This article discusses the main hurdles and hazards to the development of an economic analysis of the law in Colombia, with an emphasis on commercial contract law and economics. The main hurdles discussed are (1) structural: institutions or processes that slow the development of economic analysis of the law; (2) cultural: a possible aversion by scholars, practitioners, judges, arbitrators, and legislators to this development; and (3) academic: few legal theories have been adapted to the particularities of the Colombian legal system and economic development. If these hurdles are not overcome, at least three hazards to Colombian's development may occur. First, the law, in both theory and practice, may become completely isolated from any economic analysis. Second, law and economics may end up at the exclusive service of theoretical legal analysis without any impact on practitioners, judges, arbitrators, legislators, and other legal actors. Third, legal methodologies may disregard the contribution of other areas, such as philosophy, and may be in the exclusive service of economics or, even worse, of econometrics. This article's view, however, is not as pessimistic as to believe that the hurdles and hazards to a successful interaction between the law and economics are either insurmountable or inevitable. The hurdles may slow Colombian's development of the law and economics but they will not completely block it. Thus, if some of the recommendations put forth in this article are adopted, a negative result is less likely than a positive one in wich the law and economics thrive not only for the sake of themselves, but also for the benefit of scholars, practitioners, judges, arbitrators, legislators, and other legal actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]