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Responsibility for Collective Inaction and the Knowledge Condition
- Source :
- Social Epistemology. 30:532-554
- Publication Year :
- 2016
- Publisher :
- Informa UK Limited, 2016.
-
Abstract
- When confronted with especially complex ecological and social problems such as climate change, how are we to think about responsibility for collective inaction? Social and political philosophers have begun to consider the complexities of acting collectively with a view to creating more just and sustainable societies. Some have recently turned their attention to the question of whether more or less formally organized groups can ever be held morally responsible for not acting collectively, or else for not organizing themselves into groups capable of so doing. In this paper I argue that several questionable assumptions have shaped the character and scope of inquiry to this point, precluding us from grappling with a range of important questions concerning the epistemic dimensions of collective inaction. I offer an overview of recent conversation concerning collective inaction, advance a critique of the picture of responsibility that has emerged from this conversation, and propose an alternative approach to th...
- Subjects :
- Scope (project management)
Social epistemology
media_common.quotation_subject
05 social sciences
General Social Sciences
Environmental ethics
06 humanities and the arts
0603 philosophy, ethics and religion
Collective action
Social issues
0506 political science
Epistemology
Collective responsibility
Philosophy
Politics
060302 philosophy
050602 political science & public administration
Moral responsibility
Conversation
Sociology
media_common
Subjects
Details
- ISSN :
- 14645297 and 02691728
- Volume :
- 30
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- Social Epistemology
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi...........753d21b6fab9846403db6941ba1c313f