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As the governments of the United States, Russia, and China signal a renewed emphasis on great power competition, tensions among three leading military and nuclear powers are rising. Mounting tensions portend an increase in proxy conflicts, raising concerns about support for possible atrocity crimes of proxies. As states formulate their approaches to great power proxy conflict, they would do well to consider the possibility of their officials facing liability for aiding and abetting atrocity crimes. This paper focuses on aiding and abetting liability under international criminal law through the lens of great power proxy conflict. It argues that proxy conflict among great powers is likely, that it will probably contribute to atrocity crimes, and that states have not taken sufficient measures to ensure they do not contribute to the commission of atrocities. While this paper deals with the United States, Russia, and China, it especially focuses on recommendations and implications for the U.S. government. Section I discusses the rise of great power competition as the driving force in international politics, argues that great power competition will likely manifest as proxy conflict between great powers, and discusses the relationship between proxy conflict and liability for atrocity crimes. Section H analyzes the elements of aiding and abetting liability through the lens of three debates among legal scholars and judges that bear particular relevance for individual liability in the context of proxy conflict among great powers. Section III examines the relationships between the governments of the United States, Russia, and China and the International Criminal Court. The Section then outlines the ongoing legal debate regarding whether the ICC can properly assert jurisdiction over the nationals of those and other non-party states as a matter of customary international law. Section IV reflects on the practical implications of the paper's findings and recommends policies that the United States should adopt in light of those findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the United States and China established diplomatic relations, this relationship has been encountered many difficulties; for example, the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, the 1999 US-led NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the 2001 US-China aircraft collision in China's Hainan Island, and China's 15-year World Trade Organization accession negotiation process and its disputes later with the United States under the WTO, etc. Needless to say, the two great powers also have serious debates and arguments on the Taiwan issue. Under this long-term US-China strategic competition and conflict, Southeast Asian countries therefore have their views and considerations. They smartly have cooperated with China on trade and economic issues while are eagerly or kind of faithfully inclined toward the United States on political and militarily issues. This paper therefore wants to review first the neorealist assumptions on great powers' relations, and then examine US-China strategic competition and rivalry in the Pacific. Also, it introduces Singapore's domestic politics and foreign policy as well as its strategic hedging considerations and choices under US-China power rivalry and make a conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Power and its distribution have always been the central themes of international law, yet international lawyers have paid limited attention to the correlation between power shifts and legal change. Notably, international law effectively operates when balance of power is sustained. With this qualification, this paper examines the relationship of international law with the change in power distribution, arguing that international law should proactively attend to power in order to contribute to the peaceful reconfiguration of the international system. Furthermore, this paper explores the mechanism of power shift being transmitted to law shift and specifically adduces the process and effectiveness of hegemonic international law change centered on UNCLOS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's interaction with the international financial system is driven by its growing economic importance in the world. However, China's financial influence has been much under-presented compared with its economic power. This mismatch provides an opportunity for China to promote greater inclusiveness and better balance of power in global financial governance. The accelerated financial opening-up, exchange-rate flexibility, and deepened domestic reform also nourished the ambition of internationalization of the renminbi that would have impact on the global reserve currency system. This paper investigates the motivations behind China's engagements with the international financial system, the approaches China adopted to achieve its goals, and the key domestic policies required for China to gain more weight in the global financial market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Demography is one of the factors determining and influencing the geopolitical balance of power in international relations. Politicians are the main actors in international relations, but powerful human dynamics are at work behind them. The study of geopolitics describes these dynamics, linked to human and physical geography. In the evolution of great power competition, economic, military and technological factors are taken into account, but the importance of demographic trends, which will play a key role in the struggle for world power, is often underestimated as a political and geopolitical factor. Demography works over long periods of time, i.e., over generations. The aim of this paper is to illustrate the importance of the above theory by looking at the demographic shock that France experienced in the 19th century and the geopolitical resulting consequences. As a result of this demographic shock, France lost its supremacy as the most populous country in Europe and was definitively overtaken by Germany. It is a scenario that can be useful for understanding the evolution of demographic competition in the 21st century, such as that of China versus India. In 2023, China will lose its supremacy as the world's most populous country to India. This will be the first time that China has lost its primacy since the United Nations began tracking global demographic trends in 1950. China, like France in the past, is in danger of never catching up with its demographic disadvantage. History suggests that once a country crosses the threshold of negative population growth, regardless of the differences in national experiences, there is little that its government can do to reverse it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been much talk in recent years about an emerging EU-China axis that challenges the United States in a new strategic triangle. The EU-China strategic partnership, which was declared in 2003, suggests that both sides are gaining global influence as a new kind of superpower that seeks to avoid the bloody conflict that characterized the Cold War. Rather than discuss the contours of this new geopolitical axis, this essay argues that EU-China relations are shifting the meaning of security in an emerging arena of global symbolic politics. It analyzes the symbolic politics of EU-China relations through a close reading of two sets of documents: (1) official policy papers from the European Commission and the PRC's State Council, and (2) European think-tank working papers on China policy. It argues that these documents write the narrative of EU-China relations in ways that limit discussion to a specific narrow range of topics. After outlining Europe's approach to the rise of China, it examines how language politics guides China's engagement with the EU. Then it explores how European think tanks follow the concept of 'Europeanization' to frame both how the EU seeks to transform China, and how China policy can help transform the EU. This shows how the rhetorical form of often ambiguous official pronouncements is key in the construction of the content of EU-China relations. The essay concludes that although EU-China relations are getting stronger, predictions of an EU-China axis are over-blown in the sense of being an action to be completed sometime in the indefinite future - 'future imperfect'. Yet while EU-China relations are unlikely to construct a shared sense of a Eurasian self, the major legacy of recent EU-China ties is likely to be found in the negative identity politics of creating the US as the shared Other. This new global symbolic politics will have a serious impact on the US's concrete relations with China and the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been visualized by political scientists as a structural change in the balance of power of the world. The corridor has far-reaching economic and geopolitical impacts on Southwest Asian countries in general and Pakistan in particular. CPEC, being a transnational project, may face challenges in geographic as well as human terrain during its implementation phase. It would involve extra ordinary engineering resources to execute, massive funds to realize, and political acumen to manage social elements of Southwest Asian countries. This paper, therefore, explores China's evolving relationship with the international system to achieve accelerated infrastructure development and boosted socio-economic growth through regional integration and liberal institutionalism. It is a multilateral strategy that will help Pakistan realize its true potential in the economic and strategic domains. It also endeavors to find linkages between China's multilateralism with regional integration under the framework of CPEC based on liberal values of connectivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's rise and its consequences for U.S.-China relations and international stability has generated great scholarly interest. However, current research fails to explain why dominant powers such as the United States sometimes cooperates with rising threats like China. Edelstein notes that realists often conflate two types of uncertainty: risk, which one can assess using probabilistic estimates; and uncertainty, which suggests that, in complex world systems, outcomes are truly unknowable. We thus ask: do risk and uncertainty scenarios affect states' strategic choices differently? Unlike offensive realists who argue uncertainty always increases conflictual possibilities because states fear the intentions of others, Edelstein following a defensive realist argument suggests that uncertainty rather than risk will enhance cooperation chances because when great powers are truly uncertain about rising powers' intentions, they become less aggressive, preferring to wait and see. This paper adopts a survey experiment in China to evaluate how risk and uncertainty can encourage or reduce competitive state behaviors. Contradicting Edelstein, our experiment shows that uncertainty generates less chances for cooperation between dominant and rising powers than risk. In this vein, this paper serves as an empirical support to the offensive realist argument that portrays great power relations as invariably competitive affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research paper investigates the evolving defense cooperation between India and Japan in the context of the strategic landscape in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly considering China's rise. The existing literature recognizes China's increasing influence as a significant factor in India-Japanese security cooperation, but tends to overlook the dynamics behind India's shifting stance. The study reveals that India initially hesitated to actively engage in anti-China security cooperation with Japan until the mid-2010s, but later adopted a more proactive partnership. An analysis of policy documents, political speeches, and government records attributes India's initial reluctance to its commitment to non-alignment and strategic autonomy, its desire to balance relations with both China and Japan, and its domestic political priorities favoring economic development over military expansion or strategic alliances. However, growing concerns over China's assertiveness, military modernization, a change in political leadership, and the Quad's development as a regional security platform have prompted India's attitude shift. The research's recommendations not only offer a roadmap for India, Japan, and other Indo-Pacific countries with deep economic ties to China, but also help combat China's military threats to contribute to regional stability and security, address common challenges, and foster a peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the changing geopolitical landscape with the Covid-19 pandemic scenario, the China-India tussle and scale of regional and global exposition has begun to display with certain consequences, which seems to shake the existing regional balance of power. A mounting political and military confrontation between these two powers as experts suggested could create a hurdle on regional-global stability and can strike on the path of globalization. With historical and existing context analysis, this paper explores that putting genuine differences aside, China and India being responsible stakeholders of the global community, can cooperate and contribute to regional and global peace and prosperity. This paper is based on qualitative research and explorative form in a pattern. This paper concludes that to reduce protracted political and border-related tensions, continuous institutional dialogue, regular communication, and formal-informal exchanges could be effective tools for a peaceful resolution. At this juncture, the competition and cooperation approach could be useful for fostering China-India bilateral relations, and this situation will help to address common challenges of the global community, restructure the global order, and re-adjust regional and global scenarios crippled by the Covid-19 pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Threat perception has been central in the field of international relations, especially in the literature of states' alliances and conflict solutions. International Relations (IR) balance of power and alliance theories have largely equated "threat" to "power." A standard narrative in Singapore's foreign policy toward great powers is its reluctance to choose between both. Singapore's immediate neighbor, Indonesia, the largest archipelagic country in the world, has voiced similar inclinations. Studies have concentrated on the larger power threat interpretation and their responses toward the change in the international order arising from China's growth or the rise of terrorism but rarely examining issues from small states' point of view. According to Realists' logic, small states possess little capacity to influence the fate of their own survival; therefore, they can only choose between balancing and band wagoning. Threat perceptions play an intermediary role in connecting the external environment and state foreign policy behavior. Hence, the study of threat perception is critical as it influences states foreign policies regarding issues ranging from defense spending to states' level of commitment toward international multilateral cooperation. IR scholars have examined how states form threat perceptions from various psychological and non-psychological perspectives. However, these factors are often studied independently. This paper argues that Gestalt principles of threat perception offer a more thorough analysis of Singapore's threat perception by bridging the gap between realist and constructivist studies by demonstrating how Singapore's threat perception as a small state is magnified due to its unique geographical position and its shared cultural affinity with China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Indo-Pacific region has become a central focus of great power competition. Not surprisingly, a rising China seeks to play an important, if not a leading role in the transformation of Asia's present regional order. The United States, meanwhile, as the unipole, has strong incentives to prevent the rise of a peer competitor. Facing certain structural and domestic constraints, China is disinclined to resort to the strategy of violent revision or subversion historically pursued by previous rising powers. Instead, China has pursued a gradual change of the existing regional order through a combination of internal balancing and external reassurance strategies. Specifically, China's quest for great power status in the region, particularly in response to the Indo-Pacific strategy adopted by the United States since the Trump administration, has prompted its proactive shift to counterbalance the US' vision of order in the region. This paper argues that the balance of power and the balance of alignment constitute two key variables that affect the prospect of Sino-US competition for a preferable regional order. Beijing's balancing strategies have significantly enhanced its economic and military capabilities, reducing the gap with the United States on the one hand and attracted certain regional states to join China-led regional initiatives on the other. However, owing to the complex balancing dynamics in the region and the agency of small and middle powers, the balance of alignment supports neither American nor Chinese dominance of Asia. Contrary to the 'new Cold War' narrative, the contest for order does not entail dividing the region into two rival blocs, but rather creating certain overlapping groupings and coalitions led by the two great powers. It consequently also signifies that the current order transition under a new bipolarity will be prolonged and relatively stable compared to the Cold War bipolarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses Xi Jinping's role in China's foreign policy from elitepolitics perspective focusing on first, the policy preferences and worldviews of political elites; second, balance of power among political elites; and third, the sectoral interests behind political elites. China's foreign policies have generally developed in line with Xi's policy preferences and worldview. The current balance of power is in Xi's favour. His administration comprises mostly local cadres, whose developmentalist policy preferences are reflected in foreign policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Currently, the confrontation between two global giants, the United States and China, in trade and technology advancement and hegemony in international politics is escalating. The possibility of a Sino-U.S. economic "war," or the so-called "new Cold War," not only indicates the escalation of this confrontation but also symptomizes the international order's transformation as a result of the change in power balance and rise of a challenger against the existing United States–led international liberal order. Most IR specialists focus on the prospects of this confrontation and its uncertain worldwide circumstances and are concerned about its impact on East Asian/Asia Pacific regional circumstances. Among them, prospects regarding regionalism and regional institutions in Asia seem pessimistic. However, Asian regionalism was activated following the decline in United States' power and rise of China as a global power, and the international liberal order's retreat became visible toward the end of the 2000s. Furthermore, even under the uncertain situations created by the Sino-U.S. confrontation, regional powers, including China, Japan, and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), are promoting their multilateral approach by proposing and advancing various regional frameworks. This indicates that each regional power is adopting the "institutional hedging" strategy to ensure that their individual interests are satisfied and the regional order is comfortable for themselves. This paper verifies that regionalism and regional institutions have become important as measures of regional power for countries' institutional hedging strategies to overcome the challenges posed by the beginning of regional uncertainties and that Asian regionalism is more active today than ever before. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the world would call it, China is the 2nd superpower in the world and this fact is making headlines. With this shift of power, China is being seen as reshaping the world order. While China negated this fact in the beginning, four years later China presented itself as establishing 'new power relations.' What are the ground realties? How does China want the world to see itself? How the United is States challenging an emerging China and where are we heading towards is the emphasis of this paper. The first part, China makes headlines, provides a brief insight into how China is making inroads as a major actor, pushing itself towards a reformist agenda while making sure that its selfinterest is not damaged. Mearsheimer's theory of neo-realism is studied in this regard. In the second part of the part, the strategic relationship of South Asian states, post 9/11 has been studied with respect to the theory of balance of power, with United States and India vs Pakistan and China Strategic Quadrangle. It is concluded that in comparison to United States and India, Pakistan and China's strategic partnership presents itself as a hallmark of 'Grand Security Strategy.' In the third part of the paper, with reference to the strategy of Bandwagoning and Balancing, scholarly discussion by Robert Ross, David Shambaugh and David Kang is detailed. The authors discuss the insecurities of Southeast Asian states and the balance they are trying to maintain between United States and China. They argue that 'balance of influence' is being maintained, evading the concept of balance of power. Fourthly, the paper debates the world of economic interdependence and states (US and China) which will dominate the 21st century. It relates this factor with specific reference to the European states, since their economies have majorly been at stake. The paper is limited to studying Sino-U.S. Competitions and Changes for the Global Political Order in the region of South Asia and European States. Conclusively, placing China into an international order does not come by choice, instead it is a necessity. Henceforth, U.S. needs to ensure that China is not seen as a disruptive but a positive force with which international affairs have to be restructured and balanced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relying on the linkage and leverage theory, the paper aims at reviewing critical issues related to China's economic, cultural and political expansion in EU's Central and Eastern member states. Through the "17+1" format and "One Belt, One Road" initiative, China became an assertive competitor in Europe, acting on a "divide et impera" strategy through bilateral or multilateral negotiations, undermining the EU's cohesion. Also, the European Union is facing a movement of illiberal, nationalist or populist policies that occurred in the former Warsaw Pact countries which are trying to avoid Brussels' norms and therefore they are opened to other alternatives. In order to find out a pattern or relevant arguments for advancing a set of competing hypotheses or scenarios, a structured analytical technique will be applied, respectively "indicators or signposts of change", for the following countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. In this regard, the key indicators will refer to: economic factors, the strength of the civil society, the force of the opposition or of pro-European parties and the degree of Europeanization in the analysed states. Thereby, the article will advance three important questions: 1) Is EU in competition with China and how the confrontation takes place? 2) Which are the EU's countries more likely to strengthen the partnership with China? 3) Which are the EU's own linkages and leverages in its Eastern part and how they can be used for stopping China's advancement? The results will strengthen the idea that China became a real competitive actor, trying to expand in Europe, where the peripheral ex-communist states have been placed in the core of the confrontation. Also, the article will demonstrate that EU facing a real economic rival has the capabilities to stand up and therefore act as an international power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As researchers suggested, there is no way back for transatlantic politics; it has suffered severe setbacks that cannot be undone in recent years. Although the Biden win promises opportunities for EU-US cooperation, the EU's drive for strategic autonomy would not turn a halt given that the great leap forward for European policymakers and strategists would be to acknowledge that Europe's "autonomy" is actually in the transatlantic interests. Nevertheless, the transatlantic partnership is torn from a "thickening" tie that has bound the US and EU together for decades. Consequently, President Biden's transatlantic strategy to retie would undoubtedly pose challenges for European relations with China. The United States is increasingly intent on decoupling its economy and its technology sector from China as part of the new cold war cliché between the two. Nevertheless, the EU-China partnership has been working closely for the past few decades, and China's market has a great appeal to the world. The time has come for the EU to consider how to survive the turmoil of US-China decoupling caused by the two superpowers' agendas. This paper analyzes the critical transformation in light of not only the politics of today but also the structural trends in the global balance of power between the US and China. And explains the reasons why the pitfalls of US-China decoupling shape the dynamics of European ties with China in the last decade. This paper focuses on the issues: i) The EU's alterations of the EU-China partnership dealing with an increasingly assertive China; ii) US and China on the path to inevitable economic decoupling; iii) The EU drives for strategic autonomy aiming at enhancing the competitiveness in the high tech sector; iv) EU's ambition of safeguarding and reinvigorating cooperation over climate change and global health through the engagement of EU-China Investment Agreement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since in the early seventies after the Japanese economy had been rebuilt from the destruction of WWII and had become competitive based on preeminent manufacturing and infrastructure, high technological advancement, networked production and distribution networks, Japan has been considered the leading power base in Asia from the early 1970’s. After an initial competitive phase with the US, Japan and the U.S. have maintained a long standing economic and political relationship. However, the continued outsourcing of US manufacturing to low cost countries, specifically to China, an evolving balance of power can be clearly observed since China’s opening up to foreign trade and investment and implementing free-market reforms in 1979. This article examines the economic developments over the last two decades (2000-2019), coincident with China’s joining the World Trade Organization (as well as the dot.com bubble and the 2008 Recession) and its rise in economic and political might to determine how Japan’s role may develop in the future. The article begins with an examination of political power theory and moves to specific economic indicators over the time period in question (2000-2019) as well as drawing on current political and economic developments from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to the lackluster Japanese economic growth and development and increase in debt/GDP. The text contrasts the US theoretical model (Kindleberger, Krasner & Gilpin), which represents a field balanced by hegemonic stability, as opposed to the UK model (Cohen, Strange) which is based more on a framework of cooperation and a more theoretical examination of power. It is posited that national power has increasingly ceded to global corporate power (Stopford, Henley, Strange). Against this theoretical background the economic indicators of the region are examined from 2000-2019. The analysis carried out in the study is based on several research methods: a critical analysis of the literature, a descriptive method, and a method of inference based on statistical data. Trade and FDI flows in the region are presented and examined to make assumptions on the waxing or waning influence of the players. It was found that there is neither specific evidence that Japan will recede in relative importance nor garner increased relevance. Finally, there is an ensuing discussion of geopolitical factor which are analyzed within the current developmental context, which have the potential to greatly influence future economic and political power in the region, and beyond. Specific policy measures are beyond the scope of this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The security relations of states have always been conducted and observed through a realist lens, i.e. power politics, military alliances or competitions. The last two decades have changed dimensions of state politics in a profound way. The phenomena of globalization and war on terror with subsequent shifts in economic relations among states of different region are bound to have effect on Chinese security policy as well. This paper aims to understand the nexus between questions of traditional and non-traditional security in Chinese policy of cooperation. The regional relationship of China with its neighbours has been contentious and reserve in past. However, since the 1990s, the dynamics of socio-economic and political environment in East Asia is also changing. It is thus necessary to analyze regional and bilateral security cooperation of China comprehensively. This paper therefore explains it evaluates policy coordination through bilateral and multilateral channels against the background of overall security-political relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates how Chinese elites understand the proper role of their nation vis-à-vis its 'periphery' and how this self-understanding shapes Chinese strategic policy toward neighboring states. It makes two specific arguments. First, after 2012 China began to understand itself as responsible for actively managing and shaping its periphery. Xi Jinping has overseen an evolution in China's neighborhood strategy that has changed from mere engagement to proactive efforts to shape regional order. Efforts to achieve this goal have come primarily through: institution-building and regional integration via the 'Belt and Road Initiative', strategic partnerships, normative binding, and developmental statecraft. Second, managing newly emerged power asymmetries between China and its neighbors is now a crucial task of Beijing's peripheral policy. The emerging China-led regional order relies on norms that are hierarchical, transactional, and reflect status distinctions. Xi Jinping's neighborhood strategy rests on an asymmetric bargain: respect China's core interests in exchange for benevolence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Grand Strategy determines the ultimate goals and interests of a state. It has long-term effects on state policies. With the advent of the 21st century, China has emerged as a regional and global power. After entering the new era of development, China set specific goals and decided to achieve them, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. These goals are to convert China into a prosperous society, increase per capita income at par with developed states and realize modernization. In 2013, Xi Jinping announced China's Grand Strategy, while stating that the period extended to 2020 (and beyond) is the era of strategic opportunity for China. This article discusses China's Grand Strategy in the Asia- Pacific region. First, it conceptualizes Chinese strategy by focusing on its main objectives and interests. Secondly, it analyses its components while identifying how China is utilizing its economic, political, diplomatic, and security means to secure its interests in the region and maintain regional order. It also examines Chinese foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region according to the institutions of international society described by Hadley Bull. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Central Asia, the hub of natural resources, has been the battleground of international power politics among the big powers since long. In order to have influence in the region, the Russian and the British Empires indulge in the "Great Game". However, it ended with the collapse of the Russian empire. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created an unexpected power vacuum in Central Asia followed by a fierce competition between the big three, Russia, China and US. This competition is commonly known as "The New Great Game" in the present day international politics. The rich energy resources are usually considered the main reason of the renewed interests in the region and provide principal motivation for Russia, China and US. However, the role of energy resources is usually overstated. This paper will identify which other factors along with energy resources should be considered in order to have a broader and comprehensive understanding of the present Geo-political scenario in the Central Asia. Using the Neo-Realist approach, this paper will first analyze the significance of the Central Asian states, how they provoke strategic competition between great powers and how pipeline politics translate it. Finally, the paper will analyses the competing interests of Russia, China and US and the strategies adopted by each for the achievements of its objectives. It will be concluded by stating that how Russia, China and US struggle to attain, keep and enhance power and that energy resources are just a mean to this supreme objective. It will also conclude by asserting that although the great powers behave aggressively and self-interestedly they may find a minimum degree of cooperation to tackle common concerns such as a growing radical Islamism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China’s economic resurgence augurs the possibility of a recalibration in the global balance of power. Many contend that this process is already underway in East Asia – specifically in relation to the South China Sea. In other parts of the world, China’s growing footprint is discernible through infrastructure projects, under Beijing’s Belt and Road initiative. Does China leverage its economic power to realise its interests by forcing smaller nations to accept conditions and agreements which are not in the latter’s interests? This paper examines whether evidence to this effect is visible through a case study of Sri Lanka. The island’s geographic location – astride the Indian Ocean Sea Lanes of Communication – continues to draw the attention of regional and extra-regional powers. Sri Lanka’s constraints in size and poor pace of economic development also grants leeway for India (the regional hegemon) and China to leverage bilateral ties in their interest. Is there evidence to suggest that China has utilised port infrastructure to realise its national interests at the expense of Sri Lanka? Or, has Sri Lanka managed to thread a fine line between the two Asian powers: the neighbouring regional hegemon – India; and the resurgent great power – China? Does the truth lie somewhere in between? This article delves into these questions by examining the approaches and stances which Sri Lanka has adopted towards both nations, particularly during President Gotabaya Rajapakse’s government, from 2019 leading up to the end of 2021. By doing so, it aims to shed light on how Sri Lanka handled bilateral ties with both Asian powers as well as the degree of Sino-Indian competition visible within the island’s port infrastructure landscape. It concludes that the decisions reached with regard to port infrastructure projects represent a mixed picture. A key finding is the ability of domestic interest groups to shape Sri Lanka’s foreign policy during this period, which has significantly dented the island’s ties with other regional allies such as Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we argue that China is seeking to establish a balance of power favourable to its interests in South Asia and the adjoining waters to curtail India's rise. Military balancing, economic engagement, and the new multi-regional connectivity project – the "Belt and Road Initiative" – are the key components of China's policy against India. By roping in the South Asian and the Indian Ocean states, China has effectively deployed the "string of pearls" strategy with an express purpose to box-in India within the region so that it cannot challenge China's primacy in Asia and beyond. To neutralise Beijing's assertive activities, New Delhi has evolved its Asia policy with a clear motive to enhance its ties with the key Indo-Pacific states – the US, Japan, Australia, and the Southeast Asian countries – so that it could develop counter-leverages against China and simultaneously manage its rise as a major Indo-Pacific power. Given that both India and China are vying for similar power position in the same region, it is highly likely that their clashing interests might intensify their power competition in the near future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the prospects of U.S.-China relations in the area of human rights? Skeptics maintain that human rights is no longer an issue between the United States and China. A traditional understanding of U.S.–China relations ignores the role of norms, while the constructivist perspective recognizes their independent effects. This paper links the traditional understanding of power politics between the United States and China with the study of constructivist norm research. The three findings of constructivist norm theories are relevant and applied to predict the status of human rights in U.S.-China relations: the historical construction of norms, the long-term and multifaceted effects of norms, and the persistence of norms. Based on these theoretical predictions, it is expected that, although convergence is not completely impossible, the past dynamic of competition and confrontation will continue and human rights will still be a contentious issue in U.S.-China relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the dynamics of settling strikes in China since the 1990s within the current constraints of political resources and industrial-relations institutions. The regulation of labour relations in China has been strengthened, and the priorities of the party-state have shifted from stressing capital attraction to social stability. Labour shortages have tilted the power balance to be more in favour of workers. Employers can no longer rely solely on the endorsement of the local government in settling the strikes as they did in the 1990s. We conduct the case studies of strikes in two wholly foreign-owned enterprises and investigate how the two companies prevented and resolved the collective disputes of workers. We compare three waves of strikes in each of the two locations that occurred between 1994 and 2012. In both locations, employer responses have swung from passive to proactive coping and building trust. These inputs have played a decisive role in both the prevention and final resolution of conflicts over time. Our study revealed the complementary interactions between collective negotiation and HRM as an emerging effective approach in preventing and settling the strikes. Our study supports the current view that China's dispute-resolution system has evolved in the last two decades towards greater formalisation and institutionalisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper is devoted to the issues of economic and political integration of the Asia-Pacific region (APR) in the context of a power balance shift in East Asia. Owing to a violent (military) way of resolving country's contradiction, used in the past, is not acceptable in the modern world. So, now, major actors of international relations choose a strategy of integration from the perspective of their national interests (i.e. on favorable terms) instead of a confrontation strategy. When China rise and successfully handles the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and actively makes "the Belt and Road Initiative" come true, now, looks around Asia, most countries in Asia such as ASEAN still incline to choose to deepen economic relations with China at present, for example "ASEAN Framework for Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)," it makes China will continue to operate regional integration in Asia to increase their influence. China will be able to transform its economic power into military might. That is, economic integration will has spillover effects on politics or security. China, as the most rapidly developing economy and one of the most active political actors of the region, is in the focus of the paper. In this report, it is proposed to analyze the policy of the three leading actors, that's American, China and Russia in terms of their approach to the integration processes in Asia-Pacific region, in particular, the impact of China's rise and Russia - China relations, China-US relations and their prospects in the nearest future on changing the power balance. Thus, this article will apply two theories, theory of balance of power and integration theory, sums to assess changes in Asia-Pacific power. China-US relations are analyzed from the perspective of their possible strategic rivalry. China-Russia relations are overviewed against the background of Russia's "turn to the East". So, we can find that, integration, especially economic integration in APR, may be a strategic tool for internal and external balancing. America and Russia, especially America, will necessary to seek cooperation partners for shifting balance of power in East Asia, owing to China-US strategic rivalry and China-Russia strategic partnership. Most second-tier Asia-Pacific countries, like Taiwan, Vietnam, India and etc., have to maneuver between the United States and China. The prospects for regional integration of the APR look unclear against the backdrop of this confrontation of world powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Afghanistan; the Heart of Asia, being located at the cross-roads of tri-regional junction offers a buffer as well as a test case for the Great Powers to showcase & prove their potential. India and China both aspiring for change in their global status positioning, practicing policy of non-interference are having high-stakes in Afghanistan. Although economically engaged both have high considerations for Afghanistan. International community is looking for new stakeholders to assume more responsible role in Afghanistan, how China and India deal with such pressure and foreign policy principles will determine their power status in international system. This paper seeks to locate Afghanistan in India and China's domestic and foreign policy. China's security reason and its commercial engagement with Afghanistan and India's bridge to access and Connect Central Asia policy pave the way towards such understanding. Management of their mutual relation is very crucial for peace in Afghanistan as well as for the entire region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the foreign policy strategy that has changed world politics. It has compelled states to revisit their foreign policies either in favour of BRI or countering it. BRI has created a difficult situation for international power structure and status quo states due to transitioning power from west to east and emerging geopolitical reconfiguration. However, in September 2021, President Xi Jinping announced China's Global Development Initiative (GDI) at the opening session of the UN General Assembly, which renewed debate about the impacts of China's strategy. As China has a strong foothold in the Indian Ocean region through BRI, the undertaken research is an endeavour to study the effect of shifting China's foreign policy from BRI to GDI over the maritime geopolitics of the region. This research aims at determining GDI's role in supporting UN Agenda 2030 through focused efforts on sustainable development goals in the maritime domain. It is an exploratory and qualitative research conducted through deductive reasoning to seek an explanation of the core proposition. This research has used secondary sources for determining these upshots with potential changes in the maritime geopolitics of the Indian Ocean region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's grand strategic aims are the subject of much debate due to the country's growing influence in modern affairs. However, the past few years have demonstrated that China's strategy has undeniably changed from playing a secondary role in international politics to one of leadership and growing confidence. This paper assesses two of the most prominent hypotheses explaining why this change has come about. The first hypothesis is that China's strategic pivot reflects its global interests and growing power relative to its greatest strategic competitors. However, when the timeline of shifts in China's foreign policy is compared against shifts in the regional balance of power, a notable temporal gap appears. The second hypothesis is that China's changing foreign policy instead reflects a growing ideological shift within the country's leadership. A growing historical revisionism within academia asserts that at the apex of ancient China's power, its empire ruled over a structured tributary system that brought peace to East Asia, known collectively as tianxia (天下). This assessment may be ahistorical but is increasingly viewed by Chinese academics as a blueprint for a morally-based, Sinocentric regional hegemony. The rise of Xi Jinping and his espousal of these ideas more accurately align with China's growing international confidence than any shifts in the balance of power, and therefore provide a better explanation for why the country shifted course so dramatically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"It was the rise of Athens and the fear that it instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable" as Thucydides famously stated. But are we destined to hear echoes of "Carthago delenda est" [Carthage must be destroyed] from Beijing and Washington across the Pacific? With the tension notably on the rise in the issue-specific domains of the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula, there is cause to delve deeper into the contemporary 'Thucydides Trap', as expounded by Graham Allison. This paper will focus on the latest developments of the ongoing Korean Peninsula Nuclear Crisis, post Six-Party Talks, as an issue-specific domain to evaluate the changing power dynamic between an established and a rising power. Here the Thucydides Trap and the challenges presented by policy makers in both China and the USA make special reference to the danger of being plunged into a hegemonic conflict. This analysis covers two trajectories: 1) following the conservative approach - balance of power and conditions of hegemony; and 2) concerning a balance of hierarchies - in which the two hierarchies run parallel to each other. Due to China's rising power in both military and economic fields, it simultaneously presages the relative decline of American power projection. Allison also reconfirms that an established power, in this case the USA, is challenged by a rising power, personified by China, concludes that the likelihood of war has substantially increased. Despite the fact of their growing geopolitical rivalry, both acknowledge the calculus of falling into the trap and realize that a major conflict would devastate their geopolitical positions. Put more directly, finding the great escape from this trap remains the central issue in the contemporary world, raising the conceptionally challenging question as to whether Allison's theoretical construction is heuristically sound. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Currently, the debate about Sino-Russian relations is on the rise and draws the attention of many international analysts and policy makers. With bilateral cooperation increasing in recent years, an evident rapprochement is now occurring. This article aims at emphasising the common economic and geopolitical interests behind this new-era relationship, taking into account the recent economic and security pressures coming from the U.S. that created a common ground for the two countries, as well as the historical key-role played by trade and investment and by the energy link. Furthermore, the paper will argue the implications that this strategic economic and political partnership has on the transition in the balance of power in a unipolar world (currently led by U.S.) towards a more complex alignment. Having large natural resources, huge territory and a numerous population, both countries remain geopolitical forces in today's world. After the sanctions, Russia is currently building a strong economic partnership with China (through the Far East Initiative). It is our opinion that this new global power dynamics that sees China and Russia increasingly supporting each other on the world stage could moderate U.S. global influence leading to a new international equilibrium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to present a framework for understanding the impact of China's rise on the established international order with a special focus on the contradictions and dilemmas facing both China and the order around it. It suggests heuristic insights from two Chinese cultural and linguistic metaphysics in order to denote the dynamic and interactive relationship between the rise of China and the existing order in terms of both opportunities and challenges. The authors argue that both China and the existing order have been going through periods of 'sleeping in the same bed with different dreams', and now they are in the stage of 'riding tiger' in which both sides face dilemmas in their complicated and complex relationship. The paper concludes that the rise of China and the existing order will continue to be intertwined in a dialectic of waxing and waning, and flux and reflux. In order for each to find a regional and global role which the other will accept and support both sides will have to go through a considerable period of struggle, tension and adjustment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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