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This essay displays the central factors which animate the cyclical attempts to renew Marxism, which also had in Latin America noteworthy representatives. These attempts generally follow the way started by Georg Lukács. He separated the methodological core of Marxism from the concreteresults of Marxist analyses. The core rests always valid and true, while the specific results may contain errors which do not affect the essential quality of Marxism. The danger lies in legitimizingthe intellectuals who master the Marxist method and thus can build a political and technocratic elite, which would be armoured against any critique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes virtual learning environments as a didactic mediation tool for integral human formation. The contemporary ways of educating deserve to originate the proper management of the resources that the new communication technologies offer, with epistemic assets that arouse knowledge as human confluence. In this relationship, ethical reflections stand out as a coincidence of intentions, justifications, reasons that encourage peaceful, supportive and democratic coexistence. It seeks to reduce the digital divide by reducing socioeconomic distances by providing tools that create just societies. It is a bibliographic investigation from the Rationalist-Deductive approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While in Republic (523a) Plato considers there is no need of the existence of a Finger's Form, since a no-finger can be imagined, in Book X he affirms the existence of a Bed's Form, a substantial object such as the finger. This Platonic inaccuracy related to the Form of substances is confirmed in the Parmenides, when Socrates confesses his doubts about them. But in the Sophist, a later dialogue, we find a coherent response because The Form of the Other justifies that there be an opposite to the finger, a "no-finger", which is simply something different from the finger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Children's verbalizations provide a glimpse into their thoughts and learning processes. This research arises in the intersection of two fields: the impact of picture-books in conceptual andjustification learning. Dialogic picture-book reading is a widespread practice between children and adults. The main goal of this research was to analyze the verbalizations children gave before and after the exposition to the concept of camouflage using a picture-book. We designed two studies using a quasi-experimental pre-test post-test approach. In Study 1 we compared two age group-children: 3- and 4-years-olds. Both groups were exposed to the concept of camouflage guided by the instruction of an adult using a picture-book. We considered camouflage as the ability of some animals to blend with the environment to avoid being seen by predators. By instruction, we meant the information given by the adult using examples of animals. The animals were shown in camouflaged and non-camouflaged settings and the adult explained which prey the predator could not eat based on the color of the animal and the background. The picture-book used was specially constructed for this research. It consisted of 10 pages; the first two showed a photograph of a predator (an eagle). The next eight pages showed four different preys depicted in camouflaged and no-camouflaged settings. In the pre-test and the post-test children were asked to choose which prey the depredator will not eat. Children also had to support their answers by explaining why the bird will not eat the chosen prey. We analyzed children's answers and the explanation that they gave before and after the exposition to the concept of camouflage with the picture-book. Additionally, we analyzed the justifications and the conceptual categories that children used to support their choices. The justifications were inspired in Migdalek's work (e.g. Migdalek, Rosemberg & Santibáñez, 2014). The conceptual categories were created inductively from the transcription of children's verbalizations. We found that the 4-years-olds learned the concept and support their choices appealing to the camouflage category; also, they provided complex justifications. As far as 3-years-olds, even though they received the same instruction, they did not learn the concept, neither improved their justifications. Given these results, we concluded that the observed differences in the performance are due to the children's age, since the instruction provided was the same for the two age groups. To specifically explore the impact of the instruction we designed a Study 2 in which we compared children's answers and their verbalizations in two groups of 4-year-old children. Four-years-old were exposed to the same picture- book with and without instruction. The procedure followed was the one described in Study 1. In the condition without instruction, the experimenter presented the children the picturebook indicating which prey the depredator would not eat, but without explaining the reasons. We found out that the children that did not receive any instruction did not learn the concept or used it to support their choices. Besides, this group did not improve their justifications. In contrast, the children that received instruction learned the concept and supported their choices using the camouflage category; in addition, they provided complex justifications. Overall, the results presented provided empirical data to highlight the close relationship between instruction, conceptual learning and justifying in children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes a recurrent epistemological confusion in some contemporary philosophical trends, namely, sociologism, which consists on the establishment of judgements on the justification of science based on its historical origins. Specifically, I am interested in reviewing its relativistic variants, which, in its most radical forms, get to identify the pretension of rationality and objectivity of science with power mechanisms. By means of an argumentative analysis, I will show the errors these proposals commit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kripke formulates four objections to a simple dispositional solution to the Wittgenstenian rule-following puzzle. I present here two partially dispositional proposals, which are different from the simple view discussed by Kripke, and argue that they are not affected by his four objections to it. One of the two proposals may be attributed, although precautiously, to Wittgenstein himself. The other one, which I prefer, invokes a teleological notion of disposition. The two proposals rely on the concept of simplicity, or -- alternatively -- the concept of natural similarity. Some Kripkean criticisms of the use of such concepts to solve the rule-following problem are rejected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After more than half a century, the debate on the Gettier problem is still alive and continues to produce proposals of solution (or dissolution) that, regardless of their success, constitute interesting contributions to epistemology and even to other philosophical areas. As is well known, the Gettier problem is the challenge to provide an analysis of knowledge free of counterexamples. In this paper, first I review and critically examine the main proposals to tackle the problem; then, I draw some conclusions and offer my own suggestions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is often thought that the lack of agreement about the 'why' of human rights, led the drafters of the Universal Declaration in 1948, to avoid any attempt to establish any kind of metaphysical claims about human rights. This paper shows how the drafters of the Declaration built a complete but unfinished argument about the foundation or about the rational justification of human rights. They have articulate a description of a real 'being', which is possible 'to know', that justify a 'duty'. The practical agreement reached by the drafters is only possible, if they state minimum metaphysical truths, admit a practical knowledge, and sustain deontic commitments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We shall argue that the kind of contextualism we defend, viz., the integrative contextualism, offers a way to coordinate and integrate some of the various competing concepts of justification. We shall show how, since each of these concepts involves different intuitions and standards of justification of beliefs, it is possible to distinguish different contexts of justification attribution, each of them, equally valid. In particular, the integrative contextualism, we defend, shows that disputes between two theories of justification, namely the externalist and internalist theories of justification, are established on the erroneous assumption that there is only one valid concept of justification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The justification of research objectives is an inherent part of scientific production. However, there are not any detailed descriptions as to how this practice is carried out in different scientific areas. In this article, we analyze textual extracts of justification from a representative corpus of 162 research articles, corresponding to six scientific disciplines. Using the guidelines of the Grounded Theory, the results of the analysis show that the justification is not always expressed as a determined rhetorical move in these texts. Furthermore, it can be established that the field of justification can correspond to problems and arguments of distinctive levels, and that the most common way to justify a research project is based on the contributions, implications or applicability of the results. Finally, we propose that the rhetoric forms that the justification takes are sensible to variations determined by the nature of epistemology, the objects of study and the methodological procedures used in each of the scientific areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Endoxa is the property of Editorial UNED and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

For Hegel the self-reflexivity of reason is the beginning of philosophy; it is a fundamental determination of rational thinking in general and constitutive of philosophic thinking as such. It highlights the need for self-reflection of reason or of self-reflexive reason as the foundation of Hegel's philosophical systematization, and in turn, as that without which, according to the Hegelian claim, no philosophical reflection would be possible that seeks to be such. The article addresses: 1. The reality and necessity of self-reflexive reason in relation to the concept and task of human thought in general and philosophical thinking such as logical thinking; 2. In relation to the philosophical problem of determining the concept of "philosophical science," of philosophical knowledge in general and of the method, which leads to the necessity of self-justification of philosophy; 3. Finally, it discusses some of the elements regarding the importance of fundamental reason. [TRANSLATION]

In this paper I examine the problem of circularity in the justification of knowledge from the point of view of argumentation theory. I introduce the expression founding argument for the arguments we use to try to prove that we know, and explain the classical account of the two fallacies that may be committed: ad ignorantiam and petitio principii. A new definition of both fallacies, based on recent work in the theory of argumentation, is used to show that not every founding argument is fallacious. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Tópicos is the property of Asociacion Revista de Filosofia de Santa Fe and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this investigation an evaluation procedure of Emotional Display Rules (EDR ) based on hypothetical scenarios was adapted and applied to a sample of 11 boys, mean age of 9 years. Just one of the 11 participants used EDR and the others showed an inconsistent pattern of responses in terms of coherence between felt emotion and reported action, preference for whether or not to communicate the felt emotion and justification for communicating or masking the emotion. Implications inherent to the use of hypothetical scenarios are discussed and the relevance of the concept of rule governed behavior in the design of strategies intended to evaluate emotional displays is pointed out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Virtual Universidad Católica del Norte is the property of Revista Virtual Universidad Catolica del Norte and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Innovación Tecnológica is the property of Instituto de Informacion Cientifica y Tecnologica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Co-herencia is the property of Universidad EAFIT and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Epistemic "internalism" and "externalism" have been two dominant positions within justification theories. Intuitions underlying these positions are held to be contradictory and, thereby, it is not possible to make them converge into a unified theory. I will show that this is not only possible, but necessary. In order to do this, I will appeal to the Dual System Theory, and I will argue that if, (1) as this theory asserts, our reasoning abilities are structured into two different systems, then (2) we have good reasons to assert that the normative status that the notion of "justification" provides to our beliefs is dual, i.e., it offers evaluation criteria that should be differentially used for different kinds of beliefs, which are the result of each of our reasoning systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Endoxa is the property of Editorial UNED and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper we examine the justification of the "noble lie" that Plato offers at the end of Republic Book II. Firstly, we focus on the distinction between a true, genuine lie or falsehood (alethô̱s pseûdos) and a merely verbal falsehood (en toîs lógois). Some famous passages of Meno, as well as the final myths of Gorgias or Republic, can be considered as "lies alike truths" in the sense that Plato defends in Republic. Secondly, we examine the voluntary nature of such lies and try to explain, on the basis of Hipias Menor, why it is preferable to lie willingly than to do it unwillingly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"John Dewey. A perspective of his Concept of Truth". Rorty proposes his view as being an heir of pragmatism, such as J. Dewey's, emphasizing that it stems, among other things, from the pragmatist notion of truth. Differing from many of Rorty's ideas, I attempt to expound some notions I deem relevant in J. Dewey's philosophy, and especially discuss some aspects of his concept of truth. I plan to show that Dewey's pragmatism takes up some traces of our everyday concept of truth, related to correspondence, but that this does not imply an engagement with a robust notion of truth. At the same time, I believe that the acceptance of such traces, although it does not suppose a definition or clear explanation regarding the "content" of truth, suffices to distinguish between truth's normative aspect and any justificationist view that may operate as knowledge's epistemic support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes to (1) Outline the metamethodological proposal by Larry Laudan in his book "Beyond Positivism and Relativism" (1996) which would provide a foundation for the evaluation of scientific methodologies, that warrants ,according to the author, objectivity in sciences and (2) Develop a detailed criticism of two theses from this proposal. I suggest these theses are not justified so that a reformulation or radical change would be needed in order for the objectivity of science to be maintained. However, replacing a metamethodology with another could be misleading, since this eludes the fundamental skeptical problem of the justification of knowledge. I will not conclude the end of philosophy in skepticism; nevertheless, my arguments point towards this very overwhelming direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper defends an empiricist point of view about the problem of justification of knowledge. The stance, inspired in some writings of the last Quine, rejects at the same time the naïve empiricist commitment with the myth of the given and the radical thesis of teorethical charge of perception, finding an intermmediate position between those poles. This work includes, as a previous step, a critic to the so called "minimal empirism" of J. McDowell. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Telos (11320877) is the property of Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, Servicio de Publicaciones and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Telos (11320877) is the property of Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, Servicio de Publicaciones and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

I argue that perception is characteristically non-conceptual and non-theoretically dependent while it is granted that observational reports are inferential in character and theory laden. Backing this viewpoint requires revising one of the most influential theses of the meta-scientific analysis of the nineteen sixties, the thesis that observation is dieoretically loaded. On the other hand, if the contents of perceptions are non-conceptual we would be bound to accept, following Sellars, that these isolated and on their own do not provide justification for our beliefs - not even our beliefs of perception, which are made explicit by perception reports. Thus, we would have new reasons to reject fundationalist approaches. At any rate, it would not be necessary to advocate a purely coherentist approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ian Hacking approaches have been fundamental for the turn that Philosophy of Science has done towards the study of experimental practice. Hacking shows how the philosophy has concentrated traditionally in the representations of sideways science leaving the interventions out. But exactly the study of those interventions offers key contributions in order to understand very important aspects, such as the usual realistic position mat scientists assume in their work. The intervening practice allows asking questions about the realistic theories and the rationalists approaches, without implying an abandonment of realistic criteria when referring to objects which the scientist is working. The sense of Hacking's proposal is not the arguing of a new type of realism, but the extensive project of thinking about science not only as knowledge, but also like a material process of execution and of stable self-molding of ideas and facts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Laguna: Revista de Filosofía is the property of Universidad de La Laguna and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)