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Scientists and diplomats have significant differences in professional skills, activity time and work content, but they should work together. With the deepening impact of science and technology (S&T) on socio-economic development and international relations, S&T has become a crucial component of national strategies, particularly for diplomacy. There is a need for scientific evidence and advice, meaning that mastering more knowledge and skills in S&T would be helpful in negotiations. This paper analyses the ideas of S&T diplomacy, including a review of its 40-year history in China, its definition (with detailed connotations) and its characteristics. The paper focuses on the significant role of people-to-people communication in S&T, which may inform future work. Five suggestions are given to strengthen the strategic planning of S&T diplomacy: (1) A more clarified, strategic goal of future-oriented S&T diplomacy is required; (2) It is important to build a theoretical system for China to describe S&T diplomacy; (3) The creation of a global S&T cooperation map that adapts to the new type of international relations would be valuable; (4) Fairness and justice shall be maintained, while a reform of the global S&T governance system is promoted; (5) It is a must to adhere to bottom-line thinking and strengthen risk prediction and emergency responses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The diplomacy of Japan towards its Asian neighbours has always been a complex issue. Throughout the years, the foreign policy of Japan has witnessed severe alterations specifically after the Second World War. Since then, new challenges and opportunities have risen which have formed a new, adapted Japanese diplomacy, albeit not disconnected from its traditional aspects and its past. The current purpose of the paper is to highlight these evolutions and challenges of the post WWII Japanese diplomacy. The focus will be on the two main neighbours and traditional partners of Japan, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea. There will be an effort to highlight the challenges that Japan experiences with the aforementioned countries, its diplomatic approaches and how these could be evolved in the near future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores concessions made by Australian concerning Japanese immigration during the era of the White Australia Policy in the early twentieth century. Australia’s Immigration Restriction Act was introduced in December 1901. As the major piece of legislation in the White Australia Policy, the act made it virtually impossible for non-Europeans to migrate to Australia. However, Japanese people enjoyed a special position among non-Europeans under the White Australia Policy thanks to Japan’s growing international status as a civilised power at the time, as well as its sustained diplomatic pressure on Australia. While the Commonwealth was determined to exclude Japanese permanent settlers, it sought ways to render the policy of exclusion less offensive to the Japanese. In the early 1900s, two minor modifications to the Immigration Restriction Act were implemented in order to relax the restrictions imposed on Japanese citizens. Moreover, in the application of Commonwealth immigration laws, Japanese people received far more lenient treatment than other non-Europeans and were afforded respect and extra courtesies by Australian officials. Nevertheless, these concessions Australia made to Japanese citizens were minor, and the Commonwealth government maintained its basic policy of excluding Japanese permanent settlers from Australia. This paper shows that, despite continued diplomatic efforts, Japan was fundamentally unable to change pre-war Australia’s basic policy regarding the exclusion of Japanese permanent settlers.

Copyright of Romanian Journal for Baltic & Nordic Studies/Revista Romana de Studii Baltice si Nordice is the property of Sciendo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The events of the Slovak-Hungarian “Little War” are closely connected to the circumstances of Hungary’s re-annexation of Sub-Carpathia in March 1939, which took place under the motto of re-establishing a common Hungarian-Polish border. Corps belonging to the Carpathian section of the Hungarian army advanced into Sub-Carpathia and then proceeded to attack Slovak territories. Hungaryʼs official explanation for its occupation of Sub-Carpathia ran as follows: since Slovakia has become an independent state and thus Czechoslovakia no longer exists as a state, the Viennese arbitration is no longer valid. Hungary has won the right to exercise its claim to Sub-Carpathia. The military conflict between Slovakia and Hungary came to an end when Germany intervened and ordered the two parties to conduct bilateral negotiations with a view to reaching an agreement. At the negotiations on March 28, 1939, the parties agreed to end hostilities and to establish a neutral zone between the two armies. They also agreed that Hungarian troops might remain at their occupied positions. On March 28 the Slovak delegation announced claims on Hungarian territory by way of compensation, but the Hungarian government rejected these claims. Germany offered no support to the Slovaks on the border issue; indeed, on April 7 Slovak troops were even required to withdraw from various settlements on the Slovak side of the demarcation line. On April 3, 1939, the German Ambassador to Budapest, Otto von Erdmannsdorff, paid a visit to the Hungarian foreign minister, István Csáky; in the course of their discussions, the two men touched upon the issue of the border established with Slovakia. The Ambassador informed Csáky that the Slovak government had turned to Germany for support, but that it had been told that under the circumstances any attempt at the full restoration of the old border, which was Slovakia’s wish, would be futile. The German Ambassador then asked Csáky whether the Hungarian government would be willing to make certain territorial concessions. Csáky responded that this would be inconceivable — “where Hungarian soldiers have trodden, they will stay”. Hungary could keep the 60-kilometre long and 20-kilometre wide strip of land that it had taken from Slovakia. The Hungarian authorities attached the area of land Sub-Carpathia, of which it remained a part until 1944. In 1945 the newly re-established Czechoslovakia was obliged to surrender the railway line between Csap and Ungvár as well as the Ung line: the Czechoslovak-Soviet border — today’s frontier between Slovakia and Ukraine — was drawn ten to fifteen kilometres further west. During its engagements with the Slovak armed forces from March 23–28, 1939, the Hungarian army suffered 25 fatal and 56 non-fatal casualties; it captured 360 Slovak and 211 Czech/Moravian soldiers.

The relevance of the subject matter is conditioned primarily by the desire to achieve the national interests of Ukraine and the need to fight russian military aggression for the right to pursue an independent foreign policy. In this regard, the purpose of the study is to reveal the issue of the restoration of Ukraine’s activities in the political sphere as a result of the establishment of the United Nations. The main methods of research of this problem are: analysis, induction, deduction, and synthesis, which allow describing and highlighting the most important aspects of the development of Ukraine’s foreign policy, as well as diagnostic, comparative, system and structural methods. The paper examines the process of resumption of Ukraine’s foreign policy after the establishment of the United Nations. The role of Ukraine in the founding of the United Nations is considered, and its activities in the organisation are evaluated. The prerequisites and historical traditions of Ukrainian diplomacy are revealed. The activities of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and independent Ukraine in the United Nations bodies are investigated. The main modern achievements of Ukraine’s foreign policy are considered. It is determined that one of the main goals of Ukraine’s work in the UN Security Council was to inform council members and the international community about any attempts to escalate the situation in the temporarily occupied Crimea and Eastern Ukraine by russia. The main ways of the modern foreign policy of Ukraine were described, namely: preserving the supremacy of the state on its territory, independence in international relations, territorial integrity, and Euro-Atlantic integration. The materials of the study are of practical and theoretical value for political scientists, historians, other representatives of the scientific community, and researchers of the topic of restoring Ukraine’s foreign policy, who are interested in the features and aspects of this state activity, and study the role of Ukraine in the process of founding the United Nations

Copyright of Intus-Legere Historia is the property of Intus-Legere Historia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The island province of Orkney played a crucial role in Norway's overseas expansion during the Early- and High-Middle Ages. Located just offshore from mainland Scotland, it provided a resort for westward-sailing fleets as well as a convenient springboard for military forays into Britain and down the Irish Sea. The establishment of a Norwegian-Scottish peace and the demarcation of fixed political boundaries in 1266 led to a revision of Orkney's role in the Norwegian realm. From that point until the its pledging to the Scottish Crown in 1468, Norway depended on Orkney as a hub for diplomacy and foreign relations. This paper looks at how Orkney figured in Norwegian royal strategies in the west and presents key examples which show its transition from a tool of war to a forum for peace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The events of the Slovak-Hungarian "Little War" are closely connected to the circumstances of Hungary's re-annexation of Sub-Carpathia in March 1939, which took place under the motto of re-establishing a common Hungarian-Polish border. Corps belonging to the Carpathian section of the Hungarian army advanced into Sub-Carpathia and then proceeded to attack Slovak territories. Hungary's official explanation for its occupation of Sub-Carpathia ran as follows: since Slovakia has become an independent state and thus Czechoslovakia no longer exists as a state, the Viennese arbitration is no longer valid. Hungary has won the right to exercise its claim to Sub-Carpathia. The military conflict between Slovakia and Hungary came to an end when Germany intervened and ordered the two parties to conduct bilateral negotiations with a view to reaching an agreement. At the negotiations on March 28, 1939, the parties agreed to end hostilities and to establish a neutral zone between the two armies. They also agreed that Hungarian troops might remain at their occupied positions. On March 28 the Slovak delegation announced claims on Hungarian territory by way of compensation, but the Hungarian government rejected these claims. Germany offered no support to the Slovaks on the border issue; indeed, on April 7 Slovak troops were even required to withdraw from various settlements on the Slovak side of the demarcation line. On April 3, 1939, the German Ambassador to Budapest, Otto von Erdmannsdorff, paid a visit to the Hungarian foreign minister, István Csáky; in the course of their discussions, the two men touched upon the issue of the border established with Slovakia. The Ambassador informed Csáky that the Slovak government had turned to Germany for support, but that it had been told that under the circumstances any attempt at the full restoration of the old border, which was Slovakia's wish, would be futile. The German Ambassador then asked Csáky whether the Hungarian government would be willing to make certain territorial concessions. Csáky responded that this would be inconceivable — "where Hungarian soldiers have trodden, they will stay". Hungary could keep the 60-kilometre long and 20-kilometre wide strip of land that it had taken from Slovakia. The Hungarian authorities attached the area of land Sub-Carpathia, of which it remained a part until 1944. In 1945 the newly re-established Czechoslovakia was obliged to surrender the railway line between Csap and Ungvár as well as the Ung line: the Czechoslovak-Soviet border — today's frontier between Slovakia and Ukraine — was drawn ten to fifteen kilometres further west. During its engagements with the Slovak armed forces from March 23-28, 1939, the Hungarian army suffered 25 fatal and 56 non-fatal casualties; it captured 360 Slovak and 211 Czech/Moravian soldiers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Historia is the property of Historical Association of South Africa and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this article the author examines international relations and diplomatic measures undertaken by Mongolia since the adoption of a new constitution in 1992. The author notes that since that date Mongolia has sought significant security agreements with its large neighboring countries, Russia and China, and to protect itself under the rubric of international law. The author designates these undertakings "preventive diplomacy," measures designed to create a an atmosphere is which conflict will not occur, in contrast to the option of managing discord after is has arisen.

Recent research in the civil war literature has focused on how and when external actors intervene. However, to date, systematic data have not existed on diplomatic efforts in conflict management. This article fills this gap and introduces a dataset on 438 diplomatic interventions in 68 conflicts stretching from 1945 to 1999. The authors briefly outline previous research on third-party interventions in civil wars, describe the dataset in some detail, including some initial patterns in the data, and describe how this dataset contributes to research into conflict processes. The authors also demonstrate how diplomatic interventions can be incorporated into other research agendas by merging this dataset with Doyle & Sambanis's peacekeeping data and replicating their analysis to examine the role of external diplomacy on peacebuilding success. These data on interventions, moreover, can be merged with commonly used datasets on intrastate conflicts, which promises a wide range of application in civil war studies. Developing a greater understanding of when and how civil wars end, scholarship needs to take into account efforts to arrive at diplomatic solutions. And if, as the results demonstrate, externally driven diplomacy facilitates the termination of civil wars, then the policy implications are quite important. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses diplomatic difficulties of 'active neutrality', presenting a case study of chrome exports from Turkey to both Allied and Axis powers during the Second World War. The article also highlights competitive diplomatic activity between Britain, the United States and Germany regarding chrome exports. An overview of the chrome agreements between different nations, and the Turkish-American relationships after the emergence of 'New World Order' is offered.

The article examines the state of the Turkish-American diplomatic relations during Great War. It was noted that during the war the relations of both countries are not on friendly terms. After the war, it was restored due to the radical change in the Ottoman Empire. Both the countries worked to restore their relations. The United States recognized the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1927.