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Those who build new public law act with the past hovering over their shoulders. Rejecting regimes of horror explains much of the content of new constitutions. Aversive constitutionalism – in which constitutionalists overtly steer away from a country’s appalling pasts – guides how they understand these new texts. On balance, even among those who disagree over precisely how the past is memorialized as “never again” in new constitutions, evidence shows that the horrors of the past influence public law in the present much more than do the dreams of some ideal future.

Ziel des vorliegenden Forschungsvorhaben ist es, zentrale Konzepte der Evolutionsbiologie, u.a. Variabilität und natürliche Selektion, bereits im Sachunterricht einzuführen, damit Schüler:innen zukünftige Themen des nachfolgenden Biologieunterrichts besser verstehen und biologische Phänomen wie die Angepasstheit naturwissenschaftlich adäquat erklären können. Damit einhergehend soll die Anschlussfähigkeit des Sachunterrichts an den weiterführenden naturwissenschaftlichen Unterricht gestärkt werden. Die vorliegende Feldstudie wird als quasiexperimentelle Langzeitstudie in Klassenstufe 3 bis 5 durchgeführt. In allen Lerngruppen findet eine Intervention im Prä-Post-Follow-up-Design statt. Es wird erwartet, dass sich die alternativen Denkfiguren der Schüler:innen hin zu naturwissenschaftlich adäquateren Vorstellungen weiterentwickeln und die Kompetenz der Lernenden, naturwissenschaftliche Erklärungen für Angepasstheit zu formulieren, weiterentwickelt.

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After years of inaction, the European Commission and Council jointly acted to freeze EU funds totaling more than €28.7 billion for Hungary and more than €110 billion for Poland at the end of 2022, citing rule-of-law violations. Surprisingly, the decisions were taken not just (or even primarily) using the new Conditionality Regulation designed for that purpose. Instead, they used a variety of other legal tools to which rule-of-law conditionality was attached. It remains somewhat mysterious, however, precisely which funds and what proportion of those funds have been suspended, and how those suspensions have been legally justified. This post, a shorter version of a SIEPS paper that will be published soon, describes what we know about the complex set of funding suspensions intended to make EU Member States pay for their rule-of-law violations.

In this post, I’ll explain what has been going on as the House of Representatives has cast an unprecedented number of ballots for Speaker of the House. There are quaint legal reasons why all of this is happening. But then I want to ponder what this says about the ability of the Republican Party to govern the United States because this early-days shutdown of the House follows a pattern in which, for nearly 40 years, the Republicans have wanted to both dominate the federal government and shut it down.

The Commission needs to get its message out to Hungarians loud and clear that it is trying to fight corruption in Hungary so that EU money can be used to benefit the Hungarian people and not just Orbán’s circle of cronies. Hungarians would definitely appreciate that if they knew it. But the Commission’s press release today has been drowned out by Orbán’s use of state funds to flood the zone with his message that the Commission doesn’t care about the Hungarian people and is responsible for all of the economic pain they feel.

The EU Commission has agreed with us that the laws that we have analyzed in our series of four blogposts did not in fact constitute an effective anti-corruption plan. And the Commission has attached a €13.3 billion price tag to non-compliance. Now the Hungarian government is scrambling to unlock this cash by introducing two additional laws that attempt to address the Commission’s concerns. But these new laws repeat the errors of the prior laws. They create the appearance of an independent corruption-fighting system while digging in political allies at all of the chokepoints and tying up whistleblowers and anti-corruption fighters in red tape. The new laws do not make things better and they may even make things worse.

It’s crunch time for the Conditionality Regulation at the European Commission. In its College meeting on 22 November, the Commission is scheduled to discuss whether Hungary has actually made the 17 changes it proposed in order to avoid cuts to its Cohesion Funds. What the Commission chooses to do will depend on whether it believes that Hungary’s anti-corruption program will in fact allow Hungary to be entrusted with billions of Euros without having a sizeable fraction of those Euros pocketed by cronies. We believe that Hungary’s reforms are designed to be ineffective and will not even begin to halt the massive corruption that is the hallmark of Hungary’s kleptocracy.

The news about whether Hungary will receive EU funds (or not) these days is confusing. One day, we hear that the European Commission is proposing to lower the boom on Hungary by cutting a large chunk of its Cohesion Funds under the general EU budget. The next day, we hear that the Commission is nearing an agreement to approve Hungary’s Recovery Plan in order to greenlight the release of funds. Is the Commission using or surrendering its financial leverage to require that the Hungarian government honor the rule of law? Will the Hungarian government negotiate its way out of funding cuts by really loosening its autocratic grip on power, or would any reform be illusory?

In part III of our analysis of the anti-corruption framework, we will look at another aspect of the Hungarian “reforms”: a new procedure that seems to allow the general public to challenge in court the decisions of Hungarian public prosecutors to drop corruption cases. The new procedure is nearly impossible to use and adds little value to existing controls on the public prosecutor. In addition, the Hungarian Constitutional Court may declare it unconstitutional in any event.

In this blogpost, we’ll analyze the Anti-Corruption Task Force, sometimes translated as the Anti-Corruption Working Group. This is another institutional innovation that the Hungarian government proposes to establish in order to transform a kleptocracy into an accountable government. Like the Integrity Authority, the Anti-Corruption Task Force also looks like it might be a good idea on first glance but its significance dissolves on closer analysis. The Task Force is structured like hens trying to organize a safety plan when the local foxes have packed the meeting and dominate the discussion.

The Hungarian government is trying to convince EU institutions that it is taking adequate steps to ensure proper spending of EU funds going forward. At the center of this effort is a new ‘Integrity Authority’. The law establishing this authority, Bill T/1260, just passed the Hungarian Parliament on 3 October 2022. We have carefully read the laws enacted so far that establish a new anti-corruption framework and can confidently say that neither the Commission nor the Council should accept what the Hungarian government is offering because the proposed changes do not begin to alter business as usual in Hungary. In this blogpost, we will analyze the ‘Integrity Authority’ which forms the centerpiece of the government’s program, showing that it is not independent from the government nor are its powers real.

Der Zielgruppe heutiger Hochschulbildung werden oft vorschnell weitreichende Kompetenzen im Umgang mit zunehmender Digitalisierung von Arbeitswelt und Alltag zugeschrieben. Das vorliegende Papier betrachtet dies kritisch und versucht sich der Frage zu widmen, wie Hochschulbildung den digitalen Wandel adressieren, begleiten und Studierende so zur beruflichen Kompetenz und aktiven gesellschaftlichen Teilhabe befähigen kann. Dies geschieht unter Einbezug des Curriculum 4.0-Projekts «Medizin im digitalen Zeitalter», einem Lehrkonzept, welches die zunehmende Digitalisierung von Arbeitswelt und Alltag im Bereich der Medizin auf inhaltlicher Ebene adressiert und sich methodisch vor allem auf kollaborative Arbeitsweisen fokussiert. Erste Evaluationsergebnisse des Lehrkonzepts in Hinblick auf die Kollaboration werden vorgestellt.

Flexible Unterstützungsangebote adressieren heterogene Bedürfnisse von Studierenden und sollen den Lern- und Studienerfolg erhöhen. Im Bachelorstudiengang Psychologie der Universität Bielefeld wurden sukzessive Angebote und schließlich eine umfangreiche flexible Online-Lernumgebung zum Modul Statistik implementiert. Mittels einer längsschnittlichen Befragung von drei Kohorten Studierender wird geprüft, inwiefern sich mit zunehmender Flexibilisierung die Nutzungshäufigkeit der Angebote verändert hat und ob, bei Kontrolle um die anfängliche mathematische Kompetenz und das mathematische Selbstkonzept, eine Erhöhung des Studienerfolgs erreicht wurde.

Computational first principles models based on density functional theory (DFT) have emerged as an important tool to address reaction mechanisms and active sites in metal nanoparticle catalysis. However, the common evaluation of potential energy surfaces for selected reaction steps contrasts with the complexity of reaction networks under operating conditions, where the interplay of adsorbate populations and competing routes at reaction conditions determine the most relevant states for catalyst activity and selectivity. Here, we discuss how the use of a multi-scale first principles approach combining DFT calculations at the atomistic level with kinetic models may be used to understand reactions catalyzed by metal nanoparticles. The potential of such an approach is illustrated for the case of Al2O3-supported Ni nanoparticle catalysts in the water-gas shift and dry reforming reactions. In these systems, both Ni nanoparticle (metal) as well as metal/oxide interface sites are available and may play a role in catalysis, which depends not only on the energy for critical reaction steps, as captured by DFT, but also on the reaction temperature and adsorbate populations, as shown by microkinetic modelling and experiments.

Planifier des cours est l’une des compétences centrales que les enseignant-e-s développent durant leur formation. Les sources et processus régissant l’apprentissage des pratiques de planification restent encore largement inexplorés. Trente entretiens semi-directifs menés auprès d’enseignants du secondaire récemment diplômés ont permis de conclure que diverses pratiques de planification étaient apprises et valorisées par les enseignant-e-s. De plus, ces pratiques relèvent de sources variables qui ne se limitent pas à la formation, ainsi que d’apprentissages de types formels, non formels et informels. Cette étude révèle ainsi comment s’articulent les facteurs influençant l’évolution des pratiques de planification.

Backsliding democracies around the world all face the problem of how to restore the rule of law. Precisely because it is already embedded in European law, with deep Hungarian roots that have long honored European traditions and its international law obligations, Hungary has the option of simply embracing European law to provide a legal path back to the rule of law

The American Conservative Political Action Coalition (CPAC) is meeting in Budapest on 19-20 May. The meeting signals that US conservatives have chosen Hungary as proof of concept for the politics they want. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is proudly illiberal and proudly politically incorrect. Having won his fourth consecutive election in April with his largest parliamentary majority yet, Orbán demonstrates to American conservatives that his brand of politics can triumph.

The Hungarian government is publicly saying that it is nearing a deal with the European Commission to unlock the Recovery Funds that have been withheld because the Commission has not yet approved Hungary’s plan for spending those funds. Apparently, Hungary has agreed to four conditions that will allow the €7bn worth of grants and about €8bn in low-interest loans to be approved. But if those are any indication of the price that the European Commission will extract for comprehensive violation of the rule of law, the European Commission is making a colossal mistake.

The Tavares Report, adopted by the European Parliament with a surprisingly large majority, provides a bill of particulars against the Hungarian government and lays out a strong program to guide European Union institutions in bringing Hungary back into the European fold. With the passage of this report, Europe has finally said no to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his constitutional revolution.

The Tavares Report, adopted by the European Parliament with a surprisingly large majority, provides a bill of particulars against the Hungarian government and lays out a strong program to guide European Union institutions in bringing Hungary back into the European fold. With the passage of this report, Europe has finally said no to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his constitutional revolution.

What can the European Union – and in particular the European Commission – do about Member States that no longer reliably play by the most fundamental European rules? The question is now urgent because several Member States are already posing such challenges. Treaty reform could give the Commission new powers. But can the Commission act without waiting for the long and arduous process of treaty reform to provide new tools? Kim Lane Scheppele proposes a new approach, a simple extension of an existing mechanism: the infringement action.

Was kann die Europäische Union – und vor allem die Kommission – gegen Mitgliedsstaaten unternehmen, die sich nicht länger an die grundlegendsten europäischen Regeln halten? Die Frage drängt, weil bereits mehrere Mitgliedsstaaten uns bereits vor solche Herausforderungen stellen. Eine Vertragsreform könnte die Kommission stärken. Aber kann sie handeln, ohne abwarten zu müssen, bis sie nach einem langen und mühevollen Prozess der Vertragsreform neue Kompetenzen erhält? Kim Lane Scheppele schlägt einen neuen Ansatz vor, die schlichte Ausdehnung eines existierenden Mechanismus – des Vertragsverletzungsverfahrens.

Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party coasted to a clear victory in last weekend’s Hungarian election, as expected. The governing party got 45% of the vote, but the new “rules of the game” turned this plurality vote into two thirds of the seats in the parliament. A continuing two-thirds parliamentary majority allows Orbán to govern without constraint because he can change the constitution at will. But this constitution-making majority hangs by a thread. Orbán’s mandate to govern is clear because his party got more votes than any other single political bloc. What is not legitimate, however, is his two-thirds supermajority. Orbán was certainly not supported by two-thirds of Hungarians – nowhere close. In fact, a majority gave their votes to other parties. Orbán’s two-thirds victory was achieved through legal smoke and mirrors. Legal. But smoke and mirrors. Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party coasted to a clear victory in last weekend’s Hungarian election, as expected. The governing party got 45% of the vote, but the new “rules of the game” turned this plurality vote into two thirds of the seats in the parliament. A continuing two-thirds parliamentary majority allows Orbán to govern without constraint because he can change the constitution at will. But this constitution-making majority hangs by a thread. Orbán’s mandate to govern is clear because his party got more votes than any other single political bloc. What is not legitimate, however, is his two-thirds supermajority. Orbán was certainly not supported by two-thirds of Hungarians – nowhere close. In fact, a majority gave their votes to other parties. Orbán’s two-thirds victory was achieved through legal smoke and mirrors. Legal. But smoke and mirrors.

On 8 April, Hungary lost again at the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ). The European Commission had alleged that that Hungary violated the independence of its data protection officer and the ECJ agreed. The case broke little new legal ground. But it is important nonetheless because it signals serious trouble within the EU. The case exposes Hungary’s ongoing challenge to the EU’s fundamental principles. And it exposes the limitations of ordinary infringement proceedings for bringing a Member State back into line.

Hungary has announced to block any Article 7 sanctions that the EU might propose against Poland. Why should Poland back down when nothing will come of standing up to the EU? Given Polish intransigence, the Commission may be tempted to stall for time or to retreat, which would be disastrous for the rule of law in the European Union. But the power to levy Article 7 sanctions can be restored. The Commission should do now what it should have done long ago. It should begin by triggering Article 7 (1) not only against Poland, but against Hungary as well.

With an off-hand remark in a Belgian newspaper, President Juncker has called off the EU Commission’s effort to pressure Poland into following the rule of law. If he went through with this, he would not only pull the rug from under his own First Vice President Timmermans and spare the national governments the necessity to live up to their responsibilities. The Commission President deciding that the slide of a member state into authoritarianism is not his business, with a Trump Presidency in the US coming, forgoes the European Union’s claim to be capable of fulfilling its leadership role in the world.

On 21 December 2016, the European Commission adopted an additional Recommendation regarding the rule of law in Poland. Rather than starting the Article 7 sanctioning process, the Commission merely reiterated its old demands, added some new concerns and again held out the threat of Article 7 while apparently moving no closer to actually starting a sanctioning process. It is not that the Commission was unaware of what was happening in Poland. In December, the Commission stood by and watched the Polish government capture the Constitutional Tribunal. The new Recommendation indicates that the Commission simply chose not to act to head off the final stages of the Tribunal’s demise.

As Poland has careened away from the rule of law, the European Commission has struggled to work out its response. Given Europe’s multiple crises at the moment, the internal affairs of a rogue government or two may seem less critical to Europe’s well being than crises that affect multiple states at the same time, like the refugee crisis, the Euro-crisis or the fallout from Brexit. But the proliferation of governments inside the EU that no longer share basic European values undermines the reason for existence of the EU in the first place.

On 20 February 2017, the Polish government has replied to the European Commission’s rule of law findings. That reply is so clearly absurd, rude and full of ‘alternative facts’ that the case to trigger the sanction mechanism in Art 7 TEU promptly is more compelling than ever. It is time for Member State governments to get their act together and make explicit their disapproval of a government that finds it acceptable not only to violate its national Constitution and EU values in plain sight but also to bully and disrespect EU representatives such as Frans Timmermans and Donald Tusk.

On Wednesday, the European Commission reacted to the continuing deterioration of the rule of law situation in Poland. The remaining question, of course, is why this argument has been used in the context of 7(1) as opposed of 7(2) given that the situation on the ground in Poland is clearly – in the view of the Commission, the Venice Commission and countless other actors – one of clear and persistent breach of values, as opposed to a threat thereof. The explanation might lie beyond the simple difficulty of the procedural requirements related to the sanctioning stage.

What would happen to the principle of mutual trust? Take requests for extradition under the European Arrest Warrant: Member States would be required to send anyone on their territory (including their own nationals) to a non-rule-of-law abiding Member State.

The notion of backsliding implies that a country was once better, and then regressed. How does that happen? Turns out, it follows a well-organised script that can be summed up in 8 steps.

On 26 January 2018, Jarosław Kaczyński, Poland’s de facto leader (which in itself is a rather unhealthy sign in a democracy), claimed that what he refers to as judicial “reforms” would not be an EU matter but rather an “internal competence guaranteed by EU law”.

Is the rule of law too vague a notion to be enforced by the EU against its Member States? Discussing possible sanctions against Poland over its rule of law issues, the Bulgarian prime minister recently claimed that the rule of law is too “vague” to be measured before adding: “Every time you want to hurt someone’s feelings, you put [on the table] ‘the rule of law’.”

Why have some EU officials called Article 7 the EU’s “nuclear option” – and is Article 7 really that powerful?

Does the Commission have the competence under the Treaties to monitor compliance with the rule of law in countries suspected of rule of law backsliding, even in the event of a breach in an area where the Member States act autonomously?

When Hungary first starting doing down the path to autocracy after 2010, EU officials were quick to recall the “failed” case of Austria in 1999. Didn’t the EU learn from its experience?

According to Frans Timmermans, speaking on 17 September 2017, “the situation in Hungary is not comparable to the situation in Poland” implying that Poland is far worse off than Hungary in the rule of law department. But is that true?

Poland and Hungary have governments that are systematically undermining constitutional checks on the power of their leaders and deliberately turning all state institutions into arms of the party. Those cases demand that the EU’s full powers be urgently directed to averting a full-blown autocracy within the EU. What can be done?

Despite the Commission’s best and repeated efforts, the rule of law situation in Poland has indeed been going from bad to worse under the stewardship of Poland’s de facto leader and its “Law and Justice” governing party.

A craving for the rule of law can be satisfied in two ways. You can invoke it legally through a case-by-case checking of its presence in any particular instance (though of course, retail assessment means you’re at the mercy of the court near you) or you can better guarantee a steady and plentiful delivery by contracting wholesale, thus providing a legal constraint on the supplier’s ability to deviate. This week’s decision of the European Court of Justice in the “Celmer” case (Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality v LM) tells us that the rule of law is now available retail in the European Union, but it is not now – and probably can never be – available wholesale.