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The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) provides that children require 'special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection' (Preamble). In recent years various attempts have been made by Scottish lawmakers to safeguard and promote children's rights across a range of legal fields. However, the field of delict (termed "tort law" in many jurisdictions) has been excluded from the process of mainstreaming children's rights in domestic law. Most of the contemporary litigation in the field is about liability for negligence (i.e., unintentional wrongdoing). In negligence proceedings, children are typically victims seeking redress from adults through the judicial system following childhood injury. Using Scotland as a case study, this article examines legal reasoning in what are termed "childhood negligence proceedings". Drawing on the jurisprudence of the Committee on the Rights of the Child and wider literature, the article raises concerns about both the substance and established practices of the law. In particular, an absence of judicial engagement with children and research about childhood development is observed. Consideration is given as to what might be the nature of the obligations imposed upon states in this field of law by Articles 1 (age), 2 (non-discrimination), 3 (best interests), 6 (life, survival and development) and 12 (voice) of the CRC. Two overarching questions persist: first, can findings of negligence or contributory negligence against children ever be justified? And secondly, if so, what should be the model for imposing childhood liability? As Scotland fully incorporates the CRC in domestic law, the article concludes by framing a series of questions directed towards creating new knowledge and developing new understanding capable of transforming the child's position in delict/tort law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The distinction between the criminal fault elements of recklessness and negligence is one of Anglo-American criminal law's key distinctions. It is a distinction with practical significance, as many serious crimes require at least recklessness and cannot be committed negligently. The distinction is standardly marked by awareness. Recklessness requires awareness that one's conduct carries a risk of harm. Negligence only requires that one ought to have been aware that one's conduct carried such a risk, even if one was in fact unaware of this. But should the recklessness/negligence distinction be marked by awareness of risk, or by something else? Does a defendant's awareness of risk really have the normative significance to mark such a distinction? In this paper, I answer these questions by discussing a challenge to this 'standard account' of the recklessness/negligence distinction raised by the work of Antony Duff, who defends an alternative, non-awareness-based model of the recklessness/negligence distinction. I will argue that, although Duff's alternative model fails, seeing how it goes wrong helps us see how awareness genuinely does have the right kind of normative significance to mark the distinction between recklessness and negligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit recently made a decision in the case of McCluskey El v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc. The court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the case, stating that the appellant was adequately informed of the contract's terms and that the pandemic did not justify tolling the statute of limitations. The court emphasized the importance of reasonable communication and the rarity of granting an equitable tolling remedy in maritime tort actions. This decision provides clarity and guidance for future cases involving equitable tolling. [Extracted from the article]

Tort law has failed to respond to the intolerably high incidence of rape and sexual assault in the United States. By any measure, there is glaring disparity between the paltry number of tort claims brought by rape victims and the vast number of sexual assaults committed each year. Among the multiple reasons.for the underutilization of tort law is the inadequacy of traditional doctrinal frameworks for litigating such cases, particularly the assumption that a rape victim must bring an intentional tort claim to recover against an offender. The labyrinthine doctrine of consent that looms large in intentional tort cases has deterred plaintiffs from suing and has made it diffcult for plaintijjk to prevail. even when a defendant's sexual conduct is unwelcome and harmful. Our solution is to allow tort plaintiffs the option of bringing a negligence claim against the omnder, centering the litigation on the unreasonableness of the defendant's conduct rather than the consent of the plaintiff Allowing a negligence claim for rape responds to the countless date- and acquaintance-rape cases in which the defendant's unreasonable conduct has undermined the plaintiff's ability to consent freely-creating a risk of coercion--and to those cases in which a defendant has placed his interests above the plaintiffs by taking a risk that the plaintiff has not in fact consented. The option of negligence will allow juries to evaluate contested cases in a straightforward fashion and will provide a more secure route to adequate compensation, particularly if courts determine that such negligence claims are not subject to the "intentional acts" exclusion in insurance contracts. Courts will jace a variety of doctrinal questions in litigating such negligence-based rape claims, including the proper categorization of the injury as physical versus emotional harm and the availability Of the contributory/comparative negligence defense. Because affording such a negligence option would not preclude plaintillk.from also asserting intentional tort claims, it is important that courts not view such claims as mutually exclusive and that plaintiffs be given the opportunity to argue in the alternative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to show difficulties arising when courts judge the negligence of dog owners in absence of precise legislation and typical precedents. We analyze the elements of a crime in two cases where children were objects of canine aggression, and show how the courts constructed the issue of dog owners’ negligence. In Case 1 the Court of Appeal found that a foster parent was not negligent when leaving a boy with specific needs alone with a heavily built dog that then repeatedly bit the boy to death despite the owners attempt to pull away the dog. The court also ignored the signs of substandard animal husbandry including previous severe incidents where the dog owner also was injured. In Case 2, the Court of Appeal instead found that the breed of the dog also matter, and that not even adult presence is enough to protect a child from dog attack. Because both the child and the dog could behave unpredictably, continuous observation and supervision was required. In both cases, measures to prevent the incident were available and would have been easy to carry out.

The modified version of art. 121-3 of the French Criminal Code introduces a hierarchy of the nonintentional forms of guilt according to seriousness. From the perspective of the French legislator, this hierarchy would be the following: deliberate negligence (art. 121-3 para. 2), simple negligence – carelessness, imprudence – (art. 121-3 para. 3) and breaking a duty of care or protection (art. 121-3 para. 4). In the Italian Criminal Code only the conscious negligence is defined, whereas the simple negligence is not defined, but merely exemplified. Thus, article 43 para. 1 states that “There is an offence committed with negligence whenever the result, even though foreseen, is not desired by the agent and occurs because of carelessness, imprudence, lack of skill, or failure to observe laws, regulations, orders or instructions”.

Although in German and in Spanish legal systems there are no express provisions with regard to the criminal negligence (culpa), this has not hindered the legal doctrine and jurisprudence to thoroughly analyse this form of guilt. This made it possible to qualify as intentional offences some deeds which in our legal system are considered to be committed with conscious negligence (involving foresight). The difficulty to distinguish between indirect intention (dolus eventualis) and conscious negligence (luxuria) has nonetheless determined Spanish courts to ask the legislator to provide a clear definition of indirect intention, which could be an additional argument with respect to the weaknesses entailed by such a legal approach.

The article discusses the definition of misfeasance within the framework of tort and criminal liability. Topics covered include the scope of the breach of duty of public officials, the difference between misfeasance and criminal negligence, and an analysis of case law in misfeasance in the development of the common-law offence, and gross negligence with a focus on manslaughter.

We seem to be responsible for our beliefs in a distinctively epistemic way. We often hold each other to account for the beliefs that we hold. We do this by criticising other believers as 'gullible' or 'biased', and by trying to persuade others to revise their beliefs. But responsibility for belief looks hard to understand because we seem to lack control over our beliefs. In this paper, I argue that we can make progress in our understanding of responsibility for belief by thinking about it in parallel with another kind of responsibility: legal responsibility for criminal negligence. Specifically, I argue that that a popular account of responsibility for belief, which grounds it in belief's reasons-responsiveness, faces a problem analogous to one faced by H.L.A. Hart's influential capacity-based account of culpability. This points towards a more promising account of responsibility of belief, though, if we draw on accounts of negligence that improve on Hart's. Broadly speaking, the account of negligence that improves on Hart's account grounds culpability in a (lack of) concern for others' interests, whereas my account of epistemic responsibility grounds responsibility for belief in a (lack of) concern for the truth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author comments on the article "Improving Jurors' Evaluations of Auditors in Negligence Cases," by Kathryn Kadous. The article examined the effect of bias on jurors' decisions on negligence cases involving auditors. Kadous' article also proposed a theoretical framework for the possible influence of knowledge of a negative outcome on the evaluative judgments of jurors in an auditor negligence trial. The author expresses his concerns about the article's theoretical background, experimental design, and analysis of results.

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The modified version of art. 121-3 of the French Criminal Code introduces a hierarchy of the nonintentional forms of guilt according to seriousness. From the perspective of the French legislator, this hierarchy would be the following: deliberate negligence (art. 121-3 para. 2), simple negligence - carelessness, imprudence - (art. 121-3 para. 3) and breaking a duty of care or protection (art. 121-3 para. 4). In the Italian Criminal Code only the conscious negligence is defined, whereas the simple negligence is not defined, but merely exemplified. Thus, article 43 para. 1 states that "There is an offence committed with negligence whenever the result, even though foreseen, is not desired by the agent and occurs because of carelessness, imprudence, lack of skill, or failure to observe laws, regulations, orders or instructions". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a court case R. v. Winterton (Andrew), in which a Court of Appeal judge dismissed the appeal of the defendant, a construction site manager, who was charged with gross negligence manslaughter when a labourer died due to a collapsed trench at a housing development site.

Given the unwittingness of negligence, personal responsibility for negligent conduct is puzzling. After all, how is it that one is responsible for what one did not intend to do or was unaware that one was doing? How, therefore, is one's agency involved with one's negligence so as to ground one's responsibility for it? Negligence is an unwitting failure in agency to meet a standard requiring conduct that falls within one's competency. Accordingly, negligent conduct involves agency in that negligence is a manifestation of agency failure. Now, nobody's perfect. Human agency is innately fallible, and a measure of agency failure is, therefore, unavoidable. The more one's negligence manifests failure in one's agency as an individual, the more one is responsible for it. In contrast, the more one's negligence involves the shortcomings innate to all human agency the less responsible one becomes, because one's agency as an individual is less and less involved in one's failure. Determinative of the measure of individual and of human failings mixed into an instance of negligent phi -ing is the background quality of one's agency at meeting one's competency at phi -ing. That is, how able one is at delivering on what one is able to competently do. The more able, the less one's occasional instances of negligence involve manifestations of failures of one's agency as an individual—nobody's perfect—and are more manifestations of one's agency's innate human fallibility, making one less and less responsible for one's negligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although in German and in Spanish legal systems there are no express provisions with regard to the criminal negligence (culpa), this has not hindered the legal doctrine and jurisprudence to thoroughly analyse this form of guilt. This made it possible to qualify as intentional offences some deeds which in our legal system are considered to be committed with conscious negligence (involving foresight). The difficulty to distinguish between indirect intention (dolus eventualis) and conscious negligence (luxuria) has nonetheless determined Spanish courts to ask the legislator to provide a clear definition of indirect intention, which could be an additional argument with respect to the weaknesses entailed by such a legal approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 in Great Britain, intended to abolish gross negligence manslaughter. Topics discussed include the issues with identification doctrine in criminal liability for corporate manslaughter before this act; the case law for corporate manslaughter; and the fine that can be imposed on corporations in cases on negligence manslaughter.

The article discusses the effects of gross criminal negligence on professional tribunals. Topics discussed include information on the gross negligence manslaughter; need of professional standards and conduct in medical practice; and the death of the victim due to the breach of duty and the patient safety culture.

In this article, I advance a culpability-based justification for command responsibility. Command responsibility has attracted powerful, principled criticisms, particularly that its controversial 'should have known' fault standard may breach the culpability principle. Scholars are right to raise such questions, as a negligence-based mode of accessory liability seems to chafe against our analytical constructs. However, I argue, in three steps, that the intuition of justice underlying the doctrine is sound. An upshot of this analysis is that the 'should have known' standard in the ICC Statute, rather than being shunned, should be embraced. While Tribunal jurisprudence shied away from criminal negligence due to culpability concerns, I argue that the 'should have known' standard actually maps better onto personal culpability than the rival formulations developed by the Tribunals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on implications for the criminal justice system and the problematic prosecution of an Asian American police officer in the case the man was convicted of manslaughter, which carries a fifteen year maximum penalty. It mentions the officer was convicted of, criminally negligent homicide, require a gross deviation from the standard of care. It also mentions trigger of his pistol, there would still be no basis for homicide liability.

The article is devoted to the actual problem of the subject aspect of the unlawful carrying out of the archaeological explorations, excavations, other earth-moving and submarine works at the object of the archaeological heritage (according to the Criminal Code of Ukraine part 1,Article 298). During carrying out of the analysis of the subject aspect of the given crime such important characteristics of guilt as essence, extent of guilt, form and content of it have been revealed. The possibility of the commitment of a crime specified by the Criminal Code of Ukraine part 1, Article 298 both with the special intent and with the criminal negligence has been given grounds

The changing doctor-patient relationship and commercialization of modern medical practice has affected the practice of medicine. On the one hand, there can be unfavorable results of treatment and on the other hand the patient suspects negligence as a cause of their suffering. There is an increasing trend of medical litigation by unsatisfied patients. The Supreme Court has laid down guidelines for the criminal prosecution of a doctor. This has decreased the unnecessary harassment of doctors. As the medical profession has been brought under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, the patients have an easy method of litigation. There should be legal awareness among the doctors that will help them in the proper recording of medical management details. This will help them in defending their case during any allegation of medical negligence.

Prevalence of AIDS in recent years on the one hand, and lack of a relevant rule for criminalization and punishment of behaviours transmitting it have required paying a attention to criminal institutions available. In Iran, certain labels such as transimission of STD, murder, quasi – intentional homicide, manslaughter, attempted murder, exerting intentional assault and battery, and infringement of public security, depending on the case seem applicable. However, such labels as threatening against public health do not seem appropriate.In canadion law, among various labels of attempted murder, assault, public nuisance, etc. That of criminal negligence is cuounted a the most proper one for behaviours transmitting AIDS.

The article discusses the court case Aydogdu versus Turkey wherein a Turkish couple complained that their premature baby was deprived of vital emergency care due to structural deficiencies in public hospitals.

The article focuses on the interrelated bases upon which a court should find the laws prohibiting criminal negligence causing death to be constitutionally invalid and need of adoption of a subjective mens rea for criminal negligence causing death.

The legal status, scope, and policy implications of the waiver of tort doctrine have been a prominent, controversial, and unresolved feature of many recent class action proceedings in Canada, especially in products liability cases, where plaintiffs have sought to claim disgorgement of profits or revenues as an alternative to proof of damage or injury. The doctrine in recent years has been invoked frequently by plaintiffs in negligence class actions, though its legal status in such a context remains uncertain, as it has not been judicially decided. The article assesses the waiver of tort doctrine from an economic perspective. It argues that decoupling remedies from actual damages in negligence cases generally, or in products liability cases in particular, is not well founded from an economic perspective. Theory and evidence suggests that the deterrence and insurance aspects of negligence law are best achieved by linking remedies to losses actually suffered. In many contexts, disgorgement of gains from activities entailing negligent conduct may induce socially wasteful forms of over-deterrence. Economic analysis does not support the waiver of tort doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports decision of different U.S. courts in different cases, as of December 2015. Several cases discussed include 'United States v. Taylor' related to federal sentencing; "Edwards v. Arkansas Department of Human Services" concerning Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure; and "Gill v. State" related to conviction for criminal negligence.

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Law & Society/Revue Canadienne Droit et Societe (Cambridge University Press) is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

'Attempted negligence' is a category of criminal offense that many jurists and philosophers have law have deemed conceptually incoherent. In his Attempts: In the Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law, Gideon Yaffe challenges this dismissal, anchoring his argument in cases of what he calls 'mental self-management' in which agents plan to bring about that they perform unintentional actions at a later time. He plausibly argues that mental self-management-type attempted negligence is possible. However, his account raises the question whether such attempts can be successful: whether, in other words, attempts to perform unintentional actions at a later time could issue in actions that are, indeed, unintentional. Intuitively, at least, it would seem that we should answer in the affirmative. However, that answer poses problems for a plausible and widely-held account of intentional action. Al Mele, responding to Yaffe's account, has pointed out this problem without, I think, providing a satisfactory resolution. I propose another way of vindicating the possibility of successful attempted negligence with small, if significant, revision to the standard view of intentional action. In these cases, I argue, agents fail to act intentionally because they render themselves, through their acts of self-management, unaware that they are successfully executing their intentions. Moreover, I argue that these agents' intentions to bring about that they perform unintentional actions do not commit them to acting intentionally because of the nature of intentions to bring about actions. I offer an account of the intention to bring about that one A's and defend it against some objections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One proposed way of preserving the link between criminal negligence and blameworthiness is to define criminal negligence in moral terms. On this view, a person can be held criminally responsible for a negligent act if her negligence reflects a deficit of moral concern. Some theorists are convinced that this definition restores the link between negligence and blameworthiness, while others insist that criminal negligence remains suspect. This article contributes to the discussion by applying the work of ethicist Nomy Arpaly to criminal negligence. Although not interested in legal issues herself, Arpaly has a well-developed theory of moral agency that explains moral concern in terms of responsiveness to moral reasons. Introducing her work to the ongoing scholarly debate will be helpful for two reasons. First, while a definition of negligence in terms of moral concern is recognized as one proposed solution to the negligence–blameworthiness problem, authors promoting it have yet to give a systematic account of moral concern and its relation to blame. Borrowing Arpaly's account will help clarify the idea of moral concern so that both proponents and critics of a concern approach to negligence can have a better-defined debate. Second, her theory of blameworthiness is especially suited to defending the blameworthiness of negligent actions, because it does not have recourse to a special quality of choice or self-control that must be active to render conduct blameworthy. To make this second advantage clear, the article argues that reliance on choice or self-control problematizes blameworthiness for negligence. Those who wish to defend blameworthiness for negligent acts should base their work on an account of moral agency that does not rely on either choice or self-control to explain when an action is blameworthy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article offers information on the history, drawbacks and legal reforms to prosecution of manslaughter by criminal negligence of physicians in various jurisdictions in Australia. It discusses the case of Jayant Patel, the Director of Surgery at Bundaberg Base Hospital, Queensland, which reflects prosecutorial failure of the criminal justice system of Australia to address the fraud charges associated with deaths.

Medical profession differentiates itself from other professions, where apart from the knowledge and skill, touch of humanity is also required. Since the inclusion of medical profession under the ambit of Consumer Protection Act there has been a spurt in the number of cases against the doctors. Bolam's test is applied to assess medical negligence of doctor. Cases against the doctors can be brought in a civil or criminal court, and accordingly the negligence may be civil or criminal negligence. In deciding criminal negligence against doctors criminal intent need to be proved. The Medical Law and Ethical Code for medical professional in India are prescribed by Indian Medical Council, under the section 20-A of Indian Medical Council Act of 1956 and Amendment Act No. 24 of 1964. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dental profession holds a special level of trust with the patients; the profession makes a commitment to patient that they will adhere to high ethical standard of conduct. In recent times the dental profession is under attack by litigation cases by disgruntled patients who are not satisfied by the treatment. The dissatisfaction can be resolved between patients and doctors but sometimes patient turn to courts to get the matter solved. A litigation case against a dentist causes loss of reputation, loss of income, harassment, mental agony and embarrassment in the society. Hence, to protect oneself from such type of suffering the dentist should have an idea about the rules and regulation guiding their profession, the law and litigation pertaining to their practice and standard protocols to follow to avoid the malpractice cases. The data gathered for this review article was from manual and internet search of records. The following review article provides basic information on ethical principles, dental negligence and related liabilities, case reports and how to make dental treatment more qualitative and accountable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the lawsuit HKSAR v. Lai Shui Yin related to gross negligence manslaughter (GNM) in Hong Kong, China. Topics discussed include importance of mens rea in issues related to GNM, imposition of mandatory lengthy sentences in the cases of GNM, and issues of recklessness associated with GNM in comparison to gross negligence.

This Article empirically tests two key questions. First: How sensitive are jurors to variations in the language that delineates the criminal mental state categories? Second: To what extent do jurors assign culpability in the manner assumed by the Model Penal Code (MPC)? In prior work, we challenged numerous assumptions underlying the MPC mental state architecture, which divides guilty minds into four kinds: purposeful, knowing, reckless, and negligent. Our experiments showed that subjects had profound difficulty categorizing some of the mental states, particularly recklessness, in the context of scenarios in which hypothetical actors caused harmful results. And, when asked to punish hypothetical actors, subjects punished knowing behavior and reckless behavior indistinguishably. Here, we extend our prior work in two main ways. First, we show that a person's ability to apply the MPC mental states is susceptible to subtle variations in the language that defines and communicates them. For instance, we demonstrate that using slightly different wording can significantly improve participants' ability to accurately identify the mental state of recklessness (notwithstanding that reckless and knowing mental states remain by far the hardest to classify). Second, we show that even when people can see the mental state distinctions that the MPC draws, they don't necessarily rank order the mental states--by culpability level--in the order the MPC assumes. These findings raise questions about the normative basis for the knowing/reckless distinction in the MPC's mental state hierarchy in the context of result elements. Further, because even small changes in phrasing can produce significant differences in juror evaluation, the findings raise genuine concerns about the adequacy of MPC-based culpability instructions in criminal cases. Our results suggest the need for a critical reexamination of the substantial divide between the expectations and assumptions of drafters of criminal codes, on one hand, and empirical reality, on the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]