Search

The article examines the connection between Don Ihde's postphenomenology and phenomenological educational science, particularly learning in human-technology relationships. It shows how technology references can be established, changed, and lead to a "becoming different" on a personal level. Learning represents a connection between situation and world, in which habit and redesign play a role. The body plays a mediating role between the situation and history, perceiving, acting, and simultaneously having habits that can be activated in the situation. Postphenomenology deals with the relationships between humans, technologies, and the world, emphasizing the role of science and technology in shaping our relationships with the world. [Extracted from the article]

In this paper, I analyze the ambiguity of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's notion of repression with regard to the future dimension of human existence: The repression of personal existence by the habitual body can disable the future and enable it. I proceed in three steps: First, I redescribe the cases of pathological repression cited by Merleau-Ponty as a refusal to give up a closed horizon of possibility: Clinging to a past present leads to stagnation and ultimately to the de- substantialization of existence. In the next step, I address the role of what I call non-patho¬logical repression - a general phenomenon we can understand as a condition for having any future at all. I conclude by arguing that the distinction between future-opening and future- closing repression is not always clear. As agents who evaluate their own existences, we can at times feel unsure whether we are persistently pursuing a worthwhile goal or are pathologically clinging to an impossible future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Transformative theories of human nature posit that the genus of animality is wholly transformed by the specific difference of reason. The aim of this paper is to show that the two most prominent transformative approaches, 'resolute' and dialectical', face a dialectical impasse that Helmuth Plessner's philosophical anthropology is able to resolve. First, I outline objections to the resolute approach which motivate the 'dialectical' turn to second nature. Second, I show that the dialectical approach faces a dilemma. It either runs into an internal 'interaction problem' by its qualitative distinction of nature and spirit. Or it assimilates both in a way that either amounts to a collapse into the resolute approach or which creates the problem of a merely 'artificial naturalness'. Third, I reconstruct Plessner's 'form-typological' approach to how the genus living being is differentiated into structural types. This enables a dilemma-free rendition of transformation as 'natural artificiality': it is human first nature to seek embodied expression in second nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Forum Modernes Theater is the property of Narr Francke Attempto Verlag GmbH & Co.KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article "Sustaining the Event" by Christoph Menke deals with the theory of liberation. Menke poses the question of how once achieved freedom can be transformed into a mode that prevents a relapse into servitude. He argues that this can only succeed if wrong decisions are avoided at the right moments. Menke presents his theory as a major historical revision that demonstrates how liberation could and should have taken a different course. He emphasizes that liberation must not be understood as self-liberation and that the notion of a sovereign acting subject must be overcome. Liberation comes from outside and arises from the experience of fascination. Menke presents his design as "aesthetic materialism" and emphasizes the distinction from Hegel's absolute idealism. He explains religious liberation as a response to an external address and emphasizes the importance of obedience and listening to the commandment. Menke argues that religious liberation has failed so far because the commandment has become law. He concludes with the idea of a politics of liberation that aims for a radical change in social habits and the subject. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Sozialer Fortschritt is the property of Duncker & Humblot GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper I consider emotions as the ability to grasp meaningfulness, understood as an essential component of (social) reality, which is necessary for a rational discourse and which cannot be apprehended by means of a supposedly "sober" approach. I explicitly take into account the socio-cultural situatedness of feeling subjects and put epistemically relevant emotional abilities into perspective. This approach reveals that emotions can also contribute to questioning one's own world view and to being able to correct it if necessary. The ability tobe affectively disrupted, as I call it, enables one to see the contingency of one's emotion repertoire and habitualised schemata of grasping meaningfulness. Further, a severe affective disruption can bring about a transformation of one's emotion repertoire and habitualised schemata, thus permanently altering the subject's epistemic position and epistemic practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Nietzsche - Studien is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of SWS - Rundschau is the property of Verein fur interdisziplinare sozialwissenschaftliche Studien und Analysen and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Angewandte Linguistik is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Nasleđe is the property of University of Kragujevac, Faculty of Philology & Arts and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Recent discussions of Hegel's conception of second nature, specifically focused on Hegel's notion of habit, have greatly advanced our understanding of Hegel's views on embodied normativity. This essay examines Hegel's account of embodied normativity in relation to his assessment of good and bad habits. Engaging Hegel's account of the rabble in the Philosophy of Right and Frank Ruda's assessment of Hegel's rabble, this essay traces the relation between ethicality, idleness and race in Hegel. In embodying a position of refusal in its affirmation of idleness, the rabble disallows the progressive revision of the project of modernity central to Hegel's philosophy. Hegel's discussion of the rabble is thus key to assessing the production of race within Hegel's notion of ethical life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Perspektive Mediation is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Taliban have taken control of Afghanistan and are now faced with the challenge of severing their connections to terrorist groups in order to gain international recognition. There are several terrorist groups in Afghanistan, including al-Qaida, Chechen fighters, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, Pakistani fighters of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, and local Afghan terrorists belonging to the Islamic State Khorasan. The Taliban's relationships with these groups range from parasitic relationships to cooperation and peaceful coexistence. In particular, ISIS-K views the Taliban as puppets of Pakistan, leading to violent clashes between the two groups. Afghanistan hosts over 10,000 foreign fighters who enter the country in three ways: fleeing their home countries, joining Afghan terrorist organizations, or through connections established by the Taliban with terrorists. Afghanistan's neighboring countries hope that the new Taliban regime will cut ties with terrorist groups, but there are obstacles such as habit, disagreement within the Taliban, and the lack of a definition of terrorism. Terrorism in Afghanistan poses a threat to political stability in the region and international security. [Extracted from the article]

The article describes the personality and career of Uwe, a former DAAD lecturer in Durham, England. Uwe was a dedicated German as a foreign language (DaF) teacher who not only imparted language and cultural knowledge to his students but also challenged their thinking habits. He was curious and willing to learn from others, conducting field research to understand different perspectives. The article also mentions Uwe's travels and experiences in Great Britain, as well as his development into an expert in the DaF world. It emphasizes that Uwe will continue to be active even after his 65th birthday. [Extracted from the article]

This paper aims to situate the roles of attention and habit in contemporary approaches to embodied cognition with particular regard to the conceptualisation of affordances. While Chemero has argued that affordances have a relational character that rules out dispositions, Rietveld and Kiverstein have suggested that engaging with affordances amounts to exercising skills. By critically reconsidering the distinction between dispositions and abilities proposed by Chemero, as well as the standard theory of habit that underpins accounts of skilful coping (including Rietveld’s and Dreyfus’), I propose to disambiguate habit from skill and to reassess the phenomenology of dispositions. Dispositions are motivational factors that depend on two elements: (i) sensitivity to context clues, which is regulated by habit and attention, and (ii) the positionality of the subject, which is inseparable from context-awareness. Drawing on Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s insights, I argue that both (i) and (ii) can accommodate a dispositional view of affordances.

Osoby, które podejmują decyzję o życiu radami ewangelicznymi w instytucie zakon­nym muszą mieć świadomość zarówno praw, jak i obowiązków, które przyjmują w związku z tym na siebie. W artykule podjęto tematykę obowiązków zakonników wobec instytutu, do którego należą. Dlatego też zostały przeanalizowane takie szczegółowe kwestie, jak: zamieszkanie w domu zakonnym, zachowanie klauzury, zarządzanie do­bra­mi materialnymi, noszenie stroju zakonnego oraz zakaz podejmowania zajęć i obowiąz­ków poza własnym instytutem bez zgody przełożonego. Przeprowadzona analiza poza charakterystyką poszczególnych obowiązków, ukazuje zmiany, jakie zostały wprowa­dzo­ne przez ustawodawcę w Kodeksie Prawa Kanonicznego z 1983 r.

Despite the filiation granted by Nietzsche and the adoption of his basic themes, Schopenhauer remains just a "tumbler" for Heidegger (Heidegger 2008, pp. 106-108). His few remarks scattered across various lectures, criticize Schopenhauer's arrogant-offended tone and his habit to abuse the academic philosophy with insults. However, Heidegger is very much interested in the issue which keeps suspended Schopenhauer's philosophy and, at the same time, continues to be central in Nietzsche's work, i.e. the ways in which the will affects our representation of the world. Even though there is a verry strong resemblance with regard to the idea of negation of the will in both Heidegger and Schopenhauer, no reference to Schopenhauer's solution against an almighty (yet cruel and selfish) will is present in the Heideggerian call for serenity (Gelassenheit). The more resolutely Heidegger wants to tackle the metaphysics of the will as the core of the "oblivion" of being (Seinsvergessenheit), the more intensely the debate of Nietzsche's philosophy becomes. The questioning of the nature of metaphysics represents the starting point. The same as Nietzsche, Heidegger explores beyond the metaphysic's historic categories of being, at the same time criticising for being "nihilistic" his attempt to create new "values" or any other mental design that may block the access to "being" itself. Heidegger's counter-draft to metaphysics and its ultimate consequence (i.e. nihilism as understood by Heidegger), is a kind of gentle approach (Annäherung) which "lends voice" to being: the Zu-stimmung also can be read as mere "consent" to being and, as such, an overcoming of classical metaphysics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most philosophers and psychologists assume that habitual acts do not ensue from deliberation, but are direct responses to the circumstances: habit essentially involves a variety of automaticity. My objective in this paper is to show that this view is unduly restrictive. A habit can explain an act in various ways. Pointing to the operation of automaticity is only one of them. I draw attention to the fact that acquired automaticity is one outgrowth of habituation that is relevant to explanation, but not the only one. Habituation shapes our emotional and motivational make up in ways that affect deliberation itself. Hence mentioning a habit might be indispensable in explaining an act which nevertheless ensues from deliberation. The view that habitual acts are direct responses to the circumstances implies an impoverished conception of habit, which fails to do justice to its rich explanatory potential in theoretical and pre-theoretical contexts, as well as to its role in the history of philosophy.

The academic strife to parse, investigate and adjust human functioning establishes varieties of at least three key concepts: behavior, action, activity. Depending on the general approach chosen, human functioning is therefore defined in a certain way and in a certain understanding of freedom. Within this paper, the pragmatist considerations of John Dewey (1859-1952) offer a sophisticatedly formulated theory of human functioning that, undoubtedly, takes action-theoretical paths but formulates underlying assumptions in a significantly unusual way. The main focus is to outline the theory in such a way that clearly shows the unusual as part of the usual and the usual as part of the unusual. For this purpose, the first section defines action as the basic category of Deweyan human functioning where sensory stimuli, registering elements and motor responses play a leading role, but according to Dewey questions the today still popular model of behaviorist psychology, that positions isolated and a-cultural stimulus-response-procedures in the human organism. The second section affirms the theoretical inclusion of deliberative elements that constitute human action, but according to Dewey witnesses their substantial and rather sporadic significance in a predominantly habitual human functioning. The conclusive section outlines the possibilities and limits of transforming habitually inured patterns of human conduct by means of reconstructive habits.

Copyright of Gruppe. Interaktion. Organisation: Zeitschrift für Angewandte Organisationspsychologie (GIO) is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Nachrichten aus der Chemie is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Abstract – Samuel Beckett's interest in St. Augustine is manifest throughout his oeuvre, both in terms of content and style, and can be traced from his very first works, such as Whoroscope, to his last plays and short stories. Although this interplay has been touched upon in the critical discourse on Beckett, a systematic analysis is still to be done. This paper represents a preliminary investigation into the Augustinian influence in the early Beckett, in particular Dream of Fair to Middling Women and Murphy. By considering the presence of the Confessions in these two novels I intend to show how St. Augustine's work played a significant role in the development of the young author, offering him the occasion to overcome his theory of habit as outlined in his early essay, Proust. In this text, Beckett posits habit as merely “the generic name for the countless treaties concluded between the countless subjects that constitute the individual and their countless correlative objects”. Dream still endorses this perspective, but already suggests a different dialectic of memory, will, and habit. This shift, I argue, can be connected to Beckett’s reading of Augustine's meditations, in book VIII of the Confessions, on the cleavage between the spirit and the flesh. In Murphy, we see Beckett’s 'Augustinian dialectic' fully formed: habit is no longer a veil of Maya that hides the real essence of the individual, but the condition of possibility for the subject's flight from the “mercantile Gehenna” world towards the truth of the inner self.Riassunto – L'interesse di Samuel Beckett per Sant'Agostino è evidente nell'intero corpus dell'autore – a partire dai suoi primissimi lavori, in particolare la poesia Whoroscope, fino agli ultimi drammi e racconti – e si manifesta sia sul piano del contenuto che dello stile. Nonostante il rapporto tra i due autori sia già stato oggetto dell'attenzione dei critici, una sua analisi sistematica deve essere ancora compiuta. Nel presente saggio si offre una proposta di lettura della presenza agostiniana nel primo Beckett, in particolare Dream of Fair to Middling Women e Murphy. Considerando la presenza delle Confessioni in questi due romanzi intendo mostrare come i lavori di Sant'Agostino abbino giocato un ruolo fondamentale nello sviluppo del giovane autore, offrendogli l'occasione di superare la sua teoria dell'abitudine così come l'aveva rappresentata nel saggio giovanile Proust. In questo testo, Beckett descrive l'abitudine come “il nome generico per gli innumerevoli accordi stipulati fra gli innumerevoli soggetti che costituiscono l'individuo e i rispettivi innumerevoli oggetti”. In Dream si presenta la stessa prospettiva, ma già si intravedono i segni di una differente dialettica fra memoria, volontà e abitudine. Tale slittamento può essere ricondotto alla lettura delle meditazioni agostiniane nel libro VIII delle Confessioni, nelle quali si tematizza la scissione fra la volontà dello spirito e quella del corpo. In Murphy la dialettica agostiniana di Beckett giunge a compimento: l'abitudine non è più il velo di Maya che nascone l'essenza reale dell'individuo, ma la condizione di possibilità per la fuga del soggetto dalla “mercantile Gehenna” verso la verità dell'interiorità.

En las últimas décadas, la interpretación de la teoría de la acción de Aristótelesha tendido hacia una postura intelectualista, según la cual la razón está acargo de establecer los fines de las acciones. Un resurgimiento del antiintelectualismo,según el cual establecer los fines es tarea del carácter y no dela razón, ha puesto esta postura bajo crítica (particularmente de la mano de J.Moss). Este ensayo sostiene que ninguna de las dos interpretaciones puede darcuenta suficiente de las complejidades de la teoría de Aristóteles, y proponeuna postura intermedia, que llamo intelectualismo indirecto, que preservalos méritos de ambas interpretaciones tradicionales y a la vez logra disiparlos problemas que aquejan a cada una. Existe muy sólida evidencia textual afavor de la tesis según la cual establecer fines es tarea no de la razón sino delcarácter (y en esto los anti-intelectualistas están en lo correcto); pero tambiénes necesario reconocer que la razón puede establecer fines indirectamente, através del cuidado de los procesos de habituación que constituyen el carácterde una persona (y en esto los intelectualistas están en lo cierto). Defiendoesta interpretación a través de un estudio de los pasajes que señalan unadivisión del trabajo entre el carácter y la razón, y de una reconstrucción dela concepción aristotélica de la habituación.

Szkaplerz zakonny początkowo w regule benedyktyńskiej używany był jako fartuch chroniący habit podczas prac fizycznych. Wraz z powstaniem cystersów stał się integralną częścią ubioru zakonnego. Szkaplerz przyjęli m.in. benedyktyni, bonifratrzy, dominikanie, kameduli, kapucyni tercjarze, karmelici, kartuzi, mercedariusze, paulini, bracia pocieszyciele z Getsemani, sercanie biali, trynitarze, serwici oraz albertynki, augustianki, benedyktynki, bernardynki, brygidki, dominikanki, niektóre franciszkanki, kamedułki, kapucynki, karmelitanki bose, klaryski, loretanki, pasterki, pijarki, serafitki i sercanki.

Powstanie małego szkaplerza było wynikiem zrzeszania się wiernych w bractwa i tercjarstwa. Dzięki temu osoby świeckie mogły na co dzień nosić szkaplerz jako zewnętrzny znak nawiązujący do ubrania zakonnego, który stał się symbolem okrycia szatą zbawienia i Bożej opieki. Szkaplerz mały składa się z dwóch kwadratowych lub prostokątnych płatków wełnianego sukna (inne formy są niedozwolone). Jeden kawałek szkaplerza powinien, zwieszać się na plecach, drugi powinien opadać na piersi, powinny być połączone tasiemkami w taki sposób, aby można było włożyć je na siebie przez głowę, a tasiemki leżały na ramionach. W Kościele Katolickim przyjęto 23 rodzaje małych szkaplerzy oraz medalik szkaplerzny noszonych przez wiernych świeckich.

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Internationale Bildungsforschung und Entwicklungspädagogik is the property of Waxmann Verlag GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Habit plays an ambiguous role in Samuel Beckett's oeuvre: on the one hand, as he claims in his essay Proust, habit is merely considered as “the guarantee of a dull inviolability”, a protective screen dividing the subject from reality; on the other hand habit, as the area of friction between activity and passivity, is the object of extensive meditation and a pivotal element in the representation of Beckett's characters. In this paper I intend to investigate this ambiguity in the light of Félix Ravaisson's and Maine de Biran's philosophical reflection on the theme of habit and though a reading of the short story All Strange Away