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This paper is written from the perspective of a historian who is aware of the 20th century roots of current problems between the two Asian giants, as well as their tremendous contributions to world civilization and Asian prosperity in the past, and hopefully in the future. The paper analyzes issues troubling India-China relations, such as the unresolved boundary question, sensitivity on matters of international status, and mutual perceptions of threat arising from fears of encirclement. It shows how the two governments have made tremendous progress in overcoming or mitigating these problems, and in establishing strong human and economic ties between the two fastest growing economies in the world. Pakistan continues to be a wild card with a negative impact on India-China as well as India-U.S. relations, but its capacity to create trouble may have been reduced by its own internal problems, as well as progress in the India-Pakistan composite peace process. The United States remains the preponderant military and economic global power, despite recent damage to its moral influence, and all countries, including China and India, try to cultivate close relations with it. Both India and China are engaged with Southeast Asia and with other Asian countries, and each has close and complex relations with the United States. The author sees a low risk of military conflict between India and China and a high desirability of international cooperation among all three in tackling the many facets of human security in the 21st century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India has used civilizational discourses as part of its foreign policy to articulate its rise and rightful place in the world order. This article primarily examines India's civilizational arguments in south Asia. India's civilizational arguments in the region demand scrutiny as the neighbourhood is a theatre of contestation between territorial India and the claims of its civilizational space. Analysing historical accounts on Indian civilization, official documents and domestic narratives in India about south Asia, the article makes three points. First, India's civilizational articulation oscillates between two paradigmatic and contrasting representations of Nehruvianism and Hindutva variants. Second, it is argued that despite the ascendancy of Hindutva 's civilizational symbolism since 2014, India's south Asia policy shows no paradigmatic change. Finally, it points to how the Hindutva project may be detrimental to India's self-image and dealings in south Asia. The article argues that while there is no official corroboration of Hindutva 's claims in India's south Asia policy, the increasing salience of the domestic discussions around Akhand Bharat (undivided India) invites complications for India in its neighbourhood. India's Hindutva -driven civilizational claims raise anxieties of an Indian cultural hegemony in an asymmetric region splintered across territorial and nationalistic lines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the role played by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regarding the bilateral relations among the great powers in Asia, China-U.S., China-Japan, and China-India. It is stated that China has remained a strong supporter of ASEAN's central position in regional organizations since the 1990s, and the two sides have developed an extensive framework for bilateral cooperation. The ASEAN countries themselves promote good relations within these major powers.

The article explores issues related to economic integration among countries in Asia. It relates the proposals of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) of Japan in its "Asian Economic and Environmental Community" (AEEC) paper. It discusses the ability of Japan in matters concerning conservation and sustainable lifestyles. It describes how Japan can share its technology yo help India in addressing its water supply shortage. India can lend its expertise in the use of information technology (IT) for ensuring the safety of electronic commerce.

This article examines the 1949 attendance of John W. Burton, Australia's Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, at Jawaharlal Nehru's New Delhi Conference of non-Western nations. It argues that initial ambivalence and unevenness, then a swift process of learning and adjustment, characterised both Burton's response to India and the Chifley Government's stance toward change in Asia more generally. Burton's relationship with Nehru's India is used as a case study of the ways that intellectual and cultural preconceptions, as well as firsthand interactions and experience, shaped Australian government officials in their attempts to craft policy responses to the rise of Asian nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past 60 years, India-China relations have oscillated between friendship, hostility and indifference. In recent times, both countries have started competing for global economic gains and political status. In light of these events, the objective of this article is to analyze various strategies used by China against India, and India's policy response to these strategies. The article evaluates the process of foreign policy decision making in India, and traces the historical evolution of India's foreign policy towards China. It then deconstructs China's foreign policy towards India, and provides the rationale behind its strategies. The article suggests that after initial engagement with India on the question of boundary disputes, Chinese foreign policy has undergone a dramatic shift since 2007. It specifically evaluates the twin Chinese tactics of military incursions and denial of legitimacy to the Indian territories of Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. Based on an analysis of China's previous boundary disputes resolution record with neighbors, these tactics are identified as an extension of China's new strategy for resolving such disputes. The article concludes by suggesting various policy options available to India to counter China's new strategy on the Sino-Indian border. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Is the much hyped 'rise of Asia' translating into global public good? The leading Asian powers, China, India and Japan, demand a greater share of the decision-making and leadership of global institutions. Yet, they seem to have been more preoccupied with enhancing their national power and status than contributing to global governance, including the management of global challenges. This is partly explained by a realpolitik outlook and ideology, and the legacies of India's and China's historical identification with the 'Third World' bloc. Another key factor is the continuing regional legitimacy deficit of the Asian powers. This article suggests that the Asian powers should increase their participation in and contribution to regional cooperation as a stepping stone to a more meaningful contribution to global governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea of 'Asia', as a distinct space in international politics, has generated a good deal of historical and contemporary debate. This article seeks to engage this debate by examining how the Indian state, under its first prime minister and external affairs minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, attempted to delineate certain Pan-Asian regional identities at both the 1947 Asian Relations Conference in Delhi and the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung. It will argue that such articulations of specific Pan-Asian identities were linked to the manner in which Nehru sought to represent certain aspects of the Indian state during this period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The India-Indonesia strategic engagement is both a reflection of as well as a response to the changing politico-strategic landscape of Asia during the post-Cold War era and the first decade of the twenty-first century. The partnership has emerged out of growing concerns about prevailing strategic uncertainty in Asia and the mutual desire of benefitting from the Asian stories of growth, integration, and development. Moreover, two decades of the multi-pronged strategies of engagement under India's Look East Policy have not only broadened the canvas of the engagement but also placed the relationship in the broader strategic context of Asia, a discourse once advocated aggressively by the two leaders of the two countries-Nehru and Sukarno. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to the view of some observers who insist that the Cold War was of limited or no relevance to the transition from colonies to nation-states after 1945 we argue that the geopolitics of the Cold War played a crucial role in shaping the character and direction of the trajectories of nation-states in Asia, if not the erstwhile Third World as a whole. More particularly, the geopolitics of the Cold War provided the crucial backdrop for the rise and fall of developmental nationalism, while the post-Cold War era has set the scene for an array of cultural nationalisms. These issues are explored with a particular focus on India. The case of India makes clear that it is impossible to separate the emergence of new nation-states and their success or failure after 1945 from the geopolitics of the Cold War. It will also make clear that the shifting geopolitics of the end of the Cold War reinforced the demise of developmental nationalism. Since the late 1980s, the problems facing the nation-states of the former Third World, are being played out in a geo-political context, which includes an important shift from developmental nationalisms to cultural nationalisms, while the nation-state system itself is sliding deeper into crisis against the backdrop of the global framework of 'genuinely existing' liberal capitalism and the changing geopolitics of the early twenty-first century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]