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Most people believe some moral propositions are true. Most people would say that they know that rape is wrong, torturing people is wrong, and so on. But despite decades of intense epistemological study, philosophers cannot even provide a rudimentary sketch of moral knowledge. In my view, the fact that we have very strong epistemic confidence in some fundamental moral propositions and the fact that it is extremely difficult for us to provide even the basics of an account of moral knowledge gives us an important clue. Both of these facts stem from the very nature of moral knowledge. In this paper I provide an intuitionist account of moral knowledge. I try to remove misunderstanding and add to our understanding of the contemporary account of self-evident moral propositions. For a theory of moral knowledge to be acceptable it must explain both the moral knowledge we have and why it is so very difficult for us to explain. My theory meets both requirements.

The paper is a study of the intuitionist foundations of mathematic. It is work in the epistemology of mathematics. Hence, it is warranted by the need to ascertain the epistemic status of mathematical statements. Are they synthetic or a priori or synthetic a priori statements, as the case may be? The objective of the study is to evaluate the responses of intuitionist to these questions, so as to ascertain whether they could set to rest the controversies in the philosophy of mathematics. To achieve this objective, the method of content analysis has been adopted. This method is consistent with a qualitative research design. The major text selected for analysis are works of intuitionist mathematicians and other philosophers of mathematics. It has been submitted in the study, that although intuitionism is known for its proposal of the epistemology of subjective construction of mathematical entities, its system is inconsistent because of its dependence on ontological pluralism that leads to crude empiricism and the epistemological crisis of object absolutism.

The authors view the of the university as a system of values that is logically connected with the nature of knowledge as the subject, goal, and highest value of the university’s main scientific and educational activities. The key criterion of knowledge is the evidential validity. The article reveals its meaning from the position of Russian intuitionism, which combines the method of reflexive analysis with the tradition of ontological proof. The authors treat the meaning of absolute truth intuition as the basis of the value function of knowledge in relation to university education. In accordance with the essential orientation of universities to the reproduction of knowledge, that is the unconditional public good, they are qualified as missiotropic organizations. The University’s missiotropic axiologic is justified as a humanistic alternative to the capitalist ideal of global social harmony. Based on the methodological potential of the fundamental motivational matrix (FMM), the caste attributes of the latter are revealed. The specific nature of the appeal to moral responsibility in the context of corporate governance is revealed; the tendency to legalize ethical responsibility in connection with its instrumental understanding in the context of global market competition is noted.

This chapter traces out the implications of meta-ethical view defended in this book, and of quietism more broadly, for questions in moral epistemology. It begins by cataloguing some cases in which normative-ethical inquiry has been distorted by philosophers who have mistakenly treated metaphysics, semantics, and so on, as relevant to first-order ethics. The chapter then considers the upshots of pragmatist quietism for the question of how, if at all, to modify one’s ethical beliefs in the face of others’ disagreement. It then addresses the related issue of how much toleration we should extend to those whose ethical views we judge to be mistaken. It concludes by showing how the pragmatist quietism defended in this book is better equipped than some other objectivist views to reply to evolutionary and other debunking arguments.

Investigating the reliability of moral intuitions is not only one of the hot topics in moral psychology but also of high importance for philosophical questions. In a recent study, the influence of ...

The history of ethics often presupposes rationalist thinking on moral issues. An alternative to rationalism has been proposed by the social intuitionist model. This model suggests the bulk of our moral decisions are ‘gut reactions’ or intuitions. Unlike the rationalists, which support reasons and deliberation to draw moral conclusions, intuitionists argue such reasoning is used to support preconceived ethical decisions. This paper provides the first investigation to determine if intuitionism has any validity within business ethics. Using data from the Defining Issues Test and individual journal entries, results indicate discussion-based pedagogy improved the moral reasoning of participants but had very little influence over their beliefs. In short, the social intuitionist model is supported by this study. Most importantly, ethics education that focuses on peer-to-peer discussion can change how students’ reason about moral problems and should be heavily incorporated into classrooms.

Resumen El actual sistema mundo ha presenciado diversos escenarios de confrontación desde los grupos subalternos que representan diversos modelos ideológicos frente a acciones generadas desde los centros de poder político estatal. Este artículo de reflexión busca analizar, desde una perspectiva psicopolítica, cuáles son los condicionamientos que se han impulsado, particularmente en Nuestra América, en las movilizaciones sociales contra diversas proyecciones políticas, independientes de su valoración ideológica. Se toma en cuenta el modelo del intuicionismo bergsoniano, recurriendo como criterio de análisis a los puntos convergentes que se han generado en los escenarios de protestas de la región. Se concluye que es necesario buscar alternativas para comprender los procesos de movilización y protesta social desde una perspectiva psicopolítica, así como la necesidad de reinterpretar los usos del poder en torno a estos fenómenos sociales en Nuestra América. Abstract The current world system has witnessed different confrontation scenarios from the subaltern groups, that represent various ideological models, facing the actions generated from the center of State political power. This reflection article tries to analyze, from a psycho-political approach, what are the conditioners that have propelled, particularly in the region of Our America, the social mobilization against diverse political range, independent of his ideological assessment. It takes into account the model of the Bergsonian intuitionism, resorting to the convergent points that have been generated in the scenes of protests in the region as a criterion of analysis. It concludes that it is necessary to look for alternatives in order to understand the processes of social mobilization and outburst from a psycho-political perspective, as well as the need to reinterpret the uses of power around these social phenomena in Our America.

In this paper, I present theoretical assumptions behind Teoria/Literatura, a multifaceted digital research and publishing project on 20th-century Polish literary thought. The point of departure is the conjecture that the tensions between the digital and the humanistic in present-day DH help bring out in full relief the cardinal conflict line in Polish literary theory – between formalism/structuralism on the one hand and phenomenology on the other. Conversely, the order of concepts in the corpus of Polish literary theory enables the researcher to pinpoint the relation of the humanistic and the digital (or formalist) within DH so that it might be challenged and/or upgraded. In the first section, I provide an overview of the project's strata and its wide-ranging goal, i.e., a corpus of Polish literary theory. In section two, I examine the way in which the structure of the corpus can help elucidate the general problem of the relation between the digital and the humanistic in DH. Specifically, I relate this issue to the quarrel in constructive mathematics between mathematical intuitionism and formalism. The third section is devoted to a synecdochal representation of the general problem of the duality of intuitionism and formalism – the visualisation of narrative temporality.

The classical interpretation of mathematical statements can be seen as comprising two separate but related aspects: a domain and a truth-schema. L. E. J. Brouwer’s intuitionistic project lays the groundwork for an alternative conception of the objects in this domain, as well as an accompanying intuitionistic truth-schema. Drawing on the work of Arend Heyting and Michael Dummett, I present two objections to classical mathematical semantics, with the aim of creating an opening for an alternative interpretation. With this accomplished, I then make the case for intuitionism as a suitable candidate to fill this void.

In 1928 Ivan Orlov published a remarkable paper which contains the first formulation of a relevant logic. The paper remained largely unknown to English-speakers until this discovery of relevant log...

We investigate which part of Brouwer’s Intuitionistic Mathematics is finitistically justifiable or guaranteed in Hilbert’s Finitism, in the same way as similar investigations on Classical Mathematics (i.e., which part is equiconsistent with $\textbf {PRA}$ or consistent provably in $\textbf {PRA}$ ) already done quite extensively in proof theory and reverse mathematics. While we already knew a contrast from the classical situation concerning the continuity principle, more contrasts turn out: we show that several principles are finitistically justifiable or guaranteed which are classically not. Among them are: (i) fan theorem for decidable fans but arbitrary bars; (ii) continuity principle and the axiom of choice both for arbitrary formulae; and (iii) $\Sigma _2$ induction and dependent choice. We also show that Markov’s principle MP does not change this situation; that neither does lesser limited principle of omniscience LLPO (except the choice along functions); but that limited principle of omniscience LPO makes the situation completely classical.

We investigate the relationship between M. De's empirical negation in Kripke and Beth Semantics. It turns out empirical negation, as well as co-negation, corresponds to different logics under different semantics. We then establish the relationship between logics related to these negations under unified syntax and semantics based on R. Sylvan's CCω.

EnglishThe contribution pursues two interrelated aims: the first one is to interpret the transition from Morality to Ethical Life in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right as a theory of moral justification; the second one is to show the meaning of this theory for contemporary philosophy. The essay thus seeks to turn to Hegel’s conception in order to shed light on the limits of the current discussion in moral epistemology and then to present a possible alternative. To this end, Hegel’s text is confronted with the main theses of intuitionism, on the one hand, and Kantian constructivism, on the other, as the most prominent contemporary forms, respectively, of ethical foundationalism and coherentism. portuguesO artigo tem dois objetivos mutuamente interligados: o primeiro e interpretar a transicao da moralidade para a etica nas Linhas fundamentais da filosofia do direito como uma teoria da justificacao moral; o segundo e mostrar o significado dessa teoria para a filosofia contemporânea. Dessa forma, o artigo procura retomar a reflexao hegeliana para lancar luz sobre alguns limites do debate contemporâneo acerca da epistemologia moral e, a seguir, apresentar uma possivel alternativa. Para tanto, o texto hegeliano e posto em dialogo com as teses centrais do intuicionismo, de um lado, e do construtivismo kantiano, de outro, na medida em que representam as formas contemporâneas que tem mais autoridade, respectivamente, a do fundacionalismo e a do coerentismo etico.

espanolEl presente texto trata de la teoria de Charles Larmore, mas precisamente, de las relaciones entre las concepciones de desacuerdo razonable, de pluralismo y de liberalismo. Tal teoria tiene como caracteristicas el intuicionismo racional, contextualismo y defiende una posicion realista de la moralidad. EnglishThe present text deals with Charles Larmore’s theory, more precisely, of the relations between the conceptions of reasonable disagreement, pluralism and liberalism. Such a theory has as its characteristics rational intuitionism, contextualism and defends a realistic position of morality.

Spinoza’s epistemology is complex, with both a rationalist and an intuitionist side. The key to understanding Spinoza’s epistemology is to focus on the notion of intuitive knowledge (scientia intui...

In this essay we consider the moral claims of one branch of non-realist theory known as linguistic narrativism theory. By highlighting the moral implications of linguistic narrativism theory, we argue that the “moral vision” expressed by this theory can entail, at worst, undesirable moral agnosticism if not related to a transcendental and supra-personal normativity in our moral life. With its appeal to volitionism and intuitionism, the ethical sensitivity of this theory enters into difficulties brought about by several internal tensions as to what morality and moral judgements involve. We contend that the proponents of linguistic narrativism theory must strongly recognize and take responsibility for the “moral vison” their theory professes, in so far as they want to think of their theory as a morally responsible one.

The debate between Einstein and Bergson is a salient episode in the history of modern physics and a telling example of the interaction between science and philosophy. This paper initially discusses five reasons why Bergson criticised Einstein for giving up absolute time. The most important one was Bergson’s commitment to an intuitionist, anti-Kantian metaphysics informed by common sense. Apart from that, he knew that the theory of special relativity permits “duration” (durée) in the form of the passage of proper time, to which Bergson referred as “real time”. Neither static eternalism (which excludes temporal passage) nor dynamic eternalism (which, like the former, claims the existence of the future) are acceptable from Bergson’s philosophical perspective, which acknowledges the role of temporal experience and everyday thinking in addition to science and metaphysics. He understood temporal passage as creation of new existence, anticipating what later became known as the growing block theory of time. The pointy relativistic variant of this theory, which divides the universe into blocks of growing past light cones, does justice to large parts of his philosophy, including the distinction between the actual and the virtual. Supporters of Bergson’s account of duration should adopt this theory of time.

In this article, after clarifying aspects of the claim to objectivity in the common moral judgments and general aspects of moral epistemology, I present and analyze the possibility of the existence and attainment of true moral beliefs, firstly, in skeptical positions contrary to this, as in the nihilistic perspective of error theory and in the subjectivist perspective of relativistic theories (social and individual), then, secondly, I present and analyze the traditional concept of moral knowledge in two favorable realist positions, the naturalist realism and the non-naturalist realism or intuitionism. A perspective normally considered contrary to obtaining true moral beliefs is the expressivist one, but I suggest and outline here how it, or at least some of its more sophisticated versions, can be epistemically friendly in the search for moral knowledge, in a more weak meaning of the concept.

The aim of this paper is to establish a phenomenological mathematical intuitionism that is based on fundamental phenomenological-epistemological principles. According to this intuitionism, mathematical intuitions are sui generis mental states, namely experiences that exhibit a distinctive phenomenal character. The focus is on two questions: what does it mean to undergo a mathematical intuition and what role do mathematical intuitions play in mathematical reasoning? While I crucially draw on Husserlian principles and adopt ideas we find in phenomenologically minded mathematicians such as Hermann Weyl and Kurt Gödel, the overall objective is systematic in nature: to offer a plausible approach towards mathematics.

Fil: Lassalle Casanave, Abel. Universidade Federal da Bahia; Brasil. Fil: Lassalle Casanave, Abel. Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico; Brasil. Fil: Pereira, Luiz Carlos. Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro; Brasil. Fil: Pereira, Luiz Carlos. Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro; Brasil. Fil: Pereira, Luiz Carlos. Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico; Brasil. Lassalle Casanave, A. y Pereira, L. C. (2020). A propósito del formalismo de Johann von Neumann. Metatheoria, 10(2), 51-59. En 1930, Johann von Neumann, junto con Rudolf Carnap y Arend Heyting, participó de un evento realizado en Königsberg llamado “Segundo Seminario sobre Epistemología de las Ciencias Exactas”. La idea por detrás de la reunión de esos tres investigadores era presentar un cuadro suficientemente fiel de los tres programas de fundamentación de la matemática existentes al momento: el formalismo, el logicismo y el intuicionismo. El principal objetivo de este artículo es proponer un análisis del texto “La fundamentación formalista de la matemática” presentado por von Neumann en el mencionado seminario. Tratamos de mostrar como desde la perspectiva de von Neumann el problema de la consistencia de las teorías matemáticas es resultado de la transformación de una cuestión genuinamente filosófica en una genuina cuestión lógico-matemática y como una prueba de consistencia podía ser vista como la solución del problema fundacional. En la parte final del texto, presentamos algunas consideraciones acerca de las pruebas de consistencia de Gerhard Gentzen y su importancia para la teoría contemporánea de la demostración. In 1930, Johann von Neumann, together with Rudolf Carnap and Arend Heyting, participated in a conference held in Königsberg, called “Second Seminar on the Epistemology of Exact Sciences”. The idea behind the reunion of these three researchers was to compose a fairly faithful picture of the three main foundational programs of mathematics at the time: formalism, logicism, and intuitionism. The main objective of this paper is to propose an analysis of the text “The Formalist Foundation of Mathematics” presented by von Neumann in this conferenc e. We show how, from von Neumann's perspective, the problem of the consistency of mathematical theories results from the transformation of a genuinely philosophical question into a genuinely logical-mathematical question and how a proof of consistency could be seen as the solution to the foundational problem. In the final part of the text, we present some considerations about Gerhard Gentzen’s consistency proofs and their importance to contemporary proof theory.

Reflective equilibrium (RE) has been criticized for various reasons ever since the publication of Rawls’A Theory of Justice. Recent empirical research into moral decision-making poses new challenges to RE because it questions the reliability of moral intuitions. This research might discredit moral intuitionism in general and RE in particular insofar as it ascribes epistemic value to moral intuitions. These findings suggest, for instance, that moral intuitions vary with cultural background, gender or framing. If it could be shown that all or certain kinds of moral intuitions are unreliable, this would diminish the plausibility of the claim that they provide good reasons to believe in the truth of their content, especially given the growing evidence that professional philosophers are just as biased and susceptible to distorting factors as lay people. In this paper I critically discuss three recent defenses of RE against this unreliable intuitions objection (UIO). Two of these defenses argue that the UIO misses its target, because RE does not depend on intuitions, or because the relevant considered judgments in RE are not intuitions. The third defense grants that RE depends on intuitions and that some Rawlsian considered judgments are intuitions. But it argues that the notion of considered judgments can be revised, and that wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) has the means to adopt the criticism because it can use information about unreliable intuitions and exclude those from further consideration. I argue that the first two defenses do not succeed. The third defense is the most promising one. However, I argue that this defense also fails. In this defense, RE is not a distinctive moral epistemic theory: different versions of RE would be conceivable, all of which are deeply problematic. I conclude with a discussion of the broader philosophical implications of the UIO, specifically whether or not accepting the UIO would warrant skepticism regarding moral knowledge.

This is a careful study of the more methodological chapters of the Posterior Analytics. Bronstein probes Aristotle’s accounts of demonstration, definition, and induction. He rejects an intuitionist...

Is a mathematical theorem proved because provable, or provable because proved? If Brouwer’s intuitionism is accepted, we’re committed, it seems, to the latter, which is highly problematic. Or so I ...

The article analyses the process of intuitionism's "entry" into European philosophical – aesthetical and studying of art area from 1913 – the year of publishing the first English speaking interpretation of the French thinker. It is shown as the line of thesis of his philosophical conception transformed into the sphere of artistic creation and influenced on the art of the XX century. The examples of intuitionism's interpretation which are represented in modern Ukrainian human science have been accented. It is underlined that the first experience of English – language interpretation of Henri Bergson's ideas, whose works were very popular in European cultural area, is connected with the name of Gerbert Wildom Karr (1859 – 1931), who proposed popular account of the French theorists views in the work The philosophy of Bergson. The accent is made on the fact that G.W. Karr's interpretational model uses the principle of systematization of "the problem field" which H. Bergson formed during the first decade of the XX century. Special attention is paid to"intuitionalism" – composed part of "bergsonism" in the context of which a special theoretic loading lies on the factors "memory" and "time". Examining "time" H. Bergson proposes to take into consideration its "reversibility" and "non-reversibility". It is shown that factors "memory" and "time" were actively used in avant-garde art and in "logic – alogic" of the building of literary works of the school of "new novel" and in European cinematograph of the 70 – 80 years of the ХХ century. As a good example of aesthetic-artistic embodiment of the modifications of "memory" and "time" the creation of famous Spanish producer Karlos Sauro has been considered. It is emphasized that a special load in the general system of views of H. Bergson is "intuitionism", which in the European cultural space was highly appreciated by both the philosophical community and artists. It is emphasized that such factors of "intuitionism" as intelligence, instinct, intuition, time, memory, are still relevant in the research field.

The article focuses on the intellectual potential formation's paradigm choice in the system of the state economic security. The economic content of such concepts as intellectual potential, economic security of the state, economic security system, intellectual security is emphasized. The relationship between the paradigm and the methodology of scientific search has been established, the inner nature of intellectual potential has been revealed through the prism of system-structural and axiological approaches. There have been reasoned peculiarities of the economic security system formation and development as a complex process, which has its logic and stages of implementation, functions in accordance with modern needs, taking into account the available economic opportunities and existing requirements. The role of higher education, science, culture and spirituality in enhancing the society intellectual potential is analyzed. The state's and business participation in the realization of the intellectual potential's development and rational use policy for strengthening the economic security of the state is substantiated. Particular attention is paid to the study of intellectual security, which is a source of competitive advantage based on the dynamic development of innovation and entrepreneurship, education and science, information infrastructure and the knowledge dissemination. Taking into account the advanced scientific approaches to investigated problems' paradigmatic understanding (logicism, intuitionism, formalism), it is stated that the problem of intellectual potential formation in the system of economic security is more appealing to intuitionism, which implies a combination of intuitively obvious in the form and content of phenomena and processes. Thus, intellectual potential is at the same time a systematic formation (the construction of four elements - education, science, culture, spirituality) and a highly effective strategic national economy resource, capable of providing an intellectually innovative breakthrough, and in the spatial architectonics of the economic security system serves as a collocation mechanism for the security based development of national economy. Key words: intellectual potential, economic security system, paradigm, methodology, formalism, logicism, intuitionism.

The differentiation procedure of intuitionistic fuzzy sets (IFSs) is very important in multiple criteria decision-making (MCDM). The aim here is to introduce a fruitful class of knowledge measures related to the information provided in terms of IFSs. We present a class of knowledge measures of IFSs that are based on the two notions: the fuzziness and the intuitionism of an IFS. An experimental problem is employed to illustrate the weight determination method based on the proposed knowledge measures.

Sidgwick's seminal textThe Methods of Ethicsleft off with an unresolved problem that Sidgwick referred to as the dualism of practical reason. The problem is that employing Sidgwick's methodology of rational intuitionism appears to show that there are reasons to favour both egoism and utilitarianism. Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer offer a solution in the form of an evolutionary debunking argument: the appeal of egoism is explainable in terms of evolutionary theory. I argue that like rational prudence, rational benevolence is subject to debunking arguments and so problematic, but also – and more importantly – that debunking arguments are irrelevant in the debate over the dualism of practical reason on the view of reason and rational intuitionism that Lazari-Radek and Singer embrace. Either both egoism and utilitarianism are debunked, or neither are. If I am right, Sidgwick's dualism is left standing.

This paper sketches a way of supplementing classical mathematics with a motivation for a Brouwerian theory of free choice sequences. The idea is that time is unending, i.e. that one can never come to an end of it, but also indeterminate, so that in a branching time model only one branch represents the ‘actual’ one. The branching can be random or subject to various restrictions imposed by the creating subject. The fact that the underlying mathematics is classical makes such perhaps delicate issues as the fan theorem no longer problematic. On this model, only intuitionistic logic applies to the Brouwerian free choice sequences, and there it applies not because of any skepticism about classical mathematics, but because there is no ‘end of time’ from the standpoint of which everything about the sequences can be decided.

Powerful yet effective induction principles play an important role in computing, being a paramount component of programming languages, automated reasoning, and program verification systems. The Bar Induction (BI) principle is a fundamental concept of intuitionism, which is equivalent to the standard principle of transfinite induction. In this work, we investigate the compatibility of several variants of BI with Constructive Type Theory (CTT), a dependent type theory in the spirit of Martin-Löf’s extensional theory. We first show that CTT is compatible with a BI principle for sequences of numbers. Then, we establish the compatibility of CTT with a more general BI principle for sequences of name-free closed terms. The formalization of the latter principle within the theory involved enriching CTT’s term syntax with a limit constructor and showing that consistency is preserved. Furthermore, we provide novel insights regarding BI, such as the non-truncated version of BI on monotone bars being intuitionistically false. These enhancements are carried out formally using the Nuprl proof assistant that implements CTT and the formalization of CTT within the Coq proof assistant presented in previous works.

This study uses Moral Foundations Theory to examine the association between moral intuitions and college students’ attitudes toward drinking. The data consist of 1,447 college students sampled in 2...

This chapter revisits and further develops all the principle themes and concepts of the preceding chapters. Epistemicism about vagueness postulates a realm of distinctions drawn by basic vague concepts that transcend our capacity to know them. Its treatment of their subject matter is thus broadly comparable to the Platonist philosophy of mathematics. An intuitionist philosophy of vagueness, as do many philosophies of the semantics and metaphysics of vague expressions, finds this idea merely superstitious and rejects it. The vagueness-intuitionist, however, credits the epistemicist with a crucial insight: that vagueness is indeed a cognitive, rather than a semantic, phenomenon—something that is not a consequence of some kind of indeterminacy, or open-endedness in the semantics of vague expressions but rather resides in our brute inability to bring, for example, yellow and orange right up against one another, so to speak, so as to mark a sharp and stable boundary. A solution to the Sorites paradox is developed that is consonant with this basic idea but, by motivating a background logic that observes (broadly) intuitionistic restrictions on the proof theory for negation, allows us to treat the paradoxical reasoning as a simple reductio of its major premise, without the unwelcome implication, sustained by classical logic, of sharp cut-offs.

This chapter lays out an account of the particularist approach to epistemological inquiry and develops a version of it in terms of epistemic intuitions, which are seemings about epistemic value (such as justification or knowledge). It begins by briefly reviewing the history of particularism, from Thomas Reid through G. E. Moore to Roderick Chisholm, and then gives a clear statement of the particularist methodology. The remaining sections elaborate the view, giving pride of place to epistemic intuitions, which is why the resulting view is called ‘intuitionist particularism.’ Particularism in epistemology (which tends to be endorsed by commonsense anti-skeptics) puts more weight on epistemic intuitions about particular cases and which of our beliefs are rational. It stands opposed to methodism, which is typically endorsed by proponents of radical skepticism and puts more weight on epistemic intuitions about principles that say what’s required for a belief to be rational. In their extreme forms, these positions occupy two ends of a spectrum. The position advocated in this chapter is a moderate one that leans toward the particularist end of the spectrum, in a way that is compatible with both internalism and externalism in epistemology.

The social intuitionist model (SIM) highlights the superiority of intuitive emotions over reasoning process in the link of moral judgment and reasoning, addressing the issues of private or individual intuitions of moral judgments on an interpersonal communication level. While the SIM can be applied to explain why journalists are biased and prone to producing intuitive news stories, the hierarchy of influences model (HIM) offers a theoretical framework that affects media content, which journalists and media organizations create in a social and cultural approach to propaganda. This chapter explores how the integration of SIM and HIM demonstrates the path to propagandistic news stories manufactured by intuitive journalists and their biased news outlets on the macro social structure level.

Traditionally, research on moral reasoning has been based on the idea that moral judgments are based on reasoning and cognitive development. For example, Kohlberg's classic model of moral reasoning argues that morality develops with aging and experience in terms of preconventional, conventional, and postconventional beliefs. Conversely, Haidt's social intuitionist model offers a view in which moral judgments can be impetuous and driven primarily by intuition, not reason. This idea reflects the concept of moral dumbfounding, in which people maintain a moral judgment based on conditioning. A cognitive theory that explains the conditioning for moral dumbfounding is imagined interaction conflict-linkage theory. This theory explains how arguments are ruminated in the mind. People often remember episodes of disagreement, arguing, or fighting and dwell on them. This chapter will review research in these areas. Additionally, a few examples pertaining to personality and ideological beliefs in terms of COVID-19 pandemic compliance and rule violations are discussed.

This book chapter will first introduce theories in social and cognitive psychology to describe the process of change. The social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001) is applied to illustrate how communication operates in human function. When confronted by the need to change, individuals respond first from intuition, and only after our response do, we acquire rational justification. Additionally, this chapter provides explanations of traumatic brain functions from the neuroscience perspective. Practitioners have to recognize both the intuitive and deliberative process when working with individuals who experience trauma with physiological reactivity. This chapter also discusses strategies to reduce traumatic stress and restore the proper balance between the rational and emotional brain.

This chapter reports an original experimental study that explores the idea that “calling bullshit” may shed light on how we reach a conclusion quickly, following Mercier and Sperber's social intuitionist theory of how we reason. According to the social intuitionist model, instead of going from deliberating and finding reasons prior to arriving at conclusions, as in the rationalist model, we typically go from conclusions backwards to reasons. Little if any empirical research has studied how we come to the determination “that's bullshit,” especially our ability to decide that something is bullshit so quickly. This study explores the relationship between the strength of belief in four ideologies and the speed of “calling bullshit.” The experiment tests the effect of strength of belief in the worldviews of Individualism, Communitarianism, Hierarchicalism, and Egalitarianism. It also examines reaction time for instances of confirming versus disconfirming the subject's worldview as well as age of the subject.

Funder: University of Cambridge, We begin with the idea that lines of reasoning are continuous mental processes and develop a notion of continuity in proof. This requires abstracting the notion of a proof as a set of sentences ordered by provability. We can then distinguish between discrete steps of a proof and possibly continuous stages, defining indexing functions to pick these out. Proof stages can be associated with the application of continuously variable rules, connecting continuity in lines of reasoning with continuously variable reasons. Some examples of continuous proofs are provided. We conclude by presenting some fundamental facts about continuous proofs, analogous to continuous structural rules and composition. We take this to be a development on its own, as well as lending support to non-finitistic constructionism.

Intuitionistic Propositional Logic is proved to be an infinitely many valued logic by Godel (Kurt Godel collected works (Volume I) Publications 1929–1936, Oxford University Press, pp 222–225, 1932), and it is proved by Jaśkowski (Actes du Congres International de Philosophie Scientifique, VI. Philosophie des Mathematiques, Actualites Scientifiques et Industrielles 393:58–61, 1936) to be a countably many valued logic. In this paper, we provide alternative proofs for these theorems by using models of Kripke (J Symbol Logic 24(1):1–14, 1959). Godel’s proof gave rise to an intermediate propositional logic (between intuitionistic and classical), that is known nowadays as Godel or the Godel-Dummett Logic, and is studied by fuzzy logicians as well. We also provide some results on the inter-definability of propositional connectives in this logic.

We consider some advanced topics in logic including fuzzy logic, temporal logic, intuitionist logic, undefined values in logic, logic and AI and theorem provers. Fuzzy logic is an extension of classical logic that acts as a mathematical model for vagueness. Temporal logic is concerned with the expression of properties that have time dependencies. Brouwer and others developed intuitionist logic as the logical foundation for intuitionism, which was a controversial theory of the foundations of mathematics based on a rejection of the law of the excluded middle and an insistence on constructive existence. We discuss several approaches that have been applied to dealing with undefined values that arise with partial functions including the logic of partial functions; Dijkstra’s approach with his cand and cor operators; and Parnas’s approach which preserves a classical two-valued logic.

Este trabajo examina la concepción de la justificación en la que se inscribe el método al que Rawls apela para justificar sus principios de justicia, una de las cuestiones metodológicas que más reparos ha generado. En este sentido, se propone explicar por qué el equilibrio reflexivo supone una explicación ampliamente coherentista de la justificación, así como de qué modo la visión que ofrece de esta trata de evitar cualquier elemento de naturaleza fundacionalista. Puesto que, en cuanto teoría de la justificación, el fundacionalismo es el enfoque que más abiertamente parece oponerse al coherentismo, pero algunas de las críticas que se han formulado del equilibrio reflexivo han tratado de presentarlo como una forma encubierta de intuicionismo –la versión más importante de fundacionalismo moral–, el trabajo intenta poner de manifiesto algunas de las diferencias más relevantes que cabe trazar entre esos dos modos de concebir la justificación. Tomando esto como base, pretende evidenciar por qué los intentos de presentar la justicia como equidad como participando de esa clase de fundacionalismo son poco razonables, pero, sobre todo, ofrecer algunas respuestas a propósito de ese tipo de reproches, subrayando las cuestiones en las que debe ponerse el foco a la hora de evaluarlos. This paper examines the conception of justification that the method to which Rawls appeals to justify his principles of justice falls within, one of the methodological questions that more objections has generated. In this sense, it sets out to explain why reflective equilibrium supposes a broadly coherentist account of justification, as well as how the vision that it offers of this seeks to avoid any element of a foundationalist nature. Since foundationalism is the approach to justification that it seems to oppose coherentism most straightly, but some of the criticisms of reflective equilibrium have attempted to present it as a disguised form of intuitionism –the most important version of moral foundationalism–, the paper tries to highlight some of the most significant differences that can be drawn between these two ways of seeing justification. Taking this as a basis, it aims to show why attempts to present justice as fairness as participating in that kind of foundationalism are unreasonable, but, above all, to offer some answers regarding these objections, emphasizing the questions that must be put the focus when evaluating them.

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