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In a recent paper, Kouchaki and Gino (2016) suggest that memory for unethical actions is impaired, regardless of whether such actions are real or imagined. However, as we argue in the current paper, their claim that people develop “unethical amnesia” confuses two distinct and dissociable memory deficits: one affecting the phenomenology of remembering and another affecting memory accuracy. To further investigate whether unethical amnesia affects memory accuracy, we conducted three studies exploring unethical amnesia for imagined ethical violations. The first study (N = 228) attempts to directly replicate the only study from Kouchaki and Gino (2016) that includes a measure of memory accuracy. The second study (N = 232) attempts again to replicate these accuracy effects from Kouchaki and Gino (2016), while including several additional variables meant to potentially help in finding the effect. The third study (N = 228) is an attempted conceptual replication using the same paradigm as Kouchaki and Gino (2016), but with a new vignette describing a different moral violation. We did not find an unethical amnesia effect involving memory accuracy in any of our three studies. These results cast doubt upon the claim that memory accuracy is impaired for imagined unethical actions. Suggestions for further ways to study memory for moral and immoral actions are discussed.

This paper reports the results of two experiments that investigate the nature of plural conceptual representations that are created during sentence comprehension. Previous work has found that comprehenders seem to represent both a singular object and a plural set of objects during the comprehension of plural nouns. The activation of the singular object has been attributed to the pragmatic processing involved in understanding the plural (Patson, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 42, 1140–1153, 2016a). The goal of the current study was to further investigate this hypothesis. Experiment 1 used a picture-matching paradigm to investigate how comprehenders conceptualize plural nouns quantified with many, which renders the scalar implicature unnecessary. Consistent with the pragmatic processing hypothesis, comprehenders did not activate a singular form when the plural was quantified with many. Experiment 2 was designed to further investigate whether all quantifiers block activation of the singular form. The same picture-matching paradigm was used with numerical quantifiers that specify numbers either within or above the subitization range. When the number was within the subitization range, comprehenders’ conceptual representations contained exactly that number of objects, and importantly did not contain a singular object. When number was above the subitization range, comprehenders’ conceptual representations did not contain an exact number of objects and seemed to activate a singular object. These data are consistent with constraints on how many objects can be represented in visual working memory. Taken together, the results of these two experiments suggest that the plural’s conceptual representation emerged as a result of grammatical processing as well as limits on the visual processing system.

Growing evidence supports the dual-strategy model, which suggests that reasoners have access to both a statistical and a counterexample reasoning strategy. In this paper, we explore further the processes underlying strategy use. We report three studies, the aim of which was to clarify the relation between this model and two forms of everyday reasoning. One of the most robust effects found with conditional reasoning with meaningful premises is the effect of alternative antecedents on the endorsement of AC and DA inferences. In a first study, we presented participants with conditional reasoning problems having more or fewer accessible alternatives as well as our dual-strategy diagnostic questionnaire. As hypothesized, results showed that strategy use had an independent effect on the inferences made with the AC and DA forms, over and above the effect of the number of antecedents, but was not related to responding to the MP and the MT forms. In a second study, we found that this relation extended to reasoning from an incompatibility statement. Finally, a third study showed that this relationship did not hold with probabilistic rather than logical response instructions, suggesting that the way reasoners transform a probabilistic evaluation into a dichotomous judgment is a key determinant of strategy use.

I address a recent extension of the generalized context model (GCM), a model which excludes prototypes, to the visual short-term memory (VSTM) literature, which is currently deluged with prototype effects. The paper includes a brief review whose aim is to discuss the background and key findings suggesting that prototypes have an obligatory influence on visual short-term memory responses in the same VSTM task that the GCM's random walk extension, EBRW, was extended to account for: Sternberg scanning. I present a new model that incorporates such "central tendency representations" in memory, as well as several other regularities of the literature, and compare its prediction and postdictions to those of the GCM on some unpublished Sternberg scanning data. The GCM cannot account for the pattern in those data without post hoc modifications but the pattern is predicted nicely by the central tendency representation model. Although the new model is certainly wrong, the review and modeling exercise suggest a reconsideration of prototype models may be warranted, at least in the VSTM literature.

Central to the operation of the Atkinson and Shiffrin's (Psychology of learning and motivation, 2, 89-195, 1968) model of human memory are a variety of control processes that manage information flow. Research on metacognition reveals that provision of control in laboratory learning tasks is generally beneficial to memory. In this paper, we investigate the novel domain of attentional fluctuations during study. If learners are able to monitor attention, then control over the onset of stimuli should also improve performance. Across four experiments, we found no evidence that control over the onset of stimuli enhances learning. This result stands in notable contrast to the fact that control over stimulus offset does enhance memory (Experiment 1; Tullis & Benjamin, Journal of memory and language, 64 (2), 109-118, 2011). This null finding was replicated across laboratory and online samples of subjects, and with both words and faces as study material. Taken together, the evidence suggests that people either cannot monitor fluctuations in attention effectively or cannot precisely time their study to those fluctuations.

Several recent studies have supported the existence of a link between spatial processing and some aspects of mathematical reasoning, including mental arithmetic. Some of these studies suggested that people are more accurate when performing arithmetic operations for which the operands appeared in the lower-left and upper-right spaces than in the upper-left and lower-right spaces. However, this cross-over Horizontality × Verticality interaction effect on arithmetic accuracy was only apparent for multiplication, not for addition. In these studies, the authors used a spatio-temporal synchronous operand presentation in which all the operands appeared simultaneously in the same part of space along the horizontal and vertical dimensions. In the present paper, we report studies designed to investigate whether these results can be generalized to mental arithmetic tasks using a spatio-temporal asynchronous operand presentation. We present three studies in which participants had to solve addition (Study 1a), subtraction (Study 1b), and multiplication (Study 2) in which the operands appeared successively at different locations along the horizontal and vertical dimensions. We found that the cross-over Horizontality × Verticality interaction effect on arithmetic accuracy emerged for addition but not for subtraction and multiplication. These results are consistent with our predictions derived from the spatial polarity correspondence account and suggest interesting directions for the study of the link between spatial processing and mental arithmetic performances.

Cognitive training and brain stimulation studies have suggested that human cognition, primarily working memory and attention control processes, can be enhanced. Some authors claim that gains (i.e., post-test minus pretest scores) from such interventions are unevenly distributed among people. The magnification account (expressed by the evangelical "who has will more be given") predicts that the largest gains will be shown by the most cognitively efficient people, who will also be most effective in exploiting interventions. In contrast, the compensation account ("who has will less be given") predicts that such people already perform at ceiling, so interventions will yield the largest gains in the least cognitively efficient people. Evidence for this latter account comes from reported negative correlations between the pretest and the training/stimulation gain. In this paper, with the use of mathematical derivations and simulation methods, we show that such correlations are pure statistical artifacts caused by the widely known methodological error called "regression to the mean". Unfortunately, more advanced methods, such as alternative measures, linear models, and control groups do not guarantee correct assessment of the compensation effect either. The only correct method is to use direct modeling of correlations between latent true measures and gain. As to date no training/stimulation study has correctly used this method to provide evidence in favor of the compensation account, we must conclude that most (if not all) of the evidence should be considered inconclusive.

Autobiographical memories of past events and imaginations of future scenarios comprise both episodic and semantic content. Correlating the amount of “internal” (episodic) and “external” (semantic) details generated when describing autobiographical events can illuminate the relationship between the processes supporting these constructs. Yet previous studies performing such correlations were limited by aggregating data across all events generated by an individual, potentially obscuring the underlying relationship within the events themselves. In the current paper we reanalyzed datasets from eight published studies using a multilevel approach, allowing us to explore the relationship between internal and external details within events. We also examined whether this relationship changes with healthy aging. Our reanalyses demonstrated a largely negative relationship between the internal and external details produced when describing autobiographical memories and future imaginations. This negative relationship was stronger and more consistent for older adults, and was evident both in direct and indirect measures of semantic content. Moreover, this relationship appears to be specific to episodic tasks, as no relationship was observed for a non-episodic picture description task. This negative association suggests that people do not generate semantic information indiscriminately, but do so in a compensatory manner, to embellish episodically impoverished events. Our reanalysis further lends support for dissociable processes underpinning episodic and semantic information generation when remembering and imagining autobiographical events.

A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/ https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-021-01191-0

During text comprehension, readers create mental representations of the described events, called situation models. When new information is encountered, these models must be updated or new ones created. Consistent with the event indexing model, previous studies have shown that when readers encounter an event shift, reading times often increase. However, such increases are not consistently observed. This paper addresses this inconsistency by examining the extent to which reading-time differences observed at event shifts reflect an unexpectedness in the narrative rather than processes involved in model updating. In two reassessments of prior work, event shifts known to increase reading time were rated as less expected, and expectedness ratings significantly predicted reading time. In three new experiments, participants read stories in which an event shift was or was not foreshadowed, thereby influencing expectedness of the shift. Experiment 1 revealed that readers do not expect event shifts, but foreshadowing eliminates this. Experiment 2 showed that foreshadowing does not affect identification of event shifts. Finally, Experiment 3 found that, although reading times increased when an event shift was not foreshadowed, they were not different from controls when it was. Moreover, responses to memory probes were slower following an event shift regardless of foreshadowing, suggesting that situation model updating had taken place. Overall, the results support the idea that previously observed reading time increases at event shifts reflect, at least in part, a reader's unexpected encounter with a shift rather than an increase in processing effort required to update a situation model.

This paper evaluates the assertion that short-term memory (STM) capacity increases with age. Initially an analysis is made of the STM system in terms of its parameters and control processes. No evidence was found that can suggest conclusively that either the capacity or the rate of information loss from STM varies with age. On the other hand, substantial evidence exists to show that the processing strategies used by adults are unavailable or deficient in children. Furthermore, considerable differences in the contents and complexity of the long-term memory (LTM) knowledge base (semantic and recognition networks can produce grossly different STM performance between age groups. The second half of this paper reviews three STM-related paradigms-memory span, serial probed recall, and recognition under limited exposure-that have consistently shown performance deficits in children. These deficits are explained in terms of the lack of proper control processes (or processing strategies), as well as an impoverished LTM knowledge base rather than a limitation in STM capacity.

The first part of the paper reports an investigation of the effects of the concreteness-imagery (C-I) value of stimuli and responses on the long-term retention of paired-associate lists. With degree of learning equated, the measures of retention after a 1-week interval showed a significant interaction of Stimulus by Response C-I: When the responses had a high value, recall was substantially better with low than with high stimuli; when the responses were low, there was no reliable difference as a function of stimulus value. Recall was best when abstract stimuli were paired with concrete responses. The second part of the paper is addressed to some current issues in the analysis of coding processes. Major emphasis is placed on the experimental and theoretical differentiation of encoding and decoding processes.

This paper reports the results of manipulations of word features for the magnitude of priming effects. In Experiment 1, the printed frequency of the target words and the number of connections among their associates were varied, and during testing participants were given cues and asked to produce the first word to come to mind as rapidly as possible in implicit free association. Priming effects were greater for low-frequency words and for those with many connections among their associates. In Experiments 2 and 3, target words were presented under incidental or intentional learning conditions during study, and the presence of direct preexisting connections from target to cue and from cue to target was varied. Priming effects were greater when either connection was present, with each connection having additive effects. In Experiments 4 and 5, priming effects for indirect links (shared associates and mediators) were examined. The results of these experiments indicate that priming in free association depends on both the general accessibility of the target as a response and the strengthening of direct target-to-cue connections. These findings raise problems for theories that attribute priming only to target accessibility or only to target-to-cue association.

Adults consistently make errors in solving simple multiplication problems. These errors have been explained with reference to the interference between similar problems. In this paper, we apply multidimensional scaling (MDS) to the domain of multiplication problems, to uncover their underlying similarity structure. A tree-sorting task was used to obtain perceived dissimilarity ratings. The derived representation shows greater similarity between problems containing larger operands and suggests that tie problems (e.g., 7 x 7) hold special status. A version of the generalized context model (Nosofsky, 1986) was used to explore the derived MDS solution. The similarity of multiplication problems made an important contribution to producing a model consistent with human performance, as did the frequency with which such problems arise in textbooks, suggesting that both factors may be involved in the explanation of errors.

The paper presents the conjunctive bias in memory-a novel phenomenon that helps to clarify representations of logical connectives. The conjunctive bias is a tendency toward more accurate recall and recognition of conjunctive forms than of forms based on other logical connectives and a tendency to recall and recognize other logical forms as if they were conjunctions. Three experiments, in which participants' memory representations associated with different logical connectives were examined, were conducted to test the conjunctive bias hypothesis. In Experiment 1, participants learned picture-proposition pairs involving either conjunctions or disjunctions and then had to recall each proposition when cued with its picture. In Experiments 2 and 3, recognition memory for conjunctions, disjunctions, and conditionals was examined with an old/new recognition procedure. The findings of these experiments provide evidence for the conjunctive bias. Furthermore, the results of Experiment 3 suggest that corjunctive bias is not simply a pragmatically caused preference for conjunctions. The discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for current theories of deductive reasoning.

Burt (1992a, 1992b) reported data on the autobiographical memory of diarists for events that had occurred on average 3.3 years earlier. This paper reports data on 11 of the diarists, who were recontacted after a further 10 years and who agreed to a retest of their memory. Estimates of event date and event duration from the two recall attempts were compared. As predicted, duration estimation was extremely stable and showed no detrimental effects of the additional 10 years of retention interval. Estimation of event date was predicted to show an increase in forward telescoping due to the increased remoteness of the event sample, but, contrary to this prediction, backward telescoping dominated dating errors. A combination of the establishment of a recent boundary and Kemp's (1999) associative model of dating is proposed as an explanation for these results. It is argued that the nature of dating errors may depend on the time of the event's occurrence in the life span and the age of the individual dating the events.

When researchers are interested in the influence of long-term knowledge on performance, printed word frequency is typically the variable of choice. Despite this preference, we know little about what frequency norms measure. They ostensibly index how often and how recently words are experienced, but words appear in context, so frequency potentially reflects an influence of connections with other words. This paper presents the results of a large free association study as well as the results of experiments designed to evaluate the hypothesis that common words have stronger connections to other words. The norms indicate that common words tend to be more concrete but they do not appear to have more associates, stronger associates, or more connections among their associates. Two extralist cued recall experiments showed that, with other attributes being equal, high- and low-frequency words were equally effective as test cues. These results suggest that frequency does not achieve its effects because of stronger or greater numbers of connections to other words, as implied in SAM. Other results indicated that common words have more connections from other words, including their associates, and that free association provides a valid index of associative strength.

In their paper “Interactive Property Attribution in Concept Combination,” Estes and Glucksberg (2000) suggest an alternative to the alignment view of property interpretation— one based on salience and relevance of features. I suggest that alignment as well as feature salience and relevance are crucial to property interpretation. In making their claims, Estes and Glucksberg also assume that similarity has inverse effects on two important ways of interpreting combinations (i.e., property and relation interpretations). I show that this assumption does not generally hold and provide an alternative explanation for their results (one based on the plausibility of relation interpretations).

In a logographic language culture, repeated (hand)ivr-iting is a common memory strategy for learning letters and Chinese characters. The purpose of this paper is to determine whether this strategy facilitates children's memory for pseudologographic characters and foreign letters. It also explores which aspect of writing, the use of stroke orders or the writing action itself, is responsible for the effect. First, third, and fifth grade Japanese children participated in the study, Results showed that, for all the subjects, characters and letters were better recalled when learned by writing rather than by looking only (Experiments 1 and 4). The advantage of writing was decreased, however, when the proper writing action prevented (i.e., when subjects were instructed to trace or write without feedback; Experiments 3 and 4) but not when the proper stroke orders were prevented (i.e., when subjects were instructed to write in reverse or random orders; Experiment 2). The results indicate that the writing action, rather than the use of stroke orders, is responsible for the effect

In studies using Averbach and Coriell's (1961) partial-report bar-probe paradigm with linear arrays, most errors involve the naming of an item that was in the display but in a position other than the cued one. Up to now, there is no general agreement on the origin of these location errors. Point of departure in this paper is that part of the location errors arises from inappropriate application of the cue. It is tested whether this originates from problems to perceive the position of the cue ("cue-displacement hypothesis") or from confusion about the order of the items in the array ("item-order hypothesis"). The results of two bar-probe experiments are reported. A novel, crucial, finding in both experiments is that, among the location errors, there was a preponderance of response letters that came from the central side of the cued item. In the second experiment, this was observed not only in the usual postcue conditions but also when the cue preceded the array. These results positively corroborate the cue-displacement hypothesis and do not support the item-order hypothesis: The cue tends to be perceived more toward the center of the visual field than it actually is exposed-that is, there is a central drift of the cue.

Medin, Goldstone, and Markman (1995) recently described a series of parallel effects in similarity and choice. They suggested that similarity and choice are related in a nontrivial way such that choice may entail a similarity judgment to an explicit or constructed ideal. In this paper, the correspondences between similarity and choice were investigated with respect to a phenomenon in similarity known as the coincidence effect. In coincidence (pronounced "coincide-ence"), two items that match on one dimension but have a large difference on another dimension receive a higher similarity rating than do two items that have only modest differences on both dimensions. We conducted five experiments in order to examine commonalities between similarity and choice processes with respect to coincidence. Four types of tasks were given: similarity ratings, desirability ratings, forced choice similarities (which of two items is most similar to a target), and forced choice preferences (which of two items one would prefer, given a target). We found a main effect for ratings as opposed to forced choices, with ratings showing greater coincidence effects than did choices. Similarity measures tended to produce more coincidence than did preference measures. The overall pattern of results suggests the presence of dimensional weighting processes sensitive to task characteristics and operating somewhat differently for similarity and decision making.

When evaluating experimental evidence, how do people deal with the possibility that some of the feedback is erroneous? The potential for error means that evidence evaluation must include decisions about when to "trust the data." In this paper we present two studies that focus on subjects' responses to erroneous feedback in a hypothesis testing situation-a variant of Wason's (1960) 2-4-6 rule discovery task in which some feedback was subject to system error: "hits" were reported as "misses" and vice versa. Our results show that, in contrast to previous research, people are equally adept at identifying false negatives and false positives; further, successful subjects were less likely to use a positive test strategy (Klayman & Ha, 1987) than were unsuccessful subjects. Finally, although others have found that generating possible hypotheses prior to experimentation increases success and task efficiency, such a manipulation did little to mitigate the effects of system error.

This paper explores the question, important to the theory of expert performance, of the nature and number of chunks that chess experts hold in memory. It examines how memory contents determine players’ abilities to reconstruct (1) positions from games, (2) positions distorted in various ways, and (3) random positions. Comparison of a computer simulation with a human experiment supports the usual estimate that chess Masters store some 50,000 chunks in memory. The observed impairment of recall when positions are modified by mirror image reflection implies that each chunk represents a specific pattern of pieces in a specific location. A good account of the results of the experiments is given by the template theory proposed by Gobet and Simon (in press) as an extension of Chase and Simon’s (1973b) initial chunking proposal, and in agreement with other recent proposals for modification of the chunking theory (Richman, Staszewski, & Simon, 1995) as applied to various recall tasks.

A number of studies have argued that people view membership in animal and artifact categories as a matter of degree. These studies have generally failed to distinguish between the issues of typicality and category membership. Thus, data which have been taken to demonstrate that membership is a matter of degree may only demonstrate that typicality is graded. Partly on the basis of these findings, it has been argued that some categories are organized around an underlying essence. The essence determines membership absolutely. The present paper reports a series of studies that reexamine the question of graded membership. In the first study, subjects were asked to rate both typicality and category membership for the same stimuli as a way of distinguishing the two questions. A second method relied on the intuition that disagreements about membership in all-or-none and graded categories may have different qualities. Results from both studies suggest some support for claims that membership in animal and artifact categories is a matter of degree. A third study explored the possibility that graded responses were due to conflicting, or ambiguous, sets of criteria. A task focusing on biological features did not lead to more absolute categorization. These results contradict essentialist predictions.

Altmann, Garnham, and Dennis (1992) explored contextual influences on syntactic ambiguity resolution by monitoring eye movements during reading. In order to resolve a conflict of interpretation given that the different eye movement measures yielded different patterns, we introduced a regression-contingent analysis of reading times, separating trials according to whether the eyes departed from the region of interest with a leftward (regressive) or rightward movement. R,ayner and Sereno (1994) argue that various assumptions which they claim underlie the motivation for introducing the regression-contingent measure are in fact flawed. In this paper I demonstrate that these assumptions are incorrectly ascribed to us (while agreeing that they are incorrect), and that Rayner and Sereno's re-analysis oF an earlier study by Rayner, Garrod, and Perfetti (1992) neither questions nor threatens the generalizability of the regression-contingent measure, Finally, I discuss same of the uncertainties surrounding the interpretation of first-pass reading times which further motivate the measure we adopted in Altrnann et al.'s (1992) study.

Temporal coding has been studied by examining the perception and reproduction of rhythms and by examining memory for the order of events in a list. We attempt to link these research programs both empirically and theoretically. Glenberg and Swanson (1986) proposed that the superior recall of auditory material, compared with visual material, reflects more accurate temporal coding for the auditory material. In this paper, we demonstrate that a similar modality effect can be produced in a rhythm task. Auditory rhythms composed of stimuli of two durations are reproduced more accurately than are visual rhythms. Furthermore, it appears that the auditory superiority reflects enhanced chunking of the auditory material rather than better identification of durations.

Weber, Burt, and Noll (1986) estimated that the time needed to switch attention between memory and perception was around 300 msec. The first two experiments in the present paper estimated switching time using a variation of their task. Subjects reported aloud lists of six items. The items were read off a computer screen (perception), recited from memory, or reported alternately from the two sources. The data show that the switching-time estimate is influenced by input/output compatibility, response-initiation times, and memory load. When these factors were controlled, estimated switching time dropped to around 100-150 msec. The data suggest, however, that the switch from perception to memory might be slower than the switch from memory to perception, which would invalidate the formula used to compute switching time. Experiment 3 tested the time for a single switch from perception to memory and a single switch from memory to perception by restricting report to one pair of items in the list. When the to-be-reported pair was precued, estimated switching time dropped to zero. When the pair was not precued, the memory-to-perception switching time remained at zero, but the perception-to-memory time was more than 400 msec. The pattern of results forced a reconceptualization of the task in terms of memory retrieval rather than attention switching. The attention-switching times appear to reflect processes required to select items from memory.

We discuss three points from Altmann's (this issue) reply to our comment on the use of the regression contingent analysis. First, we again argue that the Altmann, Garnham, and Dennis (1992) paper leaves the impression that eye movements are a necessary index of readers being garden pathed Second, we acknowledge that differences among previously published studies dealing with parsing strategies are as likely to be due to structural differences in the stimuli as they are to memory span differences or different reading strategies. Third, we argue that researchers should examine a large number of possible dependent measures that are obtainable from the eye movement record.

This paper addresses the phenomenon of recognition failure from the perspective of a theory in which recognition and recall are assumed to involve independent retrieval processes. However, even given independent retrieval, measures of recognition and recall success will covary if any traces are lost from storage, simply because such traces are unavailable for any memory test. In support of the theory, rote learning produced higher covariation between recognition and recall (i.e., fewer recognition failures) than did meaningful elaboration during study. Further, recognition and recall were approximately independent of each other with meaningful elaboration and imagery encoding, regardless of whether the latter involved interactive or separate images. The results of three experiments are discussed in terms of the present “vandal” theory and other theories of recognition failure.

In recent years, a number of proposals have been advanced to account for the errors that subjects make in deductive inferences from invalid syllogisms. Principles such as erroneous conversion of premises, probabilistic inference, feature selection, and various other interpretation and combination processes have been suggested. The present paper focuses on the 32 invalid categorical syllogisms for which conversion of premises does not provide an explanation of subject error. An explanation is presented in terms of three error processes: the erroneous conversion of conclusions resulting from backward processing, the erroneous integration of information from the two premises, and the failure to consider hypothetical possibilities. Empirical predictions regarding the differential difficulty of the various premise combinations as well as the pattern of correlations between premise combinations are derived from this formulation, and data are presented that support these predictions.

This paper reports four experiments on the effects of word age of acquisition in verbal tasks. In all cases, multiple-regression analysis was used to assess the relative effects of age as opposed to other potentially relevant word attributes. Experiments 1 and 2 concerned lexical memory tasks. In Experiment 1, picture naming speeds were found to be mainly determined by picture codability and name age of acquisition. In Experiment 2, it was found that when subjects produced words in response to bigram cues, early acquired target words were more likely to be produced than later acquired words, even when frequency and other word attributes were taken into account. The remaining two experiments dealt with the episodic memory tasks of free recall and recognition. No age effects were found in these tasks. It was concluded that early age of acquisition facilitates retrieval from lexical memory but has no significant effect in episodic memory tasks.

This paper presents the results of a series of experiments using the release from proactive inhibition technique for identifying the salient encoding attributes of words. The technique uses the Brown-Peterson paradigm, but, after three trials on words of one class, a fourth trial is given with words of another class. The power of the class encoding is inferred from the extent of gain (release from PI) found on the shift trial. The studies reported show a high degree of effectiveness for semantic variables; practically no effectiveness for grammatical variables; a moderate amount for physical variables (i.e., figure-ground shift); and varying amounts for other shifts such as word frequency, imagery, language of the presentation to bilingual Ss. Some evidence is also given for the occurrence of simultaneous multiple encoding.

Several investigators of reasoning with abstract categorical syllogisms have noted that the four figures of the classical syllogism, which vary in the order in which terms occur in the major and minor premises, resemble the four three-stage mediation paradigms in paired associate learning. On the basis of the analogy, figure differences have been predicted and some support has been obtained for these predictions. The present paper proposes an alternative information processing explanation for figure effects based upon contradictions between the correct conclusions that follow from forward and backward processing of the premises. This explanation, in contrast to the associative explanation, successfully predicts which premise combinations will show figure effects as well as the nature of the specific errors which will occur.

Judgments on the subjective duration of simple and complex imagined situations are studied. Four facets, concerning the evaluation of the situation (pleasant/unpleasant) and the characteristics of its events (many/few, variable/monotonous, difficult/easy), are taken into account. These facets proved significant for duration judgments in previous studies in which subjects were exposed to situations varying with respect to one of them. In this paper, we study whether these time-perception facets have comparable effects on the symbolic temporal basis of duration judgments. that is, whether they allow one to account for differences in the beliefs about duration experience in imagined situations. Two approaches were chosen: (1) Three groups of subjects compared the durations of all possible pairs of situations characterized by facet elments x and y. The confusion probabilities could be scaled in one dimension for all groups. The facet elements defined intervals that were hierarchically nested. (2)The facets allowed us to distinguish 24 structuples. For each of them, a concrete situation was described in writing. Seventy-six subjects rated the subjective durations of the situations. The structuples led to a partial order that corresponded well to the duration ratings. Moreover, three of the facets showed significant main effects, and the fourth interacted significantly with two others. Finally, the facets were useful in explaining the similarity structure of the duration ratings.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the nature of hypothesis evaluation in conceptual tasks, especially in the identification of bidimensional concepts. In such tasks, hypothesis testing is seen as being composed of sampling and evaluation stages. With complex problems only one hypothesis seems likely to be sampled on each trial, and it is suggested that this hypothesis is evaluated according to a statistical decision-making process. In Experiment I, Ss were given an initial hypothesis involving one of eight rules and required to test it in an attempt to find a concept. When this given hypothesis was true (i.e., the concept), no difference was found between rules for the number of instances selected to the criterion of solution. Moreover, there was a tendency for Ss to choose instances which were predicted to be positive according to the hypothesis under test. Experiment II examined the role of memory in hypothesis testing. Immediate recall of instances selected revealed no difference between true and false hypotheses. Both primacy and recency effects were evident in recall. The number of instances correctly recalled was more than expected by models of hypothesis sampling and evaluation, and this was attributed to Ss having a low criterion for recall without intrusions. Examination of intrusions suggested that Ss may have retained some, but not all, of the features of the stimuli selected. Some differences were found between rules and between positive and netative instances on recall. These effects were suggested to be due to different amounts of information processing when classifying each type of instance for each rule; the results of Experiment III supported this suggestion.

The present paper compared the processing of complex embedded sentences in Chinese, Norwegian, and English to determine if the underlying mental operations are similar in these diverse languages. The task involved reading a sentence likeIt's true that the dots aren't red and deciding whether it was true or false according to an accompanying picture. The verification latencies were analyzed in terms of a model based on one central mental operation. The results for all three languages conformed to the predictions of the model and showed similar processing rates. Moreover, the Norwegian study expanded the analysis to include quantification in sentences likeIt's true that many of the dots aren't red. These studies suggest that certain fundamental operations may be universally implicated in language processing.

Recall and recognition are operationally distinct procedures, yet there is increasing evidence for the involvement of recall in recognition decisions. Although this observation is not generally disputed, there has been no agreement about the appropriate level of theoretical analysis. Our contention in this paper is that the most fundamental level of analysis is in terms of the cues used, with the next level referring to the nature of the information employed as evidence. We compare at length two dual-information models to demonstrate important differences in their cuing assumptions and the difficulty of establishing that anything more than a cue analysis is required. We conclude tentatively in support of an information distinction and devote the final section to determining whether item information is contextually descriptive or is a strength variable that merely correlates with occurrence in the experiment.

The present paper examined the selection of processing heuristics for choice and judgment across a range of stimuli. Eye fixations were monitored while six subjects made choices or judgments of pairs of gambles, vacations, or gifts. Each stimulus was represented by three attributes that varied in the amount of dimensional interdependency. The two heuristics of interest were dimensional and holistic evaluation. Each manifested a characteristic pattern of eye fixations. Dimensional evaluation required alternating fixations from a single attribute of one stimulus to the same attribute of the other stimulus. Holistic evaluation was characterized by transitions from attribute to attribute within a single stimulus. The results demonstrated that when the stimulus attributes were either interdependent (gambles) or dissimilar (gifts), the processing heuristic was determined by stimulus characteristics. When the stimulus dimensions were neither interdependent nor dissimilar (vacations), the selection of a processing strategy was determined by the prescribed task. This study suggests that any global theory of choice or judgment must be validated over a wide range of stimuli.

This paper describes a lexical decision experiment that demonstrates that there are increased rates of errors for words “misprimed” with words strongly associated with visually similar words (e.g., BREAD-BATTER) relative to rates for the same words preceded by completely unrelated words (e.g., SLEEP-BATTER). The pattern of results is shown to be inconsistent with Forster’s (1976) search model but consistent with a criterion-bias model supplemented by an orthographic checking process.

This paper concerns the relation between mental organization and memory performance. In a series of experiments, it is determined that interactive imagery exceeds separate imagery in cued recall and the organization of free recall. However, the two are indistinguishable in either recognition or the level of free recall unless some additional interunit organization is initially encoded. Although interactive imagery allows a list to be retained as fewer traces than does separate imagery, those traces are necessarily larger. The inverse relation between the number and size of traces is found also in the organization of free recall. This tradeoff results in equivalent total recall.

This paper reports five experiments that examined memory for repeated and unrepeated pairs of words. In over 40 experimental comparisons, cued recall of the repeated pairs was better than it would have been if the words had been repeated as independent cognitive events. Therefore, memory traces do interact with other traces of the same nominal items. Our account of superadditive recall is that some encodings fail on the final test because they lack a needed piece of information. Specifically, some need additional item-specific information to enable access by the cue, and some need relational information for recall of the target. The second trial is an implicit test of memory, whose results give the system a heuristic basis for standing pat or doing more encoding. If a retrieved encoding needs less than a new one to become a success, it has a good chance of becoming a success, and recall is superadditive. However, if the ease of retrieving the encoding is for the wrong reasons, such as massed repetition, the item remains a failure, and recall is subadditive.

This paper discusses the analogue-propositional distinction and argues that, given an appropriate understanding of this issue, the question of whether a particular cognitive function is analogue or not is an empirical one. As an example of how the question can be empirically investigated, the proposed analogue operation for mental rotation of images is considered. It is argued that the view that images are rotated in a holistic analogue manner should predict that rotation rate is independent of such factors as the conceptual complexity of the stimulus or of the comparison task. Two experiments are described that investigated the effects of several stimulus and task variables on the apparent rate of “mental rotation” of images in a Shepard-type task. Instead of comparing a stimulus and misoriented probe figure to determine whether they are identical (except for orientation) or mirror images, as was the case in most of previous studies, the present experiments required subjects to judge whether the misoriented probe was a subfigure of the target stimulus. The results showed that the “rotation rate” (i.e., the slope of the RT vs. angle of misorientation function) was influenced by practice, stimulus attributes, and the nature of the comparison task. In particular, when the probe was a “good” subfigure of the reference stimulus, apparent rotation rate was greater. These results are interpreted as indicating that the linear RT vs. angle relation is not due to a holistic analogue rotation of images, as had been supposed, but arises from a more articulated and piecemeal process in which analysis of the stimulus figure interacts with the comparison task.

The principle focus of this paper is on interpretation of interactions that are obtained when response probability is used as a dependent variable. It is argued that results obtained with probability [or any dependent variable) are only interesting insofar as they reflect something about a corresponding theoretical component. It follows that the functional mapping of response probability [which is measured) onto the state of a theoretical component (which is inferred) must be somehow specified if conclusions are to be meaningful. Depending on the nature of such a mapping, various types of results, particularly results involving interactions, may or may not be interpretable.

This paper examines the strategies t~sed in solving prevaricative reasoning problems. The task consisted of a noncontradictory set of propositions followed by an assumption that introduced an inconsistency. Ss were required to restore consistency by assigning truth values to propositions. When reasoning from false assumptions, Ss exhibit a specific strategy in assigning truth values: If forced to choose between the truth of a generality (e.g., All As are Bs) and that of a particular fact (e.g., This Y is a Z), the Ss assign the generality TRUE and the fact FALSE. Affirmative generalities are assigned TRUE more often than are negative ones, and those expressing class inclusion are assigned TRUE more often than those expressing property assignment. The data show that the selection of a "path" through this hypothetical reasoning problem cannot be attributed to either the syntactic form or the preexperimental credibility of the propositions. A generality coding model was discussed in terms of strategies sho~ in prevaricative reasoning problems as well as in other inference tasks.

In this paper, we propose a new version of the phoneme monitoring task that is well-suited for the study of lexical processing. The generalized phoneme monitoring (GPM) task, in which subjects detect target phonemes appearing anywhere in the test words, was shown to be sensitive to associative context effects. In Experiment 1, using the standard phoneme monitoring procedure in which subjects detect only word-initial targets, no effect of associative context was obtained. In contrast, clear context effects were observed in Experiment 2, which used the GPM task. Subjects responded faster to word-initial and word-medial targets when the target-bearing words were preceded by an associatively related word than when preceded by an unrelated one. The differential effect of context in the two versions of the phoneme monitoring task was interpreted with reference to task demands and their role in directing selective attention. Experiment 3 showed that the size of the context effect was unaffected by the proportion of related words in the experiment, suggesting that the observed effects were not due to subject strategies.

This paper explores whether free recall performance and organization can be facilitated using computer-controlled interactive presentation, where stimulus presentation on Trial N+1 depends on the individual subject’s prior recall history. A series of experiments investigated the effects of two types of response-contingent presentation order manipulations and of selective tagging manipulation designed to highlight the presentation of previously nonrecalled items. An initial experiment using 20-word lists showed no differences among groups, due to a ceiling effect. Two subsequent experiments, using longer lists (30 and 40 words), found that recall and subjective organization were increased by selective tagging and by presentation orders that preserved the subject’s prior order of recall. The results demonstrate that subjects’ previous recall histories contain information that can be used to facilitate recall. The potential of other interactive manipulations is discussed.

Themood-congruity effect refers to facilitated processing of information when the affective valence of this information is congruent with the subject’s mood. In this paper we argue that mood may be a sufficient but not a necessary condition to produce the mood-congruity effect of selective learning. Two experiments are presented in which subjects learned lists of words with neutral, positive, and negative affective valences. In the learning task the subjects were instructed to behave as if they were depressed or happy. The mood-congruity effect was indeed obtained. The effect was stronger with subjects who “predicted” the relationship between mood and affective word valence than with subjects who were unaware of this relationship. The results are not simply attributed to task demands, but are interpreted in terms of a model of cognitive processes and people’s knowledge about mood states.

When people are asked to recall words from a list they have just studied or to produce as many items as possible from a well-known category (e.g., states of the United States), having available a subset of the items as cues often does not facilitate retrieval of the remaining items and sometimes inhibits it. The finding has been obtained many times with a variety of experimental tasks including recall from categorized and noncategorized lists and retrieval from very long-term memory. This paper reviews the studies that have yielded the effect, and considers several explanations of it that have been proposed. None of these explanations is viewed to be entirely adequate and compelling.