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(Cohen and Nagel 1934, 380) As I have just mentioned, these authors were mistaken to think that psychological debunking aims to "disprove the truth" of anything, indeed, both Nietzsche and Freud were quite clear on that point.[7] However, as I will now show, it is I not i a mistake to be wary (or, indeed weary) of the activity itself. And rather than argue that his psycho-social history of religion refuted the existence of God, Nietzsche explicitly says that "with the insight into that origin the belief I falls away i ..." (Freud 1927/[9], Nietzsche 1886/[31]) 8 Rini is unfortunately given over to what I call I merelyology i : rhetorically referring to empirical causes as "mere" empirical causes in a manner which implies (without explicitly saying) that they are somehow normatively suspect as such. Ethics 124 (4): 727 - 49. 30 Nietzsche, F. 1887. MACINTYRE AND RINI ON DEBUNKING Alasdair MacIntyre, in I After Virtue i and elsewhere, suggested that the activity of what he called I unmasking i was bound up with a more general cultural shift toward emotive ethics, a moral system within which value-judgments are nothing more than mere expressions of preference, desire, or taste. [Extracted from the article]

Demandingness objections harass major theories in normative ethics as well as prominent moral views in applied ethics and political philosophy. The present paper does the following: it clarifies and distinguishes between various demandingness objections in the philosophical literature, (ii) identifies a formidable and interesting form of the demandingness objection that targets a wide scope of moral views, and (iii) defuses this objection by developing a local skeptical argument from unreliability the form of which may, interestingly, be effectively deployed in other areas of philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article comments on David Copp's argument that there is a need for genuine collectives in the ontology of agents, to accommodate the kinds of normative judgments people make about them, which appeared in his paper "On the Agency of Certain Collective Entities: An Argument from Normative Autonomy." This argument is also developed in Copp's paper titled "The Collective Moral Autonomy Thesis" (CMA) published within the issue. The argument states that individuals correctly assign blame or obligation to collectives in cases, in which it would be a mistake to assign any blame to their members. Moreover, the author also offers insights on Copp's argument in CMA, where he states that people are to judge that a collective act is blameworthy though the group members that act are blameless.

This article raises some doubts about the intrinsic/extrinsic value distinction and the theories that depend on it. It also suggests that there is an alternative way of thinking about value justification that does not make use of this distinction. The paper begins by describing the distinction and its import for an account of value justification. Then it shows that even very different theories such as Christine Korsgaard's version of Kantianism and some prominent forms of consequentialism rely on the distinction. In the next part, the article argues that one interesting and powerful form of value justification is excluded by this distinction: mutual dependence. In the last section, the paper argues that a coherence system of value justification which allows for justification by mutual dependence between values has the potential to do better by people's considered intuitions than a foundationalist system.

This paper argues that transformative feminism, which insists that ethical analysis be contextual, inclusive, flexible and ecological, provides a promising framework for revising the concepts of privacy, property and family as they are highlighted by the debate over genetics. This paper will also concentrate on reproductive applications of genetic technology, since these affect the welfare of women most intimately. Feminism is an appropriate approach to genetic ethics not only because of its theoretical novelty, but also because of the differential impact the pursuit and collection of genetic knowledge will have on women and other vulnerable groups. Feminism insists that a social analysis be a core interpretative category in ethical and legal inquiry, and accordingly, has already alerted us to the particular dangers of genetic revolution overlooked by other approaches. Genetic testing, for instance, has reproductive screening as a primary application and therefore raises questions about women's freedom of choice. These questions can be satisfactorily answered only when women's socialization to comply and to nurture, the problem of medical paternalism, and the perfectionist nature of our society's pronatalism have been addressed.

The article comments on the paper "Collective Moral Autonomy Thesis" (CMA) by David Copp, published within the issue. The author argues that Copp's examples, as part of his argument for the CMA, do not demonstrate the truth of his thesis. He states that Copp did not offer an account of what he calls "collectives" yet in his examples, he refer to organized and unorganized collectives. There is also a certain unclarity, which pertains to both moral and mental properties, in his arguments regarding the relationship between collectives and the individuals who partly constitutes them. Moreover, he suggests that Copp should provide clear examples of collectives which possess moral obligation and bears moral responsibility, for him to sustain the CMA.

The article explores the possibility that moral responsibility of individuals can be used to explain one form of collective responsibility: responsibility of collective effects. Here, the author argues that the responsibility for collective effects naturally suggests an analysis in terms of universalizability. Moreover, she explains the distinction between justification of a practice and justification a particular act falling under a practice, which is drawn from a paper by John Rawls. She concludes that under Kantian view, it is not believable to see individual agents as morally responsible for collective effect when the actions they contributed are based on maxims defined by patterns of social organization and not social practices.

The article discusses the issue of moral agents enabling others to do wrong and produce harm. In a complex society and organizational settings, those who are responsible for producing harm are frequently aided by others. The article looks at this phenomenon in relation to corporate scandals, which commonly involved groups of people acting irresponsibly and illegally. Additional examples can be found in health care, government, and terrorist activities. While accessories to crimes are often punished legally, the paper focuses on a philosophical examination of accessories.

This article argues in favor of the position that the significance of moral responsibility to people's lives has been emphasized and describes a solution to the problem of authenticity, a predicament in the philosophy of education. The article will first elucidates the concept of a normative agent. Then, summaries of two different conceptions of childhood prominent in the pertinent literature on education are given. This will supply needed background to appreciate the problem of authenticity. This problem is detailed and solution to it is expounded. The article then defend the view that the role of moral responsibility in people's lives has been overestimated. The paper ends with some thoughts on hard choices: in the critical years of their early education, what sort of normative agent should people strive to ensure their children become, and on what basis is this choice to be made?

This article aims to develop an account of the morality of abortion which is correct and is useful for developing a policy regarding abortion that is motivated primarily by moral considerations. Philosophers have typically adopted one of two strategies to try to determine whether abortion is morally permitted. The first strategy, called the rights strategy, involves establishing necessary and/or sufficient conditions for determining whether the fetus is a creature which has a right to life, and then going from there to show that abortion is morally permitted or not morally permitted. It has been pointed out in a well-known paper by Jane English that simply determining whether the fetus has moral rights will not resolve the abortion issue, for it is sometimes morally permitted to kill creatures with moral rights and sometimes wrong to harm creatures without them. The difficulty in formulating an adequate set of necessary and sufficient conditions for having moral rights, along with the need for additional argumentation to complete an adequate argument regarding abortion utilizing the first strategy, has led many to adopt a second strategy in attempting to resolve the abortion issue.

This paper argues that the basic notions and assumptions underlying H. L. A. Hart's theory of legal positivism imply a different plausible conclusion from the one he arrives at, which is that law and morality are logically separate. It will be argued that these notions and assumptions imply otherwise: that law and morality--via the concept of practical reasonableness--are logically connected. In other words, Hart's construal of the acceptance of the rule of recognition from an internal point of view implies the notion of rationality, which would not necessarily sustain a legal system. It will be argued that such acceptance from an internal point of view implies the notion of reasonableness or a disinterested attitude, and that only such an attitude can lead to the existence and sustenance of a legal system. Thus, as a necessary condition, most of the people in the legal system have to fundamentally adopt the attitude of practical reasonableness. Otherwise, it wily be difficult if not impossible for a paradigm case of a legal system--which legal theories try to capture--to exist, and for its laws to be generally obeyed, without the extreme use and sole reliance on coercion, threat and force.

The present paper assesses the traditional ethical perspective underlying the rhetoric of moralism condemning homosexuality. In contemporary Anglo-American moral and political philosophy, Kant figures large in discussions about personhood, autonomy and justice. Yet Immanuel Kant himself condemns same-sex relations with reference to his ethical theory. Kant's views on same-sex relations are products of a certain religious and historical background, but it is important to note that the religious moral condemnation of homosexuality characteristic of his view continues even today. Kant discusses the ethics of same-sex relations in the context of sexual relations generally. He advances two kinds of arguments to reach the conclusion that same-sex relations are immoral. The first argument is that from natural ends, which holds that same-sex activity does not conform to the natural constraints of procreation that ground the ethical legitimacy of human sexual activity. The second is his means-ends argument, which holds that individuals outside the marriage contract instrumentally use one another during sexual activity, thereby reducing themselves to a mere means, which is a violation of the categorical imperative.

This article discusses the author's views on economic consumption, pleasure and the good life. My topic is economic consumption, about which I make two contentions: first, that we should judge consumption on whether it improves or detracts from our lives, and act on that basis: and second, that many of the limits to economic consumption advocated by environmentalists would improve our lives. My ultimate goal is to argue this second point in detail, as part of an encompassing environmental virtue ethics. But the first point is logically prior, and it is the focus of this paper. Unless we place the issue of economic consumption in the context of living good lives and creating good societies, we cannot discusses its justifiable limits. The ancient Greek ethicists placed consumption, and economic issues generally, squarely within this context. The modern science of economics, contrarily, has developed methods of explaining economic behavior and view of human beings and the world we inhabit that obscure the connection between or well-being and our economic lives. In what follows, I contrast the treatments of consumption within the ancient Western ethical tradition and the modern scientific discipline of economics and argue the superiority of the former.

This paper discusses some of the necessary conditions of collective moral responsibility. In doing so, it is assumed that collectives are at least of two kinds: aggregates and conglomerates. The former are random groups of persons, whereas the latter are organized, tend to have decision-making structure, etc. Of course, a collective is an aggregate or conglomerate to one degree or another, and there are collectives that do not fall easily into either of the aggregate or conglomerate categories. What are conditions of collective moral responsibility? Furthermore, do any collectives satisfy these conditions? To answer this, first, a plausible analysis of the nature of collective moral responsibility prior to figuring out which collectives qualify as morally responsible agents. Consider the principle of Collective Moral Liability. It states that it is justified for one to ascribe to a collective moral liability with respect to an outcome or a state if affairs to the extent that: the responsible collective is either an intentional, voluntary or epistemic agent concerning that outcome; the casually contributory conduct was in some way faulty; if the harmful outcome was truly the fault of the collective, the required causal connection exists between the faulty aspect of its conduct and the outcome.

This article comments on the paper Culture, Responsibility, and Affected Ignorance and the book Fieldwork in Familiar Places, both by Michele Moody-Adams. Particularly, it singles out Moody-Adams' objections to the inability thesis. The inability thesis often has been invoked carelessly, with the result that many responsible agents have been let off the moral hook for grave wrongs. It has been commonly coupled with oversimplified and exaggerated views about how cultures might influence moral capacities. Granting that the inability thesis has regularly been misapplied in these ways, however, compatible with the truth of the thesis, properly interpreted. For the thesis need make nothing more than the modest claim that some cultural influences can affect the circumstances or moral capacities of some persons in ways that exempt them from responsibility for some of their actions. Moody-Adams correctly notes that charges about certain persons' inability to know the wrongfulness of their acts are often based on little more than the fact that they did not know or believe that their acts were wrong. But this fact is consistent with their culpably having refused to seek moral knowledge that they could acquire.

Is there a moral problem if a society governed by elected rulers maintains economic arrangements under which a significant proportion of the citizens work hard and well without earning enough for a good life? In this paper I argue that there is. I shall refer to the minimum income sufficient for a good life as the "good-life minimum" and shall argue that its establishment as the minimum wage is morally incumbent upon the citizens of a democratic society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among the many challenges climate change includes, the specter of displacement stands out for its dramatic impact on the individuals and communities that face it, for its potentially destabilizing effect on regions where the displaced are very numerous, and for its emblematic character as a specific aspect of climate change that is both local and global. First, one might object that I have not established the claim that we will have burdensome moral obligations to the displaced, either because all of the arguments concerning our moral obligations I have canvassed are wrong, or because the future state of affairs in which many people are displaced through the effects of climate change does not obtain. Finally, Tessman's treatment of moral failure comes in the context of individual agents rather than collectives, and individual moral obligations rather than collective obligations. It is very likely to be true that on basically any view, at a broad enough level of description, many of the same parties will end up bearing some significant responsibility anyway.[2] The reparations argued for can be grouped into three categories, including refugee status, eased immigration, or, in cases of the displacement of entire political communities, concessions to preserve some measure of sovereignty. [Extracted from the article]

An essay is presented which discusses the perspectives offered by Derrick Darby in his book about social recognition. It explores the social recognition that is vital to legal rights within conventional morality. It highlights the problem associated to the social recognition theses and Darby's argument on moral rights.

The article discusses the claim of Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists called the eudaimonist thesis. The claim stresses that there is a kind of deep and enduring happiness and it is impossible without virtue. The paper presents an advanced studies from empirical psychology to support the eudaimonist thesis that is interpreted as a psychological claim, and reconsider counterexamples that have been directed against the thesis interpreted as a conceptual assertion. It discusses that refocusing the debate in the way affords a fresh perspective on a familiar philosophical landscape, and provides eudaimonist virtue ethics with a source of empirical support for its moral psychology.

This article responds to the paper Legitimate Authority in Non-state Groups Using Violence, by Virginia Held, published in this same issue of Journal of Social Philosophy. The main thesis of Held is that non-state groups resorting to terrorism can be legitimate representatives of their peoples. In the current stage of her writings on terrorism, Held denies that it must target people in any morally protected category, say, civilians, non-combatants or innocents. According to the present author, this is certainly one basis for denying that terrorism differs from war in being fated by its nature always to be unjustifiable. Held offers a variety of reasons why it would be arbitrary or inimical to justice for a non-pacifist to condemn all actions fitting such target-specifying characterizations while refusing to condemn certain acts of war that do not target in these ways, acts that have been committed by governments now urging such blanket condemnation. The present author notes that these are cogent arguments for equity in condemnation. But rather than supporting a target-neutral definition of terrorism, the considerations that Held powerfully deploys are, the present author thinks, best used as means of assessing terrorism in various senses of the term that do depend on targeting.

This article examines the conditions under which deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill is workable using a uses a social-contract approach. To this end, a voluntary implicit contract is constructed based on the responsibilities of stakeholders affected by deinstitutionalization. The feasibility of such a con-tract will serve as a guide to whether further collective action is needed to insure that deinstitutionalization is workable. Deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill in the U.S. was not a static policy decision, but a dynamic process evolving from medical discoveries, court decisions and government policies over a period of decades. The idea of a social contract has traditionally been used to explain the relationship between rulers and their subjects. In order to minimize conflict, rulers and subjects agree to accept duties and responsibilities as they relate to one another. These agreements are in the form of implicit contracts, that is, they are not written, legally enforceable contracts, but they are agreed upon nonetheless. In order for such an agreement to be sustainable, it must be in the best interest of each party. Social contracts that follow Kantian ethics generally assume that everyone is entitled to equal consideration and therefore, should be treated accordingly.

This article discusses Peter French's argument that corporations have the kind of limited moral responsibility as have those children in the society who are considered to have limited status. French offers two different lists of requirements for moral agency. Moral selfhood requires the ability to form rational plans for the pursuit of his interests. This is seen in his discussion of the traditional role of intentional action in theories of moral agency. Moral selfhood also requires the ability to modify plans in response to challenges. He tells that it must have the facility to respond to events and ethical criticism by altering intentions and patterns of behavior that are harmful to others or detrimental to their own interests. The element of the corporation that holds significance for French's position is that part which contains the plans. The Corporate Internal Decision Structure is the firm's established way of making decisions and converting them into actions. It contains two principal elements: organizational rules and policy and procedural rules. It is the collection of rules, positions, goals and policies of a corporation but is not reducible to the people in the corporation.

Thus, he says, two kinds of goods can come from a healthy parent-child relationship: "generic goods, which could in principle be received from anyone, and special goods, which the parent can receive from no one (or almost no one) but the child, or the child can receive from no one (or almost no one) but the parent" (Keller 2006, 266). 6 Keller makes the criticism that dysfunctional relationships do not have intrinsic value (Keller [7], 56). To illustrate how his individuals view can capture our reasons of partiality as we experience them, Keller introduces a modified version of Williams's example, which he calls the "Two-Leveled Pier" case (Keller 2013, 90-92). Keller adopts Jonathan Dancy's conceptual distinction between a I favorer i and an I enabler i to defend his individuals view (Keller 2013, 133-136). [Extracted from the article]

On October 27, 2017, the Catalonian regional parliament, acting on what they regarded as a right of self-determination, held a referendum on the independence of Catalonia. With this conception of collective self-determination on the table, it is possible to examine the primary right "theory" of secession, to see if a referendum is an adequate expression of either democracy or self-determination, which are the underlying values that justify a right of secession. This has been true of the decision to join the European Union (even though there is no legal requirement to hold a referendum to join and to legitimize independent states in the context of a disintegrating state structure[13]; and referendums have also been employed to legitimize independent states in the context of a disintegrating state structure.[14] The fourth criterion is not particularly salient to the issue of secession, but the first three count against primary rights to secession (the plebiscitary theory of secession) and in favor of remedial right theory (where unilateral secession is justified only to remedy egregious injustice in an illegitimate state). [Extracted from the article]

The article critiques the law and economics theories of U.S. Judge Richard Posner pertaining to property rights and mentions the concerns and consequences of the efficiency approach. Topics include the ethical aspect of wealth maximization, difficulties in government institutions mimicking the market and transaction cost, and the outcomes of market transactions depend on voluntary consent and consequentialism.

The article discusses the philosopher Miranda Fricker and her views regarding the testimonial justice. Particular focus is given to the role of the speakers and their decisions. Details related to the cases of smoking and tobacco control, research on circumcision, and laws for the HIV AIDS disease are also included.

The article presents a discussion on the moral and ethical aspect of intention during decision making process. Topics of the article include the advise provided by American philosopher, Judith Jarvis Thompson, the significance of Objection from Oddness (OFO), along with instances of fallacy in decision making.

The article discusses the philosophy of philosopher David Hume when it comes to supporting Same-Sex Marriage and opposing those who oppose it. Topics include Humean philosophy when it comes to the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Obergefell v. Hodges and also Hume's philosophical approach and the morality involved in social conventions such as marriage.

The article discusses the injustice and morality of colonialism and the arbitrariness of violence associated with it. Topics include the social injustice of sixteenth and seventeenth-century colonialism in the Caribbean, injustice of colonization and how it was perpetrated by the arbitrary nature of the power relations of domination between the colonized and the colonizers, and how unjust relations of domination, misrecognition and oppression is revealed by arbitrary violence.

The article discusses the moral validity of Mutually Beneficial Exchange when the trade in question is mutually beneficial to both parties. Topics include examples in Mutually Beneficial Exchange and trade like sweatshop labor, markets in sexual services and markets in surrogate pregnancy and the morality of a political party that trades in votes.

The article discusses the ethics involved in moral and non-moral testimony and under what conditions it is appropriate to defer a testimony to someone else. Topics include how injustice can affect our moral epistemology, reasons why we have a moral obligation not to defer to the testimony of others, and the perpetuation of unjust social hierarchies through moral deference.

The article discusses the moral and political philosophy about the expression of emotions like anger in the public sphere. Topics include the association between normative judgment and anger, the strategic value of public performances of anger which can show injustices that may have been suffered, and violent retribution when it comes to the expression of anger.

B Janna Thompson b is the author of I Taking Responsibility for the Past: Reparation and Historical Injustice i , I Intergenerational Justice: Rights and Responsibilities in an Intergenerational Polity i ; and other books and articles on intergenerational and global justice, environmental ethics and politics, and memory and heritage. He works mainly on issues in contemporary moral and political philosophy, especially those relating to ideal and non-ideal theory, political feasibility, linguistic justice, public reason, and public deliberation more generally. B Kenneth Shockley, b the Holmes Rolston III Endowed Chair in Environmental Ethics and Philosophy, is Professor of Philosophy and Affiliate Faculty in the School of Global Environmental Sustainability at Colorado State University. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the principle of social cooperation and basic economic rights by American philosopher and theorist John Rawls. Rawls has clarified that the principle of justice provides protection to basic rights based on social democracy. It explores Rawls' criterion of basic rights that protect the development and exercise of moral powers.

The article focuses on the approach to ethics which is structurally or methodologically constrained in some fundamental respects which will continue to bother many moralists after philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. It mentions that the fact that moral approaches to same-sex equality and animal liberation can be morally radical and socially challenging with the conservative bias. It also mentions that less popular approach to moral philosophy with the socially revisionary possibilities.

The article argues against the bearers of moral rights to human embryos have the same moral status as typical adult human beings with the significant roles in versions of the embryonic rights argument. It mentions that logical roles played by the origins thesis and the relevant-similarity thesis with the certain claims made by proponents of the embryonic rights argument. It also mentions that the denial of human preembryos have any moral rights.

The article focuses on the individual and therefore on private ownership and personal consumption and provides self-regarding, prudential or eudaemonistic rather than moral considerations. Topics discussed include the author's view that there are very strong moral arguments against a lifestyle of ever-increasing consumption and the distinction between ownership and possession which can be found in the writings of the young Karl Marx.

The article presents the views of the author on abortion, Ectogenesis and responsibility of woman undergoing medical termination of her pregnancy for the death of the fetus. The conflict between right of the woman to discontinue pregnancy and the right of the fetus to live is presented and substantiated by quotes from works of authors like Judith Jarvis Thomson, Soran Reader and Jennifer S. Bard. The author also justifies her views on the use of Ectogenesis to save the life of fetuses.

The article discusses a study on miscarriages and the moral side of permissibility of abortion and person-denying. The study deals with the moral aspects of fetal killing and the emotional aspects of fetal death. It discusses the moral permissibility of person denying and person affirming. It also mentions the lack of ability of the fetus to self defend.

The article focuses on the association of the political and ethical concept of privacy with the logical privacy concept. The relatedness of the personhood and logic laws is discussed and explained. The resemblance of creature-construction arguments to familiar state-of-nature arguments category is pointed out.

The article presents information on a debate over marriage as a matter of right or of virtue with reference to German philosopher Immanuel Kant's ethical theory. Kant's theory focuses on the distinction between doctrine of right and doctrine of virtue. The author explains why Kant placed marriage in the state regulation sphere and then proceeded to undermine the placement by challenging the view of sexuality. According to the author, marriage appears to be morally optional.

The author criticizes the assertion of Joshua Glasgow, senior lecturer at Victoria University of Wellington, that there are no races based on experimental philosophy and traditional thought-experiment approach. He describes Glasgow as an anti-realist because of his use of biology and geography in conceptualizing race. He refutes Glasgow's notion that races are biological categories and are not influenced by social classification, nutritional differences, education and other factors.

An essay is presented on the empirical scrutiny on the use interrogational torture. It analyzes the debate regarding the ethics of torture which is marred by a failure to emphasize plausibility and the difference between the terroristic and interrogational forms of torture as well as aspects of pain and suffering and the psychological and social sequelae of torture. The author states that moral philosophers and thinkers should to settle violent conception of torture.

The article offers the author's insights on the aspects of voluntary obligations. He mentions moral permissibility of the acts which creates voluntary and moral obligations. He attempts to identify the significance of the moral permissibility condition in determining whether one's actions may be considered as justifiable. He adds that several actions such as promising, contracting and consenting are not enough to create duties.

The article offers the author's insights on the arguments by Kirk Ludwig and Seumas Miller against Collective Moral Autonomy (CMA) thesis. The author argues on the two versions of CMA thesis, the substantive and conceptual versions, which both hold the possibility for a collective entity to have an all-in moral obligation even if no member of it has a relevant all-in moral obligation. The author discusses an example where CMA thesis will hold true.

The article focuses on the ethical aspects of the government-driven credit democratization. It explores the reasons why such government policy is morally objectionable, in particular whether the policy violates the rights of lenders forced to act as the policy's agents and/or the rights of third parties exposed to its associated risks. It notes that somes risks involved in such policies are not reasonably rejectable.

The article offers information on the role of precautionary principle in social philosophy. It states that precautionary principle is fundamentally a principle born in the context of public policy and includes in a framework that provide a policy which permits action that raises the prospect of a threat of harm to others. It also discusses on principles as an interface rule and moral rule and provide justification for precautionary principle.

The article offers the author's insights concerning the politics and ethics associated to resentment. The author states that the account philosophers who provide resentment would impact the conclusions obtained from actual resentments. The author mentions that she considered the standard philosophical record of resentment in presenting a discussion on the issue and on her claims. Moreover, the author adds that resentment is considered as anger which is possibly worthy of moral attention.

The article offers the author's insights on the social condition of white people living in South Africa. The author discloses the moral and ethical issues among white people in South Africa and their privileges in terms of custom. She says that the initial conciliatory approach of President Nelson Mandela and moral influence of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to white people was partially dependent. She adds that the feeling of shame among whites must reflect for their transgression.

The article presents an argument regarding the relationship between moral and sentimental cosmopolitanism as well as their application to the problem of global poverty. According to the article, moral cosmopolitanism emphasizes the duties of each individual, regardless of nation or state. Meanwhile, sentimental cosmopolitanism focuses on each individual's emotional attachment to others.