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This paper proposes a re-interpretation of the idea of Body in Nietzsche's philosophy to distinguish it from two important perspectives of Nietzsche-studies in Spanish: The first one maintains that the Body is comparable with Nature, and the second one, states that the Body is a cause of subjectivity. Analyzing part of Nietzsche's work after 1885 --published and unpublished-- shows that the idea of the Body works as a methodology that allows Nietzsche to accomplish a new task of his philosophy, such as the task of self-knowledge. In this way, the Body in Nietzsche's philosophy, besides being an innovative and redeemable concept, is a performative tool that establishes new dimensions "in-between" human knowing and bodily experimentation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central aim of this paper will be to consider the role assigned to the body in contemporary discussions about emotions. I will particularly examine the metaphor of the emotions in the theater of the body, presented by A. Damásio, with the purpose of raising doubts about two dominant models of embodiment of emotions --an externalist or behaviorist and an internal or neurobiological --which remain trapped in several difficulties. So I will reject the general concept of body these models are committed with, and I will suggest an alternative understanding of emotions along the line of a bodily and motor phenomenon. To do that, I will deepen the analysis of the relationship between movement and emotion by considering it under the theoretical framework provided by the Phenomenology of Body developed by M. Merleau-Ponty and his followers. Thus, my alternative proposal will be to take emotions as a bodily performance which can provide us a way to avoid both the dualist and the reductionist standpoint commonly held on emotions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Starting from considering that social policies constitute a central link between the systemic order and the world of life of the populations, the aim of this paper is to explore the emotions of women mothers who have Conditional Cash Transfers of Income in Argentina linked to the social care and the conditionalities that they entail. This will be carried out based on a qualitative strategy, based on in-depth interviews. It is concluded that the social policies under study consolidate emotions linked to self-denial, postponement, the obligation in relation to the care tasks that they suppose and demand. This series of practices, emotions and feelings of the populations receiving the social policies worked, allow us to notice the connections between waiting, postponement and moral obligation in relation to social care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we evaluate the impact of Leibniz’s defense of relativity of motion on his metaphysics. We argue that the abandonment of the absolutist position makes void his first notion of corporeal substance. First, we analyze Leibniz’s conception of body and movement in his youth (1663-1672) and explain how the assumption of absolute motion during these years plays a role in his notion of corporeal substance. Second, we examine his arguments in favor of relativity of motion during the Parisian period (1672-1676) and show the repercussion on his first conception of the corporeal substance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper has two main purposes. First, I recall a relevant methodological reservation that concerns our reading of the Homeric poems (is it right to take one of our modern concepts, namely "body", as point of departure for our study of an ancient text?). Second, I try to explain how something like our common body-mind dualism could emerge from what originally was a single reality (in order to grasp the meaning of a Greek word like phrénes the modern reader would have to put his dualistic language aside in some way); nevertheless, it is also true that in the Homeric poems, especially in the Odyssey, phrénes seems to be one of the names for that peculiar space we would nowadays call "the innerness of the mind or thought". Finally, I suggest that this original single reality is related to Nietzsche's criticism of Metaphysics by means of the reference to the Ancient Greece. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we expose a comparison, regarding differences and coincidences, between the philosophies of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Luc Nancy, focusing in their conceptions of the body, as a central way, in both of them, for an arrival to ontology of existence in the broadest sense. Finally, we evaluate their promises since the perspective of the recent philosophical movement of the new realism (speculative realism or ontological realism) observing in which aspects Merleau-Ponty and Nancy are preparing this movement and in which aspects their philosophies need to be corrected or redefined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The strangeness caused by the cynic gesture and verb is well known since ancient times regarding philosophical praxis. This paper will challenge, in cynical terms and according to his way of living and thinking, the notions of culture and beauty, but from a modern reading of such school, producing a critical thinking exercise. As a result, a current and lively mode of artistic philosophizing will be revealed, at least as written verb in a literary and philosophical way. This challenge can be ironically understood in two ways: the one that the cynics apply when valuing corporal ascesis in its ponos in contrast to institutionalized philosophy schooling; and the one that we apply when the cynicism becomes a subject of the critical proof of our thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Spinoza's deductive metaphysical system states a problem in regard to the knowledge of the passions. On the one hand, the passions are explained like body's affections, but the soul has a mutilated and confused knowledge of the body. On the other hand, the nature of passion necessarily implies the nature of the object which affects us; likewise, Spinoza says that the idea of human body's any one affection not implies the appropriate knowledge of the external object who affects us. In this paper, the idea of soul's double dimension like solution at the problem is presented. According to Spinoza, is possible that we build a clear and distinct idea of the body's affections because the soul can remit them to the idea of God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Considering Merleau-Ponty's treatment of Whitehead's Concept of Nature, the paper regards the affinity between these two authors, in their characterisation of the deficiencies of classical ontology and in their invention of concepts for a new approach to nature and ontology. Merleau-Ponty sees the task of philosophy of nature as the articulation of the two dimensions of Cartesianism, immaterial and material, in a single configuration, whose privileged site will be the 'body proper', as the insertion of matter into consciousness and consciousness into matter. Whitehead conceives this task as bringing together the idea of nature as a totality which is unaffected by our perceptual capture of it and the notion of perception as constitutive of nature. The conclusion evaluates the current stakes and political resonances of a philosophy of nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]