Back to Search Start Over

The ontological and moral significance of persons

Authors :
Jason T. Eberl
Source :
Scientia et Fides, Vol 5, Iss 2, Pp 217-236 (2017)
Publication Year :
2017
Publisher :
Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika, 2017.

Abstract

Many debates in arenas such as bioethics turn on questions regarding the moral status of human beings at various stages of biological development or decline. It is often argued that a human being possesses a fundamental and inviolable moral status insofar as she is a “person”; yet, it is contested whether all or only human beings count as persons. Perhaps there are non-human person, and perhaps not every human being satisfies the definitional criteria for being a person. A further question, which will be the primary focus of this paper, concerns what essential features of personhood endow persons, human or otherwise, with their moral status and the inherent rights they concomitantly possess. A survey of the history of philosophical theorizing on what it means to be a person yields a broad consensus upon the key capacities being rational thought, self-consciousness, and autonomous volition. It is not sufficient, however, simply to cite these capacities, but to explain why these particular capacities bear moral import. A more recent concern has developed regarding the possible future existence of so-called “post-persons” who, due to their enhanced cognitive and emotive capacities, may be morally superior to mere persons and thereby possess a higher moral status. This paper will conclude with an analysis of the extent to which this concern is warranted.

Details

Language :
English, Spanish; Castilian, French, Polish
ISSN :
23007648 and 23535636
Volume :
5
Issue :
2
Database :
Directory of Open Access Journals
Journal :
Scientia et Fides
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
edsdoj.f2240018f0e04d24a0e3786a90c26465
Document Type :
article
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.12775/SetF.2017.016