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This article is a qualitative study of anti-IS fighters who have traveled from the West to join the military struggle in Syria and Iraq. while earlier studies have mainly analyzed open sources (i.e. social media or journalist's reports), this article is based on an in-depth analysis of eight autobiographies written by individuals who traveled from Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Germany and the U.S. to take part in the fight against IS. What motives do they give for doing so, how are they treated by the police and journalists after they return from the wars in Syria and Iraq, and do they express other motives than those given by Westerners who have joined IS? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: War with ISIS (Daesh) is plaguing the Middle East region since 2014. It had a major regional and global impact on the lives of many. Peshmerga forces are the most active and effective ground force against ISIS. The major western forces and the international communities including the United Nations back up these forces. Although the war started 4 years, till now, little is known about the injuries these forces suffer from the explosive materials on the battlefield, and even less is known about the first aid and paramedic activities on the frontlines. Material and Methods: Reports estimate that 8,610 peshmerga were injured and 1,466 have died since the war with ISIS started. In this study, we randomly sampled the Medical records of 100 peshmerga injuries during the 3 years ISIS war(2014 o 2017) from Duhok Emergency Hospital. Objectives: This study aims to provide the descriptive analyses for the injuries suffered by Peshmerga forces in Duhok region, near Mosul, ISIS’s largest captured city in Iraq where the heart of the Battlefield was located. Results: This study also provides the information about the management lines and the outcome of these injuries. The main focus of this study is on blast and explosion injuries. It sheds the light on the line of the medical management on the battlefield and also highlights the availability of medical staff/equipment both at the frontlines and also at Duhok Emergency hospital which took care of the injured Peshmerga forces near Mosul. Conclusion: This study assessed the medical services and the outcome performance of wounded Peshmerga from blast injuries during the ISIS war.

The identification of chemical weapons as "weapons of mass destruction" highlights their possible damaging consequences on many civilians' health. The effect of chemical weapon agents has been documented to cause reproductive toxicity and have adverse effects on semen, leading to infertility in those exposed to those chemical agents. This study analysesthe semen fluid and follows up the exposed Peshmerga forces to the chemical weapon during the ISIS war.A prospective cohort study in which 58 exposed Peshmerga in three chemical attacks, compared with the same number of the non-exposed Peshmerga. Semen fluid analysis was performed for all, following up after one year. The serum level of both MDA and SOD was measured. An individual's BMI was calculated. The participants' mean agein this study is (32.5) years in the case group while (35.5) years in the control group, with a standard deviation of5 years in both groups. All participants are male, and no gender effect be seen. All chronicillnesses have been excluded from the study. The mean body mass index is 22.4, with a standard deviation of about 3.1 kg/m. Hypospermia developed in 18% of the exposed group(20% of the total participants), oligospermia (20% overall, only 3% of these in the non-exposed), and decreased motility in 19% of all participants, but 16 of this 19% where the exposed group with significant relative risk results, while morphology not changed inboth groups, also the findings showed that significant elevation in MDA level and SOD activity. Chemical weapons cansignificantly affect semen fluid analysis and interpretation through quantitativedisturbances in the volume and account of sperm, while the percentage of abnormal spermcounts has been increased considerably in peoples exposed to chemical weapons. However, the morphology of semen fluid sperms has not changed to the same degree, and its functioncannot be estimated. Even when functioning, the genetic errors on future generationsmay need further testing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The aim of the study was to know noise induces hearing loss and the effect of the noise on peshmerga that participated in the Daesh war in Erbil city. One of the health problems or most common forms of sensorineural is the noise induced-hearing loss. depending on the exposure noise induce cause damaging of the cochlea. So, one of the causes of noise induced hearing loss is exposure to the excessive noise. Objective: To determine noise induce hearing loss among peshmerga participated in the Daesh war in Erbil city. Patients and Methods: In the present study, a total of (253) Peshmerga of four special brigades who exposed to noise in the Daesh war in Erbil city was performed, also pure tone audiogram was done for each peshmerga in the Auditory department at Hawler teaching hospital. Also, pure tone audiogram and firearm noise levels for the right and left ear for each degree of hearing loss for the range of the noise induced hearing loss (4000Hz) performed and hearing loss range in dB. Slight/Mild from 16-40dB, Moderate/Moderate severe from 41-70dB, and Severe/Severe profound from 71-120 dB. were evaluated for each peshmerga in the auditory department at Hawler teaching hospital to know the cause of inducing hearing loss. Subjects answered a questionnaire and underwent threshold tonal audiometry. Results: Two hundred and fifty-three peshmerga who participated in the Daesh war, was enrolled in this study that subdivided into four age groups (20-29), (30-39), (40-49), (50-59) years, pure tone audiogram was done for each peshmerga for right and left ear. Conclusion: Because of the nature of the profession military, the common disease in the military is induce hearing loss is caused by noise. Hearing is the vital origin during exposure to loud noise. So, prevention is needed and to be a learner with care to the use of hearing protection device. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we empirically study the effects of terrorism on the para-diplomacy of Kurdistan Region of Iraq during the last two decades. The research paper analyses the form of diplomacy, in the current age, has covered new style, in particular, when the new actors (non-state actors) are playing significant roles. In this regard, the Kurdistan region government as non-state actor has successfully used terrorism as a great instrument to attract the attention of the world community and created broad its paradiplomatic relations with actors around the world. In turn, we find suggestive evidence that the Kurdistan Region Government should further enhance the ability of its foundations to sustain its relations with world community. Our findings are consistent with the idea that the threat of terrorism is never going to be end, thereby it is not easy for the state-actors to keep their eyes away from the role of any world actors (including non-state actors).

Background: War with ISIS (Daesh) is plaguing the Middle East region since 2014. It had a major regional and global impact on the lives of many. Peshmerga forces are the most active and effective ground force against ISIS. The major western forces and the international communities including the United Nations back up these forces. Although the war started 4 years, till now, little is known about the injuries these forces suffer from the explosive materials on the battlefield, and even less is known about the first aid and paramedic activities on the frontlines. Material and Methods: Reports estimate that 8,610 peshmerga were injured and 1,466 have died since the war with ISIS started. In this study, we randomly sampled the Medical records of 100 peshmerga injuries during the 3 years ISIS war(2014 o 2017) from Duhok Emergency Hospital. Objectives: This study aims to provide the descriptive analyses for the injuries suffered by Peshmerga forces in Duhok region, near Mosul, ISIS's largest captured city in Iraq where the heart of the Battlefield was located. Results: This study also provides the information about the management lines and the outcome of these injuries. The main focus of this study is on blast and explosion injuries. It sheds the light on the line of the medical management on the battlefield and also highlights the availability of medical staff/equipment both at the frontlines and also at Duhok Emergency hospital which took care of the injured Peshmerga forces near Mosul. Conclusion: This study assessed the medical services and the outcome performance of wounded Peshmerga from blast injuries during the ISIS war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the war against Islamic State from 2014 to 2017 the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga became important local allies of the United States and its international partners, playing a significant role in the eventual defeat of Islamic State. In 2017, backed by the US and its Western allies, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) agreed plans to reform and modernize the Peshmerga. This article provides an analysis of this reform process. Reform is severely constrained by two problems. First, the continuing soft civil war between Iraqi Kurdistan's two main political parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), within which both parties view their maintenance of independent Peshmerga forces as central to their power and political survival. Second, the heroic-mythic status of the Peshmerga within Iraqi Kurdish society, which makes it difficult to convert the Peshmerga into a "normal" military force. Reform efforts to date have not addressed these issues. Until such time as the deep political divide between the KDP and the PUK is addressed, Peshmerga reform is unlikely to make significant progress – the military cart cannot be put before the political horse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Kurdish armed forces and security forces, known as the Peshmerga and Asayish, respectively, have both been intensively politicized by the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan from their foundation to the present. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has already experienced serious systematic crises caused by weak democratic institutions, poor governance, and a dysfunctional party system. The failure to build cohesive armed forces in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq exacerbates these issues because it politicizes basic internal and external security. This article, based on interviews with the Kurdish authorities, discusses the ramifications of the KRG's politicized forces on the democratic process, civil-military relations, the defence readiness of the Kurdish armed forces, societal instability, and judicial power. This research argues that Kurdish politicized forces severely affect the democratic process in the Kurdistan Region, create problems for civil-military relations, undermine defence readiness, cause instability, and also have a considerable, negative impact on judicial power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Northern Part of Iraq and its structures has generated considerable interest in the West in the last thirty years. This paper analyzes the creation of the security structures in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), highlighting the difficulties effected by their traditional disunity within the context of the historical periods that this article considers – the period from 1991 to 2003, 2003 to 2014, 2014 to 2017 and finally, 2017 to 2020. As for the last of the stages, this article claims that a US´s withdrawal from Iraq might change the strategy followed by the Iraqi Kurds whose identity and political structures are at stake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research aims to analyse the drivers which informed the decision and timing of Kurdistan's independence referendum on 25 September 2017. Here we argue that any proper examination of these drivers must begin by investigating the relationship between the fight to counter the Islamic State begun in 2014, the disputes arising as a result of Kurdistan's presidential election issue in 2015 and the internal political rivalry exacerbated by the question of whether to hold a referendum. The findings of this article highlight the centrality of de facto entities' internal governance in their struggle towards statehood. The fight against IS served as a primary driver in influencing the timing and the approach of the September 2017 referendum. While the 2015 political deadlock resulting in the illegal extension of Barzani's presidency was not a determining factor leading to the referendum, nonetheless it quickened the process and influenced the timing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Less than a month after the Kurdistan independence referendum, the Iraqi Army and units of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) attacked the disputed province of Kirkuk on October, 16, 2017. Unlike most national defence forces, the Kurdish Peshmerga is divided along partisan lines between the two largest parties in Iraqi Kurdistan. This particular area was largely under the control of units affiliated with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which decided to make a strategic withdrawal in the face of superior numbers and firepower. The city was then retaken in short order by forces loyal to Baghdad, as were all other disputed territories previously under Kurdish control. Subsequently, the allegation that the PUK had retreated too easily has been described by the rival Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and others as a betrayal of the Kurdish people by the PUK. This has created two competing post-event perspectives: first, that the Peshmerga forces should have defended Kirkuk to the last man and should not have left their front line trenches; second that the withdrawal of the Peshmerga was a deliberate and rational military reaction to overwhelming opposition. This article critically assesses both perspectives and finds that partisan divisions in the Peshmerga critically undermined the ability of Kurdish forces to defend the disputed areas that they controlled. Instead of serving as motivation of create a unified fighting force, the loss of Kirkuk has only served to deepen those divisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyzes the creation of primary unit cohesion among the Kurdish Peshmerga soldiers fighting the Islamic State in northern Iraq and among Hezbollah fighters active in Syria. For this comparative study, Kurdish soldiers were interviewed on three fronts outside Mosul, Erbil, and Kirkuk in February 2015 and May 2016, and Hezbollah fighters were interviewed in Lebanon in March 2016. In contrast to many studies’ depictions of unit cohesion as relating to shared experiences of training and battle, this study argues that the Kurdish soldiers also import into their units various ideas relating to Kurdish identity. These include ideas about nationalism and religion produced through discourses within the Kurdish military and society. However, Hezbollah seeks to minimize political damage in the multisectarian political context in Lebanon while conducting domestically contested military operations abroad. This has led to a downplaying of the sectarian aspects of the conflict, which could be imported from the Shia community to increase unit cohesion, and to an ideological framing of the conflict. The general ideas circulating in society and the political context therefore matter for the strategies that can be used to increase primary unit cohesion and soldiers’ fighting power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores differing strategies and tactics employed by the peshmerga forces against the Islamic State (IS). This experience highlights a number of issues which are relevant to contemporary security debates. Firstly, the struggle highlights important aspects of the development of the peshmerga and their strategies as an organised non-state military force (defending as it does the Kurdistan Region in Iraq). Secondly, the peshmerga-IS conflict is an important case study of small wars. The strategy and tactics used here are therefore useful empirical references about the effectiveness of military force in counter-insurgency. Finally, the war against IS united the peshmerga forces, possibly for the first time, and effected a radical change in the Kurdish use of military tactics, including the shift from defensive to offensive strategies. The article examines the methods employed by the peshmerga forces against IS, explains why the cases of Makhmour and Shingal stand out as tipping points, and discusses the evolution of Kurdish defence capacity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyzes the war against the Islamic State (IS), specifically on the front in northern Iraq, and the mental strategies that the Kurdish Peshmerga soldiers use to maintain their combat motivation. For this field study, dozens of soldiers of various ranks were interviewed and observed on three fronts outside of Mosul, Erbil, and Kirkuk in February 2014. While some mental strategies are nearly universal, others depend on the characteristics of the fighting force and the threat that they face. The article identifies five distinct mental strategies for dealing with the stress of fighting the IS: simultaneous dehumanization and humanization of the enemy, seeing a larger cause, use of humor, religious identity, and martyrdom. The findings suggest that factors beyond primary group cohesion, on which much previous research has focused, can play an important role in increasing soldiers’ fighting power. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on the European Union Peace Building and the Enable and Enhance Initiative. Topics include the revelation of the increased importance of the Enable and Enhance Initiative (E2I) as discussed by European Union member states (EU) with the Germany's decision to militarily support Kurdish Peshmerga in northern Iraq against Islamic State (Organization), a reference to the cases of South Sudan and Mali, and addressing of the implications for future research and policy making.

The siege of the northern Syrian town of Kobane was lifted in January 2015. The Kurdish defenders there had triumphed against Islamic State (IS). The conflict then moved on. It moved on, though, with the United States, the United Kingdom, and other Western powers having adopted, almost by default, the Kurds as proxy fighters in this conflict. The Kurds, however, are a divided and fractious nation spread across three states and historically famous for fighting among themselves. In employing the Kurds as proxies against IS, as this article shows, these Western powers must be aware of the unintended consequences that can result. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the U.S.'s strategy of fighting the terrorist organization the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the American policy of containment against Iran, including in regard to Iran's supporting the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian Civil War. The author recommends increasing support for Sunnis in Iraq to fight ISIS. An overview of the role of the Kurds in Iraq and Syria in combating ISIS, including the Kurdish peshmerga in Iraq and Syrian Kurdish militant group Popular Protection Units' (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel's, or YPG's) fighting ISIS, is provided.

The article provides a comparison of the various military commitments, armed forces levels and military defence expenditures of various countries such as the U.S., Germany, and Russia as of February 2015. Selected non-state armed groups are mentioned, including the Kurdistan Regional Government's Peshmerga forces, the Boko Haram militant group, and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham terrorist organization. Defence spending statistics for Great Britain, Turkey, and Japan are assessed.

The Kurds tend to get lost in discussions about the tilt of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki toward Iran, the increasingly arbitrary nature of his rule, and the growing [...]

Following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Kurdish politicians were involved in Baghdad governments, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) became a federal unit with increased autonomy. Nevertheless, the KRG's quest for keeping its autonomy was challenged after the withdrawal of US forces at the end of 2011. When US forces left Iraq, the Baghdad government, headed by Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, the leader of the Shiite State of Law Coalition, tried to centralize power. Unsurprisingly, Maliki's centralization efforts have generated criticism and secessionist repercussions among Kurdish political circles. Furthermore, the Maliki government has violated the basic principles of power sharing, which is sine qua non to strengthen the confidence-building processes in divided societies. Increasingly, the Kurds' willingness to remain as part of Iraq considerably decreases as the Baghdad government consolidates its power and excludes the ethnic and religious groups from the political system., In 1970, a commission headed by Saddam Hussein visited Mullah Mustafa Barzani's headquarter in Saman, Arbil. There had been an ongoing Kurdish armed struggle for autonomy since 1961, and the [...]

For those interested in ensuring Iraq's stability and territorial integrity, the relationship between Arabs and Kurds is now of paramount importance. Indeed, it is a difficult task to identify any [...]

The Islamic State's rise has shaped the battlefield in Iraq and Syria, as well as shifting alliances between the United States and countries in the region. Rather than try to placate its adversaries, Washington should cooperate more closely with the Kurds. Kurdish militia in Iraqi Kurdistan and Syria have shown the commitment and capability to confront ISIS. In addition to security assistance—air support and the supply of sophisticated weapons—Kurds deserve diplomatic and political support. Iraqi Kurdistan is emerging as the world's next newest nation and America's best friend in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses relations between Israel and the Kurdish people. Topics include connections between the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) organization in Iraq and Kurdish Jews in Israel, political aspects of Israeli-Kurdish ties during the Baath regime era in Iraq, and tensions between the militant group Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey and Israel. Comparisons between Zionism and Kurdish nationalism are addressed. Allegations that PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan holds anti-Semitic views are addressed in light of his anti-Zionist statements. Purported Israeli military training of Kurdish peshmerga militants is discussed.

'We'll do whatever the U.S. wants us to. We belong to them' Hamid Afandi, KDP Minister of Peshmerga Affairs In a June 19th commentary that appeared in Asia Times, analyst [...]

The author discusses the proposal about the ultimate dependence of strategy on the understanding of environment and adapting to uncertainty. He mentions the postulation made by the professor Yakov Ben-Haim about the decision to initiate or refrain from war to be accompanied by multifarious uncertainty. He speaks of the importance Enable and Enhance Initiative as discussed by the European Union by the Germans to supply arms to Kurdish Peshmerga against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

This paper provides a detailed, insider assessment of the new Iraqi security and military forces as organized under current Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. It analyzes the recruitment, training and fielding of Iraqi police and regular armed forces with special attention to the volatile sectarian and ethnic allegiances - exacerbated through direct recruitment from partisan militias including the Kurdish Peshmerga, the Badr Corps and Ṣadrist groups - that obviate against a stable and reliable hierarchical chain of command. It contains a complete analysis of all current Iraqi Army divisions, their composition, leadership and deployment as well as recommendations for how all branches of the Iraqi armed forces may be restored to levels and readiness characteristic of effective national defense and security forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kamal Majid provides an insider's assessment of the history, political dynamics, major players and current social and economic conditions in the Kurdish region of Iraq. The author outlines a state of exception that has had an ambiguous and sometimes turbulent relationship both with the previous Baﺀth regime and the present Baghdad government which ultimately replaced it. The powerful rival groups of Jalal Ṭalabanī and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Masﺀud Barazanī and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) vie for power, control of oil resources and pipelines as well as lucrative trans-national smuggling routes at a time when services have deteriorated and material components of infrastructure have been sold off to Iran. The picture of a region run by the Peshmerga militias of the ruling parties and plagued by corruption and influence peddling in a world of shifting alliances between Turkey, occupation forces and Iran is a dim one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]