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The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the recognition of the rising challenge from China have resulted in a closer alignment of American, British and French strategic interests. This policy paper explores how the strategic relationship between the United States, the United Kingdom and France has evolved amid this changed threat environment. The Russia–Ukraine war exposed the limitations of France's policy of 'strategic autonomy' and reasserted the importance of an American role in European security. The war has re-focused attention upon the Lancaster House framework in which the UK and France have the potential to enhance their contribution to European defence. The UK still regards its 'special relationship' with the US as being of critical importance to its foreign policy. But the UK's diminishing military power makes it a less valuable ally to the US whose attention is increasingly upon the Indo-Pacific region. The paper argues that the alignment between the three countries has been closer over the Russian war in Ukraine compared to attitudes towards China, where tensions between France and the 'Anglo-Saxons' persist. France has been unwilling to adopt the American approach towards China and has stuck to its vision of a multipolar world. The AUKUS deal arranged between the US, UK and Australia had the effect of alienating France. The policy paper contends that the temporary alignment between US, UK and French interests will erode as long-standing conflicts of interest re-emerge. In particular, the unpredictability of US leadership will damage the trilateral relationship if Donald Trump regains the presidency in November 2024. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Structural realists might reasonably predict that foreign policy elites in countries like Japan and Australia would view China's economic and military rise as a potential threat and seek to balance against it. However, the actual policy behaviour of Japanese and Australian policy elites has been quite complex—pushing forward at times, hesitating at others and generally uncertain if an explicit counter-coalition against China through bilateral security cooperation is the right policy path. Why is this? This paper explains the puzzle by focusing on the perceptions of policy-makers regarding the risk of provoking China; entrapment with the other; and entrapment with the United States. The paper demonstrates how policy-makers' concerns regarding entrapment or abandonment related to their mutual US ally—as well as concerns about potentially provoking China—have had an instrumental effect on the degree to which Japan and Australia have strengthened their security commitments to each other. While the rise of China—and the relative decline of US power—has shaped the overall direction of Japan–Australia security ties, such structural imperatives are of course also complicated by how domestic actors think about the tactical aspects of understanding and surviving these structural features. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The past decade has seen a push for 'gender sensitive' approaches within nuclear policy-making. Yet the significance of this approach, and how it understands 'gender sensitivity' are unclear and have not been studied. This article asks the question: how does work done on 'gendering' nuclear policy to date understand what a gender sensitive approach to nuclear weapons means and requires? The article provides an overview of the movement to include gender in nuclear policymaking before conducting an analysis of the discourse on gender in a core institution of nuclear politics, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Through qualitative analysis of five years of NPT texts, we find that dominant understandings of a 'gender sensitive approach' centre on the inclusion of women. We further find that there is almost no mention of men and masculinity in the NPT discourse; women are constructed as a homogenous category of outsiders; and women's inclusion is understood mainly as a means of increasing institutional efficiency. We suggest that the next steps in 'gendering' nuclear policy engage more with feminist policy analysis and the experiences of those already working within the policy space, and consider further how and if one can meaningfully link gender sensitive approaches to the practice of nuclear deterrence. The findings of this study also have significance beyond nuclear weapons, illuminating the broader dynamics and challenges of 'gendering' international security spaces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia has been among the most prominent advocates of the increasingly popular Indo-Pacific concept. This article argues that Canberra's enthusiasm for the concept stems from its appeal to the two dominant traditions of Australian foreign policy—a 'dependent ally' tradition and a 'middle power' approach. While these two traditions are typically seen as being in tension, the Indo-Pacific concept provides a rare point of convergence between them. The article begins by outlining the appeal of the Indo-Pacific concept to each of these traditions. Using a case-study of recent Australian policy toward the South China Sea disputes, however, the article then demonstrates that Australia has in practice implemented its stated Indo-Pacific strategy far less consistently than its very vocal support would appear to suggest. This disjuncture is attributed to the growing influence of a third, generally understudied, 'pragmatic' Australian foreign policy tradition. Because Australia has been such a prominent champion of the Indo-Pacific concept, the article concludes that this divergence between the rhetoric and the reality of Australia's Indo-Pacific strategy threatens to have a negative impact on the concept's broader international appeal and sustainability, particularly among Australia's south-east Asian neighbours. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does the rule of law matter to maritime security? One way into the question is to examine whether states show a discursive commitment that maritime security practices must comply with international law. International law thus provides tools for argument for or against the validity of certain practices. The proposition is thus not only that international law matters to maritime security, but legal argument does too. In this article, these claims will be explored in relation to the South China Sea dispute. The dispute involves Chinese claims to enjoy special rights within the 'nine-dash line' on official maps which appears to lay claim to much of the South China Sea. Within this area sovereignty remains disputed over numerous islands and other maritime features. Many of the claimant states have engaged in island-building activities, although none on the scale of China. Ideas matter in such contests, affecting perceptions of reality and of what is possible. International law provides one such set of ideas. Law may be a useful tool in consolidating gains or defeating a rival's claims. For China, law is a key domain in which it is seeking to consolidate control over the South China Sea. The article places the relevant Chinese legal arguments in the context of China's historic engagement with the law of the sea. It argues that the flaw in China's approach has been to underestimate the extent to which it impinges on other states' national interests in the maritime domain, interests they conceptualize in legal terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Americans have generally seen the principles and objectives proclaimed by President Woodrow Wilson during the First World War as having continued relevance for United States foreign policy. However, they have often differed over their application to specific situations, particularly because there is likely to be a tension between a drive to establish democratic values across the globe and commitment to a universal system of collective security. Rather than seeking a pure, abstract definition of ‘Wilsonianism’, it is more illuminating to examine its origins and evolution in relation to the development of American foreign policy over the years. Tracing this historical process reveals that Wilson committed himself to a postwar league of nations during the period of American neutrality, but it was only as the United States became a belligerent that the spread of democratic government became a policy objective, and then only in a partial and qualified way. A similar pattern has been discernible in subsequent decades. It has been during conflicts, or the run-up to them, that the more ideological and revisionist aspects of Wilsonian principles have come to the fore, whereas it has been in the aftermath of conflicts that there has been the greatest interest in the potentialities of a universal collective security organization. There has also been a broad shift of emphasis over time. As confidence in America's power position has grown, the core of Wilson's legacy has more often come to be seen as the promotion of democracy rather than the strengthening of international institutions. The persistence of both themes may be seen as reflecting basic and enduring elements of the policy-making context—on the one hand, the interests of the United States as a status quo power, and on the other, the demands of domestic American opinion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why did Putin decide to invade Ukraine in 2022? Structural realists regard it as a preventive war with a strategic rationale in response to NATO's eastward expansion. However, as many scholars suggest, Putin's decision-making is riddled with various irrationalities, which can be better framed as overbalancing and the classical realist concept of 'hubris'. Lawrence Freedman and others argue that a key to explaining Putin's overbalancing is applying the concept of self-deception in evolutionary psychology, which can be the scientific foundation of hubris in classical realism. Thus, Freedman's argument of Putin's self-deception and others' general theses of self-deception as a cause of overconfidence led to the introduction of self-deception into classical realism to solve the puzzle of overbalancing in international affairs. Thereby, the novel balancing concept of 'hubris balancing' was developed: irrationally aggressive balancing that exceeds what is achievable in practice. There are three causal pathways (cognitive, emotional and social) to hubris balancing as ideal types: overconfidence, anger and nationalism. As a plausibility probe, hubris balancing is illustrated by analysing Putin's decision to wage war against Ukraine. The result shows that, as the logic of hubris balancing suggests, driven by overconfidence and anger towards western liberalism, Putin decided to invade Ukraine by driving exclusive nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Population aging is pervasive in powerful states in the Asia—Pacific region, but the effects of and responses to it vary in ways that do not neatly fit with what initial theories anticipated. Why have many of these states' foreign policies been far more aggressive or militaristic than expected for their demographics? The key to understanding population and national security is an institutional perspective that recognizes how demographic changes interact with other factors. The range of institutions among the Asia—Pacific powers explains some of the variation in their foreign policies; policies intended to respond to or adapt to those demographic shifts explain the rest. Understanding how aging shapes states' external behaviours is increasingly important as population aging is becoming the predominant demographic trend globally. Those forecasting the effects of population aging must accurately account for the ways institutions mediate demographic change, or risk severely underestimating or overestimating the capabilities and intentions of allies and adversaries. An illustrative discussion of institutional arrangements and military manpower adaptations demonstrates why the effect of population aging has been diluted in China and Russia thus far but suggests that Japan is well positioned to manage the economic risks posed by an aging population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do small powers choose the version of an international order to subscribe to? What factors are at play when a state subscribes to the rules-based order or decides to abandon those commitments and shift to an alternative version of order? The argument put forth in this article is that this choice is a function of domestic dynamics and the expected foreign policy gains of the sitting leader. In questioning the automaticity of a small power's choice, the article makes two important contributions. At the conceptual level, it supports the idea that orders persist because of the mutually constitutive actions of great and small powers. It lends credence to the claim of intersubjectivity in international relations and emphasizes that agency is anchored in relations between states. At the policy level, the article finds that while the Philippines seems to automatically subscribe to the United States-led order, pockets of resistance are a function of a colonial past that lingers to this day, which became fertile ground for the country's pivot to China during the Duterte administration. The article closes by highlighting that alliances risk their cohesion and effectiveness without coordinated maintenance, so policy lessons on alliance management are necessary to improve collective security arrangements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do major Asian states regard the current international security order? Do they agree or disagree among themselves? This is an introduction to a special section on 'Asian conceptions of international order: what Asia wants'. It draws on articles analysing the stances of China, India, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines and Vietnam towards the existing international security order usually described as a liberal international order (LIO). It argues that Asian states substantially support the main constitutive and regulatory norms and institutions of the LIO, but they worry that the LIO does not consistently honour these norms. Asians disagree on the centrality of political liberalism, but even Japan and South Korea, the most liberal states, are uncomfortable with strident criticism, punishment and the exclusion of less liberal states. Asians also disagree on the role of US alliances: some are strongly supportive, some are ambivalent and some are negative. Finally, Asians disagree on how they voice dissatisfaction. Japan and South Korea supplement existing norms and institutions as a way of transcending the limitations of the LIO; south-east Asian states promote ASEAN's mediatory role for peace and security above and beyond existing global arrangements; and Indonesia, India and China want to move from being norm takers to becoming norm shapers. The introduction ends with six policy implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The security implications of climate change are increasingly acknowledged in academic scholarship and in national security strategy documents. Climate change has also increasingly featured in UN Security Council (UNSC) debates since the first discussion of this topic in 2007. However, the UNSC has yet to agree a resolution formally recognizing its own role in addressing the implications of climate change for international security; a draft resolution on this issue was voted down in late 2021. Examining the statements and contours of 2021 debates preceding this vote, this article points to fundamental impediments to such a resolution, with the position of opponents (Russia, China and India) suggesting intractable obstacles linked to different visions of world order. While opponents' stated concerns about the UNSC's role in addressing climate change find some support in existing scholarship, the authenticity of claims made by opponents is called into question by the internal inconsistency of these arguments, the gap between stated concerns and foreign policy in other contexts, and the broader foreign policy interests and identities of these states. These factors present key impediments not simply to a UNSC resolution, but arguably to international action consistent with the urgency of the climate crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding the scope and the limits of cooperation of authoritarian regimes is important to assess their ability to support each other and strengthen authoritarian rule worldwide. While there is substantial evidence of authoritarian regimes working together to ensure mutual stability, autocracies are also notoriously mistrustful of one another. Therefore, they prefer to limit the assistance from other autocracies to rhetoric, to avoid the emergence of excessive dependencies. The conditions under which authoritarian cooperation goes beyond rhetoric, and even takes such extreme forms as military interventions, are insufficiently studied. The article investigates the case of the Collective Security Treaty Organization's (CSTO) intervention in Kazakhstan in 2022 as an example of an authoritarian regional organization sending a military mission to one of its member states. Using process tracing and carefully investigating the available evidence on the role of CSTO forces in Kazakhstan, we show that their intervention was more of symbolic importance than having an actual military role, and precisely for that reason it was acceptable to the leadership of Kazakhstan and other CSTO countries. The balance of power in central Asia (and in particular the role of China) ensured the credibility of commitment of the CSTO to keep its mission a symbolic one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because of his personality, had Donald Trump won the 2020 election the remarkable and unexpected united response by NATO allies to the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine would not have happened. Relying on leader personality research in foreign policy, we demonstrate this by using the counterfactual method of analysis. Specifying key differences between Biden's and Trump's personalities in terms of their experiences, traits and beliefs, we explicitly show that president Trump would have been very unlikely to share US intelligence, rally NATO allies in support of Ukraine or challenge Vladimir Putin. In contrast, these responses fit very well with Joe Biden's personality. We first present counterfactual analysis as a method before comparing Biden and Trump along personality characteristics known to significantly influence foreign-policy decisions. Through our case-study, we demonstrate the value of using systematic and theoretically grounded counterfactual methods for assessing the importance of individual differences between leaders and emphasizing their impact on international affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Former US President Donald J. Trump was infamous for his nakedly transactional approach to politics. However, as we demonstrate in this article through the lens of migration politics, this kind of unabashedly transactional approach is less an outlier than a common feature of contemporary international politics. Drawing in part upon initial findings from our ongoing Diplomacy of Forced Migration Dataset Project, we explore historical and contemporary cases to illustrate how transactional migration management 'deals' such as the 2022 UK–Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership are not particularly new, unusual, or revolutionary. In this exploration of the long history of deal-making in the realm of forced migration management, we first define the phenomenon—which we term transactional forced migration (TFM)—and situate it within the growing literature on migration diplomacy, externalization and what is known as the instrumentalization and/or weaponization of migration. We then highlight illustrative historical precedents that presage what we are witnessing today. We additionally identify and unpack several of the under-appreciated connections between TFM schemes and other dimensions of diplomacy and international politics. We conclude with a summary of our argument, its implications for contemporary policy and a few thoughts about what current trends suggest the future is likely to hold. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The consequences of the Iraq War of 2003 continue to reverberate throughout the Middle East and wider world in multiple, if still underacknowledged, ways. Though subsequent regional developments have taken centre stage—notably those surrounding the Arab Uprisings and the subsequent civil wars and interventions in Libya, Syria and Yemen—the effects of the Iraq War remain powerfully present. A watershed event, it has generated major and irreversible changes at the international and regional level. It has empowered certain states and actors, and weakened others— notably Iraq itself—but its impact on both the regional and wider global security landscape cannot be underestimated. Arguing that the events surrounding the Iraq War and its outcome constituted a 'critical juncture', or major inflexion point in regional order, this article examines three interdependent features of the changing regional architecture. The first relates to the region's international alignments; the second to its balance of power; and the third to the changing institutional environment, which challenges and redefines the very boundaries of the Middle East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When a state faces a rising great power rival, it has a range of balancing options from which to choose. But a balancing state may consider many of the most common options to be either too costly or unduly provocative. Thus India, for example, considered 2020 to be a strategic watershed—with a clearly more aggressive China on the border, and a clearly more disorderly international system after the COVID pandemic—but has undertaken only modest military balancing. What alternative options do such erstwhile balancers have? This article addresses both those theoretical and empirical puzzles, by introducing the novel concept of 'zone balancing' as another option in a balancing state's repertoire. Zone balancing seeks to shape the international field of competition in which the balancer and rival operate—specifically, to build the capacity and resilience of third-party states, to shrink the rival's ability to coerce them. This article advances that concept and uses it to explain India's post-2020 strategic adjustment, and especially its warmer embrace of the Quad—the minilateral grouping comprising Australia, India, Japan and the United States. Zone balancing effectively explains the Quad's recently-clarified strategic logic, and predicts some of its limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers an analysis of the EU's engagement in Georgia as a standpoint from which to assess the EU's role as a conflict manager. The article begins with a brief narrative account of the development of EU—Georgia relations in the context of the country's two unresolved conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It then proceeds to the analysis of two sets of factors—those within, and those external to, the EU—that are crucial for understanding the nature and impact of EU efforts to manage the two Georgian conflicts. On the basis of this case-study analysis, the authors offer a wider analysis of the EU's potential for assuming a wider role as an international security actor. This is undertaken by considering both the limitations of the EU's existing capabilities for conflict resolution and the new developments contained within the Lisbon Treaty. The final part of the article asserts that the EU has suffered from two key weaknesses that have prevented it from living up to its aspirations of becoming a globally significant and effective conflict manager. The first is structural—the lack of, to date, a permanent External Action Service; the second is conceptual—the lack of a coherent and comprehensive conflict management strategy. The article concludes with five substantive principles that should guide the EU's approach to conflict management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For many observers, the Iraq crisis spelled the end for EU ambitions in the defence sphere. The profound public and bitter divisions that emerged were seen as illustrative of the insuperable problems confronting ESDP. This article argues, however, that the reverse is in fact the case. Far from sounding the death knell for ESDP, the crisis has had a cathartic effect in compelling the member states to face up to and resolve the major ambiguities that had always threatened to undermine EU defence policies. Consequently, these member states have, in the months following the war, laid the basis not only for a more modest but also for a more effective ESDP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A developing public commentary views China as exerting influence in international organizations to legitimize and disseminate PRC foreign policy values and interests. This article examines an understudied source identified by PRC elites to promote influence in the United Nations system: dispatching PRC nationals as international civil servants, specifically in a targeted pursuit of executive leadership positions. Using decades of UN staffing data, we find that apart from Russia, China holds the fewest executive leadership posts among the aspiring and permanent members of the UN Security Council. Moreover, China is yet to lead an agency addressing international security matters. US and European staff contributions are significantly higher at all staffing levels of the international civil service. Still, the data shows that China made modest, targeted gains in most specialized UN agencies, and agencies headed by PRC nationals show faster increases in PRC staff members, though all base numbers were low. We draw from Chinese-language sources to discuss issues facing China in increasing its international civil service numbers, affecting the country's ability to shape global governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental peacebuilding is a rapidly growing field of research and practice at the intersection of environment, conflict, peace and security. Focusing on these linkages is crucial in a time when the environment is a core issue of international politics and the number of armed conflicts remains high. This article introduces a special issue with a particular emphasis on environmental opportunities for building and sustaining peace. We first detail the definitions, theoretical assumptions and intellectual background of environmental peacebuilding. The article then provides context for the special issue by briefly reviewing core findings and debates of the first two generations of environmental peacebuilding research. Finally, we identify knowledge gaps that should be addressed in the next generation of research, and to which the articles in this special issue contribute: bottom-up approaches, gender, conflict-sensitive programming, use of big data and frontier technology, and monitoring and evaluation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Saudi Arabia's decision in recent years to use novel and hitherto unexplored informal alliance formats, which we term multinational security coalitions (MSCs). This development was initiated by the new Saudi political leadership under King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, who have a much greater inclination to pursue proactive foreign and security policies than their predecessors. However, it will be highlighted that beyond the priorities of individual personalities, this shift in Saudi Arabia's behaviour occurred against the backdrop of significant changes in the existing security environment, including the perceived withdrawal of the United States from the security affairs of the region during the presidency of Barack Obama, and crucially also Saudi Arabia's frustration over the failure of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to develop into a viable security mechanism. The article begins with the introduction of the key ideas relating to institutional design, the conceptual framework for this study. Section two outlines the most important reasons for Saudi Arabia's choice of the MSC format. The third section examines the strengths of the MSC format—especially informality, the resulting low entry-thresholds and the low risk of entrapment—that provided Saudi Arabia with partial and temporary success in recruiting coalition partners and thus bolstering its leadership role. The final section demonstrates, however, that ultimately MSCs are not a panacea. The informality of MSCs that makes it easy for the pivotal state to assemble a coalition also makes it hard for it to forge, and enforce, a common vision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we analyse the factors underpinning the shift towards hybrid security governance in Africa. Extant scholarship largely attributes this shift to broader global processes, such as histories of colonialism, neoliberalism and transformations in global governance, which have served to legitimize the role of private authority in security provision around sites of resource extraction. Our analysis seeks to understand the relative and relational influence of power and rules in international politics by offering empirical insights about what hybrid security arrangements look like 'on the ground'. Drawing upon recently conducted fieldwork in Kenya, Uganda and Ghana, we examine how hybrid security arrangements affect the lives of those living near sites of natural resource extraction. Our analyses suggest that although hybrid security has emerged as the leading approach to security governance, this approach to security does not uniformly involve or serve the interests of all stakeholders. Rather, we find that hybrid security arrangements aid the security of extractive operations—securing investments in both physical and human capital—while sometimes undermining the security of nearby communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The massive expansion and evolution of United States security cooperation under the auspices of the 'war on terror' remains overlooked in the counterterrorism and interventions literature. The Sahel provides a useful region in which to explore the constitutive effects of such cooperation and its evolution because the US has always pursued an 'economy of force' mission there. In this article, I focus mainly on the constitutive effects of US indirect military intervention in the Sahel after 9/11, and subsequent more direct military intervention following the outbreak of civil war in Mali. The indirect intervention by the United States to build the capacity of local forces in Mali, where jihadists were based, failed because of the dissonant relationship between the two countries. This led the United States to intervene more directly in the region, including through its cooperation with and support for French and Nigerien forces. The nature of this more direct military intervention was also informed by evolving US experiences working by, with and through partner forces in other parts of the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is becoming widely accepted that we have transitioned, or are now transitioning, from an international liberal order to a different reality. Whether that reality is different solely in terms of power dynamics, or also in terms of values and institutions, is up for discussion. The growing body of literature on 'post-liberalism' is used as an entry-point for this article, which aims to explore how the post-liberal transition applies to cyberspace. We explore how power dynamics are evolving in cyberspace, as well as how established norms, values and institutions are contested. The article then looks at the emergence of cyber diplomacy as a consequence and response to the post-liberal transition. As it will be argued, if cyberspace was a creation of the liberal order, cyber-diplomacy is a post-liberal world practice. What role it plays in shaping a new order or building bridges between different political visions, and what it means for the future of cyberspace, will constitute key points of discussion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades 'youth bulge' theory has dominated understandings of youth in mainstream International Relations. Youth bulge theory has also become part of some public media analyses, mainstream political rhetoric, and even officially enshrined in the foreign policy of some states. Through the 'youth bulge' lens, youth—especially males—have been presented as current or future perpetrators of violence. However, this article argues that the youth bulge thesis postulated in mainstream IR is based on flawed theoretical assumptions. In particular, supporters of youth bulge theory fail to engage with existing research by feminist IR scholars and thus take on a biological essentialist approach. This has led to theoretical and practical misunderstandings of the roles youth play in relation to conflict, peace and security. These partial and biased understandings have also resulted in less effective policy-making. In critically reflecting on the 'youth bulge' thesis, this article argues that applying gender analysis is crucial to understanding the involvement of young people in general—and young men in particular—in conflict. Doing so will contribute to advancing more accurate analysis in scholarship and policy-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been regarded by international society as a major policy tool in China's geo-economic strategy. Under this policy platform, Beijing has pledged to invest billions of dollars in the infrastructure and industrial sectors across Eurasia and in the Indo-Pacific nations. It is widely believed that such huge amount of investment will inevitably generate significant geostrategic repercussions in these regions. In response to the BRI, the United States and other powers have come up with a 'free and open Indo-Pacific' strategy. This article attempts to address the following question: what impact is the BRI likely to have on the security ties between China and the other major players in the Indo-Pacific? The author finds that the BRI may significantly transform China's international security policy and the expansion of Beijing's security influence may further intensify the security competition between China and other major powers in the Indo-Pacific region. The article also proposes a new analytical angle for the study of geo-economics that unpacks the role of economic activities and processes in generating geopolitical intentions and catalysing geopolitical competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article assesses how south-east Asian countries and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have responded to the 'free and open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) strategies promoted by the United States and the other countries in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the 'Quad': US, Japan, Australia and India). Their nuanced ripostes imply a persistent commitment to hedging and shifting limited alignments in the face of growing great rivalry and the lack of a clear FOIP vision among Quad members. In the face of external pressure to take sides, the ASEAN states are likely to keep hedging through working selectively with China and the United States. Given the United States' apparent preference to balance China and Trump's disregard for multilateralism, ASEAN's ability to maintain its centrality in the evolving regional architecture is in doubt—despite the Quad countries' (belated) accommodation of ASEAN in their FOIP strategies. However, the success of the US strategy depends on Washington's ability to build and sustain the requisite coalition to balance Beijing. ASEAN has undertaken efforts to enhance bilateral security collaboration with China and the United States respectively. In doing so, ASEAN is arguably seeking to informally redefine its centrality in an era of Great Power discord and its ramifications for multilateralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'free and open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) strategy, actively promoted by the United States with support from its allies and partners, is a significant geopolitical response to China's growing power and expanding influence in Asia and beyond. Beijing has adopted various new strategies to cope with the challenges related to FOIP. One of these strategies is to secure a robust relationship with south-east Asia in order to make these regional states either neutral to or less supportive of the Indo-Pacific vision. In addition to economic statecraft and soft power, Beijing believes that it can also tap into the domain of non-traditional security (NTS) to strengthen relations with this region to position itself better in the intensifying regional geopolitical competition. The article addresses the following question: what is the impact of China's NTS cooperation with south-east Asia on Beijing's geopolitical rivalry with other major powers in the Indo-Pacific region? The article argues that China's NTS cooperation with south-east Asian countries may help China maintain its geopolitical standing in the region, but it is unlikely to lead to any dramatic increase of China's strategic influence in the region. This essentially means that Beijing may be able to prevent ASEAN or most ASEAN member states from lending substantive and strong support to the Indo-Pacific construct, but it will not be able to stop ASEAN states from supporting some elements of the FOIP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Linking health and security has become a mainstream approach to health policy issues over the past two decades. So much so that the discourse of global health security has become close to synonymous with global health, their meanings being considered almost interchangeable. While the debates surrounding the health–security nexus vary in levels of analysis from the global to the national to the individual, this article argues that the consideration of health as a security issue, and the ensuing path dependencies, have shifted in three ways. First, the concept has been broadened to the extent that a multitude of health issues (and others) are constructed as threats to health security. Second, securitizing health has moved beyond a rhetorical device to include the direct involvement of the security sector. Third, the performance of health security has become a security threat in itself. These considerations, the article argues, alter the remit of the global health security narrative; the global health community needs to recognize this shift and adapt its use of security-focused policies accordingly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent developments in the eastern Mediterranean, such as significant gas finds; disagreements over the demarcation of maritime boundaries; large-scale violence and political instability following the Arab Spring; mass migration via sea routes; Great Power dynamics in the region; and environmental hazards, make the political entities along the shores of the eastern Mediterranean part of a regional security complex and create strong incentives for regional coordination on maritime security. Material international relations theories predict that growing security challenges (realism) coupled with expected gains (liberalism) will facilitate regional cooperation. Yet, the political entities in the region rely mainly on unilateral actions, or limited quasi-alliances in response to these challenges. The article shows the puzzling gap between the theoretical expectation and practical outcome in the region and explains why regional cooperation in the maritime domain fails to occur. It argues that cooperation on a regional scale fails to take place due to three complementing reasons: 1) lack of shared ideational features like cultural traits, set of values and regime type; 2) enduring rivalries between political entities in the region (Israel–Palestine; Turkey–Greece–Cyprus) coupled with internal strife within other regional political entities (Libya; Syria); and unequal political standing and lack of sovereignty of some of the political entities in the region (Northern Cyprus; the Palestinian Authority and the Gaza Strip). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although frequently ignored in discussion of ocean security, fisheries have had central security implications throughout history. This article re-centres fisheries issues as both a cause and effect of security conflicts, and examines the implications of this re-framing for addressing this intersection. Underlying the security concerns that arise related to fisheries is depletion of global fish stocks. When stocks are overfished or not well managed, fishing vessels move to other areas, where they are more likely to come into conflict with each other and to threaten vulnerable stocks that some populations rely on, and states will claim or defend more ocean territory. These issues are explored here with four sets of security crises that can be best understood by examining the underlying or contributing aspect of fishery depletion: conflicts over sovereignty of small maritime islands, the rise of Somali maritime piracy, the 'fish wars' between otherwise friendly states in the middle and latter parts of the twentieth century, and the human insecurity represented by slavery-like conditions aboard some fishing vessels. Understanding the security implications of fisheries grants new reason and new approaches—ideally multi-jurisdictional, transnational and focused on capacity-building—to better protect fisheries and prevent security threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

War made the state, and the state made war, but does this statement hold true today? Will it apply in the future? The consensus is that the absence of major war within the western world, post 1945, did cause the war–state relationship to change, but each became significantly less important to the other. This article argues that the relationship was closer and deeper than has been assumed. It proposes that the peculiar strategic conditions created by the nuclear age caused states to wage a ritualistic style of war, in which demonstration rather than the physical application of violence became increasingly important. Within this setting, the state drove the process of technological innovation in defence to its limits in an effort to demonstrate its military superiority. This massive peacetime investment in defence technology exerted a huge impact on the character of war, which led to new strategic forms. However, most importantly, the diffusion of military technology also affected the wider economy and society, leading to a form of internal power transition within states. The author speculates on how these elemental forces will play out in the future, what will happen to war and the state, and whether we will reach a point where war leads to the unmaking of the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the end of the Cold War the Nordic states gradually began to work together on military issues beyond UN peacekeeping operations, including in NATO operations, on training and education, as well as on armament development and acquisition. Between 2006 and 2013 these efforts reached their aspirational and rhetorical zenith, as the Nordic states agreed in principle to integrate their armed forces closely. The main catalyst was the conviction that small states could no longer maintain balanced and modern military forces on a purely national basis. The core countries in this integrationist experiment were Norway, Sweden and Finland. The integrationist idea soon faced insurmountable difficulties and expensive setbacks, leading to its quiet abandonment by early 2014. At approximately the same time, the Ukrainian crisis caused a change in the Nordic states' perception of Russia, from a difficult partner to a strategic challenger. The need to work together to meet Russia's revisionist challenge in the Nordic–Baltic region produced a resurgence in Nordic defence cooperation, focused on making the Nordic armed forces able to operate together in a crisis rather than full-blown defence integration. Nordic cooperation today serves as a complement to NATO, the EU and enhanced bilateral cooperation with the major Western states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Women, Peace and Security' (WPS) is not just any normative agenda: everyone wants a piece of it. WPS is characterized by unprecedented recognition by states at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the presence of multiple stakeholders, including its own transnational NGO network focused on the first Resolution, 1325. The high degree of participation from civil society in framing the norm from the outset—driving their own access to contestation—makes WPS relatively unique among global normative agendas. It is therefore a good case in which to examine the 'dynamics of dissent' and test the effects of discursive and behavioural contestation on normative change. The article seeks to advance the thriving literature on the UN WPS agenda and to further develop the exploratory approach to contestation, which evaluates normative progress based on increased access of all those affected by the norm to practices of norm validation. It maps norm contestation at distinct sites, reflecting a sequence of WPS events referenced at the 2015 UNSC open debate on WPS. It evaluates practices of contestation with regard to affected WPS stakeholders' access to political agency and assesses 'whose practices' affect norm change and transformative change in the WPS agenda. The authors conclude that the relative access of the wide range of stakeholders to the different repertoires and constellations of contestation affects the outcomes of WPS. They suggest that scholars should evaluate diverse practices of contestation and identify expanding spaces and choices for a variety of local, national and regional perceptions of gender-equal peace and security. This article forms part of the special section of the May 2019 issue of International Affairs on 'The dynamics of dissent', guest-edited by Anette Stimmer and Lea Wisken. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Protection of Civilians (PoC) in peacekeeping and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) populations from atrocity crimes are two norms that emerged at the turn of the new millennium with the aim of protecting vulnerable peoples from mass violence and/or systematic and widespread violations of human rights. To date, most scholars have analysed the discourses over the status, strength and robustness of both norms separately. And yet, the distinction between the two has at times been exceptionally fine. In this article, we analyse the constitutive relationship between PoC and R2P, and the impact of discursive and behavioural contestation on their joint evolution within the UN system and state practice over three phases (1999–2005; 2006–10; 2011–18). In so doing, we contribute to the International Relations literature on norms by illuminating ideational interplay in the dynamics of norm evolution and contestation. More specifically, we illustrate how actors may seek to strengthen support for one norm, or dimension of a norm, by contrasting it or linking it with another. Our analysis also reveals that while the two norms of R2P and PoC were initially debated and implemented through different institutional paths and policy frameworks, discursive and behavioural contestation has in more recent years brought them closer together in one important respect. The meaning ascribed to both norms—by representatives of states and institutions such as the United Nations—has become more state-centric, with an emphasis on building and strengthening the capacity of national authorities to protect populations. This meaning contrasts with the more cosmopolitan origins of R2P and PoC, and arguably limits possibilities for the external enforcement of both norms through any form of international authority that stands above or outside sovereign states. This article forms part of the special section of the May 2019 issue of International Affairs on 'The dynamics of dissent', guest-edited by Anette Stimmer and Lea Wisken. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies a conflict over two competing norms in which the actors demonstrated incompatible positions not through arguments, but through actions. During the SARS crisis, China and the World Health Organization (WHO) entered a norm conflict over the precedence of sovereignty or global health security. Both resorted to behavioural, not discursive contestation: while the WHO practically but not rhetorically challenged the sovereignty norm by acting according to the norm of global health security, China—without openly acknowledging it—contravened the basic principles of global health security by acting according to the overlapping sovereignty norm. Why and with what consequences do actors choose to contest norms through actions rather than words? The article accounts for the resort to behavioural contestation by pointing to the strategic advantages it offers for furthering a contentious norm understanding without facing the social costs of making it explicit. It furthermore highlights that behavioural contestation may feed back into and change the odds of discursive contestation as its practical effects provide rhetorical resources to (de-)legitimate one or the other position. The propositions are illustrated in the interactions of China and the WHO during the SARS crisis and the subsequent norm development. This article forms part of the special section of the May 2019 issue of International Affairs on 'The dynamics of dissent', guest-edited by Anette Stimmer and Lea Wisken. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's ties with Africa are evolving into a multi-faceted relationship of increasing complexity. After nearly two decades of debt-financed infrastructure development, Beijing's exposure to African debt is reaching disquieting proportions with an estimated US$132 billion owed to China in 2016. Managing this new role as Africa's creditor poses uncomfortable questions for creditor and debtor alike. Concurrently, the quiet surge of Chinese investment in manufacturing in Africa is transforming local economies in ways that are beginning to alter the continent's position within the global economy. Finally, the proliferation of Chinese businesses and migrants across Africa is inspiring greater Chinese involvement in UN peacekeeping and private security initiatives. This article examines how these structural changes are challenging core practices and principles which guided China–Africa relations in its formative decades. For instance, under the banner of an alternative to western policies China promoted the absence of conditionalities attached to its concessional loans and grants. Equally, promotion of industrialization of African economies marks a key shift away from China's resource-centric engagement with the continent. And, in the case of security, Beijing's commitment to avoid intervention in domestic affairs is being set aside with implications for its principles, and ultimately status, in Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Hybridity' is in vogue these days. Yet, the utility of the hybrid label is often contested in security studies. A problem relates to how the concept of hybrid warfare has been extended to cases that have little in common with the cases from which the concept was originally derived. This article suggests making a conceptual distinction between hybrid warfare and hybrid interference. The article is devoted to developing this latter, new strategic concept. In essence, hybrid interference is conceptualized as a 'wedge strategy', namely a policy of dividing a target country or coalition, thereby weakening its counterbalancing potential. By drawing particularly on recent practices by China and Russia, the article shows how hybrid interference uses a panoply of state-controlled, non-kinetic means, which are more or less concealed in order to provide the divider with plausible deniability and to control targeted actors without elevating their threat perceptions. Three main bundles of means are central to hybrid interference: 1) clandestine diplomacy; 2) geoeconomics; and 3) disinformation. The article shows how western democracies are vulnerable to hybrid interference. Hybrid interference makes use of the liberal values that characterize western democracy, exploiting them as opportunities to drive wedges through democratic societies and undermine governability. The article argues that this sort of external interference has been overlooked in the debate on democratic deconsolidation, that it is becoming more common, and discusses some counter-measures to defend against it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the Trump administration expanded the scope of US nuclear deterrence, re-emphasizing the importance of non-strategic nuclear weapons, perceptively lowering the threshold for nuclear use and casting doubt on the future of arms control. The authors argue that these changes are consistent with the administration's wider 'peace through strength' approach that draws on traditional Republican thinking on security policy. While designed to demonstrate credibility and resolve to both allies and adversaries, however, this assertive approach to security policy and specifically nuclear policy as a necessary precursor to renewed engagement in strategic negotiations may have unintended consequences. This article focuses on European reactions to the strategy and argues that the Trump administration's nuclear posture challenges common European understandings in three principal areas. First, changes to US declaratory policy contest European assumptions on the role of nuclear weapons in defending NATO. Second, US modernization plans and their implications for intra-alliance relations risk accentuating controversial debates about the US commitment to Europe. Third, the apparent US rejection of arms control widens the scope for discord with European leaders. If European leaders assert a clear and credible alternative vision advocating nuclear restraint, risk reduction and arms control they could rebuild trust and confidence between the United States, NATO and Russia, demonstrating real strength and ultimately leading to more genuine opportunities for peace and sustainable European security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The existing liberal hegemonic order is essentially an American-led and western-centred one. Its desirability and sustainability have been called into questions due to a wide array of challenges and developments. The rise of China is both one of the drivers of change as well as a key determinant shaping the emerging order. This article discusses what China's vision for a future international order looks like, what kind of impact China is likely to have on this order and how this will happen. By examining the ideas, concepts and practices which inform China's vision for the future, it argues that China will search for a liberal partnership order composed of an open economic order, a relatively more equal political order and a cooperative security order. To advance this goal, China will aim to preserve or even expand the liberal features of the prevailing order while curtailing its hegemonic nature. Instead of attempting to overturn the current order, China would pursue selective and incremental adjustments that overtime will lead to an order transition. Given current constraints, China cannot shape the emerging order in the same way as the United States did in the post-Second World War period, and the form and tempo of the order transition will depend largely on the outcome of Sino-US bargaining. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethiopian foreign policy is based on ambitious domestic objectives, including aiming to become a middle-income country by 2025. Economic interdependence and integration are portrayed as the methods necessary to stabilize the region and fulfil those objectives. Why, then, is Ethiopian power challenged by regional actors when it claims to be acting as a security provider? This article interrogates the nature of one of Africa's powerful states in a region of conflict and examines the idea of hegemony. It proposes that Ethiopia sees itself as the regional hegemon while acting differently, and we analyse this notion by focusing on the concepts of hegemony. We conclude that Ethiopia is an imperfect hegemon, espousing a foreign policy characterized by a relationship of dominance over and assumption of allegiance from its neighbours, which could paradoxically lead to destabilizing policies. This policy was given momentum by former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, and must now be studied in a new light in the absence of this charismatic leader. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the dynamics of digital (dis)information in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. International Relations scholars have presented the online debate in terms of 'information warfare'—that is, a number of strategic campaigns to win over local and global public opinion, largely orchestrated by the Kremlin and pro-western authorities. However, this way of describing the online debate reduces civil society to a mere target for manipulation. This article presents a different understanding of the debate. By examining the social media engagement generated by one of the conflict's most important events—the downing of the Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) over Ukraine—we explore how competing claims about the cause of the plane crash are disseminated by the state, media and civil society. By analysing approximately 950,000 tweets, the article demonstrates how individual citizens are more than purveyors of government messages; they are the most active drivers of both disinformation and attempts to counter such information. These citizen curators actively shape competing narratives about why MH17 crashed and citizens, as a group, are four times more likely to be retweeted than any other type of user. Our findings challenge conceptualizations of a state-orchestrated information war over Ukraine, and point to the importance of citizen activity in the struggle over truths during international conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For hundreds of years, states have sought to intervene in the affairs of others in a surreptitious manner. Since the professionalization of intelligence services in the aftermath of the Second World War, this behaviour has become known as covert action, which - for generations of scholars - has been defined as plausibly deniable intervention in the affairs of others; the sponsor's hand is neither apparent nor acknowledged. We challenge this orthodoxy. By turning the spotlight away from covert action and onto plausible deniability itself, we argue that even in its supposed heyday, the concept was deeply problematic. Changes in technology and the media, combined with the rise of special forces and private military companies, give it even less credibility today. We live in an era of implausible deniability and ambiguous warfare. Paradoxically, this does not spell the end of covert action. Instead, leaders are embracing implausible deniability and the ambiguity it creates. We advance a new conception of covert action, historically grounded but fit for the twenty-first century: unacknowledged interference in the affairs of others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In tackling the current nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, President Donald Trump has invested - especially before the dramatic turn of events since early 2018 - a great deal of political capital in President Xi Jinping in the hopes that he might rein in North Korea, China's traditional ally. However, expecting Beijing to 'solve' the problem is unrealistic. Chinese thinking on North Korea - as reflected in policy positions and domestic debates - has been marred by inconsistencies and overcaution and it is now further complicated by the intensifying geopolitical competition with the United States, which also embroils, to a varying degree, South Korea and Taiwan. Beijing has been strenuously walking a fine line between pressing Pyongyang and averting a war, all the while watching its back, particularly with regard to Taiwan and the South China Sea. Beijing's risk aversion over North Korea and its security competition with the US has led it into a geopolitical conundrum from which there is no clear exit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If shared security perceptions were the foundation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 2011 might be analysed as the watershed year in which the GCC began to fragment from within. Both the 2014 and 2017 intra-GCC crises were manifestations of conflicting security perceptions, formed across the GCC countries in and since 2011. Through an in-depth analysis of the events and of the subsequent reaction of the GCC governments in terms of discourse and foreign policy, we distinguish three different categories of conceptualization. First, the governments of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates perceived domestic protests as an 'intermestic' threat - triggered by the intersection of the international and domestic levels. Second, the leaders of Oman and Kuwait conceptualized protests in their countries as manageable domestic insecurity, rather than as fully-fledged externally orchestrated events - arguably because they did not perceive a direct danger to their stability and legitimacy. Finally, it can be argued that the government of Qatar did not see any real danger in the protests but instead viewed them as an opportunity to expand Doha's regional influence, arguably at Riyadh's expense. Unpacking the fundamental factors shaping such perceptions is the key to finding the appropriate framework for analysing GCC security in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A pivotal question raised in the 1980s debate over the durability of the United States-led world order still haunts us today. Does the postwar liberal international order, which the US was central in shaping, serve US interests? President Trump's answer is a resounding no, promising an ambitious redistributive programme to rebalance global wealth and power. Similar to political platforms in other advanced countries, Trump argues for a fundamental revision of the order, proposing a renewal of international principles to foster a global system tailored to US interests. The major theatres where this battle is being fought are the politics of security, trade and money. Prominent academics align on some aspects of this agenda. Instead, I contend that as the primary beneficiary of the liberal international order, the US will be its first casualty. While President Trump is right to identify the potential role redistribution could play in strengthening America's global leadership, he misidentifies the nature of the distribution problem. Internationally, 'America First' is premised on zero-sum logic and poses a risk to the liberal international order, to US security and prosperity. Domestically, 'white America First' promises to restore lost greatness to white Americans, aggravating economic and political inequality in the US. Drawing on presidential exit polls, other survey data, real income and income growth nationally and regionally, I explain the 2016 election outcome as a function of education and ethnicity, contextualized by income concerns and racism. Redistributive domestic policies, particularly expanding higher education, are necessary for US support of the liberal international order to endure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a discussion of nuclear doctrines and their significance for war, peace and stability between nuclear-armed states. The cases of India and Pakistan are analysed to show the challenges these states have faced in articulating and implementing a proper nuclear doctrine, and the implications of this for nuclear stability in the region. We argue that both the Indian and Pakistani doctrines and postures are problematic from a regional security perspective because they are either ambiguous about how to address crucial deterrence related issues, and/or demonstrate a severe mismatch between the security problems and goals they are designed to deal with, and the doctrines that conceptualize and operationalize the role of nuclear weapons in grand strategy. Consequently, as both India's and Pakistan's nuclear doctrines and postures evolve, the risks of a spiralling nuclear arms race in the subcontinent are likely to increase without a reassessment of doctrinal issues in New Delhi and Islamabad. A case is made for more clarity and less ambition from both sides in reconceptualizing their nuclear doctrines. We conclude, however, that owing to the contrasting barriers to doctrinal reorientation in each country, the likelihood of such changes being made-and the ease with which they can be made-is greater in India than in Pakistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sanctions are frequently applied by the UN Security Council (UNSC) as well as regional organizations. While the objectives sought often vary, a frequent commonality is that they target African states. Indeed, Africa is the most frequently targeted continent by the UNSC and regional organisations including the African Union, Economic Community of West African States and the European Union. However, little attention has been paid to the confluence of this sanctions activity by these different organizations. This article seeks to address this gap in the research. While the UNSC continues to focus on sanctioning to end hostilities, the regional organizations have assigned themselves unconstitutional changes to government as the principal reason to sanction African states. Drawing on data from the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC), this article suggests that: 1) regional organisations are leading UNSC activity more often than is appreciated in the literature; 2) the UNSC has of late been expanding its sanctioning activity to consider issues of democracy and good governance; 3) the UNSC uses sanctions to endorse the activity of African regional organizations to deal with crises on the continent; and 4) UNSC and regional sanctions are intimately tied to crisis management in Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The transatlantic partnership needs to be reassessed. Since the end of the Cold War, Europe has chosen to bandwagon with the United States and to outsource its security to Washington. Bandwagoning has serious consequences when the use of force is at stake: it may lead to entrapment, where weaker allies may be involuntarily dragged into a conflict. It may also lead to abandonment, where the dominant ally may choose to discard their vital security concerns. With the evolution of the international system towards a multipolar configuration, this strategy of bandwagoning is becoming increasingly costly for Europe while the dominant power, the United States, is progressively confronted by other competitors at the systemic level. These classic dilemmas attached to an asymmetric partnership are exacerbated in a multipolar configuration. In particular, the abandonment scenario may become more and more frequent precisely because there is competition-and thus potential costs-at the international level: the United States may leave Europe alone, not by choice but by necessity. The current crisis in Ukraine illustrates this shift: while some American leaders were keen to escalate the conflict by arming Ukraine, the Obama administration's commitment to the defence of Europe has been minimal and it has largely delegated the management of the crisis to the Europeans themselves. Washington had other and more important priorities. Strategic autonomy is not an option for Europe; it has become a reality, a Gaullist moment where Europeans will have to learn to think and act strategically for themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]