Does perceptual content have to be objective? A defence of nonconceptualism

In this paper, I discuss the conceptualist claim that we cannot speak of perceptual content unless we assume it is objective content. The conceptualist argues that only conceptual content can meet the requirement of being objective, so that the view that perceptual experience has nonconceptual content is not tenable. I start out by presenting the argument from objectivity as it can be found in McDowell (Mind and world, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1994b (See CR11)). I then present the following objections: First, perceptual objectivity cannot be due to the perceiver's conception of objectivity; and second, even nonconceptual capacities of the individual cannot and need not be appealed to in order to account for objective perceptual content.
Author(s): Eva Schmidt[sup.1] Author Affiliations: (1) Philosophisches Institut, Universität des Saarlandes, 66123, Saarbrücken, Germany Some Background The argument I discuss here is taken from the debate between conceptualism and nonconceptualism [...]