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The emergence of the political party Sinn Féin as an electoral force, and its gradual displacement of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as the primary vehicle for Provisional Irish republicanism, was an indispensable precondition for the peace process that brought an end to the long-running Northern Irish 'Troubles'. Unsurprisingly, this process has been a subject of close academic scrutiny, with much attention focusing on the dramatic, early breakthroughs made by Sinn Féin, particularly in the years 1981–1983. By contrast, the mid-to-late 1980s are often represented as something of a fallow period for the party, when its initial, seemingly meteoric rise stalled. Within this narrative, the 1985 local elections are typically passed over relatively quickly. Yet this article makes the case for revisiting those elections, seeing them as marking a somewhat under-appreciated political earthquake in Northern Ireland. It does so on the basis that first, the elections laid bare the ambiguities and tensions arising from the Irish republican movement's 'Armalite and Ballot box' strategy. And second, the consequences of the 1985 elections proved decisive in reshaping both Irish republicanism and the wider political landscape of Northern Ireland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The stability of Irish democracy since 1922 is often a cause for contentment with lines of succession drawn from 'Grattan's parliament', O'Connell's popular movement, and the achievements of the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) at Westminster through to Dáil Éireann. The IPP certainly disrupted the Commons, yet Irish politics was also shaped by the 'mother of parliaments' – MPs mastered parliamentary procedure and home rule legislation drew on British and colonial parliamentary models. By 1918, the party's machine and parliamentary behaviour were rejected as much as British rule – but as Michael Laffan suggested, Sinn Féin triumphed by beating the home rulers at their own game. However, the 1922 constitution gave generous expression to the sovereignty of the people, and for judicial review. But, within short succession, facility for popular initiative was overridden. Ironically, the Irish Free State would never be amended by popular will or judicial review but by parliamentary majority in 25 amendments as the people only voted to adopt it in 1922 and replace it in 1937. In practice then, it was closer to a vision of Dicey's supremacy of parliament dogma that prevailed, so much so, that Seán Lemass acrimoniously proclaimed in 1934: 'this is a sovereign assembly'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political communication is central to the electoral ascension of populist parties across the world. Several studies investigate how communication is used by populists to gain power, but we know very little about how the communication varies when moving between opposition and government office. The few studies on the topic focus exclusively on right-wing populist parties and neglect left-wing populism. This article addresses this gap in the literature and analyses the political communication of left- and right-wing populist parties by comparing their periods in opposition and in government. It focuses on the Northern Ireland case and compares Sinn Féin and the DUP and uses deductive thematic analysis for each election manifesto for the Northern Ireland Assembly between 1998 and 2022. The analysis includes four themes: people-centrism, anti-elite bad manners, crisis talk and volonté générale solutions. Contrary to theoretical expectations, we find that the right-wing populist DUP has changed more substantively its political communication than the left-wing Sinn Féin when moving from opposition to government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examining the writings of more than 150 IRA prisoners, this article explains why a majority of jailed republicans supported the movement's strategic reorientation between the anti-criminalisation protests of the late 1970s and the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. First, it argues, experiences of prison protests, culminating in the hunger strike of 1981, inclined prisoners to endorse electoral interventions to counter their isolation. Sinn Féin's subsequent successes impelled prisoners to back electoralism more constructively, envisioning an all-Ireland 'pan-nationalist' front. By the end of the 1980s, many republican prisoners regarded tactical eclecticism as vital for their campaign's advance. Second, the article contends, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, prisoners pragmatically approved new methods as open-ended experiments. Electoralism, pan-nationalism, and, in the 1990s, peace talks were supposed to aggregate and strengthen the struggle. Tactics were dispensable, and worthwhile only insofar as they enhanced the perceived prospects of victory. By the Good Friday Agreement, prisoners espousing a transitional, constitutional route to Irish unification regarded even the IRA's 'armed struggle' as suspensible. Woven through prisoners' voluminous acclaim for tactical adaptability, traditions of intra-movement discipline and unity cohered the bulk of the IRA's prison population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Irish party system has been exceptional both for the weakness of its left-right conflict and for its long-run stability. How then can party competition on policy, and particularly competition between the main parties, be characterised? This study examines the Irish party system from an issue competition perspective, examining the party system agenda and asking whether Irish party competition is marked by differences in issue focus. New data from Irish party manifestos (1981–2020) coded within the framework of the Comparative Agendas Project show that rather than competing by focusing on different issues, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael's issue focus is very similar and has moved in parallel over time. Nor is a distinct focus on new issues evident in Sinn Féin's offering as they have emerged as a major party. Moreover, it finds that 'new politics' issues have remained marginal and it examines how this has occurred using the 'crucial case' of environmental policy. While differences in issue focus do not help us to distinguish the main parties, the politics of competence continues to have an important role and positional politics may be coming to the fore. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both Sinn Féin and the DUP have successfully mobilised ethnic tribune strategies in order to secure dominance in the electoral politics of Northern Ireland. Alongside this development, Northern Irish society has become markedly more diverse as a result of increasing inward migration. While immigration has enriched the array of cultural variety in the territory, it has been accompanied by increasing evidence of high profile racism. This raises questions as to how political parties that have profited from ethnic tribune strategies might adapt to the realities of a more diverse society. This paper illustrates the manner in which Sinn Féin and the DUP have approached the issue of racism against ethnic minorities, using an in-depth, qualitative analysis of party language. The data are drawn from a series of interviews with elected representatives, party literature, and from debates in the Northern Ireland Assembly. Two key findings are discussed. Firstly, the paper notes a lack of clarity in the manner in which both parties approach the subjects of racism and sectarianism. Secondly, the paper highlights the process by which varieties of racism experienced by ethnic minorities, have become absorbed by debates traditionally associated with bi-national division in the territory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Irish party system has been an outlier in comparative politics. Ireland never had a left-right divide in parliament, and for decades, the dominant centrist political parties competed around a centre-right policy agenda. The absence of an explicit left-right divide in party competition suggested that Irish voters, on average, occupy centre-right policy preferences. Combining survey data since 1973 and all Irish election studies between 2002 and 2020, we show that the average Irish voter now leans to the centre-left. We also show that income has recently emerged as a predictor of left-right self-placement, and that left-right positions increasingly structure vote choice. These patterns hold when using policy preferences on taxes, spending, and government interventions to reduce inequality as alternative indicators. We outline potential explanations for this leftward shift, and conclude that these developments might be anchored in economic inequalities and the left populist strategies of Sinn Féin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally, political parties engage with journalists to promote their agendas and claim issue ownership through publishing manifestos, holding public events and issuing statements, but the coverage that this interaction produces is determined by the editorial focus and decision making of each outlet. In a hybrid media age, political parties can engage in disintermediation by directly shaping their own agenda and communicating with the public using social media, which also facilitate populist messaging. In this article, we use a combination of traditional media and social media data to explore how key issues and parties were mediated during the battle to own 'change' and claim issue ownership in the 2020 election campaign in Ireland. The analysis draws upon coded articles from three mainstream outlets and Facebook posts from the three main parties, along with user engagement data from those Facebook posts. We find that newspaper coverage reflected the framing of a change election. While Fine Gael received the most coverage, both Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin show clear attempts to own change through social media, with Sinn Féin in particular 'owning' the most salient election issue of housing while also deploying substantial populist messaging which resulted in the most engagement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Authors have argued that counterterrorism must be consistent with 'the rule of law.' Often associated with this approach is the assumption that plural political structures limit the state's response to terrorism and that state agents will be held accountable if their response is excessive. Scholars who focus on social movements reject this assumption. We examine the state's response to anti-state violence in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1994. In 1982, Sinn Féin did much better than expected in an election to the Northern Ireland Assembly. Following the election, it is alleged that state agents followed a 'shoot-to-kill' policy and shot dead Irish republican paramilitaries instead of arresting them. We find evidence suggesting such a policy and consider the implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The split of Sinn Féin and the IRA in 1969 established a lasting schism within Irish Republicanism. Historians tend to narrate the split as the result of an intense struggle between two opposing factions led by men. However, women performed an important role in the Republican movement throughout the twentieth century. This article analyses how women reacted to the factional struggle in the movement between 1967 and 1970. Contrary to the general perception of women as passive subjects in this factional struggle, I argue that Republican women had agency in this process. This agency allowed them to perform an independent role in the factional struggle, empowering them to stage the first public show of strength opposing the leadership at Bodenstown 1968. This process was later marked by the departure of the women's organisation Cumann na mBan from the movement; by foreshadowing the later split, the Republican women became, as I will argue, de-facto 'the first Provisionals'. Based on interviews with Republican women, the article outlines the role of women in one of the most significant splits of Irish Republicanism and provides an understanding of how Irish women shaped the politics of the Republican movement during the evolving Northern Irish conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the biographical writing devoted to the critical individual in the history of the Provisional Irish republican movement, Gerry Adams. As President of Sinn Féin from 1983 until he stepped down in February 2018, Adams has been viewed by many as the key figure in the leadership of the Provisional movement, despite his long-standing and continuing denial of membership in its armed ‘wing’, the Irish Republican Army. He has been interpreted as being instrumental in shaping, if not determining the evolution of Provisional republicanism, which began as a movement committed to violent insurrection in the cause of Irish unity and, after causing approximately 49 per cent of the deaths during the ‘Troubles’, subsequently espoused a largely non-violent political strategy in the post-Belfast Agreement era after 1998. This article takes a comparative approach to the three biographies of Adams published to date, by Colm Keena [(1990). A biography of Gerry Adams. Cork: Mercier], David Sharrock and Mark Devenport [(1997). Man of war, man of peace? The unauthorised biography of Gerry Adams. London: Macmillan] and Malachi O’Doherty [(2017). Gerry Adams: An unauthorised life. London: Faber and Faber]. The argument pursued here is that the biographical study of political life histories of emblematic individuals, such as Adams, may shed significant light upon the trajectory and character of the parties/movements which they lead. Moreover, the academic study of biographical writing should be an important resource for political scientists and contemporary historians, although there has been a tendency to marginalise this approach from the mainstream of the discipline of political science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Feminist criticisms of nationalism as a patriarchal structure often cite post-war regression, among others, as robust evidence of the pitfalls for women's participation within such highly gendered movements. Based on in-depth interviews, this article critically examines the case of the Sinn Féin Women's Department, and in particular focuses on the reasons for its ambiguous demise in the aftermath of the 1994 IRA cessation. While the ending of the Women's Department appears to perfectly fulfil the consistent pattern of nationalism's post-war regression, I argue that the roots of its downfall reside not in nationalism as such but in the institutionalisation of Provisional republicanism. As the republican movement ‘professionalised’ itself in preparation for its post-Troubles electoral struggle, we see a marked contrast in the ways in which women's equality is conceptualised and pursued. In particular, as the radical organising of the Women's Department is furtively wound down, what emerged in its place, the Equality Department embraced visions and strategies that are largely indistinguishable from any other mainstream political party. Despite Sinn Féin's progressive record on promoting women, it appears that feminism is now consigned by the republican movement to its ‘revolutionary past’ and the radical politics of yester-year. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines a critical aspect of the contemporary political debate in Northern Ireland regarding ‘the past’, and how to deal with the legacies of violent conflict. The article will specifically analyse the Provisional republican movement's developing policy in this area. It outlines Sinn Féin's (SF's) policy evolution with regard to ideas of ‘truth and reconciliation’ in the context of the post-Belfast Agreement era of ‘peace’. It proceeds to critically assess the Republican movement's demands for an independent and international process of ‘truth recovery’, and subsequently engages in a detailed critique of SF's recent promotion of a ‘reconciliation strategy’, designed to enhance the movement's strategic agenda, and usher in a new phase in the ‘peace process’. The article concludes by arguing that SF's approach to ‘truth and reconciliation’ has been characterised by an emphasis upon the movement's efforts to legitimise its version of the historical narrative of the Troubles, rather than by any authentic attempt to address self-critically the previous commitment to ‘armed struggle’, or to seek genuine compromise with unionists, loyalists and the broader Protestant population. This approach has also been formulated for an internal audience, with the goal of convincing republicans that progress towards a united Ireland has not stalled. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The 2014 European election in Northern Ireland, while containing a greater field of candidates than ever before, returned the three sitting Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) without too much disruption to the status quo. Sinn Féin (SF) topped the poll with their candidate Martina Anderson increasing the party's vote and the Democratic Unionist Party's Diane Dodds came in second with a comfortable margin over the third successful candidate, the Ulster Unionist Party's Jim Nicholson. Following up the three MEPs with challenging performances were the Social Democratic and Labour Party's Alex Attwood and the Traditional Unionist Voice leader Jim Allister. Anderson was new to the European elections and regained the seat for SF with ease, being the only candidate to pass the quota on the first count. The tussle between Nicholson, Attwood and Allister turned out to be more competitive for the third seat with only 7,000 first preference votes separating the three. In the end, it was a result that was largely expected. Drawing upon party political manifestos and leaflets, media coverage and other relevant sources, the report assesses the campaign, outcome and consequences of the 2014 European election in Northern Ireland. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article presents information on the organization of the government of Northern Ireland. It lists the members of the Northern Ireland Office members that includes secretary of state Theresa Villiers, minister of state Andrew Robathan, and shadow secretary of state Ivan Lewis, and members of the Northern Ireland executive including first minister Peter Robinson, deputy first minister Martin McGuinness, and junior minister Jonathan Bell. It also presents information concerning Northern Ireland political parties such as the Democratic Unionist Party, Sinn Féin, and the Ulster Unionist Party.

The article presents information concerning the organization of the government of Ireland. It lists government ministers and opposition spokespersons including Enda Kenny, Gerry Adams, and Brendan Smith, representation of political parties such as Fine Gael, Sinn Féin, and the Labour Party. It also lists bills enacted by the Irish legislature the Oireachtas, state funding of Irish political parties, and information concerning a referendum on amending the Irish constitution.

Deception has played an important role in advancing the Northern Ireland peace process. This article discusses the morality of British Prime Minister Tony Blair's deception to secure a ‘Yes’ vote during the referendum campaign on the Good Friday Agreement 1998. The British Prime Minister misled Northern Irish public opinion by stating that the IRA would have to decommission before either republican prisoners were released or Sinn Féin entered government. This article explores the morality of Blair's deception from a variety of perspectives combining nationalist and unionist positions with realist and idealist approaches to deception. The idealist argues that morality does and should play an important role in politics. The realist approach, by contrast, argues that morality is not, and should not be, influential on politics. A ‘democratic realist’ argument is advanced in this article, which takes from idealism: the inevitability of morality in politics, a commitment to deepen democracy and concern about the corrosive impact of deception. From realism it takes: its ability to unmask power and hypocrisy, its critique of anti-political fundamentalist idealism and moralism, and an acceptance of the inevitability of deception. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article supports interpretations of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 as a significant factor contributing to the development of the Northern Ireland peace process. However, it also emphasises a certain serendipity in the Agreement's effect on northern nationalist, and more specifically republican, politics in the region. In particular, it stresses that a specific interpretation of the Agreement promoted by the Social Democratic and Labour Party inspired a dialogue with republicanism, encouraging an ongoing reappraisal within the latter about the nature of Britain's role in Northern Ireland. This, the article argues, reinforced the movement towards a more political approach that republicans had begun in the 1980s, and encouraged their eventual embrace of a constitutional strategy in the 1990s. However, in advancing this argument, the article notes that such an outcome was far from the minds of the British and Irish officials who negotiated the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The Agreement was intended to marginalise rather than accommodate republicans. Despite this, it provided an inadvertent incentive to draw militant republicanism into the democratic process in Northern Ireland. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article argues that Northern Ireland's ‘perpetual’ peace process needs to be examined in the context of the events at the time. There is a tendency in some of the literature to read the result of the peace process back into its origins and development. Such accounts have misinterpreted the reasons for the emergence of the peace process and have criticised the actions of parties based on interpretations that could not have been made confidently at the time. Drawing on path dependency literature, this article employs process tracing to illustrate that the peace process of today is fundamentally different in both focus and purpose from the variant that existed in the early 1990s. The trajectory of the peace process and its outcome are comprehensible only if the objectives of the parties to the conflict are identified and the ways in which they altered over the period evaluated. The fundamental changes in the politics of Northern Ireland during the peace process led to the parties eventually accepting outcomes that many of them appeared to be categorically unwilling to countenance in earlier phases. This article examines and explains how the peace process resulted in the Democratic Unionist Party–Sinn Féin-led power-sharing government. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Whereas there is an obvious ethnic explanation for the deep divisions between the nationalist and unionist communities in Northern Ireland, Ulster Protestants are often treated as a uniform group. It has been noted that there are more than two ethnic traditions in Northern Ireland; academics have distinguished between British Unionists and Ulster Loyalists. This is also linked to a divide in party support within the Protestant community. These two groups, it has been suggested, may have ethnic or religious bases derived from different migrations to Ulster in the last 400 years. The proposition is tested on surname data that have been shown elsewhere to allow us to see through the ‘fog of history’. Evidence is found to support the ethnic explanation for divisions between the nationalist and unionist communities, but the ethnic explanation for the divisions within unionism is rejected. This leaves a continuing puzzle for scholars as to what explains the two traditions in Northern Ireland's Protestant community. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Northern Ireland peace process saw remarkable change in the policies of Sinn Féin. Having pledged to end Northern Ireland as a political entity, Sinn Féin accepted the 1998 Good Friday Agreement and has since been a strong supporter of the political institutions created under that deal. The party's backing for political institutions has amounted to the zeal of converts, the one-time ‘unequivocal support’ for the IRA's ‘armed struggle’ and repudiation of ‘partitionist institutions’ long displaced by participatory politics. This article shows how, in agreeing to work within political institutions, Sinn Féin was following the desires of the nationalist electorate, assisting the party in capturing majority support within that community. Drawing upon electoral survey data from 1998 and beyond, the article illustrates how, controlling for other demographic and socio-economic variables, it is Sinn Féin supporters who are now the most enthusiastic backers, if only marginally more than those of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, of the devolved power-sharing government in Northern Ireland. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Twelfth of July is the unofficial ‘national day’ of Northern Irish Protestantism, and has often been characterised as highly sectarian and divisive. Research on the Twelfth has concentrated on the parades and on the Troubles period; assertions about the Twelfth and its rhetoric in the post-war, pre-Troubles era have often been based on little more than assumption. This article attempts to fill this gap by examining speeches made at Twelfth of July gatherings in Northern Ireland from 1954 to 1962. It will show that the dominant theme of the speeches was the threat to Ulster Protestants and their state from the Irish Republic, republicans such as the IRA and Sinn Féin, and from the Catholic Church. Orange and Unionist leaders used this sense of threat to discourage division and dissent within Ulster Protestantism. Although Irish nationalism and Catholicism were consistently presented as threatening, the amount of blatant sectarianism was much less than might be assumed. Northern Catholics were rarely attacked directly, and some Twelfth speakers argued specifically for better relations with Catholics. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Following the first full term of regional government in the province since 1972, the Northern Ireland Assembly election held on 5 May 2011 saw the continuation of several trends. Foremost, the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Féin bolstered further their positions as leaders of their respective communities, with the Social Democratic and Labour Party and Ulster Unionist Party losing yet more ground. Building on their decision to enter power-sharing government together in 2007, the two largest parties framed themselves as the progressive choice for voters. As this was the first Assembly election since St Andrews (2006), much of the campaign dialogue centred on the prospect of a Sinn Féin First Minister, a concern highlighted by both unionist parties. The campaign also focused on ‘normal’ socio-economic political issues and possible institutional reform. The absence of inter-party conflict led to the campaign being perceived as the most mundane in living memory, with fears of a record low turnout realised. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The composition of the government of the Republic of Ireland as of December 31, 2011, is presented. It lists government ministers and opposition spokespersons including Taoiseach Enda Kenny, political party Fianna Fáil representative Micheál Martin, and Sinn Féin representative Gerry Adams. It also lists Irish ministers of state including health minister Roisin Shortall, foreign affairs and trade minister Joe Costello, and education and skills minister Ciaran Cannon. The article also mentions significant political reports from 2011 authored by Colin Hunt, Mario Felice, and justice Michael Moriarty.

People do political violence for a reason. That is, the tactic of violence is resorted to in order to achieve a purpose. So what might lead the perpetrators of political violence to abandon its use and embrace peaceful democratic political activity? From the perspective of the perpetrator, the answer will lie in the nature of the ends/means relationship and the re-evaluation of the usefulness of particular means to achieve a given end. This paper explores the Irish Republican Movement's ‘transition to democracy’ and its apparent adoption of a different interpretation of democracy that no longer prioritises simple majoritarianism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Northern Irish Westminster general election of 6 May 2010 witnessed a mixture of striking episodes and more mundane continuities in Northern Ireland. Not for the first time in the history of the Northern state, these changes reflected the ethnic divide - the leaders of the two main unionist parties failed to win a seat (indeed, the First Minister and leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, Peter Robinson, was unseated), as did the leader of a much-vaunted unionist insurgency, while nationalist politics remained largely as-you-were. The election reinforced divisions at the communal and party political level that have been a hallmark of the 1998 settlement. As such, one of the main results of the general election was to sound a starting pistol for the race for control of the symbolically important post of First Minister in the Northern Ireland Assembly elections scheduled for 2011. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of remembrance of the First World War in contemporary Irish republicanism in Northern Ireland, both Official and Provisional, is examined in this article, which places such remembrance in a wider nationalist context. After considering the nature of nationalist engagement in the British army in 1914-1918, and all-Ireland issues around remembrance, the article focuses on Sinn Fein's involvement in Somme commemoration in 2002 and 2008. It then examines republicans' 'discovery' of ancestors with a past in the British military, focusing on the Official Republican ex-prisoners group, An Eochair. The article concludes with an examination of how far theories of memory can shed light on republican remembrance, and the extent to which changes in attitudes to remembrance are part of republicanism's 'historic compromise' with unionism. It argues that despite a significant shift, republicans have engaged with remembrance on their own terms, and that the gap between them and unionists remains large, with the possibility of genuinely shared remembrance remote. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sinn Fein's relationship with the European Union has changed significantly since the late 1990s. The party has moved from a position of outright opposition to European integration to one of 'critical engagement'. This has been embodied most clearly in its campaigning (and growing success) in European Parliament elections and referendums on European treaties. The degree to which this constitutes a process of Europeanization of the party is tempered, however, by the motivations for this shift in policy, which are closely related to the party's electoral and political strategies in both parts of Ireland. Moreover, the party's cautious engagement with the EU is predicated on a careful presentation of itself as a resolutely republican and left-wing party. The role it plays in European elections and referendums, therefore, is a self-consciously independent and oppositional one. The Europeanization of the party is clearly shaped by the motives, context and dynamics of the domestic arena as much as the European one. This is exemplified in the de facto prioritizing of the 'critical' over the 'engaged' elements in Sinn Fein's approach to European integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article calls for a reappraisal of the consensus surrounding the split within Sinn Fein in 1926 that led to the foundation of Fianna Fail. It demonstrates that quantitative factors cited to show Sinn Fein's 'terminal' decline - finances, cumann (branch) numbers, and election results - and to explain de Valera's decision to leave Sinn Fein and establish a rival republican organisation, Fianna Fail, do not provide sufficient objective grounds to explain the republican leader's actions. The article demonstrates that Sinn Fein's election results during the period in question (1923-26) were encouraging and the decline in finances and cumann numbers can be explained by the fact that the base year used to compare progress was 1923, an election year. Moreover, the article compares the performance of Sinn Fein to the first five years of Fianna Fail (1926-31) to show that what has been interpreted as terminal decline can also be attributed to normal inter-election lulls in party activity. Correspondingly, subjective factors - e.g. personal rivalries, differences in ideology, organisational style and levels of patience in terms of achieving political power - were most likely the determining factors rather than organisational decline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses how the war against terrorism has affected political perceptions in Northern Ireland. After the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, Irish republican groups such as Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA had to adjust to a political climate less sympathetic to organisations associated with terrorism. Unionists on the other hand sought to take advantage by attempting to link perceptions of republicanism to Islamic extremism. Though somewhat successful, their efforts did not convince the British government to change course from an approach of accommodation, as demonstrated by Tony Blair's 2005 public distinction between the IRA and Al Qaeda. Using structured interviews with Northern Irish political figures, this article examines how the context of the 'war on terror' has influenced the political rivalries between unionism and republicanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is an empirical study about Sinn Fein and how the party perceives the role of the news media in relation to its political goals and aspirations within the Northern Ireland peace process. Drawing from interviews carried out with a number of Sinn Fein representatives, it brings to light the organisational priorities of the party when dealing with the news media and provides insights into the various considerations which come into play when trying to shape the news agenda. Importantly, this work offers an original and timely exposition of Sinn Fein’s approach to media strategy and indicates how the party, one of the leading protagonists in the peace process, tries to use the news to develop positions and apply pressures in order to try and shape the communication of policy in Northern Ireland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]