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The index of electoral volatility has been used as the principal indicators of institutionalization of party systems in recently democratic countries. However, comparative studies usually analyze the index at a highly elevated level of aggregated data, evaluating the variation only in national terms. From this perspective, our goal is to analyze Brazilian electoral volatility by taking the twenty-seven federal units as units of aggregation of the electoral data for the Chamber of Deputies. In the first part of the article, we show that there is great variability in the index between the states and between the successive elections; in the second part, we run a statistical test of the explanatory impact of political, economic, and social variables in the variation of electoral volatility in two dimensions: temporal (between the elections) and spatial (between the states). The results demonstrate the importance of some political variables to explaining variation of Brazilian electoral volatility. O indice de volatilidade eleitoral tem sido usado como um dos principais indicadores de institucionalizacao dos sistemas partidarios em paises de democracia recente. Contudo, os estudos comparados usualmente analisam esse indice num nivel de agregacao dos dados muito elevado, avaliando sua variacao com base nas medias nacionais. Sob tal perspectiva, nosso objetivo e analisar a volatilidade eleitoral brasileira tomando os 27 entes federativos como unidade de agregacao dos dados eleitorais para a Camara dos Deputados. Na primeira parte do artigo, mostramos que ha grande variabilidade no indice entre os estados e entre as sucessivas eleicoes; na segunda parte, realizamos um teste estatistico do impacto explicativo de variaveis politicas, economicas e sociais na variacao da volatilidade eleitoral em duas dimensoes: a temporal (entre as eleicoes) e a espacial (entre os estados). Os resultados mostram a importancia de algumas variaveis politicas na explicacao da variacao da volatilidade eleitoraI brasileira., INTRODUCAO OS estudos de politica comparada que se dedicam a analise das democracias recentes enfatizam a importancia da institucionalizacao dos sistemas partidarios como parte dos requisitos para o funcionamento adequado [...]

Partisan theories of political economy expect that bondholders will panic with the election of a left-wing presidential candidate. The latter seems to be what happened in Brazil in the 2002 presidential elections. However, quantitative analysis of perceptions of sovereign credit risk in Argentine, Brazilian, Mexican, and Venezuelan presidential elections from 1994 until 2007 shows no real evidence of a link between partisanship and perceptions of risk, even if the left-right divide is further broken down into left, center-left, center-right, right. Instead, international and domestic economic fundamentals have a stronger influence on risk evaluations. Qualitative analysis of the individual presidential elections shows the importance of policy uncertainty in explaining why certain electoral periods seemed more critical than others and how bondholders select between multiple equilibria. This research helps shift political analysis away from partisanship and more in the direction of policies and articulation. Keywords: partisan theories; political economy; political uncertainty; sovereign risk; Latin America

We argue that most survey measures of partisanship are misclassifying many respondents as nonpartisans. Common wordings, especially those in major cross-national surveys, violate well-established best practices in questionnaire design by reading aloud a nonpartisanship option. This is akin, we show, to the taboo of inviting no-opinion responses. Consequently, most wordings produce high rates of false negatives, meaning respondents with partisan leanings who nonetheless choose the nonpartisan response. Our analysis of experimental and observational data from four countries (Brazil, Mexico, Russia, United States) shows that nearly a quarter of respondents are false negatives when read an easy nonpartisan opt out. More importantly, we demonstrate, using item response theory and other measurement checks, that wordings that remedy this problem by not inviting nonpartisan responses have greater measurement validity. Our findings show that scholars are underestimating the prevalence of partisanship and that harbors for false negatives can exist in unexpected forms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article investigates the impact of local policies on human development indicators in Brazilian municipalities. This is an attempt to investigate the role of the legislative branch in reducing inequality and poverty through budget amendments, usually seen in derogatory form as pork barrel politics. We assess the effect of pork on municipalities using up‐to‐date policy evaluation techniques. Brazil is a case of extreme inequality and an active legislative branch in disbursing monies. The data set contains over 60,000 observations from all 5,500+ Brazilian municipalities for over a decade. We use matching and longitudinal data analysis techniques, treating pork as exogenous shocks, mapping how its effect reverberates on social and economic indicators in succeeding years. The results indicate a positive impact of such policies in improving local level development. However, these results are not sustainable over time, thus suggesting inclusion with a dissipative profile. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The paper describes the main characteristics of the 2006 Brazilian Presidential elections. It explores two defining traits of this elections: the interplay between how retrospective economic voting and views towards corruption affected vote volatility and the final result of the election. The paper concludes by pointing out implications of the current elections to the strengthening of democracy in Brazil. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we explore how the management of governing coalitions and attributes of the dynamics of the conflict between and within governing and opposition coalitions affect obstructionist movements in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies from 1991 to 2010. Obstructionist movements are operationalized by the percentage of monthly roll call votes related to procedural requirements that delay decisions on legislative proposals. We find that the proportionality in the distribution of ministerial posts reduces obstruction in minority coalitions. In larger coalitions, this type of incentive has little effect in reducing obstructionist moves. Smaller, more cohesive, and better managed governing coalitions are more capable than oversized coalitions of diminishing problems for decision making in the Chamber of Deputies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]