1. ENTRY, CONTROL AND THE MARKET FOR BANK CHARTERS.
- Author
-
GREENBAUM, STUART I. and ALI, MUKHTAR M.
- Subjects
BANKING policy ,CHARTERS ,SUPPLY & demand ,PROFITABILITY ,CAPITAL requirements ,FINANCIAL services policy - Abstract
Regulatory control of entry (exit) in banking is implemented by varying entry standards, i.e., of capital requirements and minimum levels of applicant competence and character. If regulation of entry is to promote norms of industry performance, this form of control may be neither adequate nor desirable. In this paper, we formulate a model of the market for bank charters in order to evaluate alternative methods of entry control. The first section considers salient properties of bank charters, the demand for and supply of charters, and entry, exit and equilibrium in the charter market. This discussion proceeds as if unit-banking prevailed universally. In addition, complications posed by the fragmentation of regulatory responsibilities are circumvented by proceeding as if there were but one bank regulatory agency. In the second section, we explore the model's implications for maintenance of industry stability, for interpretation of the "capital adequacy" question, and for regulating entry and exit by controlling banking industry profits instead of varying entry standards. In addition, we adduce rudimentary empirical evidence in support of the feasibility of profits control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 1974
- Full Text
- View/download PDF