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In this paper, I discuss the conceptualist claim that we cannot speak of perceptual content unless we assume it is objective content. The conceptualist argues that only conceptual content can meet the requirement of being objective, so that the view that perceptual experience has nonconceptual content is not tenable. I start out by presenting the argument from objectivity as it can be found in McDowell (Mind and world, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1994b (See CR11)). I then present the following objections: First, perceptual objectivity cannot be due to the perceiver's conception of objectivity; and second, even nonconceptual capacities of the individual cannot and need not be appealed to in order to account for objective perceptual content., Author(s): Eva Schmidt[sup.1] Author Affiliations: (1) Philosophisches Institut, Universität des Saarlandes, 66123, Saarbrücken, Germany Some Background The argument I discuss here is taken from the debate between conceptualism and nonconceptualism [...]

Keywords: protein; experimentation; conceptual variation and selection; evolution; Mulder; Liebig; Pfluger; Nageli Abstract: A philosophically comprehended account is given of the genesis and evolution of the concept of protein. Characteristic of this development were not shifts in theory in response to new experimental data, but shifts in the range of questions that the available experimental resources were fit to cope with effectively. Apart from explanatory success with regard to its own range of questions, various other selecting factors acted on a conceptual variant, some stemming from a competing set of research questions, others from an altogether different field of inquiry, and still others from the external environment. These results are best explained on, hence support, an evolutionary model of the progress of experimental investigation, whose outlines are briefly discussed. Article History: Registration Date: 29/09/2004