic environments creates ongoing challenges to manage the authorization contexts. This paper proposes RASA, a context-sensitive access authorization approach and mechanism leveraging unsupervised machine learning to automatically infer risk-based authorization decision boundaries. We explore RASA in a healthcare usage environment, wherein cyber and physical conditions create context-specific risks for protecting private health information. The risk levels are associated with access control decisions recommended by a security policy. A coupling method is introduced to track coexistence of the objects within context using frequency and duration of coexistence, and these are clustered to reveal sets of actions with common risk levels; these are used to create authorization decision boundaries. In addition, we propose a method for assessing the risk level and labelling the clusters with respect to their corresponding risk levels. We evaluate the promise of RASA-generated policies against a heuristic rule-based policy. By employing three different coupling features (frequency-based, duration-based, and combined features), the decisions of the unsupervised method and that of the policy are more than 99% consistent., ACM Digital Threats: Research and Practice, 2021 30 pages, 14 Figures, 14 Tables

Wireless networks are considered the best utilized network and in particular Mobile Ad-hoc NETworks (MANETs) have found many applications for its data transmission in real time applications. The accompanying challenges restrict the current protocols for the routing being specifically used in MANETs. The design issues in this network are to restrict the usage of energy while transmitting information and provide security to the nodes. In the existing routing protocols, route comes from a source where the source node seeks a way to the target node, by transmitting messages to its adjacent nodes, and the nodes use energy to do this. Mobile Ad-hoc network faces challenges in improving the energy efficiency and providing security for the routing protocol. This research work proposes the Enhanced Energy Efficient-Secure Routing (EEE-SR) protocol as a novel security algorithm to access secure data in hostile environment. In the proposed work, to secure data transmission in the network, the nodes associates with security policy. Under this policy, both the nodes have a common enforcing policy, and then they communicate with each other. The selection of the nodes for the transmission has to prove its authentication and then selection of the routing path built on the available energy threshold at the nodes in the set-up for forwarding packets in the network. The routing protocol implements the best shortest path in network and also checks for the nodes trustworthiness by evaluating the trust policies enforcement on it. The protocol enables a node to autonomously decide whether to select the neighboring node or based on the available energy threshold and security policy enforced. The algorithm evaluates increase network lifetime and low in the energy consumption, packet loss and end-to-end delay.

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022, Türkiye’s role in NATO has once again become a topic of intellectual discussion, with many observers arguing that a revival of Russian power would lead to Türkiye’s return to the alliance as a good-standing member, while others questioned the likelihood of such a scenario due to the country’s political transformation. This is not the first time Türkiye’s role within the alliance has become a subject of debate. Türkiye is often described as a valuable and dedicated partner of NATO. Yet, since the beginning of its membership, the country’s role in the alliance has been questioned more than that of any other member state. This article seeks to analyse NATO’s relations with Türkiye and the country’s role within the alliance from a historical perspective. It aims to understand the debates on Türkiye’s role within NATO by focusing on the moments of transformation in relations. The main assumption of this article is that, from the beginning of Türkiye’s membership process, TurkishAmerican relations have been the main determinant of Türkiye-NATO relations. Türkiye’s role, defence, and identity have always been questioned by European members. But these debates on Türkiye had, until as recently as the 2010s, been directed and/or suppressed by the US in accordance with its own interests. The US had been the main supporter of Türkiye in the alliance against the opposition and criticism of Europeans in exchange for Türkiye’s commitment to US policies. While differences on interests and values between the US and Türkiye became more visible after 2010, Türkiye failed to secure the support of the alliance’s European members to fill the gap left by the waning US support. Indeed, the differences between them grew from security-based issues, to wider, more major identity issues.

Software-Defined Networking (SDN) provides a programmable framework for multi-tenant cloud network management and orchestration. The end-to-end packet processing induced by virtual network functions (VNFs) like stateless firewall, load balancer, intrusion detection, and prevention system (IDPS) in a network involves the processing of network traffic through security policies matching the traffic pattern defined in security rules of individual VNF. The conflicting rules in terms of traffic match and conflicting actions can lead to a) violation of security requirements (authentication and authorization bypass) b) mission requirements - the presence of redundant rules (increased latency, reduced throughput). We present a new object-oriented policy conflict detection and resolution framework (OOPC), which analyzes the rule dependency relationships between the rules of heterogeneous virtual network functions (VNFs) and creates a VNF-Graph. The rules are analyzed using object-oriented dependencies between the address space and actions of VNF rules. OOPC utilizes a compact VNF-Graph, which leads to a reduction in search complexity when analyzing new security policies. Our security policy composition in our framework OOPC achieves 37% lower latency in policy graph composition than previous work. The proposed solution performs 20% faster security policy conflict detection on a cloud network with 60k OpenFlow rules than prior frameworks that serve a similar purpose.

The significant enhancement in demand for bring your own device (BYOD) mechanism in several organizations has sought the attention of several researchers in recent years. However, the utilization of BYOD comes with a high risk of losing crucial information due to lesser organizational control on employee-owned devices. The purpose of this article is to review and analyze the various security threats in BYOD; further we review the existing work that was developed in order to reduce the risks present in BYOD. A detailed review is presented to detect BYOD security threats and their respective security policies. A phase-by-phase mitigation strategy is developed based on the components and crucial elements identified using review policy. Managerial-level, social-level and technical level issues are identified such as illegal access, leaking delicate company data, lower flexibility, corporate data breaching, and employee privacy. It is analyzed that collaboration of people, security policy factors and technology in an effective manner can mitigate security threats present in the BYOD mechanism. This article initiates a move towards filling the security gap present the BYOD mechanism. This article can be utilized for providing guidelines in various organizations. Ultimately, successful implementation of BYOD depends upon the balance created between usability and security.

The worst contemporary refugee crisis that occurred during the summer of 2015 challenged the basic values of the European Union. There had never been a time when the need for a consistent approach, both from the individual Member States and the EU as a whole, was more urgent. The Union’s response during 2015’s refugee crisis was unreliable, fragmented, and it largely affected the Western Balkan countries that are now aspiring to become EU Member States. This paper analyses how the EU’s response to the refugee crisis has affected and still affects the countries in the Western Balkans, which are all in different stages of their European integration. The refugee crisis created many challenges for the Western Balkan countries which are all weak democracies and which have unstable institutions. This paper also analyses the numerous domestic costs connected to these countries when faced with the refugee crisis. Finally, the paper argues that, although largely harmonised with the EU acquis, the legislative and institutional frameworks for migration management in Western Balkan countries need further adjustment.

Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) is a vision which offers safe, secure and smart travel experience to drivers. This futuristic plan aims to enable vehicles, roadside transportation infrastructures, pedestrian smart-phones and other devices to communicate with one another to provide safety and convenience services. Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) communication in ITS offers ability to exchange speed, heading angle, position and other environment related conditions amongst vehicles and with surrounding smart infrastructures. In this intelligent setup, vehicles and users communicate and exchange data with random untrusted entities (like vehicles, smart traffic lights or pedestrians) whom they don't know or have met before. The concerns of location privacy and secure communication further deter the adoption of this smarter and safe transportation. In this paper, we present a secure and trusted V2V and V2I communication approach using edge infrastructures where instead of direct peer to peer communication, we introduce trusted cloudlets to authorize, check and verify the authenticity, integrity and ensure anonymity of messages exchanged in the system. Moving vehicles or road side infrastructure are dynamically connected to nearby cloudlets, where security policies can be implemented to sanitize or stop fake messages and prevent rogue vehicles to exchange messages with other vehicles. We also present a formal attribute-based model for V2V and V2I communication, called AB-ITS, along with proof of concept implementation of the proposed solution in AWS IoT platform. This cloudlet supported architecture complements direct V2V or V2I communication, and serves important use cases such as accident or ice-threat warning and other safety applications. Performance metrics of our proposed architecture are also discussed and compared with existing ITS technologies.

The aim of this article is to discuss how a weakening transatlantic relationship influences European defence cooperation and integration. It also asks how these observed patterns of weakening EU–US relations can be explained and what the consequences might be for the EU’s efforts to build a stronger and more coherent security and defence policy. Building upon a “comprehensive neo-functionalist” approach first coined by the Norwegian scholar Martin Sæter, European security and defence policy should be seen as part of an externalisation of EU integration as a response to weakening transatlantic relations. The debate on European “strategic autonomy,” the Strategic Compass, and the European “defence package” should therefore be considered as part of such an externalisation process of actively influencing and reshaping the transatlantic relationship. When analysing European security and defence, the article also shows that it is misleading to regard European integration as something to be subordinated to NATO. Nevertheless, a European security deficit does exist due to differing perspectives among member states on how the EU process should relate to NATO. The article, therefore, concludes that strategic autonomy can only be developed with close EU–NATO cooperation. Furthermore, a more multipolar world order where the EU no longer can rely upon a transatlantic security community to the same extent as before challenges the EU’s role as a defender of multilateralism and poses new challenges to the EU’s common foreign and security policy.

With the popularization of Internet of Things (IoT) devices in smart home and industry fields, a huge number of IoT devices are connected to the Internet. However, what devices are connected to a network may not be known by the Internet Service Provider (ISP), since many IoT devices are placed within small networks (e.g., home networks) and are hidden behind network address translation (NAT). Without pinpointing IoT devices in a network, it is unlikely for the ISP to appropriately configure security policies and effectively manage the network. Additionally, inferring fine-grained user interactions of IoT devices is also an interesting yet unresolved problem. In this paper, we design an efficient and scalable system via spatial-temporal traffic fingerprinting from an ISP's perspective in consideration of practical issues like learning-testing asymmetry. Our system can accurately identify typical IoT devices in a network, with the additional capability of identifying what devices are hidden behind NAT and the number of each type of device that share the same IP address. Our system can also detect user interactions and meanwhile identify their (concurrent) number through a multi-output regression model. Through extensive evaluation, we demonstrate that the system can generally identify IoT devices with an F1-Score above 0.999, and estimate the number of the same type of IoT device behind NAT with an average error below 5%. By studying 29 user interactions of 7 devices, we show that our system is promising in detecting user interactions.

Problem setting. Ukraine’s implementation of the strategy of integration into the European Union necessitates taking into account the experience of countries that have already transformed security institutions in accordance with the European democratic tradition, as well as their adaptation to the nature of threats to EU member states. Ukraine’s security is based on strengthening the Nommon European security in all its dimensions. In the conditions of Russian armed aggression and “hybrid war”, Ukraine faces the task of creating a modern and effective system of state defense and integrating into international systems. Solving this problem, the successful implementation of defense reform require examining foreign experience in the organization of the EU defense system, peculiarities of development of the security and defense sector in the context of expanding democracy. Ukraine is not a member of NATO and, under the current conditions of counteracting Russia’s armed aggression is forced to develop national defense forces which are necessary to restore territorial integrity.Recent research and publications analysis. Due to Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, the study of experience of the leading EU and NATO member states in the field of defense has recently received more and more attention. Thus, a significant contribution into the study of the evolution of European security and defense policy was made by such foreign scholars as R. Gardner, K. Gill, M. Craig, S. Morsch, D. Navarette, M. Smith, B. Tonra, and others. The analysis of the processes of creation and formation of the common foreign security policy of the EU were covered in the works of such domestic scientists as S. Voloshchuk, O. Vonsovych, M. Hladysh, V. Govorukha, Y. Gonchar, A. Grubinko, V. Rud, O. Snigir, V. Streltsov, O. Turchenko, L. Falaleyev, N. Fesenko, V. Shatun, A. Sheludchenkova and others. O. Bodruk, M. Yezheev, V. Gorbulin, O. Litvinenko, V. Gorovenko, M. Lobko, O. Izhak, A. Lobanov, V. Grubov, F. Saganyuk, I. Romanov, V. Trotsko, I. Veshchytsky, M. Sungurovsky and other authors dedicated their works to the development of the defense sectors in the conditions of expansion and deepening of democracy.Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. The variability of the political situation, new challenges and threats lead to a constant search for new approaches to addressing security issues. This is what actualizes the problematics of the article.Paper main body. The purpose and the task of the article is to study the system of public management of the EU defense sphere and identify opportunities and areas of cooperation between Ukraine and EU defense structures at the supranational level.The activity of security structures is analyzed, their organizational and legal status and the scope of tasks to ensure the defense capabilities of the union are determined, their powers in relation to national security and defense systems are characterized. The main directions of ensuring the institutional stability of defense structures in the context of changing the position of the United States as the basis of NATO’s military power are described and the possibilities of creating a European Defense Alliance are described. It is proved that the EU needs to radically reconsider its approaches to security, first of all, in the field of cooperation of the armed forces of the member states while conducting joint operations and their resource provision. It is established that for Ukraine the development of autonomous supranational European defense structures opens the possibility for further deepening of cooperation with the EU and parallel strengthening its defense capabilities.Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. For Ukraine, the development of autonomous supranational European defense structures opens a possibility for further deepening of cooperation with the EU and parallel strengthening of defense capabilities. Such cooperation is a mutually beneficial process, during which Ukraine contributes to the security of the Euro-Atlantic region, and on the other hand, gains the necessary experience in the process of training and exercises.The partnership approach to the further development of Ukraine’s cooperation with the EU in the field of foreign policy and security demonstrates three directions:– cooperation between Ukraine and the EU in the international and regional dimensions for the sake of common security;– EU assistance in strengthening the stability and security of Ukraine;– Ukraine’s contribution to the security of Europe.It is obvious that in the future the international and regional dimensions of cooperation between Ukraine and the EU will be based on the full support of Ukraine by the European Union in matters relating to sovereignty, territorial integrity, protection of national interests, state and human security. In return, Ukraine must support EU policy, adhere to European values and become their proponent in the regional dimension. Ukraine’s main contribution to Europe’s security is to strengthen its own defense capabilities and deter Russian aggression on its eastern borders.EU-Ukraine cooperation can be developed both on a large scale and through individual initiatives. The EU Global Strategy provides an opportunity to develop proactive cooperation, for example between the Visegrad Group and Ukraine, or the countries of the Black Sea region in a wide range of issues related to security, crime prevention, terrorism, exchange of information on security issues.

The coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) pandemic remains a global security threat, as the result of the emerging and exacerbated security challenges that have impacted on the national security policies of various regional economic communities (RECs). This study analyses SADC and ECOWAS’ responses to the Covid-19 pandemic under their respective existing peace and security structures and explores if both RECs, SADC and ECOWAS have been efficient. This article discusses the Southern African and West African security setting, how its security architecture emerged and whether it has been successful in overcoming the security ramification in the region under the Covid-19 pandemic. Coincidentally, both SADC and ECOWAS have been confronted with existing and emerging human security threats, such as increased poverty, inequality, and the spread of diseases, such as Covid-19. The Covid-19 pandemic, a non-traditional security threat, has exposed how RECs, such as SADC and ECOWAS, respond to non-traditional and emerging security threats, suggesting for the transcendence of their security architecture that caters equally for non-military and emerging human security threats, alike military threats. This article explores the regional security experiences, challenges, and responses of both the SADC and ECOWAS under the Covid-19 pandemic.

Account recovery (usually through a password reset) on many websites has mainly relied on accessibility to a registered email, due to its favorable deployability and usability. However, it makes a user's online accounts vulnerable to a single point of failure when the registered email account is compromised. While previous research focuses on strengthening user passwords, the security risk imposed by email-based password recovery has not yet been well studied. In this paper, we first conduct a measurement study to characterize the password recovery activities in the wild. Specifically, we examine the authentication and password recovery protocols from 239 traffic-heavy websites, confirming that most of them use emails for password recovery. We further scrutinize the security policy of leading email service providers and show that a significant portion of them takes no or marginal effort to protect user email accounts, leaving compromised email accounts readily available for mounting password recovery attacks. Then, we conduct case studies to assess potential losses caused by such attacks. Finally, we propose and implement a lightweight email security enhancement called Secure Email Account Recovery (SEAR) to defend against password recovery attacks by adding an extra layer of protection to password recovery emails.

This article critically analyzed the Turkish and Libyan refugee deals. We argued that these deals proved to be unsustainable policy frameworks by focusing on their practical outcomes regarding humanitarian objectives. We utilized the "Fortress Europe" concept to demonstrate how the European Union's security concerns shaped the framework of these deals. Our study elaborated on two main arguments: First, these deals have undermined both Turkey and Libya's migration management capacities. Second, these deals failed to provide adequate mechanisms supervising the enforcement of humanitarian objectives. We focus on two dynamics leading to the failure of these deals. First, the EU’s prioritization of security concerns has resulted in overlooking the irregular migration’s humanitarian and societal costs to the third countries. Second, the EU's securitarian strategy contributed to further politicization and securitization of cooperation on migration. In conclusion, we argue that the EU should revise its securitarian strategy on irregular migration to include a more effective multi-lateral and multi-dimensional framework that focuses more on humanitarian issues while ensuring that the responsibilities will be fairly shared between the EU and third countries based on their capacities.

The inclusion of security aspects in organizations is a crucial aspect to ensure compliance with both internal and external regulations. Business process models are a well-known mechanism to describe and automate the activities of the organizations, which should include security policies to ensure the correct performance of the daily activities. Frequently, these security policies involve complex data which cannot be represented using the standard Business Process Model Notation (BPMN). In this paper, we propose the enrichment of the BPMN with a UML class diagram to describe the data model, that is also combined with security policies defined using the UCONABC framework annotated within the business process model. The integration of the business process model, the data model, and the security policies provides a context where more complex reasoning can be applied about the satisfiability of the security policies in accordance with the business process and data models. To do so, wetransform the original models, including security policies, into the BAUML framework (an artifact-centric approach to business process modelling). Once this is done, it is possible to ensure that there are no inherent errors in the model (verification) and that it fulfils the business requirements (validation), thus ensuring that the business process and the security policies are compatible and that they are aligned with the business security requirements. This work has been supported by Project PID2020-112540RB-C44 funded by MCIN/AEI/ 10.13039/501100011033, Project TIN2017-87610-R funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and FEDER “Una manera de hacer Europa”, Project 2017-SGR-1749 by the Generalitat de Catalunya, Projects COPERNICA (P20 01224) and METAMORFOSIS by the Junta de Andalucía.

With the immense increase of population density, many challenges facing organizations and governments. Thus, it has become mandatory to turn up our cities to be intelligent by introducing IoT and smart grids to build smart buildings, smart communication technologies, smart healthcare systems, smart transportation, etc. Smart cities guarantee the healthy living of indoor inhabitants by sensing, processing and controlling all possible indoor–outdoor measures. In this paper, we develop a framework that systematically builds a reliable and secure Smart City Model (SCM) to be integrated then exploited by the building information model (BIM). SCM encloses both physical and digital models which highlight smart buildings in particular. First, the proposed solution identifies and models SCM components including their appropriate architectures that are responsible for communication, extension, information flow, and protection. To ensure SCM functional and security requirements, we develop a sound hybrid approach that relies on formal methods and network analysis. Uppaal model checker is used to verify the satisfiability of the smart city requirements whereas Cooja is deployed to simulate the connectivity and the communication coverage of the developed SCM. The obtained results, in Uppaal, showed that the different implemented scenarios are satisfying the functional correctness and security policies. Moreover, the simulation through Cooja showed that how different obstacles and positions of nodes affect the communication coverage and the energy consumption regarding the deployed nodes. Experimentally, the effectiveness of the developed framework has been shown through practical scenarios that are difficult to model and analyze.

Der "Blaue Pazifik" ist eine riesige Region im Südpazifik, die sich über 30 Millionen Quadratkilometer erstreckt und 14 Nationen umfasst. Insgesamt drei Millionen Einwohner leben auf Tausenden von Inseln, die akut vom Klimawandel bedroht sind - eine Herausforderung, die durch die geopolitische Konkurrenz der Großmächte noch erschwert wird. Die Europäische Union kann dieser Region durch den ­Aufbau von Kapazitäten zur Klimaanpassung, zur Verbesserung der ­maritimen Sicherheit und zur engeren regionalen Zusammenarbeit helfen. Dies deckt sich mit europäischen strategischen Interessen, zu denen auch gehört, sich als vertrauenswürdige auswärtige Macht zu etablieren.

Der historische Anspruch der Zeitenwende und die sich daraus ableitenden militärischen Anforderungen an die Bundeswehr drohen an Geldmangel zu scheitern. Deutschlands bereits ausgehöhlten Streitkräften steht der Rückfall in die alte Lückenplanung bevor. Damit der Schritt zu mehr Nachhaltigkeit bei der militärischen Sicherheit und anderen existenziellen Staatsaufgaben gelingt, sollte Deutschlands Sicherheitslücke in einer auf zehn Jahre angelegten systematischen Anstrengung geschlossen werden - einer Sicherheitsdekade. The historic aspiration of Germany's Zeitenwende - the new era in its foreign and security policy - will fail without the proposed funding. The growing tension between its demands for the Bundeswehr and missing resources is already driving Germany back to the old and shortsighted approach of cutting and stretching budgets and fragile procurement plans. The country needs a security decade: a ten-year systematic spending effort that closes its substantial security gap. Without sustainable funding for military security and other existential government tasks, Germany will continue to pose a risk to itself and others.

Mit der European Sky Shield Initiative hat Deutschland seinen Führungsanspruch bei der europäischen Luftverteidigung angemeldet. Verteidigung gemeinsam zu denken ist begrüßenswert, aber schwierig umzusetzen. Wichtige europäische Partner, allen voran Frankreich und Italien, sind derzeit nicht gewillt, Deutschland zu folgen. Die fehlende politische Einigkeit zeigt, dass der deutsche Vorstoß die europäischen Sicher­heitsinteressen nicht genug berücksichtigt, Partner nicht überzeugt und viele Fragen zur strategischen, militärischen, industriellen und ökonomischen Ebene offen lässt. Soll die ESSI Europas Schutz im Bereich Luftverteidigung spürbar ver­bes­sern, muss Berlin Antworten zum strategischen Gleichgewicht, zur Entwicklung der europäischen Rüstungsindustrie und zu militärisch sinnvollen Lösungen geben. Der Aufwuchs ein­zelner militärischer Fähigkeiten wird keinen europäischen Sky Shield ermöglichen. (Autorenreferat)

There are no security "guarantees," but NATO membership is as close as it gets - and has long proven its effectiveness in deterring ­Russian aggression. It is thus the only real option for Ukraine - and for wider European security. Addressing the lack of political will to recognize this, especially in Washington and Berlin, means finding an interim solution that provides credible, collective security in the meantime and fosters more durable, fairly delivered European ­security in the long term.

Starptautiskās attiecības un diplomātija Socioloģija, politoloģija un antropoloģija International Relations and Diplomacy Sociology, Politics and Anthropology Šī darba nosaukums ir “Ungārijas vadošā speka varas leģitimizešana attiecībās ar Ukrainu drošības jomā pec 2014.gada” un darbs balstās uz Ungārijas valsts vadošā speka leģitimizešanas procesa ietekmi uz valsts iekšpolitikas un ārpolitikas veidošanu Ukrainas un Ungārijas drošības attiecību kontekstā. Darba aktualitāti nosaka šī brīža kara darbība Ukrainā un Ungārijas pretrunīgā nostāja publiskā telpā. Darba merķis - noskaidrot Ungārijas vadošā speka varas leģitimizešanas ietekmi attiecībās ar Ukrainu drošības jomā pec 2014. gada. Darba ietvaros tika izvirzīta hipoteze - Ungārijas vadošā speka varas leģitimizešana nosaka atturīgas attiecības ar Ukrainu drošības jomā. Darbu veido četras nodaļas, pirmajā tiek aprakstīts varas leģitimizešanas koncepts neoklasiskā reālisma teorijā. Otrā nodaļa veltīta Ungārijas ārpolitikas merķiem un drošības politikai. Trešajā nodaļā tiek analizeti Ungārijas un Ukrainas attiecību aspekti kopš 2014. gada, kad Krievija sāka iebrukumu Ukrainā. Ceturtajā, nosledzošajā nodaļā tiek petīta Ungārijas vadošā speka varas leģitimizešanas ietekme. Darba ietvaros hipoteze - Ungārijas vadošā speka varas leģitimizešana nosaka atturīgas attiecības ar Ukrainu drošības jomā – apstiprinās, balstoties uz izpetīto Ungārijas vadošā speka varas leģitimizešanu tika secināts, ka sabiedrības intereses ir vadošais aspekts Ungārijas vadošā speka varas leģitimizešanas procesā, ko ņem verā valsts amatpersonas, līdz ar ko atturīgas attiecības ar Ukrainu raksturo Ungārijas palīdzības sniegšana Krievijas - Ukrainas kara un minoritāšu jautājums. This work is entitled “Legitimization of Hungary's leading power in the security field in relation with Ukraine after 2014”, and the work is based on the influence of the process of legitimizing the leading power of the Hungarian state on the formation of the country's domestic policy and foreign policy in the context of security relations between Ukraine and Hungary. The actuality of the work is determined by the current war in Ukraine and Hungary's contradictory position in the public space. Purpose of this work - to find out the impact of legitimization of Hungary's leading power in relation with Ukraine in the security field after 2014. As part of the work, a hypothesis was put forward - Hungary’s leading power legitimization determines restrained relations with Ukraine in the security field. The work consists of four chapters, the first describes the concept of legitimizing power in the theory of neoclassical realism. The second chapter describes foreign policy goals and security policy of Hungary. The third chapter analyzes aspects of Hungarian-Ukrainian relations since 2014 when Russia began its invasion of Ukraine. The fourth and concluding chapter examines the influence of Hungary's leading power legitimizing. In the framework of the work, the hypothesis - Hungary’s leading power legitimization determines restrained relations with Ukraine in the security field - was confirmed, based on the researched legitimization of the leading power of Hungary, it was concluded that the publics interests are the leading aspect in the process of legitimizing leading power of Hungary, which is taken into account by state officials, which means that restrained relations with Ukraine are characterized by Hungary's assistance in the Russia- Ukraine war and the issue of minorities.

In contrast to the United States' unilateral China policy under President Donald Trump, the Joe Biden administration has renewed its ties with European and Asian allies. In its struggle with China for supremacy, the US strives to build a "united front" based on similar values. Although European countries share many values with the US, the China policies of the European Union and some of its member states substantially differ, not least due to diverging threat perceptions and economic interests. Against all expectations, the Biden administration continued Trump's policy of containing China's development through tariffs, exports controls, investment blockades, and visa restrictions. With the US CHIPS and Science Act and new export controls, the US government seeks to slow down China's further technological rise. Security issues have become more important in both the US and EU approach. European countries are, however, still reluctant to apply the same threat assessment for China as for Russia and to disengage from China. Europe's dependency on China as a key market and production base is still high, and most EU member states are not yet prepared for an economic decoupling. Although governments and research institutes in Europe have become more aware of the risks of science and technology cooperation with China, to discontinue it is not seen as an option. Despite the US and EU attempting to coordinate their China policies, the new US export controls on semiconductors were criticised by many European companies as unilateral decisions. The US and EU struggle to align their diverging interests on important topics such as the use of subsidies to support their economies. Therefore, the chances of them developing a unified China policy remain limited. The relationship between the US and China has turned into a new Cold War in which the coexistence of different economic and political systems does not seem possible. For European countries, decoupling from China would undermine economic stability. Instead, the EU should further cooperate with China following an interest-led policy based on the principles of openness and rules-based multilateralism.

The 'Blue Pacific' is a vast region in the South Pacific, encompassing 30 million square kilometers, three million inhabitants and 14 nations. Its consists of thousands of islands threatened by climate change - a concern aggravated by geopolitical competition. The EU can help mitigate these challenges through capacity-building for climate adaptation and maritime security and regional consolidation. This overlaps with European strategic interests, including establishing itself as a trusted outside power.

Eine Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie muss klare Prioritäten setzen, die Bedrohungslage analysieren und sich auf strategische ­Partner konzentrieren. In einer Online-Umfrage haben wir über 2800 Mitglieder der DGAP befragt, um Einblicke in das Denken eines Teils der deutschen außenpolitischen Community zu erhalten. Die fast 500 Antworten zeigen signifikante Unterschiede zwischen den Generationen.

Ein französischer Nuklearschirm für Europa als Ersatz für die US-Nukleargarantie stände vor großen politischen und militärisch-technischen Herausforderungen. Dennoch wäre es aufgrund der wachsenden Unsicherheit in Europa und Asien sinn­voll, wenn die Bundesregierung sich mit Szenarien und Optionen aus­einandersetzte, die über die heutige Abschreckungsarchitektur hinausgehen. Denkbar wäre vor allem, dass Frankreich eine sichtbarere ergänzende Rolle zur erweiterten nuklearen Abschreckung der USA übernähme. Dies könnte unterschiedliche Formen annehmen, von gestärkten Konsultationen bis hin zu gemeinsamen Nuklearübungen. Auch wenn solche Schritte zurzeit unwahrscheinlich sind, schei­nen sich die Interessen der USA und der Europäer in einer Weise anzunähern, die eine besser abgestimmte west­liche Abschreckungspolitik ermöglichen könnte. (Autorenreferat)

On June 22, 2030, somewhere in Europe, you wake up later than usual. You reach for your smartphone, but it did not recharge. You want to check your emails and the news, but there is no internet. You go out and find public transport disrupted and ATMs out of order. Reminiscent of the Covid lockdown of 2020, there are no planes in the sky. While the citizens of Europe are unaware of what is happening, its leaders have been informed that European space infrastructures have been disrupted. It is not yet clear whether that is due to a solar storm, advanced jamming of satellites or ground networks, anti-satellite technologies that have destroyed space assets, or a chain reaction caused by space debris like in the movie Gravity.

Aufgrund seiner strategischen Weite und der Möglichkeiten zu verdecktem Agieren ist der maritime Raum zum wichtigsten Schauplatz globaler Großmachtrivalität gewor­den. Im Schatten dieser Auseinandersetzung und des russischen Angriffskrieges in der Ukraine ist die Ostsee in den Fokus geopolitischer Interessen und Konflikte gera­ten. Ausdruck dessen sind vermehrt auftretende hybride Aktivitäten, von Sabo­tageakten bis hin zum Einsatz unbekannter Drohnen. Vor allem den westlichen Staaten des Ostseeraums führt all dies ihre Abhängigkeit von fossilen Ressourcen, kritischer maritimer Infrastruktur und sicheren Handelswegen vor Augen. Als Antwort auf den Krieg in der Ukraine und russische Marineaktivitäten in der Ostsee haben Anrainerstaaten ihre Militärs in erhöhte Bereitschaft versetzt. Inmitten dieser krisenhaften Lage verharren Nato-Verbündete und zukünftige Alliierte in einem überflüssigen Streit über Kräftedispositive, neue Strukturen und Führungsrollen. Von der deutschen "Zeitenwende" ist daher im Ostseeraum kaum etwas zu spüren. (Autorenreferat)

Major Western leaders have been calling for "de-risking" from China, rather than "decoupling." But what exactly de-risking means and how it differs from decoupling, remains unclear. It is ultimately firms, not governments, driving trade and investment relations. But firms cannot account for unidentified risks by themselves. National security risks are for governments to define. Complex supply chain externalities might entail risks to production that are also difficult for firms to account for. Furthermore, firms may bet that governments will rescue them if a worst-case scenario happens, effectively socializing risks. In the EU, Germany is particularly exposed to China risk in terms of security, macroeconomic, and political exposure.

In the second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, Azer­baijan achieved a decisive victory over Armenia. Quite sur­prisingly, Israel was a key player in this conflict, providing Azerbaijan with exten­sive support in the form of technology and arms. This support is part of a bigger research puzzle: How can Israel’s involve­ment in this conflict be explained? This report offers an explanation by showing how both geo­political factors and identity struggle are inter­twined. Using the lens of critical geo­political analysis, the report argues that not only realist factors, but also social con­structions of security as well as natio­nal and cul­tural iden­tity play into Israel’s inte­rest in the region.

Cross-border investment and trade give rise to both economic gains and economic vulnerabilities. As geopolitical competition is intensifying, governments increasingly resort to restricting cross-border investment and trade. Policies are informed by a desire to limit security risks and secure technological advantages rather than pursue efficiency gains.

In recent weeks, Japan's government under Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has im­plemented significant adjustments to the country's security policy. In December 2022, Tokyo published a new National Security Strategy along with two other defence-related strategic documents. In doing so, the government decided, among other things, to significantly increase Japan's defence budget to 2 per cent of its gross domestic product by fiscal year 2027. During bilateral alliance meetings in mid-January 2023, Japan and the United States addressed the implications of the new strategic documents and discussed possibilities for closer cooperation. By making far-reaching decisions such as on the acquisition of so-called counter-strike capabilities, Tokyo is seeking to respond to a rapidly deteriorating security environment. Even though some of the announced steps are indeed historic for Japan, they have been the topic of discussion for a while now and can therefore be seen as part of the evolution of Japanese security policy that has been occurring for years. (author's abstract)

The stagnating EU accession process needs political will and procedural changes allowing eastern candidates to advance. In the meantime, they should be more supported to use the full potential of existing opportunities for gradual economic and sectoral integration with the EU. An upgraded Eastern Partnership needs a comprehensive security dimension linking resilience, connectivity, and defense policy, as well as cooperation in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The protracted regional conflicts (in Moldova and the South Caucasus) require a more active EU engagement as existing OSCE formats continue to be blocked, and Russia's role and military presence weaken. New openings for conflict resolution mean higher demand for the EU's diplomatic, monitoring, and peacekeeping capacities. A new eastern Neighborhood Policy should be designed for the wider region, connecting the Black Sea and the South Caucasus with Central Asia and thus creating viable alternatives to the competing geoeconomic and governance "offers" of China, Russia, and Turkey.

Auf Drängen Moskaus haben die Türkei und Syrien mit einer diplomatischen Wiederannäherung begonnen. Dabei steht die Regierung in Ankara unter Druck, da der Verbleib der gut 3,4 Millionen syrischen Geflüchteten in der Türkei ein Hauptthema bei den Wahlen am 14. Mai ist. Doch die Aussichten auf eine schnelle Einigung mit Damaskus sind schlecht. Ein Abzug der türkischen Truppen aus Nordsyrien, wie ihn Syriens Präsident Baschar al-Assad fordert, würde für Ankara neue sicherheitspolitische Risiken schaffen.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has implemented legitimate fears of a global crisis and further and inevitably aggravating existing food-security challenges. The international community is being called upon to take targeted action to address the rapidly-evolving, resultant scenarios, making it essential to go beyond immediate interim measures and to re-examine the agricultural and energy policies that underpin our global economy. This article, without any claim to exhaustiveness, examines the inevitable link between war and the dynamics related to food security. In the first instance, a theoretical-interpretative key of the logics of violent conflicts that generate a relevant impact on global food supplies and food (in)security is provided, within the broader framework of the dynamics related to the instability of international relations which hinder the supply of energy resources and determine the volatility of general price levels. In the concluding section, there is refl ection crossed reference to the ongoing Russia/Ukraine conflict as well as the devastating consequences on global food systems, already put under stress by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The chapter intervenes in current public debates about German security policy. Many observers in the media have argued that the Russian invasion has triggered a revolution in German military affairs, de facto putting an end to German pacifism. The chapter takes issue with this argument. It draws on public opinion polls and prior research of parliamentary debates in the German Bundestag to show that neither German foreign policy elites nor the German public could ever aptly be described as pacifist in a strict sense; neither elites nor the general public as a whole were ever fundamentally opposed to the military. And while German society could (mostly) be adequately described as antimilitarist (reluctant to get militarily involved abroad), since the 1990s there has been a significant shift among foreign policy elites towards increased support for military operations outside the NATO area. Even public opinion, commonly seen as sceptical of military involvement, is much more differentiated than commonly assumed, in particular among the media. Thus, while the German government has only haltingly and somewhat hesitantly expanded its military support for Ukraine, this is does not appear to be primarily a result of a lack of public support.

Der historische Anspruch der Zeitenwende und die sich daraus ableitenden militärischen Anforderungen an die Bundeswehr drohen an Geldmangel zu scheitern. Deutschlands bereits ausgehöhlten Streitkräften steht der Rückfall in die alte Lückenplanung bevor. Damit der Schritt zu mehr Nachhaltigkeit bei der militärischen Sicherheit und anderen existenziellen Staatsaufgaben gelingt, sollte Deutschlands Sicherheitslücke in einer auf zehn Jahre angelegten systematischen Anstrengung geschlossen werden - einer Sicherheitsdekade. The historic aspiration of Germany's Zeitenwende - the new era in its foreign and security policy - will fail without the proposed funding. The growing tension between its demands for the Bundeswehr and missing resources is already driving Germany back to the old and shortsighted approach of cutting and stretching budgets and fragile procurement plans. The country needs a security decade: a ten-year systematic spending effort that closes its substantial security gap. Without sustainable funding for military security and other existential government tasks, Germany will continue to pose a risk to itself and others.

Russia's full-scale of invasion of Ukraine pushed Germany to fundamentally revise its foreign and security policy, including its assumptions about European security, its relations with major powers, and its role as a mediator of intra-European disputes. The Zeitenwende’s level of ambition entails a profound reckoning of the failure of past policies, and has to be both European and global. Germany bears a special responsibility for strengthening European defense vis à vis Russia, reducing Europe’s vulnerabilities vis à vis China, maintaining a strong transatlantic alliance while also preparing Europe for a possible reduced US commitment in the future, and ensuring a coherent EU.

Die Hängepartie bei der Wahl Kevin McCarthys zum neuen Sprecher des US-Repräsen­tantenhauses ist auch für Washingtons Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik von Bedeutung. Sie verdeutlicht den Einfluss einer kleinen, aber doch zunehmend rele­vanten Gruppe republikanischer Politikerinnen und Politiker. Viele von ihnen lehnen nicht nur die Ukraine-Hilfen der USA ab, sondern blicken generell skeptisch auf das sicherheitspolitische und militärische Engagement Amerikas in Europa. Diese Vor­behalte zeigten sich bereits bei mehreren Abstimmungen in Senat und Repräsentantenhaus, als es nach dem russischen Überfall auf die Ukraine im Februar 2022 um Unterstützung für Kiew, um die Nato und um Sanktionen gegen Moskau ging. Lange Zeit konnten sich Amerikas Verbündete in der Allianz darauf verlassen, dass beide Häuser des US-Kongresses mit großen, überparteilichen Mehrheiten die sicherheitspolitische Führungsrolle Washingtons in Europa unterstützen. Doch an dieser ein­helligen Position zum Bündnis sind zuletzt Zweifel aufgekommen. (Autorenreferat)

Das längst überfällige neue Strategische Konzept der NATO, das auf dem Madrider Gipfel im Juni 2022 angenommen wurde, bietet mittelfristig klare Leitlinien für das Atlantische Bündnis. Der Krieg in der Ukraine hat den Alliierten einen starken Impuls gegeben, die Identität der NATO, ihre Kernaufgaben sowie ihren Blick auf Russland und China zu überdenken. Der neue abschreckungs- und verteidigungszentrierte Ansatz der NATO hat bereits zu einer großen Veränderung unserer Sicherheitsarchitektur geführt, insbesondere an der Ostflanke Europas. Ohne seine historische Neutralität zu untergraben, könnte Österreich sie angesichts des "Neustarts" der NATO neu interpretieren und diese Gelegenheit nutzen, um seine Partnerschaft mit dem Bündnis neu zu beleben. Adopted at the Madrid Summit in June 2022, the long-overdue NATO's new Strategic Concept provides a clear set of guidelines for the Atlantic Alliance in a mid-term perspective. The war in Ukraine has provided the Allies with a powerful catalyst to reconsider NATO's identity, core missions, as well as their vision of Russia and China. NATO's new deterrence and defence-centric approach has already entailed a major shift in our security architecture, especially on Europe's eastern flank. Without undermining its historical neutrality, Austria might reinterpret it in light of NATO's "reset" and use this opportunity to reinvigorate its partnership with the Alliance.

En el periodo 2004–2013 se presentaron cambios en el presupuesto destinado a seguridad y defensa, con rubros especiales para la consecución de resultados de primera necesidad en ese momento, como el de la protección del territorio nacional y sobre el cual se desarrollaron dos procesos de paz y una política intensiva de seguridad. El trabajo acá presentado deja entrever que dentro de un mundo globalizado es muy difícil alcanzar Seguridad y Defensa al mismo tiempo para una nación, si no se cambia el comportamiento del ser humano, es decir, la formación en valores con principios de autorregulación, para de esta forma favorecer la gobernabilidad y la legitimidad. In the period 2004-2013 changes were made in the budget for security and defense, with special areas for achieving results staple at that time, such as the protection of national territory and which were developed two processes intensive peace and security policy. The work here presented suggests that in a globalized world is very difficult to achieve security and defense at the same time for a nation if human behavior, ie, the formation of values with principles of self-regulation is not changed, and in this shape promote good governance and legitimacy.

En la actualidad, en especial en tiempos de pandemia, el comercio electrónico se convierte en la manera predominante de comercializar productos y servicios en el mundo. Un estudio realizado por la Cámara Ecuatoriana de Comercio Electrónico, en el año 2020, demuestra que las compras y ventas a través de canales digitales se han incrementado al menos 15 veces desde el inicio de la pandemia. Por lo tanto, para realizar estudios de mercado las empresas deben buscar nuevas formas de extraer información para luego desarrollar un análisis de la misma y así obtener una ventaja competitiva. La extracción de datos es un proceso complejo y poco escalable, de manera que, esta investigación presenta una metodología para la extracción de información de un sector industrial determinado. La metodología consiste en dos pasos fundamentales, primero se realiza un ranking de las principales fuentes de información disponibles y más utilizadas en un determinado sector de la industria, se consideran varias características y opinión de expertos. Segundo, se propone una plataforma, la cual integra las fuentes de información mejor rankeadas y realiza la extracción de datos. Finalmente, estos datos se presentan en un Dashboard con la disponibilidad de poder descargar y hacer uso en estudios posteriores. Se concluye que las 4 plataformas que mayor beneficio ofrecen para esta investigación son: Google Trends, Facebook, YouTube y Twitter. También existen fuentes de información que al aplicar el análisis propuesto tienen una calificación alta, sin embargo, la extracción de los datos es difícil debido a sus políticas de seguridad.

We develop a theoretically informed quantitative evaluation of the large-scale policy of security pacts (SPs) in Italy (2007–2012). In particular, we show how Matland’s theoretical model of policy implementation (1995) may help clarify the contextual heterogeneity present in the outcomes of security policies. We build and use a macro-panel dataset in which we exploit variations in the temporal and geographic adoption of SPs to develop a dynamic analysis of the contextual factors that influence the probability of adopting a large-scale security policy at the sub-national government level. We apply a rigorous counterfactual design to assess the effectiveness of SPs in reducing theft and robbery rates. We find that the probability of adopting SPs is positively affected by coalitional strength but not political orientation. In contrast, the effectiveness of SPs in reducing crime relates more to the political orientation of the ruling parties than to coalitional strength.

Border security is an essential component of Malaysia’s defence and security policy. During the COVID-19 outbreak, Malaysia’s border security management was tested with the increase of illegal entry into the country. The central argument of this paper is that, whilst Movement Control Order (MCO), or lockdown as it is more commonly known, aims to restrict movement, this limited movement was exploited for illegal entries into the country, leading to the establishment of the National Task Force (NTF), which coordinated various enforcement agencies to safeguard Malaysian territory. On this ground, this paper aims to analyse the role of the NTF in responding to increasing illegal activities amidst the pandemic. The discussion is divided into: (a) identifying illegal entries during the pandemic; (b) the impact of illegal entries to border management in Malaysia; (c) examining the roles of the NTF in responding to the illegal activities; and (d) the impact of the NTF in border security management in Malaysia. As a preliminary study, this paper only uses secondary data collection in addressing the problem statement. Keywords: National task force; COVID-19 pandemic; Illegal activities; Illegal immigrants; Border security managemen

This paper focuses on understanding the characteristics of multiple types of cyber-attacks through a comprehensive evaluation of case studies of real-world cyber-attacks. For each type of attack, we identify and link the attack type to the characteristics of that attack and the factors leading up to the attack, as observed from the review of case studies for that type of attack. We explored both the quantitative and qualitative characteristics for the types of attacks, including the type of industry, the financial intensity of the attack, non-financial intensity impacts, the number of impacted customers, and the impact on users’ trust and loyalty. In addition, we investigated the key factors leading up to an attack, including the human behavioral aspects; the organizational–cultural factors at play; the security policies adapted; the technology adoption and investment by the business; the training and awareness of all stakeholders, including users, customers and employees; and the investments in cybersecurity. In our study, we also analyzed how these factors are related to each other by evaluating the co-occurrence and linkage of factors to form graphs of connected frequent rules seen across the case studies. This study aims to help organizations take a proactive approach to the study of relevant cyber threats and aims to educate organizations to become more knowledgeable through lessons learned from other organizations experiencing cyber-attacks. Our findings indicate that the human behavioral aspects leading up to attacks are the weakest link in the successful prevention of cyber threats. We focus on human factors and discuss mitigation strategies.

With the development of 5G technology, Internet of Things (IoT) is proliferating and deeply integrated with our daily lives and industry productions. IoT applications in the 5G era generate massive connections, and this would bring about many security issues. In this paper, we first analyze security risks for massive IoT in the 5G era, then summarize related security policies and standards. Furthermore, we propose security requirements and measures for various layers, including sensor control equipment and IoT card, IoT network and transmission exchange, IoT business application and service, and IoT security management and operation. Next, we introduce the case of the cyber security monitoring platform, explain the security technology based on edge computing, and point out the related standards. Finally, we put forward suggestions on IoT security technology and standardization work, so as to promote the secure development of IoT in the 5G era.

The article is devoted to the study of the problem of international information security. It is part of overall international security. International information security is a state of international relations that excludes a violation of global stability and threats to the security of states in the information space.Information threats are a new challenge to international peace and security. Therefore, for effective counteraction, it is necessary to adapt to modern realities. Since international organizations are created to unite the efforts of states to achieve certain goals, they (organizations) must also adapt to changes. They must transform their policy in the field of international security and, in particular, in the field of information security. Accordingly, the subject of this research is the transformation of the policy of international organizations in the field of information security.International organizations are adapting to new threats in two directions:1) transformation of the structure of the international organization itself;2) transformation of the security policy of international organizations.The transformation of the security policy of international organizations can be divided into internal and external.The internal transformation of the security policy of international organizations presupposes a reorientation (or additions) of their goals of activity. If earlier, speaking of global security, they meant only military-political security, today it is also food security, climate security, space, energy and information security.External transformation of the security policy of international organizations presupposes close cooperation with regional organizations, departments and governments of states (according to the level of communication) in the field of information security.Defending its information interests, each state must take care of information security. The strengthening of the Ukrainian statehood also requires the same. A balanced state information policy of Ukraine should be formed as an integral part of its national security. And also as a part of socio-economic policy in accordance with the priorities of national interests and threats. From a legal point of view, it is based on the principles of a rule-of-law democratic state and is implemented through the development and implementation of relevant national doctrines, strategies, concepts and programs in accordance with applicable law.

The conventional wisdom says that material and structural constraints push small states into a more or less predictable foreign and security policy. Georgia’s case shows that, together with these limitations, the foreign policy of small states is also influenced by the way the ruling elites perceive the smallness of their state. This article explains why at different periods of time Georgia demonstrated diverging and even contradictory foreign policy behaviours, despite not achieving significant economic and military strength or witnessing crucial systemic changes in its security environment. I argue that the way ruling elites interpreted smallness influenced their understanding of Georgia’s foreign policy capacity and agency in the international system. This in turn pushed Georgia into fundamentally different paths, stretching from a passive and mostly reactive foreign policy to a highly ambitious, uncompromising and hawkish one.

We present Security Relaxed Separation Logic (SecRSL), a separation logic for proving information-flow security of C11 programs in the Release-Acquire fragment with relaxed accesses. SecRSL is the first security logic that (1) supports weak-memory reasoning about programs in a high-level language; (2) inherits separation logic’s virtues of compositional, local reasoning about (3) expressive security policies like value-dependent classification. SecRSL is also, to our knowledge, the first security logic developed over an axiomatic memory model. Thus we also present the first definitions of information-flow security for an axiomatic weak memory model, against which we prove SecRSL sound. SecRSL ensures that programs satisfy a constant-time security guarantee, while being free of undefined behaviour. We apply SecRSL to implement and verify the functional correctness and constant-time security of a range of concurrency primitives, including a spinlock module, a mixed-sensitivity mutex, and multiple synchronous channel implementations. Empirical performance evaluations of the latter demonstrate SecRSL’s power to support the development of secure and performant concurrent C programs.