Kant: razão pura, razão humana e a imputabilidade do mal moral.

In this paper I propose a discussion on the problem of the imputation of immoral decisions in Kant's practical philosophy. Firstly, I argue that this problem is a consequence of an ambiguity in Kant's conception of the "subjective constitution" of the human will, named impure or rationally imperfect, and of the cooperation of rationality and sensibility in the authorship of its choices. This ambiguity leads to the insolvable hermeneutical dilemma between a will that is responsible for choices made by its natural impulses and a pure will (practical reason) that deliberately chooses against reason in the form of immoral agency. Secondly, I expose and confront the popular solution that takes the imputation of immoral actions as a pseudo-problem and embraces a definition of human freedom -- as the power of choice for or against morality -- that Kant explicitly rejects and must reject, due to his own theses in his major grounding works on morality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]