Search

The life of Family Businesses is largely limited to the generational transition (on average 30% of these survive the second generation, 15% of these to a third, and 1% to the fourth). Objective: to analyze success and failure factors in successions from the literature. Method: to developed said analysis from a descriptive approach. The document review process completed the following stages: definition of the objective, bibliographic search, consultation of databases, establishment of search strategy and selection criteria, organization of information, and writing. Results and conclusions: the succession problem starts from the conflict of interests between the family business systems (company, family, and property), arising situations such as: informality, loose discipline, assumptions of permanence, nepotism, grasp, among others. Finally, a succession plan was developed considering the factors that influence the process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the critical factors regarding the financing decision, which may be public or private, of Chilean companies that do not belong to the financial sector. In particular, the impact of controlling structures on Chilean companies is examined, in the sense of whether there is a family group or a business group behind it. To develop the research, an unbalanced data panel of 92 companies listed on the Santiago Stock Exchange, included in the 2003-2013 period, was used. The study concluded that companies that have a greater separation between voting rights and cash flows tend to have less exposure to public debt issues, as long as they do not have a family or business group behind them. In addition, it was found that belonging to family groups means that companies more frequently attend the issuance of public debt than when they only belong to a business group, given that the latter has access to an internal capital market and at the same time, it is not necessary to reveal sensitive information about its investment projects. The relevance of the results described above lies in the fact that the Chilean market is composed mainly of companies linked to family groups, which means that this greatly affects their capital and financing structure, and this can be decisive in the decision making process for the different market players, both creditors and debt issuers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we analyse the impact of the capital structure, the ownership structure and the payout policy on managers' discretionary decisions. We have identified some manifestations of the agency costs and we have examined the effect of the mechanisms of control on the agency costs. Based on two measures of the agency costs concerning managers' efficiency on assets performance and on the most discretionary costs, our results stress the role of the mechanisms of control. The capital structure does not seem to work as a mechanism to monitor the managers whereas the ownership structure plays a relevant role and can be divided into two issues: the equity ownership concentration and the managers' ownership. The payout policy has a relevant influence on managers control too. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We extend the Maquieira and Danús (1998) study. In doing so, we use the model proposed by Rozeff (1982) to determine dividend payments. This model considers two opposites factors which may explain the dividend payout policy-- transaction costs and agency costs. We do a cross sectional analysis on a sample of fifty four Chilean public companies in the Santiago Stock Exchange during the period 1996-2002. We find that dividends signal future growth of the companies. Furthermore, the greater the percentage of shares owned by insiders the higher the dividend payout. Finally, we find that the past growth rate of the companies is negatively associated with the dividend payments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the determinants of the dividend payout ratio considering a model that minimizes the sum of transaction and agency costs. Using a cross-sectional analysis on a sample of 60 Chilean public traded companies from 1986 to 1992, we examine the relationship between the dividend payout ratio and the expected growth rate, the beta, the percentage of shares helds by insiders and the number of stockholders. We find a positive and statistically significant relationship between the dividend payout ratio and the expected growth rate, which can be consistent with the signaling hypothesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]