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In this paper, I analyze the concept of passions in Kant, trying to answer the question: are passions good for society or are they the source of evil and irrationality? I begin by showing the danger of passions, if compared with affects. In the Anthropology, as well in the Religion, Kant claims that passions are the evil we should fight against. More than inclinations, or affects, the evil principle refers to passions. However, in the Ideia for an Universal history with a cosmopolitan aim, Kant admits that passions are good for society. They are not the cause of their irrationality, but the possibility of the development of the natural predispositions of human being. I claim that we have two distinct answers in Kant, and I try to understand this ambiguity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I propose a discussion on the problem of the imputation of immoral decisions in Kant's practical philosophy. Firstly, I argue that this problem is a consequence of an ambiguity in Kant's conception of the "subjective constitution" of the human will, named impure or rationally imperfect, and of the cooperation of rationality and sensibility in the authorship of its choices. This ambiguity leads to the insolvable hermeneutical dilemma between a will that is responsible for choices made by its natural impulses and a pure will (practical reason) that deliberately chooses against reason in the form of immoral agency. Secondly, I expose and confront the popular solution that takes the imputation of immoral actions as a pseudo-problem and embraces a definition of human freedom -- as the power of choice for or against morality -- that Kant explicitly rejects and must reject, due to his own theses in his major grounding works on morality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Groundwork III, Kant claims that "a free will and a will under moral laws are the same" (4: 447). Although the literature calls this Kant's reciprocity thesis, we argue for an analyticity thesis. This is not a question of nomenclature, but of logics. To understand the precise sense of Kant's thesis it is necessary to clarify the Einerleiheit to which Kant refers. The alternative is whether the adjective einerlei refers to an identity between "free will" and "will under moral laws", or to a sameness between these concepts. It is also necessary to clarify the precise sense of "freedom", since Kant uses different conceptions throughout the text, as well as "under moral laws", since the moral law is synthetically represented as a CI by imperfect rational beings. Kant's thesis expresses, in its argumentative context, a relationship of analyticity between freedom and morality in the case of perfect rational beings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to present the debate between two interpretations of Kant's GMS III. The interpretations analyzed here are those of Dieter Schönecker and Henry Allison. This will be done through the reconstruction of their central arguments and theses, as well their reciprocal criticism. For this purpose, the passages of Kant's work (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals) to which these interpretations relate will first be identified. Then, the arguments and perspective of both interpreters will be presented and analyzed. Finally, we set out a summary of the central issues of the controversy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The extent of the originality and relevance of Kant's ethics is undeniable. But it is not so evident the fact that the Kant's moral philosophy as a whole was not suddenly built, but it was dependent on a profound debate with the philosophical tradition, especially with the German scholastic tradition, a debate which led to the assimilation or appropriation of several of its aspects. With special regard to the history of the development of the categorical imperative, it is not possible to be indifferent to the influence of the practical philosophy of the Enlightenment German philosopher and theologian, Christian August Crusius. The aim of this article is thus to try to identify, taking into account the distinction of praxis in problematic and moral and the contrast between prudence and morality, some points of intersection between the moral philosophy of Crusius and Kant in its origin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Groundwork III Kant warns about a suspicion of circularity in the relationship between freedom and morality. Commentators disagree whether this "kind of circle" is a circulus in probando or a petitio principii, and whether Kant avoids this alleged logical defect or not. These interpretations neglect, however, the role that Groundwork I and II play in the problem of the circle. In this paper, I will argue that the circle consists of two petitiones in one non-vicious-circle, and that Kant removes it by replacing the analytical procedure in Groundwork I, II and beginning of 3 by the synthetic procedure from subsection 3 of Groundwork III on. In my view, the reference to a "kind of circle" is Kant's strategy to emphasize the need of shifting procedure to justify human freedom through the critical distinction between phenomena and noumena, and human morality through the transcendental deduction of the categorical imperative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims at arguing that Kant's proposal to morality does not consist in an "empty", and, therefore "cold" and "without sentiment" "formalism" as some of his commentators interpreted. According to these commentators, Kant's proposal of morality is seen as not having any connection to the real human life, given the fact that he grounds moral decision in a principle of pure reason. The article presents the main elements that make up that totality of Kant's proposal of morality: the faculties of reason, its powers (to know, to judge and to will), the dynamics between them, the feelings generated by this dynamics, the feeling of respect and the satisfaction named of "self-contentment". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to show the opposition and reconciliation relations between the concepts of happiness and morality in practical philosophy of Kant, as set out in the Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals (1785), the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and Doctrine of virtue (1797). This task will be carried out in three moments. First, it is shown that happiness, morality and freedom are the three fundamental concepts of Kant's ethics, whose first two are considered under the form and the last under the matter of practical reason. Second, it will be argued that Kant initially emphasizes the opposition between these two concepts and only gradually thematizes the conciliation in the three books mentioned. Third, it will be stated that the limitation of Kant's ethics to the concept of empirical happiness, to the detriment of pure happiness, brings limitations of his philosophical reflection on the moral feelings and on possible relations between the practical and aesthetic systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a translation and a commentary of Kant’s essay On the miscarriage of all philosophical trials in theodicy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]