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In Sorgner's 2009 paper "Nietzsche, the Overhuman, and Transhumanism", he argues, contra Bostrom, that the transhumanist movement's postman is fundamentally similar to Nietzsche's overman. In this paper, Sorgner's thesis is challenged. It is argued that transhumanism, as presented both popularly and academically, is fundamentally incompatible with Nietzsche's overman, as presented in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. This argument focuses on three significant characteristics's of Zarathustra's description of the overman: the role of earthly existence, immortality, and the rejection of collective values.

This paper provides a critique of Bostrom’s concern with existential risks, a critique which relies on Adorno and Horkheimer’s interpretation of the Enlightenment. Their interpretation is used to elicit the inner contradictions of transhumanist thought and to show the invalid premises on which it is based. By first outlining Bostrom’s position this paper argues that transhumanism reverts to myth in its attempt to surpass the human condition. Bostrom’s argument is based on three pillars, Maxipok, Parfitian population ethics and a universal notion of general human values. By attempting to transcend the human condition, to achieve post-humanity, transhumanism reverts to myth. Thus, the aim of this paper is to provide a critical examination of transhumanism which elicits its tacit contradictions. It will also be argued that transhumanism’s focus on a universal, all-encompassing, notion of humanity (Earth-originating intelligent life) neglects any concern with actual lived lives. This absence is problematic because it clearly shows that there is a discrepancy, between transhumanism’s claimed concern for all of humanity and the practical implications of proposing a universal notion of humanity. This paper will conclude, that transhumanism’s lack of concern with actual lives is due to its universal and totalising gestures. Gestures which allow for universal claims such as general values or Earth-originating intelligent life.

The relationship between socio-constructionism and Christian theology has not been sufficiently explored. This paper critically analyses some of the main insights of socio-constructionist theories and suggests that a reinterpretation of the idea of social construction from a theistic perspective can avoid the unresolved problems of its radical versions. The paper argues that an order of meaning, whose origin cannot be reduced to human action, has to be presupposed for practices of social construction to work. This resonates with the belief in God´s action in human reality.

The composition of the human person is a central issue for Augustine. He addresses it in a philosophico-theological way; particularly in The Soliloquies and in The Confessions. What is at stake here is his exposition of “what” constitutes a person’s being human. This paper refers to some of his key ideas in this regard and attempts to identify and establish what this great thinker understands by specific terminology: the soul, the mind, and the self. His hunger for knowledge of the self helps his readers to ponder on the shifting emphasis between interiority and exteriority as well as a person’s consciousness and selfhood. Augustine wrestles with the concept of the soul, but at no point does he minimise the role of the intellect. After examining four definitions given by Augustine of the human person, this paper attempts to clarify all underpinnings related to this subject, as to be able to answer the topic in question.

In his 1994 paper, neuroscientist Benjamin Libet affirmed that he found a way to test the interaction between the mind and the brain. He believed that this procedure would also test the reality of a non-physical mind, emerging from neural activity. In 2000 John Searle objected to Libet’s evident dualism, affirming that the mind is not a hypothesis to test but a datum to be explained. According to Searle, Libet’s problem arose from accepting the Cartesian distinction of ‘mind’ and ‘body’, obsolete categories from an old philosophy. Searle’s solution implied the rejection both of dualism and reductive materialism, suggesting a non-reductive materialism. This first-person ontology, as Searle calls it, aims at preserving, against reductive materialism, the essential features of consciousness, i.e. subjective, qualitative and unified. Searle argued, however, that the nature of consciousness remained biological. Dan Zahavi’s thesis is that a phenomenological approach to the self and consciousness can offer a complementing alternative to the contemporary comprehension of the nature of consciousness. Engaged in an open dialogue with neuroscience and cognitive science in his dealings with consciousness, Zahavi holds, nonetheless, that this notion cannot be completely understood without reference to the notion of the self. Thus, this paper will analyse Zahavi’s ideas about the self and consciousness in Subjectivity and Selfhood (2005) as to evaluate whether his phenomenological approach is able to overcome the materialist tones of Searle’s philosophy of mind, opening the possibility of a non-reductive comprehension of human beings.

Neuroscience is one of the most propulsive of all sciences and very often, directly or not, it tries to answer the question: What is man? However, neuroscientific research does not acknowledge the concept of man as a unity of body and soul. The modern scientific research paradigm therefore rests on physicalism, while theologians are turning towards non-reductive physicalism. In this paper, we will highlight a few key points of the theory of philosopher and theologian Nancey Murphy, which is based on the deconstruction of Aquinas's thought about the human soul and its reduction to the physical. We aim to show that she neglected the full scope of Aquinas teachings. In the second part of this paper, for the scientific paradigm of humans we shall propose new-old hylomorphism, and try to complement certain points of such a system with modern neuroscientific views. The aim of this work is to offer advice for the interdisciplinary cooperation between neuroscience, philosophy and theology alongside the guidelines of Aristotelian-Thomistic hylomorphism.

Many debates in arenas such as bioethics turn on questions regarding the moral status of human beings at various stages of biological development or decline. It is often argued that a human being possesses a fundamental and inviolable moral status insofar as she is a “person”; yet, it is contested whether all or only human beings count as persons. Perhaps there are non-human person, and perhaps not every human being satisfies the definitional criteria for being a person. A further question, which will be the primary focus of this paper, concerns what essential features of personhood endow persons, human or otherwise, with their moral status and the inherent rights they concomitantly possess. A survey of the history of philosophical theorizing on what it means to be a person yields a broad consensus upon the key capacities being rational thought, self-consciousness, and autonomous volition. It is not sufficient, however, simply to cite these capacities, but to explain why these particular capacities bear moral import. A more recent concern has developed regarding the possible future existence of so-called “post-persons” who, due to their enhanced cognitive and emotive capacities, may be morally superior to mere persons and thereby possess a higher moral status. This paper will conclude with an analysis of the extent to which this concern is warranted.

Practical reason and first principle of the natural law in SuárezThe aim of this paper is to examine the Suarecian theory of practical reason and its first principle, which is also the first principle of natural law. Although our main source is Suarez’s De anima, other texts are used as well, including De legibus ac Deo legislatore and Disputationes metaphysicae, wherein the Jesuit author introduces some relevant insights about the first principle of natural law. This paper attempts to show that Suarecian practical reason operates independently of speculative reason (because both have their own first principles) and that natural law is a norm of reason, i.e., a practical and directive principle of human actions.

The affective challenge of interdisciplinary researchIn this paper I analyze the affective problem related to interdisciplinary research using, as a guiding theme, some of my autobiographical memories linked to Mariano Artigas. Starting from a theory of feelings that connects emotions closely to reasons, I defend that many problems in developing interdisciplinary research are caused by the current divorce reason/emotion in which many researchers are educated. Secondly, I identify three types of feelings in a hierarchical relationship, whose scope may be very extensive, in my opinion, for the good performance of interdisciplinary dynamic: eureka excitement, narrative catharsis, and ecstatic experience. In the last part of my paper, I offer some suggestions on how to return feelings to academic domains and, at the same time, keeping sources of funding, and avoiding present evils as commoditization of knowledge and students, clientelism, and cynicism.

This paper presents some schematically steps which Mariano Artigas thinks are necessary for building strong bridges between science and theology: First, the philosophical nature of these bridges is identified. Second, the paper highlights the compromise with some form of scientific realism as an essential commitment for this bridge-building. Third, some proposals which Artigas consideres unsuitable to serve as bridges between science and theology are mentioned, and finally some aspects (somehow related to science) he believes that can actually serve to build those bridges are pointed.

If God knew I were going to write this paper, was I able to refrain from writing it this morning? One possible response to this question is that God's knowledge does not take place in time and therefore He does not properly fore-know. According to this response, God knows absolutely everything, it's just that He knows everything outside of time. The so-called timeless solution was one of the influential responses to the foreknowledge problem in classical Christian Theology. This solution, however, seemed to lose support in the recent debate. For example, Pike claims that "the doctrine of God's timelessness entered Christian Theology (only) because Platonic thought was stylish at the time" (Pike, 1970, 190) and Hasker (2001) catalogues this as one of the minor solutions to the problem. One possible source for this general attitude towards timelessness is the thought that the very idea of timelessness is incoherent. In this paper I argue that that the timeless solution to the foreknowledge problem is congenial with the supervaluationist theory of branching time and that this formal framework provides, in fact, a precise characterization of the timeless solution to the foreknowledge problem. The views presented in this paper are in line with those of Kretzmann and Stump (1981), Leftow (1991) and De Florio and Frigerio (2015).

The idea of a self-organized system brings both political and biological discourses together, for they both aim at explaining how a certain compound can achieve self-unity out of plurality. Whereas biological metaphors in politics have been much examined, political metaphors in biology have not. In this paper I intend to show how political metaphors can enlighten biological discourses, taking the work of Aristotle as a case-study. The relationship between the main elements of a living-body could be better understood within a political scheme: the soul rules over the body through pneuma, its prime minister. This scheme entails, thus, to re-examine Aristotle’s definition of soul in the light of the key concept of pneuma, and to replace the hylemorphic explanation with a triadic one. On the one hand, soul is the entelecheia of the body as it keeps both the form and the end of the organism, which is its unity. On the other hand, the moving-efficacious principle that performs unity by circulating through the body, and by linking the body to its environment is pneuma. Therefore, the political formula: “the king does not govern” could shed light upon the structure of the living body: whereas the soul rules the body, pneuma governs it. Although Aristotle does not build his biology upon political concepts, metaphors are already there, shaping his explanations, within the bio-theo-political paradigm of autarchy.

My purpose in this paper is to illustrate how we can understand that what the Christian tradition calls the peccatum naturae neither consists in a mere privation nor in the total corruption of nature. There is a widespread understanding that for Catholics the sin of nature consists in the privation of the gift of original justice –the complete order of the natural tendencies and their subjection to reason as a result of the elevation of our first parents to a state of grace–, whereas Protestant denominations would in general terms understand that after the fall human nature was abandoned to a complete corruption. The two stances are sometimes seen as an either-or dichotomy. My intention is not theological, since I do not want to discuss or decide what Christians should believe in this matter, but I try to dig into the conceptual conditions under which we can coherently understand that our present condition is characterized by a twisted inclination of the will, which without destroying or totally corrupting human nature, still runs contrary to its proper good and cannot be considered as belonging or being inherent to it. I first present Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of the peccatum naturae as a moral defect. Then, I take recourse mostly to Rosmini’s work in order to better understand how there could be a moral weakness, which could be rightly called corruption, without implying that our moral condition is completely irrecoverable.

Environmental sensitivity and ChristianismContemporary environmental sensitivity has characterized for decades the emerging culture in the developed world. It is not yet mainstream in influencing behavior at a global level, as the growing environmental impact of consumerism testifies particularly to it. Present day environmental sensitivity seems somehow at odds with Christianism, charged for decades alongside Judaism with major responsibility in the environmental crisis.This paper explains and discusses on seven interlinked aspects of the environmental value amply recognized across environmentalism. In examining them, Christian environmentalism learns particularly some demands of the Christian vocation that may remain neglected and demand a moral conversion both of Christians and of no non-Christians and non-believers. In accepting this demand, the Christian discerns the life-giving presence of Christ in many traits of the environmental sensitivity and culture. This encounter offers grounds for a reciprocal understanding and enrichment of Christians and non-believers or non-Christians, towards the attainment of a wider and deeper respect of environmental and human shared values.

“Meaning” and “religion” appear as deeply interlinked concepts in modern thought. Theology has often discovered religious faith as a “source of meaning” against a background of “meaninglessness”, as the XX century existentialist philosophies would remark. Beyond such an apologetic stance, some philosophies of religion have tried to better describe such a link: hermeneutics, phenomenology and even systems theory, may be accounted as main attempts to tackle this very complex framework, and to show how religion provides meaning, or is built trough structures of meaning, or is a form of “meaning-construction”. Cognitive approach may add new perspectives to better explain this implication. Recent attempts combine scientific methods and philosophical analysis to show how meaning is built and works, and how religion provides a specific sort of meaning, distinct from other forms in which meaning displays itself: moral, aesthetic, or affective. Describing religion in terms of “meaning management” helps to better understand its specific role and function in the human mind, beyond the most reductivist programs, and offers a more balanced view on its cognitive dimensions. Different attempts to connect religion and meaning are reviewed in this paper in order to offer an alternative model to the new scientific study of religion.

On September 1st2017, Pope Francis and the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew issued a Joint Message for the World Day of Prayer for Creation. The gesture reveals the church’s efforts “to breathe with two lungs” on the urgent matter of climate change and ecological sustainability. But, the church leaders have also insisted on a philosophical and religious reflection on technology if humanity is to take responsibility for the environment. In particular, they have sought to correct the wrong interpretation of the biblical imperative to “have dominion over” (Gen 1:26) the creatures of the Earth and to “subdue it” (Gen 1:28) that for centuries has condoned ecological abuse, in particular in the name of technological progress.In this paper, I propose a theological reflection on Homo technologicusthrough the writings of the seventh century monk Maximus the Confessor and the twentieth century Catholic priest Romano Guardini. Maximus offers a systematic account of human techneas reflecting the mark of sin, while being God’s gift to assist us in stewarding creation. Guardini offers a challenging argument for the moral nature of technology in our times. In an age where technology extends human power, even as it seemingly takes on a life of its own, Maximus’ and Guardini’s insights on the “technological human” offer a renewed Christian anthropology that, in the tradition of natural law reasoning, can ground a global ethic for a “sustainable and integral development.” (Joint Message, 2017)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology presents a multitude of ethical concerns, many of which are being actively considered by organizations ranging from small groups in civil society to large corporations and governments. However, it also presents ethical concerns which are not being actively considered. This paper presents a broad overview of twelve topics in ethics in AI, including function, transparency, evil use, good use, bias, unemployment, socio-economic inequality, moral automation and human de-skilling, robot consciousness and rights, dependency, social-psychological effects, and spiritual effects. Each of these topics will be given a brief discussion, though each deserves much deeper consideration.

Nature of natura: un approach on mystic and science in peninsular Iberian medieval FranciscanismThe present paper shows the relationship between the concepts Natura (Latin term, understood as common creatural reality) and Nature (Vernacular term, understood as personal and social reality) at Castillan Court and Franciscan Peninsular thinking on XIII century. Especially we study this distinction in Juan Gil de Zamora wisdom methodology of natural philosophy, equilibrating science, and mystical approach.

Quantum physics and the dialogue with religionThe present paper has two main purposes. On the one hand, to introduce Pascual Jordan (1902-1980), an author little known in philosophy academic circles and better known in scientific ones. Jordan took part in the birth of quantum physics during the first half of the 20th century and worked side by side with Werner Heisenberg under Max Born’s direction to elaborate Matrix Mechanics, an essential contribution to the formal description of atom quantum structure.On the other hand, I expose his personal contribution to the science and religion debate. In this regard, he found himself both in an unfavorable and a favorable position. Unfavorable, because Jordan stands far from such epistemological matters as scientific realism; favorable, because he took very seriously the discoveries of new rising physics, and was, thus, a committed realist when discussing scientific theories. Furthermore, he was a devoted Christian, which means that he has a realist stance on religion – the only valid choice for those who consider the relation between life and faith as indissoluble. His constitutive realism leads him to regard the relation between religion and science as an existential problem rather than as an academic one, and therefore, he dedicated a large part of his philosophical works to this subject.

Alasdair MacIntyre: narrative introduction to his workIn the wake of the publication of the last book of the British philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity: An Essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning, and Narrative, this work proposes a way to understand his bibliographical production in the context of the narrative of his life and his intellectual career. It is elaborated a periodization of the itinerary of MacIntyre, based on the references that the author himself has made of his academic life and in the proposals of several scholars of his thought. It is concluded that the narrative examination of MacIntyre’s work reveals that his philosophical project is basically marked by Aristotle and Aquinas, whose thought helped our author a solid proposal on the main issues of moral philosophy and philosophy of religion. This work is conceived as introductory because it focuses only on MacIntyre’s books, but it’s expected to serve as a solid basis for a thorough critical study —especially from a chronological perspective— of his entire work, which includes chapters of books, papers, interviews, among others.

In this paper I pursue an avenue of argument implicit in Patristic thinkers — such as Tertullian and Athanasius — and explicit in the thomistic and scholastic tradition. I argue that there is an ontological unity to the world, and that this unity calls for an explanation in terms of a transcendent cause, traditionally identified with God.

Ptolemy´s astronomy and the Galileo case: two historical and epistemological considerationsThe Galileo case is the most famous example of the encounter betwen science and Faith. The debate was centered, among others, in the field of epistemology and the history of science. The paper shows that the Galilean pretentions of interpreting the heliocentric hypothesis in a realistic way did not constituted a novelty, but rather it was a continuation of the most important Ptolemaic astronomical tradition. It also argues that the Copernican hypothesis did not inaugurate, because of the introduction of the Earth´s motion, a new phase of conflict between astronomy and physics. This conflict already existed, at least, since the times of Ptolemy.

Philosophical intervention in the dialogue between science and theology: an analysis of the concept of consonance In the last decades, a strong debate on the relationship between science and theology has taken place. In the early 1980, Ernan McMullin introduced the notion of “consonance”, defined as the spontaneous convergence of the conclusions presented by the natural sciences and theology on certain features or properties of the universe. In this paper, I shall try, first and foremost, to carefully look into the meaning that has been attributed to this relationship. Thus, I shall examine the possible implications derived from specific cases of consonance; I shall consider the connection between consonance and truth (as well as, symmetrically, the one that could be established between “dissonance” and falseness); I shall expand on the proposal for a dialogue based on different attitudes regarding consonance (rejection, indifference, acceptance and promotion); I shall evaluate the thesis that understands consonance as a cultural construction or an a priori accepted in certain contexts; finally, I shall mention certain variations of this concept, such as strong and weak consonance, or hypothetical consonance. Then, I shall explain the assumptions on which the idea of consonance rests: the unity and intelligibility of reality, the diversity of formal objects and the realism of knowledge. All these assumptions are comprehensive proof of the indispensable intervention of philosophy, as wisdom, in any kind of exchange that occurs between science and theology. And it is only from them that criticism regarding this issue is vested authority. Finally, I suggest a series of critical proposals on the notion of consonance. I shall stress, on the positive side, the opportunity that it offers to move towards a greater disciplinary integration and foster, at the same time, the ordering mission of philosophical wisdom. On the negative side, I shall point out the confusion between religion and theology, the tendency towards a kind of epistemic naturalism of theology, the uncertain creation of the idea of scientific realism and the aspiration to an excessive interference among disciplines.

Suárez and who denied the agent intellect in s. XVIIn this paper three theses on the agent intellect of various Renaissance writers are studied: a) those that deny the real distinction between one and another intellect: Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples, Francisco Suárez, and Gabriel Vázquez. b) those who admitted only a formal distinction: Philip Melanchthon, John Velcurio and Rudolph Goclenius. c) those who accepted only one nominal distinction: Gómez Pereira (the Brocense), John Eck and Augustin Faba.

This paper explores some presuppositions in Francisco Suárez’s theory of law. I intend to show that his doctrine of law can be understood more deeply attending to the role the intellect and the will play in its genesis, i.e. I intend to construct a view of the grounding of the law in the moral psychology of Francisco Suárez. The interaction between the intellect and the will make way for the recognition of the goodness of beings and the openness of human nature to formulate different practical courses of action and to self-determine itself towards those concrete forms of goodness. A comparison with the animal-sensitive circuit of action will be offered as a contrast.

Renaissance medical treatises in the psychology of Francisco SuarezSpanish Renaissance physicians, especially Francis Valles, are a major source of inspiration for Suarez's commentary to De anima. This paper analyzes two concepts inherited from the medical tradition: experientia and theory of the sympathy of faculties. Suarez could be considered a precursor of gnoseological ocasionalism, but his psychology is rather far from the Cartesian mechanicism and much closer to the philosophical biology of Aristotle.

The good as the object of wanting. Suárez on the appetitive and cognitive conditions of rational actionThis paper discusses Suárez’s characterization of the formal object of wanting, i.e. the good. Wanting, in all its possible forms, is based on cognition, in its various possible forms. But the starting point for wanting something is given in a judgement about its goodness. What is wanted, in its turn, provides the starting point for deliberation. The ratio boni marks the first transtion (i.e. the transtition from cognition to wanting), the ratio finis the second one (i.e. the transition from wanting to deliberation).

The will as first mover created in Francisco SuárezThe aim of this paper is to show that Francisco Suarez’s claim that the will is the prime mover of the human actions is grounded in his own metaphysical system. For that purpose, I argue that the will is not necessitated to act by any extrinsic efficient cause: nor by God’s grace, neither by the intellect, the law or fate. For all these active principles are either just a necessary condition for the will’s act or something that necessitates the practical act of the intellect by which it guides the will, but does not affects the will itself. On the other hand, I argue that Suárez’s account on potency and act allows conceiving an efficient cause that is able to determine itself. Besides Suárez distinction between the transcendental sense of potency and act and the predicamental one –among which only the latter is relevant for this matte—, for him act does not perfect potency. Then the will can simultaneously be denominated patient and agent regarding its own action since it does not imply that the will can give itself something it previously lacked.

This paper surveys the main issues in Suárez’s theory of visual perception, which in its complexity and systematical ordering has not been explored yet. These questions, exposed in the first five questions of the seventh disputation De sensibus exterioribus in particulari of Suárez’s Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis and in the first two sections of the fifth disputation De potentiis cognoscitivis in communi, are the following: 1) the nature of light; 2) the nature of colour; 3) the formal (adequate) object of vision; 4) the necessity and the nature of the visual species; 5) the critique of the theory of extramission; and 6) the organ of visual power. The main emphasis is laid on the presentation of the systematical dimension of Suárez’s visual theory.

This paper analyzes the thought on science and religion of two thinkers that share essentially the same position: Stephen Jay Gould and Karl Popper. We first make a comparison between those passages of their works where this similarity emerges more explicitly. We then recall some of the critiques that have been extended to Gould on this topic; they can be extended to Popper as well. Moreover, we highlight another critical issue—taken from evolutionary theory—that Gould’s theorization is not able to handle adequately from the theological standpoint. We finally place Gould’s proposal inside Barbour’s fourfold typology for the science-religion relationship, and we conclude by recommending further critical reflection on these interdisciplinary issues.

Mariano Artigas and the relationship of philosophy to fundamental theology. Evocation and debateThe first point of the paper evoques the autor’s personal relation with Prof. Mariano Artigas. Draw the convergent and divergent lines of thought between them. The second point summarizes the main thesis of the book The unexplained conciousness, debates with proyects of naturalization of conciousness and studies the alternatives offered by aristotelian and cartesian philosophies in order to clarify the concept.

Mariano Artigas: Introduction to his published workThe published work of Mariano Artigas (Zaragoza, 1938 – Pamplona, 2006) is extensive and addresses a very wide range of topics. The purpose of this paper is to offer a possible classification of his published books into five categories: general public, textbooks, studies on Philosophy of Nature, Epistemology and History of Science. From this first approach to his works it is possible to grasp some features of his philosophical formation and his intellectual insights.

The neglect of the presuppositions of science and philosophyThis paper is based on the suggestion of Professor Artigas in order to bring to light the epistemological and ontological assumptions of scientific activity, warning about forgetting them. We focus particularly on an assumption of scientific knowledge: that the subject itself is known immediately. This fact reveals a kind of knowledge different from the framework subject-object. This knowledge is also at the origin of the philosophy, although it is often forgotten by philosophers. Finally we suggest a widening of the usual theory of truth, to incorporate every kind of knowledge and to be able to dialogue among very different kinds of truth and languages.

Is a naturalistic world view coherent?Plantinga’s argumentation against naturalism from Artigas’ perspectiveIn this paper, I examine the critique of the naturalistic world view that Plantinga exposes based on the concept of world view formulated by Artigas. The analysis of the results of contemporary science carried out by the American thinker, stemming from his epistemological investigations, is largely coincident and convergent with that of Artigas, developed almost a decade in advance. The impossibility of sustaining a naturalistic belief, in keeping with the developments of contemporary science, contrasts with the success of the new atheists’ popular diffusion, which Artigas thoroughly studied in Oracles of Science. Both philosophers, Artigas and Plantinga, are examples of how philosophical excellence allows a more attentive interdisciplinary world view and a more extensive and precise knowledge.

My aim in this paper is to critically assess two opposing theses about the epistemology of religious belief. The first one, developed by John Mackie, claims that belief in God can be justified or warranted only if there is a good argument for the existence of God. The second thesis, elaborated by Alvin Plantinga, holds that even if there is no such argument, belief in God can be justified or warranted. I contend that the first thesis is plausibly false, because belief in God is not just like a scientific hypothesis, and the second thesis is likely true if epistemic externalism is the correct view. However, even if the second thesis is true, I argue that to work on good arguments for God’s existence is unavoidable in order to cope with a new version of the Great Pumpkin objection, as well as to achieve other relevant purposes such as to convince rational observers outside the theistic community that belief in God is likely justified or warranted.

In this paper I aim at explaining how analytic philosophical theology developed into a thriving field of research. In doing so, I place analytic philosophical theology into a larger intellectually narrative that is deeply influenced by the philosophy of Enlightenment. This larger framework shows that analytic philosophical theology aims at providing answers to concerns raised by a philosophical tradition that shaped fundamentally the making of our modern Western secular world.

My primary aims in this paper are to give an overview of a recent movement which goes by the name of ‘analytic theology’, to locate that movement within the larger context of contemporary philosophy of religion, and to identify some of the weakness or objections that analytic theology will need to address moving forward. While I think that some of these objections have merit, I also think that the promise of analytic theology’s contribution to theology more broadly is, in my view, sufficiently robust that we should continue to engage in it as a theological enterprise (even if one among many).

Faces of Religion of August Cieszkowski. Temporal and Historical Dimension of Religious ExperienceAugust Cieszkowski is one of the greatest philosophers of Polish philosophy of nation and history. He was also a thinker for whom religion played a formidable role in his philosophical system. If it had not been for religion, this system would not have existed at all. The present paper shows the importance of religious thinking in the whole historiosophical system of Cieszkowski. It underlines the fact that while the developing science was striving to “disenchant the world”, Cieszkowski as a philosopher wanted to “enchant the reality” afresh. However, this “enchanting” was not being performed “against science”. Quite to the contrary, this Polish thinker was employing scientific achievements to demonstrate that “religion is everything”. Divinity is not placed in the mysterious and isolated sacred any more but constitutes our daily life and action.

Neuroscience and Faith: The belief system as a venue of interdisciplinary meetingThe present paper offers contributions from neuroscience to faith experience and vice versa. First of all, we look for a meeting point between them for beginning the interdisciplinary dialog. Personal system of beliefs (PSB in English and SPC in Spanish) is proposed as the meeting point. PSB has to do with both disciplines. The relation between PSB and faith is assumed, but it is not treated here. Here we try to answer two questions: (i) what can be said from neuroscience about PSB?, and (ii) what can be useful for the experience of faith? To do that we make a conceptual redefinition of one neural system that neuroscience calls “default mode”.So, we need to clarify how neuroscience works. How several reductions of reality are made in order to be capable to study it. We also introduce some other elements which manifest the person as a unity. After this initial approach (parts 1 and 2), a neuroanatomical presentation (part 3) about the “default mode”, “precuneus”, and “rich-club” is presented.This is the starting point for the following reflection about contributions from cognitive neuropsychology to faith experience. They show the importance of keeping in contact faith experience with the whole life and reality, of human relationships, of emotions, and they also talk about personal processes for maturation, about the consequences for personal future and other relevant aspects like: conscience, forgiveness, cognitive dissonance / blame, and possible pathology of faith (part 4).The conceptual redefinition of “default mode network” (DMN) as a personal system of beliefs (PSB) is made in order to have a broad conception of making decisions. Neuroscience has reached the view that emotion, as body and perception are several elements for making decisions, but it is not yet assumed that our PSB is another element playing an important role. PSB would be the abstract representation about what is and what could be the world, my relationships, and myself. these beliefs are reached through a long process of reappraisal in which personal experiences, emotion, and relationships are settled down. When beliefs are formed thanks to abstraction they are no longer connected to a given and concrete experience but to a conceptualization of the whole world and myself. Thus, the PSB is one more element for making decisions.

Neuroscientists frequently use two folk psychology terms –self and consciousness– in formulating decision-making process models. According to Daniel Dennett, such notions lead them to dualistic view of brain functions and hence to dead ends or, at least, to less than optimal designs in the research field. Indeed, Dennett’s position offers interesting insights that may help neuroscientists to comprehend the distinction between conscious and non-conscious behavior. In this paper, I first explore how habitual behavior could be defined from Dennett’s model. Second, taking his view into account, I try to offer a better interpretation of habits. Particularly, I define habits as involving a teleological and preconscious process whose traits and dynamics are indistinguishable from computational ones, but this is so more in their ends than in their origins. Finally, I propose seven lines of experimental hypothesis to support this definition.

The formalization of the languages of mathematics has led to the formal languages of computer science and artificial intelligence. This article studies a few semantic properties of the formal languages of artificial intelligence, which I call languages of sign. This paper compares and opposes the semantic properties of these formal languages of artificial intelligence with the richer semantic properties of the languages of metaphysics and religious faith, which I call languages of symbol.

The perspective drawn from evolutionary science, undoubtedly one of the most remarkable intellectual achievements in our conception of the world, poses a deep challenge to epistemology and the meaning of truth. The present paper aims to examine the difficulties offered by the prevailing biological model for the emergence and development of mind in its attempt at constructing a possible philosophical theory of truth. We propose a solution which, while preserving the priority of the distinction between truth and falsehood, is nonetheless capable of reconciling its philosophical fundamentals with the scientific evidence concerning the evolutionary origin of our capacity to recognize truth and falsehood.

Faith in general and the Catholic Church in particular have often been considered, and they still are, as an obstacle to the development of science. The alleged hostility of the Church to evolutionary theories is one of the arguments given by proponents of this thesis. This paper studies the historical truth of the Church’s opposition to Darwinism. Finally, it outlines a proposal that could help to understand the harmony and compatibility between the evolutionary theories and the theological doctrine of creation.

In this work we analyze the relationship between science and religion in the beginning of the 21st century in a context of change. The hypothesis from which we articulate the paper is that we are immersed in a failure of the so-called “secular raison”. Next, we show the aspects that in a fi rst sight illustrate this change from the point of view of religion and experimental science. Finally, we suggest some proposals to integrate in an interdisciplinary perspective this relationship, which is so important to obtain a comprehensive and profound vision of reality.