MOVIMIENTO, CUERPO Y SUSTANCIA CORPÓREA EN LEIBNIZ: LA DEFENSA DE LA RELATIVIDAD DEL MOVIMIENTO Y SU IMPACTO EN EL DESARROLLO DE LA METAFÍSICA DE LOS CUERPOS.

In this paper we evaluate the impact of Leibniz’s defense of relativity of motion on his metaphysics. We argue that the abandonment of the absolutist position makes void his first notion of corporeal substance. First, we analyze Leibniz’s conception of body and movement in his youth (1663-1672) and explain how the assumption of absolute motion during these years plays a role in his notion of corporeal substance. Second, we examine his arguments in favor of relativity of motion during the Parisian period (1672-1676) and show the repercussion on his first conception of the corporeal substance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]