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First published online: 28 October 2019 Amid increasing terrorist violence in and beyond European countries, concerns have been raised about connections between illegal migration and terrorism. Regional armed conflicts in the Middle East have led to the massive migration of people in search of safe heavens and better livelihoods, pressing upon frontline countries in the Mediterranean and throughout the EU. Multiple government and intelligence agencies report that human smuggling networks have been identified as providing a readily available conduit through which terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and Al-Qaida can enter Europe and the U.S. These criminal travel networks are said to rely on highly effective transnational alliances involving service providers within source, transit and destination countries. There is also widespread consensus in the intelligence circles that terrorist groups rely on the practice of smuggling for financing of terrorist activity. Nonetheless, despite the region's geopolitical significance and its demonstrated potential for spillover effects, scant systematic field research has been conducted by independent researchers to understand the purported nexus between terrorism and human smugglers within the Middle East into the Mediterranean. This constitutes a severe gap in knowledge which our study will address. In this paper, we debunk the nexus human smuggling-terrorism by comparing the Islamic State's logistics with human smuggling networks' modus operandi and organizational structures. Based on a mixed research approach that combines the analysis of a unique date-set (U.S. Special Forces) and an empirical research carried out among smugglers and migrants in the Middle East and across the Eastern Mediterranean route over the past two years, this paper will tackle the alleged connection between human smuggling and terrorist groups. What will be argued is that smuggling networks and terrorist networks have fundamental operational and structural differences. These operational and structural differences need to be taken into account in order to deconstruct harmful stereotypes on irregular migration and, consequently, develop adequate responses to analytically distinct phenomena.

This paper presents new, original data on food riots and protests between 2005 and 2015 and explores the societal conditions in which these events occurred. These conditions include a range of economic, social, demographic, political, and household consumption factors, with reference to a number of conflict theories. The paper explores whether instability related to food prices should be seen as an expression of hunger within the most vulnerable and deprived societies, or a demonstration of grievances rooted in broader political contestation. The paper also contributes to debates about the methodological challenges of focussing on food prices as a factor relevant to instability and conflict, and the question of whether food riots have significance to broader debates about conflict.

How conspiracy theories mobilize protesters against the Covid-19 measures and whether they harbor an underestimated potential for radicalization requires more research. This paper first recognizes the possibility of anti-government conspiracy theories to mobilize a heterogeneous “resistance movement” and theorizes their ability to radicalize some supporters. An analysis of 71 interviews from the German magazine “Demokratischer Widerstand” reveals that an entire “Covid-regime” is often marked as an enemy. The empirical investigation suggests that conspiracy beliefs reflect a means of processing adverse experiences and anxieties, yet are increasingly directed against the political order, fostering anti-democratic attitudes and actions. Publisher PDF

The Pakistani state signed a number of peace agreements with the Taliban between 2004 and 2015. Despite their significance, hardly any academic evaluations of these agreements exist. This paper assesses these peace deals from three perspectives: political settlements, culture and conflict resolution and cosmopolitan protection. We argue that they failed due to the following reasons: the Pakistani state was more concerned with the interests of the central government in Islamabad than those in the tribal borderlands; the agreements clashed with the unique tribal cultural code of Pashtunwali; and they represented a solution imposed on the tribal societies from the outside.

Terrorist organizations increasingly resort to the Internet to promote terrorism, recruit new terrorists, plan and finance their operations. The paper first proposes a definition of terrorism, cybe...

Many scholars and practitioners claim that labelling groups or individuals as “terrorists” does not simply describe them but also shapes public attitudes, due to the label's important normative and political charge. Yet is there such a “terrorist label effect”? In view of surprisingly scant evidence, the present paper evaluates whether or not the terrorist label – as well as the “Islamist” one – really impacts both the audience's perception of the security environment and its security policy preferences, and if yes, how and why. To do so, the article implements a randomized-controlled vignette experiment where participants (n = 481) first read one out of three press articles, each depicting a street shooting in the exact same way but labelling the author of the violence with a different category (“terrorist”/“shooter”/“Islamist”). Participants were then asked to report on both their perceptions and their policy preferences. This design reveals very strong effects of both the “terrorist” and “Islamist” categories on each dimension. These effects are analysed through the lenses of social and cognitive psychology, in a way that interrogates the use of the terrorist category in society, the conflation of Islamism with terrorism, and the press and policymakers’ lexical choices when reporting on political violence.

While the impact of the Troubles retains centrality within much of Northern Irish political life, the spectre of almost daily violence is becoming a more distant memory. Peace has come to the region. In spite of this, however, there are those who wish to maintain the utility of violence to achieve their stated aims. Most dominant amongst these are the violent dissident republican groups. No longer is their existence solely defined by their desire to bring about a united Ireland. In order to have any opportunity of longevity, they must first legitimise their continued existence, and in turn distance themselves from their former Provisional comrades. This paper assesses how groups, such as the Continuity IRA, Oglaigh na hEireann and the IRA/New IRA utilise the lessons learned from their Provisional history to differentiate themselves from the politicised dominance of Sinn Fein. This evaluation is carried out through the analysis of interviews with leadership and rank and file members of both political and paramilitary dissident groupings, which is complimented by the analysis of the Violent Dissident Republican (VDR) events database. These sources are supplemented with the assessment of organisational statements, from 2007 to the present day. The article focuses on violent, and non-violent, learning.

The terms Deep Web, Deep Net, Invisible Web, or Dark Web refer to the content on the World Wide Web that is not indexed by standard search engines. One can describe the Internet as composed of layers: the “upper” layer, or the Surface Web, can easily be accessed by regular searches. However, “deeper” layers, the content of the Deep Web, have not been indexed by traditional search engines such as Google. Michael K. Bergman who wrote the seminal paper on the Deep Web, compared searching the Internet to dragging a net across the surface of the ocean: a great deal may be caught in the net, but there is a wealth of information that is deeper and therefore missed. In fact, most of the Web's information is buried far down on sites, and standard search engines are unable to access it.

In America, Britain and Australia the threat of terrorism has been used to justify radical new legislation that gives police and intelligence agencies unprecedented powers to detain and question people believed to have information connected to terrorism. In this paper I explore the nature of the threat of non-state terrorism—threat to national security and the well-being of citizens. I argue that terrorism does not pose a threat sufficient to justify the kinds of counterterrorism legislation currently being enacted. Furthermore many of the current counterterrorism practices pose a greater threat to individual physical security and well-being than non-state terrorism. We should fear counterterrorism more than we fear terrorism.

Guided by previous research and recent empirical analyses, this paper gives insight into elements that characterize the spatial decision making of terrorist target selection. Five key factors explain why targets are chosen by terrorists. The authors propose that, generally, targets will be selected when they are Tolerable, Relevant, Accessible, Close and/or Known.This is followed by a discussion of attacks witnessed between January 2013 and December 2018 in the United Kingdom, and implications.

The paper analyses more than 20 years of evidence on electoral violence as reported by OSCE monitoring mission reports. It identifies prevailing trends of electoral violence in the OSCE participating states in order to better understand how the phenomenon is understood and framed by leading international monitoring organizations in the region. The analysis utilizes a unique approach based on automated content analysis employing counting algorithms and latent semantic indexing. The results of the analysis show how electoral violence differs throughout the region while highlighting the qualitative variations in regional patterns of the reported incidents of election-related violence.