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Moral Epistemology
- Source :
- Pragmatist Quietism ISBN: 0192856502
- Publication Year :
- 2022
- Publisher :
- Oxford University PressOxford, 2022.
-
Abstract
- This chapter traces out the implications of meta-ethical view defended in this book, and of quietism more broadly, for questions in moral epistemology. It begins by cataloguing some cases in which normative-ethical inquiry has been distorted by philosophers who have mistakenly treated metaphysics, semantics, and so on, as relevant to first-order ethics. The chapter then considers the upshots of pragmatist quietism for the question of how, if at all, to modify one’s ethical beliefs in the face of others’ disagreement. It then addresses the related issue of how much toleration we should extend to those whose ethical views we judge to be mistaken. It concludes by showing how the pragmatist quietism defended in this book is better equipped than some other objectivist views to reply to evolutionary and other debunking arguments.
Details
- ISBN :
- 978-0-19-285650-0
0-19-285650-2 - ISBNs :
- 9780192856500 and 0192856502
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- Pragmatist Quietism ISBN: 0192856502
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi.dedup.....ba9574432918af86515edf1c1a26fb7c
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192856500.003.0008