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The use of questionnaires as measuring tools involves the use of language. Spanish intralinguistic variation entails differences in the ways of perceiving the world, analyzing events and behaving, which must be taken into account when designing and adapting questionnaires. The IA-PLAT (Primary Care Assessment Tools for lberomerica) harmonization process differs from the cross-cultural adaptation scenarios described in the scientific literature, since it intends to obtain a single Spanish product suitable for multiple target populations, that emanates from questionnaires previously adapted in several populations. Hence, this work requires the use of new analysis categories. The aim of this methodological note is to propose discriminant definitions of conceptual equivalence, practical equivalence and linguistic acceptability as analysis categories of the data collected during cognitive interviews to assess the questionnaires' comprehension, carried out with health professionals and users of healthcare services. (C) 2020 SESPAS. Published by Elsevier Espana, S.L.U. Resumen La utilización de cuestionarios como instrumentos de medición implica el uso de procesos lingüísticos. La variedad intralingüística del español conlleva diferentes modos de percibir, analizar y actuar en el mundo que deben considerarse al diseñar o adaptar cuestionarios. La armonización de los cuestionarios IA-PCAT (Primary Care Assessment Tools para Iberoamérica) difiere de los escenarios de adaptación transcultural descritos en la literatura porque intenta obtener un único producto en español adecuado para numerosas poblaciones meta a partir la armonización de cuestionarios provenientes de diversas poblaciones fuente hispanohablantes, por lo que requiere innovaciones en las categorías de análisis que se utilizan. El objetivo de este trabajo es proponer definiciones discriminantes de equivalencia conceptual, equivalencia práctica y aceptabilidad lingüística como categorías de análisis para la comprensión de cuestionarios, y ofrecer ejemplos de pruebas de comprensión realizadas mediante entrevistas cognitivas con profesionales y personas usuarias de servicios de salud.

In this article I argue against Matthews (1981) claim about the impossibility of deriving dependencies from constitution. Based on his claim, Matthews defends that there is no strong equivalence between the corresponding theoretical frames. Contrary to that opinion, I start defending the evident connection between weak and strong equivalencies, and weak and strong generative capacities, and I point out the error that drives Matthews to his wrong hypothesis: he correctly defines the notions of weak and strong equivalence, but he applies the latter imperfectly. If strong equivalence consists not only in the generation of sequences, but also in the attribution of an structural description to each sequence, such descriptions give a knowledge of dependencial properties (at least, the most important ones) mechanically, with the only exception of the descriptions referred to sentences. Summing up, I do not explicitly affirm the existence of a strong equivalence between constitutional and derivational frameworks, but I demonstrate that in order to deny such an equivalence arguments other than those of Matthews' are required.