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The novel coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) has had far-reaching effects on public health around the world. Attempts to prevent the spread of the disease by quarantine have led to large-scale global socioeconomic disrup- tion. During the outbreak, public authorities and politicians have struggled with how to manage widespread ignorance regarding the virus. Drawing on insights from social epistemology and the emerging interdisciplinary field of ignorance studies, this article provides evidence that the temporality of non- knowing and its intersection with knowing is a force that leads political decision-making during a crisis. Illuminating the epistemic analysis with statements given by the Finnish government to the media in decision- making documents and in press conferences, this paper proposes that a crisis situation, itself, seems to demand from political decision-makers dynamic action while simultaneously knowing little (‘non-knowing’) about the different fronts of tackling the pandemic. We conclude that non-knowing must be recognized explicitly as an enduring and central condition in deci- sion-making, which we call ‘epistemic humility.’ publishedVersion

Following Hubert Dreyfus, this paper takes up the debate over the limits on what can be articulated by means of intentional analysis. Section 1 reviews the contrast between Husserl's position and Heidegger's position. Husserl's is an ‘inexhaustibility theory’ of the inarticulable, according to which, although it is in principle impossible to articulate everything, there is not anything that it is in principle impossible to articulate. Heidegger's is a genuine ‘inarticulability‐in‐principle theory’ of the inarticulable, according to which it is, in principle, impossible to articulate the whole of what makes human understanding possible. On this view, it is, in principle, impossible to articulate the background of skills and practices presupposed by and taken for granted in all our everyday human activities. Whereas Dreyfus has been largely interested in this debate for the sake of its parallels to developments in cognitive science, this paper aims, in Section 2, to consider the political importanc...

In this paper we examine the epistemic treatment of Indigenous peoples by the Inter-American Court and Commission on Human Rights, two institutions that have sought to affirm the rights of Indigenous peoples in the wake of colonialism and industrial encroachment onto Indigenous land. The Court and Commission have sought to do this in two ways. First, they have insisted on a right to consultation, according to which any Indigenous peoples who would be affected by industrial activity must be given a say in the decision-making process. Second, they have given an expansive interpretation of the right to property in order to encompass Indigenous relations to land. We argue that although the right to consultation and the expanded right to property have led to a number of landmark legal victories for Indigenous peoples, they nonetheless have an epistemic dark side in that they foster forms of epistemic injustice. What happens in the course of consultation often involves a kind of epistemic objectification of Indigenous testimony that amounts to radical testimonial injustice. And the requirement that Indigenous peoples frame their relation to land in the language of ‘property’ stifles their ability to articulate that relation, thus amounting to a hermeneutical injustice.

This paper offers an analysis of how the American criminal justice system sets unfair constraints on the epistemic agency of detained subjects and promotes unfair negative consequences on the exerc...

The main aim of this paper is to investigate how sexist ideology distorts our conceptions of sexual violence and the hermeneutical gaps such an ideology yields. I propose that we can understand the...

My aim in this paper is to engage with C. Thi Nguyen’s characterization of the echo chamber and to propose two things. First, I argue that a proper reading of his concept of echo chamber should mak...

Climate science denial results from ignorance and perpetuates ignorance about scientific facts and methods of inquiry. In this paper, I explore climate science denial as a type of active ignorance ...

This paper uses the concept of epistemic injustice to shed light on the discriminatory treatment of experts in and by development aid. While the literature on epistemic justice is largely based on ...

No matter how hard we try to grasp it fully, something about suicide always remains out of reach or outside of knowledge, unspoken, shrouded by the privacy and singularity of the moment in which someone suicided. How do we, the living, respond to this secret, to this bad timing so to speak? How do we give voice to the unspoken, which ironically is bespoken and embodied the moment it comes to be? In this paper we respond to the secret of suicide by examining how poetry resonates through suicide’s bad timing. Our discussion orbits around four parts of one poem entitled, ‘Suicide Quartet in Four Voices’. Keeping company with thinkers such as Jan Zwicky, Jacques Derrida, Elizabeth Grosz, Emmanuel Levinas and Margaret Atwood, we analyse how the viscerality of the body and time constitute what comes across as beyond the limits of understanding suicide. We also examine the embodied thinking of poets whose work honours suicide’s bad timing. We argue that poetry bears witness to the gift of suicide – an ethical demand placed on the living to honour what is vulnerable and visceral in death as much as it is in life. Refereed/Peer-reviewed

This paper elaborates on the question of how to design an epistemological foundation for problem-oriented, collaborative forms of research, such as transdisciplinary sustainability research. It picks up approaches of twentieth-century European philosophy to the concept of the problematic and design research. The problematic is explained as a historical epistemological effort. Design research shows parallels to the epistemological thinking of the problematic by contributing to a differentiation and historicity of knowledge and knowledge production itself. Designing is constituted by a nexus of conceptual thinking and creative making, and so designs are drafts themselves. We interweave the thinking of the problematic with the practice of designing in order to open an epistemological perspective in and for transdisciplinary sustainability research. We call this a ‘thinking practice of problematic designing,’ which describes an epistemological tool as well as a transformative process. Problematic designing is characterized by always being in the making–its designs can grow beyond their conditions of production. By opening up manifold dimensions of transformation, this epistemological approach is oriented towards complexity, enabling the generation of sound and future-relevant knowledge.

The very beginning of collaborative research endeavors often lies in politically difficult and practically challenging entanglements. The purpose of this paper is to empirically capture and theoret...

Militarization and various forms of state repression are continuous factors shaping daily life and practices in Manipur. Within this context my paper grapples with the impossibility of preparing fo...

In this paper, I will characterize a phenomenon I call ‘self-appointed speaking-for’, and show how it constitutes a counter-example to Miranda Fricker’s definition of testimonial injustice (TI), ex...

This paper is based on my experience of conducting ethnographic fieldwork in the Indian Himalayas to study the illegal hashish trade in the region. The work required me to spend time with cannabis ...

This paper discusses Jacobinism and the French/Haitian revolution in its unity and diversity. It shows that the main imaginary and institutional elements of modernity – including further anti-colon...

This paper assesses the introduction of Core HR technologies in British higher education. The work of Adorno and Horkheimer is adopted as a starting point for understanding Core HR technologies as ...

This paper seeks to ignite debate surrounding the computerization and change in organizing financial markets and, due to the emergence of trading algorithms, investigates those as disruptive innova...

In this paper, I argue for a way to evaluate beliefs grounded in the testimony of sham epistemic authorities and then apply that principle to beliefs tokened as a consequence of implicit biases. As a result, such implicitly biased beliefs are correctly evaluated as praiseworthy by their possessors, even though the belief is epistemically defective.

This paper aims to contribute to current discussions about methods\nin anthropological (especially ethnographic) research on the cultures\nof the internet. It does so by considering how technology has been\npresented in turn as an epistemological boon and bane in methodological\ndiscourse around virtual or online ethnography, and cyberanthropology.\nIt maps these discussions with regards to intellectual traditions\nand ambitions of ethnographic research and social science, and considers\nhow these views of technology relate to modernist discourse about\nthe value of technology for producing a particular kind of objective\nknowledge. For this article, I have examined a number of monographs\nand methodological texts in which the internet, as both a new setting\nand a new technology for doing ethnography, is shown to raise new\nissues for ethnographic work and for theorising anthropological approaches.\nIn this material, questions of presence, field relations (including\ntrust and confidentiality), and new possibilities for observation\nare especially prominently discussed. Anxieties about whether the\ninternet can be a field at all are also expressed. In my analysis,\nI place these issues and dilemmas facing the researcher in the context\nof the intellectual tradition of ethnography as applied to technology.\nThe main themes found to subtend these discussions of ethnography’s\n‘way of knowing’ are the notion of ‘field’, technology, intersubjectivity\nand capture. The paper ends with a reflection on the kind of knowledge\nabout the internet that ethnography can be expected to produce, given\nthese methodological prescriptions.

When engaging in verbal communication, we do not simply use language to dispense information, but also to perform a plethora of actions, some of which depend on conventionalised, recurrent linguistic structures. Additionally, we must be skilled enough to arrive at the speaker's intended meaning. However, speakers' performance may deviate from certain habits and expectations concerning the way(s) of speaking or accomplishing actions, while various factors may hinder comprehension, which may give rise to misappraisals of their respective abilities and capacities as competent language users. This paper discusses whether such misappraisals may be subsumed by any of the already identified types of epistemic injustice and proposes a new label for them. It also describes the consequences of those misappraisals and approaches their origins from a cognitive perspective.

For philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend, an outcome of the Plato-led victory of philosophers over poets is the ‘conquest of abundance’ where abstraction replaces the ‘richness of being’. This poignant motif is visible in the project of the social sciences, where theory describes classificatory schemas that can be imposed upon the social world to categorise and, subsequently, explain it. However, Homer’s writings (which pre-date Plato) provide a completely different frame of reference. By reimagining ourselves within this work we may be able to rethink and reconfigure our understanding of science, and perhaps even the practice of science. This paper reports on a Feyerabendian ‘experiment’ in sociology of science which attempts to write contemporary scientific production from the frame of reference of Homer. This new methodology leads to fragments of epic poetry which act as a provocation to, and a disruption of, sociology of science and STS and their ways of making sense of science in society.

It is commonly claimed that scientists should hold certain communicative virtues, such as sincerity, openness, honesty and transparency. This paper uses the case of climate science to argue against these claims. Rather, based on a novel account of the range of ways in which non-experts learn from experts (detailed in Section 1), there are reasons to deny that scientists are under any basic obligation to be sincere, honest, open or transparent. Furthermore, not only are these claims analytically confused, they are epistemologically and politically dangerous. Sections 2-4 argue for these claims. The conclusion proposes an alternative standard for ethical communication: that scientists should not engage in “wishful speaking”.

The emergence of the term ‘Plebanski’ as a topic trend in the scientific literature is studied as a significant communication event resulting from its use by authors to refer to the relevant aspects of Jerzy Plebanski (JP) scientific work in the area of mathematical physics. We searched the ‘Plebanski’ topic included in the titles, abstracts and key words of the papers registered in five databases: ADS/NASA, MathSciNet, SCOPUS, SPIRES and Web of Science. Our results clearly show the evolution of the JP’s scientific work from a cited reference to a recognized term in the indexes of the published literature, then to a nodal concept in the scientific communication process and finally as an eponym in the Latin American scholar literature.

This paper summarizes some of the major concepts of Raimo Tuomela’s social ontology as it is articulated and defended in his most recent major works and provides a set of objections to it. It also ...

In this paper, I argue that the asymmetrical mediated communication of the broad democratic public sphere can profitably be understood through the lens of deliberative democracy only if we adopt a system approach to deliberation. A system approach, however, often introduces a division of labor between ordinary citizens and experts (knowledgeable elites). Although this division of labor is unavoidable and I believe compatible with a deliberative principle of legitimacy, it flirts with elitist theories of democracy: epistemic elites come up with the agendas, ideas, and policy positions and democratic publics ratify or repudiate the agendas but do not generate or really engage with them. This I argue would violate an essential defining feature of deliberative democracy, namely that epistemic quality and equal participation are tightly linked. I turn to Habermas and his idea of a feedback loop as a possible solution to this dilemma.

This paper takes stock of a recent but growing movement within the field of deliberative democracy, which normatively argues for the epistemic dimension of democratic authority and positively defen...

This paper examines the properties of the validity and scope of arguments as standards for evaluating the epistemic qualities of particular deliberative exchanges within a context of value pluralis...

What form should jury decision-making take? In particular, should juries be permitted—even encouraged or required—to make their decisions by means of free, unstructured deliberation? In this paper, I argue that juries should not engage in such deliberations on the way to reaching a verdict. In particular, I argue that jury deliberation is problematic on both theoretical and empirical grounds. On the theoretical front, deliberation destroys the independence of jurors’ judgments that is needed for certain theoretical results (in particular, the Condorcet Jury Theorem) to be applicable. On the empirical front, there is evidence from both legal and non-legal contexts that unstructured group deliberation leads to group judgments that are worse in a number of respects than judgments generated by non-deliberative methods of judgment aggregation. Finally, I examine some possible alternatives to unstructured deliberation, including the constrained, structured deliberation embodied in the DELPHI method, voting (without deliberation), and averaging of probabilistic judgments

Disciplinary boundaries become increasingly unclear when grappling with “wicked problems,” which present a complex set of policy, cultural, technological, and scientific dimensions. “T-shaped” professionals, i.e. individuals with a depth and breadth of expertise, are being called upon to play a critical role in complex problem-solving. This paper unpacks the notion of the “T-shaped expert” and seeks to situate it within the broader academic literature on expertise, integration, and developmental learning. A component of this project includes an exploratory study, which is aimed at evaluating the emergent attributes of T-shaped expertise in two different educational programs completed between January and May in 2015. The two programs build disciplinary knowledge in science, technology engineering, and mathematics fields at the core (vertical dimension), while expanding the students’ awareness and comprehension of other expertise (horizontal dimension). The courses introduced science and engineering...

The aim of the present paper is to show that the fundamental transformation of Russian society that had been realized by the Soviet government since the early twenties included not only the reforms of scientific institutions or the creation of a new educational system but also a radical reevaluation of the social role of the expert knowledge. It proposes a transversal analysis of the institutional history of the Soviet science and its complex relations with the state apparatus in order to show that the research policy of the twenties should be considered not only as an attempt to stimulate a “catch up growth,” but rather as an anticipation of some essential problems discussed in the contemporary social epistemology. The early Soviet government had a very particular vision of “social engineering” that was both utopian and extremely pragmatic. The Soviet Union was considered as the first truly “scientific state,” based on the idea that the historical development could be accelerated due to a party lead popu...

The question we pose in this paper is: How can wisdom and its inherent drive for integration help information systems in the development of practices for responsibly and ethically managing and using big data, ubiquitous information and algorithmic knowledge and so make the world a better place? We use the recent financial crises to illustrate the perils of an overreliance on and misuse of data, information and predictive knowledge when global Information Systems are not wisely integrated. Our analysis shows that the global financial crisis was in part caused by a serious lack of integration of information with the larger context of social, cultural, economic and political dynamics. Integration of all the variables in a global and information hungry industry is exceptionally difficult, and so “exceptionality” of some kind is needed to make sufficient integration happen. Wisdom, we suggest, is the exceptionality needed to lead successful integration. We expect that a wisdom-based shift can lead to m...

This article deals with Plato’s (mathematical) version of ancient atomism which in many respects anticipated the ideas of modern physics. The author relates mathematical atomism to so-called structural realism—which is now considered by many philosophers of science as the most defensible form of scientific realism. It is supposed in the paper that the association of structural realism with Plato’s atomism would make it possible to take out the latter from the sphere of speculative natural philosophy of antiquity and to place it in the frames of rational discussions about the structure of being. It is assumed that this association might clarify the problem of effectiveness of mathematics in scientific cognition.

One way to articulate the promise of interdisciplinary research is in terms of the relationship between knowledge and ignorance. Disciplinary research yields deep knowledge of a circumscribed range of issues, but remains ignorant of those issues that stretch outside its purview. Because complex problems such as climate change do not respect disciplinary boundaries, disciplinary research responses to such problems are limited and partial. Interdisciplinary research responses, by contrast, integrate disciplinary perspectives by combining knowledge about different issues and as a result reduce ignorance about more aspects of the problem. In this paper, we develop this idea and argue that while interdisciplinary research can help remediate damaging ignorance about complex problems, it also creates conditions in which other damaging forms of ignorance can arise. We illustrate this point in detail with three case studies before discussing three implications of our analysis for identifying and managing deleterio...

Ignorance of one’s privileges and prejudices is an epistemic problem. While the sources of ignorance of privilege and prejudice are increasingly understood, less clarity exists about how to remedy ignorance. In fact, the various causes of ignorance can seem so powerful, various, and mutually reinforcing that studying the epistemology of ignorance can inspire pessimism about combatting socially constructed ignorance. I argue that this pessimism is unwarranted. The testimony of members of oppressed groups can often help members of privileged groups overcome their ignorance. This paper argues that a particular type of speaker’s trust—hopeful trust—can motivate hearers to become cognizant of their privilege and prejudice. I argue that hopeful trust is a powerful way of eliciting trust-responsiveness that can be an effective mechanism for challenging privilege and prejudice. To make this case, I draw on case studies of online attempts to challenge ignorance. While the problems of testimonial injustice, defensi...

When confronted with especially complex ecological and social problems such as climate change, how are we to think about responsibility for collective inaction? Social and political philosophers have begun to consider the complexities of acting collectively with a view to creating more just and sustainable societies. Some have recently turned their attention to the question of whether more or less formally organized groups can ever be held morally responsible for not acting collectively, or else for not organizing themselves into groups capable of so doing. In this paper I argue that several questionable assumptions have shaped the character and scope of inquiry to this point, precluding us from grappling with a range of important questions concerning the epistemic dimensions of collective inaction. I offer an overview of recent conversation concerning collective inaction, advance a critique of the picture of responsibility that has emerged from this conversation, and propose an alternative approach to th...

The aim of this paper is to investigate the consequences of the bibliometrics-based evaluation system of scientific production on the contents and methods of sciences. The research has been conducted by means of in-depth interviews to a multi-disciplinary panel of Italian researchers. We discuss the implications of bibliometrics-based evaluation on the choice of the research topic, on the experimental practices, on the dissemination habits. We observe that the validation of the bibliometrics-based evaluation practices relies on the acceptance and diffusion within the scientific community, and that these practices are self-sustained through their wide application. We discuss possible evolving scenarios, also considering the recent development of digital archives.

This paper explores the relationship between epistemic integrity, virtue, and authority by offering a virtue epistemological reading of the defences of non-scientific beliefs, practices, and traditions in the writings of Paul Feyerabend. I argue that there was a robust epistemic rationale for those defences and that it can inform contemporary reflection on the epistemic authority of the sciences. Two common explanations of the purpose of those defences are rejected as lacking textual support. A third “pluralist” reading is judged more persuasive, but found to be incomplete, owing to a failure to accommodate Feyerabend’s focus upon the integrity of scientists and the authority of science. I therefore suggest that the defences are more fully understood as defences of the epistemic integrity of scientists that take the form of critical exposures of failures by scientists to act with integrity. An appeal is made to contemporary virtue epistemology that clarifies Feyerabend’s implicit association of epistemic ...

The purpose of this paper is to examine epistemology as a general procedure or set of procedures for making discoveries about 'knowledge' in general, and about 'educational knowledge' in particular. Contrary to many current versions of epistemology, the present exercise is in counter-epistemology - based loosely on the counter-history-of-ideas of Foucault - which attempts to mount a critique of epistemology as a generalized technique. As it stands, epistemology unwarrantedly claims sovereignty over a number of practical and theoretical educational domains, converting whatever it finds into legitimated 'knowledges'. If we re-think epistemology so that it becomes but one competing and (derivative) discourse in educational studies, rather than ascribing to it any particular curricular privilege, as this paper suggests, a number of quite crucial consequences about what is being done (and what is yet to be done) in teacher education curricula emerge.

One of the most fundamental problems plaguing the state of social science research in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is the lack of methodologies that appropriately respond to the cultural context of the country. Most social science research published from the region has merely transplanted Western quantitative methods and has proved ineffective as very few social problems in UAE have been appropriately responded to by social science research. This paper suggests the use of qualitative methods to make social science research in UAE more relevant and impactful. This researcher contends that qualitative methods present an epistemological framework that allows for a greater recognition of the cultural uniqueness of the country and that addresses the nuances that make UAE difficult to study under quantitative methods.

The epistemic poverty objection is commonly levelled by externalists against deontological conceptions of epistemic justification. This is that an “oughts” based account of epistemic justification together with “ought” implies “can” must lead us to hold to be justified, epistemic agents who are objectively not truth-conducive cognizers. The epistemic poverty objection has led to a common response from deontologists, namely to embrace accounts of bounded (perspectival) rationality—subjective, practical or regulative accounts rather than objective, absolute or theoretical accounts. But the bounds deontological epistemologists and their opponents entertain rarely include cultural limitations. This paper considers neo-Vygotskian (contextualised cognition) arguments that we must consider such cultural limits in defending deontologism, and thus that any deontologically motivated perspectivism must be in part a cultural perspectivism. The dangers of strong relativism are flagged and an attempt is made to steer a...

It would seem that an epistemic framework can be justified only by means of a non-circular argument that establishes its truth-conduciveness. The problem of epistemic circularity suggests that no such argument is possible. Externalists and particularists have addressed the problem of scepticism by claiming that epistemically circular arguments can establish the truth-conduciveness of a framework’s epistemic methods. However, since these arguments are available for a good many frameworks, this response does nothing to answer the threat of epistemic relativism. The purpose of this paper is to offer a non-circular argument in favour of naturalistic epistemic frameworks, and therefore against epistemic relativism. The argument establishes that non-naturalistic frameworks depend on naturalistic methods for their application, and therefore, they cannot be more truth-conducive than naturalistic frameworks. This argument does not establish that naturalistic frameworks are truth-conducive, but it does provide a ra...

In this paper, I argue that there is neither valid deductive support nor strong inductive support for Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis. There is no valid deductive support for Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis because, from the fact that the reference of the same kind terms changes or discontinues from one theoretical framework to another, it does not necessarily follow that these two theoretical frameworks are taxonomically incommensurable. There is no strong inductive support for Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis, since there are rebutting defeaters against it in the form of episodes from the history of science that do not exhibit discontinuity and replacement, as Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis predicts, but rather continuity and supplementation. If this is correct, then there are no compelling epistemic reasons to believe that Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis is true or probable.

This paper offers an analysis of the nature of epistemic trust (ET). With increased philosophical attention to social epistemology in general and testimony in particular, the role for an epistemic or intellectual version of trust has loomed large in recent debates. But, too often, epistemologists talk about trust without really providing a sustained examination of the concept. After some introductory comments, I begin by addressing various components key to trust simpliciter. In particular, I examine what we might think of when we consider what it means to place trust in someone. Once we have examined trust in general, we can modify this discussion to derive an epistemic version of trust—placing trust in someone for an epistemic reason. I argue that ET includes four components: belief, communication, reliance, and confidence. The first two sets (belief and communication) are distinctively epistemic and the second set of conditions (reliance and confidence) form the core of any kind of trust. Put together,...

Conciliatory views of disagreement are an intuitive class of views on the epistemic significance of disagreement. Such views claim that making conciliation is often required upon discovering that another disagrees with you. One of the chief objections to these views of the epistemic significance of disagreement is that they are self-defeating. Since, there are disagreements about the epistemic significance of disagreement, such views can be turned on themselves, and this has been thought to be problematic. In this paper, I examine several different incarnations of this objection and defend conciliatory views of disagreement from each of them, while making a modification regarding how such views should be understood.

Social license reflects environmental and social change, and sees community as an important stakeholder and partner. Science, scientists, and science policy have a key role in the processes that generate social license. In this paper, we focus on the interaction between science and social license in salmon aquaculture in south-eastern Tasmania. This research suggests that social license will be supported by distributed and credible knowledge co-production. Drawing on qualitative, interpretive social research we argue that targeted science, instilled by appropriate science policy, can underpin social license by supporting emerging, distributed, and pluralistic knowledge production. Where social license is important and environmental contexts are complex, such knowledge production might support environmental governance, and so improve outcomes in coastal zone management and beyond.

This paper is presented as a sociological account of social action and as part of the “cognitive and cultural turn” in sociology. It retains Weber’s definition of social action as meaningful behavior directed toward another, but employs concepts developed by Noam Chomsky, Pierre Bourdieu and Ludwig Wittgenstein to refine and amplify Weber’s understanding of meaning and subjectivity. It attempts to ground symbolic interaction in innate properties of mind suggested by Chomsky and others. It attempts to enrich Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus with concepts taken from cognitive psychology. Finally it attempts to further integrate Wittgenstein’s language games in to the ethnomethodolical analysis of social situations while grounding ethnomethodological analysis in Bourdieu’s concept of social fields.

Digital technology can facilitate collaboration and data sharing among humanities scholars, and therefore is sometimes seen as a catalyst for attempts to revise problematic canonical traditions in literary history. In this paper, I interrogate how specific ways of organising scholarly labour make possible certain forms of knowledge, and I study the obstacles scholars face when trying to adapt established organisational models. For this purpose I draw on fieldwork in a large European database project, launched to create empirical knowledge about "forgotten" women writers. Literary studies is characterised by monograph-oriented scholarship, situated in regional disciplinary contexts. The collaborative use of a database, however, requires an integration of individual research practices, and it blurs the division of labour between scholars and information professionals. In the present case, the inertia of established infrastructural arrangements manifested itself as a conflict between what was required to generate the specific type of knowledge the project aimed for, and the need for participants to engage in a more traditional form of knowledge production to advance their individual careers. The tension was better manageable in cases where the project conceded organisational authority to local contexts, an empirical finding with implications for established funding models for collaborative digital scholarship.