Search

Despite a growing convergence in the attitudes and behaviours of voters in the unified Germany, research shows that eastern and western German voters continue to differ over general ideological issues. How well does the party system in the unified Germany represent this ideological diversity? To answer this question, this paper analyses the extent to which (1) parties-in-electorates, (2) parties-in-parliament and (3) parties-in-government agree ideologically with voters from both regions between 1980 and 2013. Hypothetically, a lop-sided representation pattern, where the ideological location of parties converges primarily with those of western voters, suggests that existing ideological differences become institutionalised. Contrary to this scenario, we find that the German party system effectively articulates the ideological preferences of western and eastern voters. The same applies to parliaments and governments where the election outcome rather than any institutional bias affects the distance of parties to voters in the East and the West. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper addresses the assertion that preferences for a comprehensive welfare state hamper and delay the emergence of a liberal-democratic culture in East Germany. Two questions are explored: first, has the impact of welfare-state values on support of the German democratic regime declined in East Germany since re-unification and adapted to the lower levels observed in West Germany? Second, are attitudes towards different welfare-state programmes equally important for citizens’ approval of the German democratic regime? Empirical analyses on the basis of representative public opinion surveys conducted between 1991 and 2012 confirm that the effect of welfare-state values in East Germany has converged to the smaller effect size observed in West Germany. Furthermore, attitudes to welfare-state programmes aimed at reducing income inequalities turn out to be a significant determinant of regime support in both parts of Germany. It is the higher demand for inequality-reducing governmental activities which still restrains the approval of the liberal-democratic regime among citizens in East Germany. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This study explores the financialisation of sovereign debt through an in-depth study of institutional change in German debt management. Between 1998 and 2006, the Ministry of Finance fundamentally altered the management of federal public debt by not only disempowering the Bundesbank and Federal Debt Administration as debt managers and outsourcing this task to a new agency, the Federal Finance Agency; moreover, the conservative debt strategy was replaced by strict market orientation. Conceptualising this change as institutional innovation, the paper argues that the Ministry of Finance played a leading role in the reform process. It shows that the arrival of the Euro brought with it a power struggle between the Ministry and the Bundesbank. The evidence fits better the concept of institutional innovation as a result of entrepreneurship than approaches which conceptualise institutional innovations as consequences of profit maximisation or layering and displacement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Household surveys such as the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) tend to underestimate income and wealth inequality. The research methodology developed by Thomas Piketty et al. therefore analyses official tax statistics in order to more accurately determine the inequality between the people at the top of the income and wealth distribution scale and the rest of the population. However, Piketty's methodology underestimates the rise in inequality in Germany since the turn of the millennium due to the fact that companies are retaining a significant percentage of their rising profits which are therefore not recorded as private household income. We show how the specific pattern of income distribution in Germany has contributed to the country's large and persistent current account surplus, thereby contributing to macroeconomic instability at the international level. We note that addressing economic inequality in Germany politically through wealth and inheritance taxes faces the resistance of powerful lobby groups including family-owned businesses (the German Mittelstand). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While Germany is generally considered one of the most important democracy promoters, there is still limited work on the German approach to promoting democracy. There is a general understanding that Germany – as a civilian power – should be guided by democratic values in its external affairs, but it is neither theoretically nor empirically very clear what this means for the actual practice of democracy promotion. The present paper contributes to filling this gap by (1) locating democracy promotion as a foreign policy aim and instrument in the role conception of civilian power, (2) summarising the fragmented state of the art on German democracy promotion, (3) presenting results of a qualitative content analysis in order to reconstruct the main features of the official outline of German democracy promotion, and (4) confronting these programmatic findings with a brief comparative view on the practice of German democracy promotion towards Bolivia, Turkey and Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Six years ago the Left Party arose out of the Left Party.PDS and the WASG. Although the Left Party.PDS possessed organisational assets that far exceeded those of the small WASG, the new Left Party has differed significantly from the former PDS in terms of programme, personnel and approach. To understand the conditions under which smaller merging partners may transform a newly fused party, this article examines the lessons of three other post-1945 cases of party merger in Germany. This analysis finds that strategic assets, in addition to organisational ones, determine the post-merger balance of forces within a new party. The paper concludes by reconsidering the Left Party's development and prospects in light of these findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The selection of party leaders in Germany has traditionally been characterised by elite agreement behind closed doors. Most often, only one single candidate was presented to the conference delegates. Yet things have changed to some degree since the 1990s. First, most parties have introduced statutory reforms at the national level allowing for intra-party plebiscites. At the national level, this has basically remained paperwork. Second, and more interesting for the purposes of this paper, similar reforms have been introduced at the Land level. In an increasing number of cases, Land parties have chosen their party leader or top candidate for Land elections via grassroots participation. What have been the motives for opening up selection procedures and giving members a say? The article points to electoral images and elite stalemates as main drivers of this development. It shows that party primaries contain elements of uncertainty about outcomes which make party elites hesitant to make more extensive use of membership ballots. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the peculiarities of the territorial dimension of Christian Democracy in Germany is the fact that it is represented by not one, but two parties: the CDU and the Bavarian CSU. This article focuses on the CSU and discusses the pressures for transformation that it has been subjected to, by focusing on the question of whether it can still be considered as a Volkspartei. The article disaggregates this term around the notions of a majority party (Smith), office-holding party (Fröhlich), membership party (Wiesendahl), cross-class party (Nipperdey) and Kirchheimer's catch-all party. The paper concludes that the CSU remains a Volkspartei, albeit with some qualifications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even though political trust has been well studied so far in its structure, development and conditions, there are hardly any analyses dealing with the important question of what political trust – and particularly a lack or decline of political trust – implies for the citizens' reaction to public policy and policy changes. This article will focus on the effects of political trust on the willingness of German citizens to accept recent reforms of retirement pension, health care and family aid. It aims to highlight the following questions: Does political trust of the population encourage the disposition to support welfare state reforms? How do the characteristics of different policy reforms affect the impact of political trust on support of reform? The empirical evidence presented in this paper underpins the role of political trust as a valuable resource in attitudes towards reforms. Although political trust is not the most important determinant of support for welfare state reform and does not play the same role under all circumstances, it impacts positively on approval of reforms. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Grand coalitions are highly debated in Germany, where large parts of the media and the political world expect negative effects of grand coalitions on parliamentary party systems. This did not happen either with Merkel's grand coalition resulting from the 2005 election or with other grand coalitions in the German Länder. On the contrary, only the SPD suffered heavy losses in 2009. Most experts agree that those losses were caused by the SPD's participation in the grand coalition. Still, it remains largely unclear how Merkel's grand coalition affected the 2009 federal election. To close that gap, this paper thoroughly analyses the effects of Merkel's grand coalition by looking at a crucial but mostly neglected factor in that regard, the evaluation of the grand coalition by voters. It can be shown that the CDU/CSU was mostly unaffected whereas the SPD suffered from being perceived as the less influential party in Merkel's grand coalition. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper addresses the role of candidate orientations, issue orientations and party identification in shaping voting behaviour in the 2009 federal election. In line with the notion that the 2009 campaign was rather 'issue-less' and candidate-centred, the analysis shows that candidate orientations were more effective as predictors than issue orientations. Moreover, preferences for Chancellor Angela Merkel and her challenger, the Social Democrat Frank-Walter Steinmeier, exhibited somewhat different effects. Taking a closer look at Chancellor Merkel, the analysis demonstrates that she had become much more popular during her first term. Given this increase in popularity and the substantive effect of candidate preference on vote choice, Merkel was an electoral asset for the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) in 2009. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given that US-style televised debates were held for the third time in a row in a German federal election campaign, it seems fair to say that they have become an institutionalised feature of German campaigns. Although a number of studies have analysed (single) German debates, comparative work covering the full set of debates is still lacking. The aim of this paper is to reveal patterns and trends in a) debate exposure, b) the evaluation of the candidates' debate performances and c) debate effects. To this purpose, a pooled data set for the 2002, 2005 and 2009 debates is analysed. Consistent evidence is found that cognitive as well as partisan mobilisation increases the probability of watching debates. Concerning the impact of debates, it is found that debate exposure has a mobilising effect - especially among those less interested in politics. In addition, we find a considerable impact of debates on party choice - with the effects reflecting patterns of 'reinforcement' as well as 'conversion'. The greatest debate effects can be observed for independent voters. Given these results, televised debates are not only an institutionalised feature of German campaigns, but also a powerful and hence possibly decisive one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2009 German federal election took place during the deepest recession in German post-war history. It brought to power a coalition of Christian democrats and liberals while the social democrats suffered by far their worst result at a general election since 1949. This paper discusses whether there is a causal relationship between the government's response to the crisis and the election result. While voters basically supported the government's management of the banking crisis they were much more sceptical with regard to the grand coalition's management of the recession. Interestingly, a majority of the voters disapproved of some of the interventionist policies the SPD had suggested and believed that the Christian democrats were the most competent crisis managers. Therefore, the economic crisis may well have helped the bourgeois parties win the election. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question 'who gets in?' is one of the central research areas in studies on coalition politics. This paper analyses government formation after the 2009 Bundestag elections in Germany. On the basis of the 'Political Heart' model, which is modified in a way so as to include the parties' pre-electoral coalition statements, it is argued that the Christian Democrats maintained a pivotal position during the 2009 German coalition formation game. In a second step, the probabilities for all coalition options are estimated on the basis of the seat distribution in the 17th Bundestag and in a hypothetical parliament where the CDU/CSU and FDP do not have a majority. The results show that, firstly, a Christian-Liberal coalition was by far the most likely outcome of the actual government formation process. If, however, CDU/CSU and FDP had not achieved a parliamentary majority, then a remake of the 'grand coalition' between Christian Democrats and Social Democrats would be the most likely result of the coalition negotiations. Secondly, the data reveals that the so-called 'Jamaica coalition' between Christian Democrats, FDP and Greens and a coalition between SPD, Greens and the 'Linke' would be a realistic alternative to a 'grand coalition'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a strongly rooted assumption that foreign policy is an executive domain and rarely plays a role in the electoral struggle. Germany is something of an exception and this paper looks at the way foreign policy has provided a site for electoral competition in Germany. Its principal focus is on the two Grand Coalitions with an especial emphasis on the contest between Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier to turn foreign policy profile into party advantage. It concludes that this contest was won overwhelmingly by Chancellor Merkel but that in contrast to the first Grand Coalition that foreign policy was not transformative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, it is argued that Germany has undergone a series of large-scale institutional changes under 11 years of Social Democratic governance, weakening all of its core Continental principles and effectively triggering a process of regime hybridisation. Elements of these reforms include the recalibration of its labour market governance system, as well as a two-fold path-correction toward (a) a Nordic ideal type through the introduction of an activation pillar, a comprehensive, state-led childcare strategy, and a desire to improve lifelong learning opportunities, and (b) a liberal welfare ideal type through the curtailment of status-preserving privileges, increased benefit conditionality, and (more hesitantly) a move toward a relaxation of employment protection legislation, especially for labour market 'outsiders'. As the path corrections toward the Nordic ideal type came far too late in the Social Democrats' reign, the party leadership lost the trust of many voters, its party base, and the union movement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution introduces the development of German party competition and coalition politics in recent decades on the one hand and the latest techniques for estimating the preferences of political actors on the other. It argues that, for reasons of social change, the preferences of the electorate were reshaped and political actors therefore had to adopt programmatic changes. In addition, the establishment of a new socialist party in the eastern German states, and since 2005 also in the western part of Germany, resulted in new coalition strategies for the 'traditional' political parties, which are discussed between and within the parties. Researchers can apply various methods to test what programmatic position political actors adopted and whether they changed their programmatic orientation over time. The paper discusses the advantages and drawbacks of the major strategies in estimating preferences of political actors and provides an overview of the contributions to this issue of German Politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we present a method based on the CMP data to identify parties' ideological signals. Although our approach uses the same data as others, our method is different in that we distinguish the methods for the directional and proximity models which have long been relevant for the theoretical literature. We apply our method for all German Bundestag parties between 1949 and 2005. One problem with policy preferences is that various - and sometimes only slightly deviating - approaches lead to rather different results. Thus, we test our method in terms of its robustness using the Jackknife method. We also show confidence intervals around policy positions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper discusses the effects of the first step of the reform of German federalism on economic policy-making. It turns out that the overall ratio of bills needing Bundesrat approval to all bills decreases substantially, but the necessity of Bundesrat approval for key decisions in economic policy is unlikely to decrease due to the reform (with the exception of health care reforms). Furthermore, it is argued that even if the reform were to reduce the need of Bundesrat approval to a larger extent than expected here, the permanent electoral campaign in which German governments find themselves continues to make coherent and far-reaching reforms difficult. Therefore, the politics of German economic policy are unlikely to change fundamentally in the near future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews the articles in this volume and places them in the broader discussion about German politics and comparative legislative behaviour. I describe their collective understanding of German law-making and highlight the strong empirical foundation of the research. Some challenges of the research agenda appear after comparing and contrasting the individual articles. Specifically, I start with a simple veto game and then amend and scrutinise this model using theoretical and empirical insights from this volume and the larger literature on legislative politics. The article closes by suggesting two future areas of research: institutional transformation and policy dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2005 German parliamentary elections produced two parties claiming victory, the inability to form a government, and Germany's second post-war grand coalition government. This article explores the peculiarities in the contemporary dynamic of the German party system. It considers the strategy and motivation of parties and the effect of party competition. A key focus is to revisit and evaluate the predictive power of Otto Kirchheimer's 'end of ideology' proposition in the German case. On the one hand, mainstream parties seem to be converging at the ideological centre across Western Europe. At the same time, some party polarisation within the party system is evident as more marginal parties such as those of the far left and far right have gained votes at the expense of the mainstream parties in recent elections. A third possibility is that both of these circumstances have produced a political void with voters becoming increasingly apathetic and non-ideological. This paper argues that in the aggregate, trends do not reflect the predictions of Kirchheimer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper gives a critical overview of school reform measures in the German state of Bavaria in the aftermath of the OECD's PISA 2000 and 2003 studies. While the highly selective Bavarian school system has provided the best test results among the German federal states, its overall performance in an international context has been less impressive. In order to improve the Bavarian education system a range of initiatives has been introduced in recent years. While following pedagogically sound ideas in most cases, however, the projects have been hampered by fiscal restraints, ideological reservations against breaking up the traditional three-tier system of secondary education, prevailing bureaucratic restrictions, and a lack of improvements in incentives for teachers' involvement in reform. As a consequence, genuine, fundamental changes in the traditional system have not so far been initiated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the 1980s there existed a deep fascination in the UK with what makes Germany successful. This has dissolved somewhat in the last 15 years as Germany has struggled with the challenges of reunification and globalisation. Since 1997 the UK has focused on the drivers of productivity and wealth creation in the interests of closing the 'productivity gap' with the US. In contrast, productivity improvements in Germany have been regarded as something of a 'luxury problem' for policy makers who have had to facilitate systemic change in eastern Germany and adaptation in the old Länder. This paper looks at the systemic adaptation in Germany from a UK perspective and argues that, although structural reform still has some way to go, the endogenous growth drivers of the German economy are strong, and visibly stronger than in the UK. It is argued that commentators and policy makers alike have been ignoring the real issue in the debate about the future of the German economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to analyse the existence of political milieus in the eastern and western German electorate by using the concepts of lifestyle and social milieu. After introducing these ideas a theoretical approach will be taken which integrates them by pointing out their similarities and differences. Finally, empirical analyses of lifestyle groups and social milieus in the eastern and western German population will be carried out with the aim of ascertaining the existence of political social milieus in reunified Germany. The results indicate that the German electorate to some extent is still characterised by political milieus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unemployment is one of the key issues in German politics today. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the former East Germany. This paper examines the impact that this exceptionally high unemployment in the new German states has had on East German women since reunification. It reflects, in particular, on the potential influence of their experience of life in the GDR in developing coping strategies to deal with the effects of unemployment, an ongoing resistance to unemployment and, most significantly, to a male-breadwinner ethos. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analysing the careers of members of the Bundestag Standing Committee for Labour and Social Affairs, the paper demonstrates that the ties between social politicians and social policy organisations such as trade unions, faith-based social policy organisations, independent charity organisations, works councils and social insurance institutions have become blurred. Since the 1990s social politicians have become more focused on political careers in the party and in parliament than on social policy. The new social politicians are party politicians who have distanced themselves from the interest groups. The qualitative change in parliamentary personnel is explained by changes in electoral politics, parties and interest groups. The author argues that the weakening linkages confirm contemporary research results on change in German neo-corporatism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regions have attempted to influence the emerging constitutional order of the EU for around 20 years. The German Länder have made a particular impact in sensitising the Union to regional concerns at successive Intergovernmental Conferences since Maastricht. They were also the leading regional voice in shaping debates at the Convention on the Future of Europe, though the Scottish government also succeeded in leaving an imprint on the Constitution for Europe. This article contrasts the different understandings in Germany and Scotland of how regions should make their interests felt. The German Länder have opted for a strategy focused heavily on using the structure of the member state to limit EU regulation of their fields of competence, while the Scottish government developed a more open-ended and flexible strategy based also in constructive engagement beyond the member state at the EU level. In the light of the Scottish approach the article questions whether the Länder strategy is too one-dimensional, leaving them over-dependent on the German federal government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A primary challenge facing both immigrants and German society more generally is immigrants' integration into the wider social, economic and political community, including the development of their political attitudes and behaviour in the host country. This paper examines how one aspect of the immigrant experience - individuals' educational experiences - has influenced the development of immigrants' political attitudes and behaviour. Twenty-five in-depth interviews conducted in 2002 with second-generation Turks and Yugoslavs living in Berlin illuminate how individuals' educational experiences in German schools influence the development of their political attitudes and behaviour. Survey data from the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP) are then used to test specific hypotheses concerning the relationship between education and various political attitudes and behaviour. Results suggest that, while interviewees reported numerous negative experiences in German schools and often used these experiences to form unfavourable opinions about government policies, quantitative analyses reveal that German education has generally benefited the political engagement of immigrants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The policy field of energy and climate policy has been shaped by a profound polarisation in recent years. On the one hand, young people in urban centres across Germany and beyond are protesting in the streets, demanding more effective political action and greater responsibility regarding climate change. On the other hand, citizens in rural areas are increasingly rejecting specific projects to implement the energy transition. These distinct poles are diametrically opposed and form clusters of people sharing the same mindsets regarding the issue of climate and energy policy. We conduct a qualitative analysis to describe these shared mindsets and collective identities of these clusters and their specific conceptualisation of the 'others'. Although the shared mindsets of the clusters are distinct, some narratives overlap, e.g. the ambition to serve the common good, the strong reliance on science and experts and the attachment to nature and the environment. Both poles recognise each other as their respective counterpart, but the external perception is mostly negative and distorted thus leading to additional tension. Finally, we conclude that it is worthwhile for future research to investigate if this polarisation integrates into existing cleavages or whether it should be discussed beyond this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this Special Issue, we show that the study of civil society, social movements, and protest is central for assessing the current state of German politics. First, moving beyond political parties and electoral politics delivers crucial insights into the ideological, affective, and organisational structuring of emerging polarisation and cleavages. Second, the transformations in electoral politics are closely interrelated with dynamics in civil society. Building on these perspectives, the contributions to the Special Issue underline that, due to the emergence of new cleavages, Germany, like other European countries, has seen a double transformation of its landscape of political contestation: 'New contentious politics' is on the rise, marked by new issues and claims as well as hybrid organisational forms and close interactions between protest and electoral politics. Importantly, in contrast to long-held assumptions, protest is not the exclusive terrain of 'progressive' forces and not shaped by increasingly differentiated arenas of mobilisation. Based on a broad range of cases and methods, the contributions take stock of social movement and civil society activism in Germany since the 2000s, i.e. in an era of multiple crises and increasing polarisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do political parties respond to street protest by political outsiders widely considered to be 'pariahs' (i.e. radical or extremist actors)? Bridging the literature on responses to 'populist' radical right parties with insights from social movement studies, we propose a theoretical model that conceptualises potential party responses to pariah protest. Innovatively, our typology distinguishes between a set of formal and substantive responses to street mobilisation. Empirically, we apply this model by providing the first systematic study of how political parties have responded to the 'anti-Corona' protests of Querdenken, contributing to social science research on the politics of the COVID-19 pandemic. Analysing the critical case of Germany, we underline the stark difference between how the populist radical right AfD and all other Bundestag parties respond to anti-Corona mobilisation, showing how political protest may sharpen the polarisation of party politics. Moreover, we highlight the more nuanced but still important differences in responses by established German parties. Theoretically, the article provides an analytical framework valuable in times of increasing street mobilisation by radical and extremist actors. Methodologically, our analysis relies on a systematic media analysis of articles from two major German newspapers. Empirically, it contributes to our understanding of the difficult but crucial relationship between the German protest and party arena during the COVID-19 pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is uncontested that political trust is highly relevant in democratic political systems. Although scholars have begun to study to a larger extent political trust in new democracies, this latter interest has faded away in recent times. To reinvigorate awareness of this area, thirty years after German reunification, we take stock of political trust in East and West Germany. Drawing on ESS data from 2002 to 2018 (ESS 1–9), we study empirically the convergence hypothesis in view of both the levels of political trust and the particular quality of citizens' trust in its democratic institutions. Our findings show that we can still not speak of a convergence of the mere levels of trust in East and West Germany: East Germans do still display lower levels of trust in both representative and regulatory institutions. Regarding the quality of political trust, however, the gap between East and West is less pronounced. These findings are highly relevant for both research on the social and psychological underpinnings of trust and the assessment of the consequences of the undemocratic heritage for the German political system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do lasting differences in the political cultures of social subgroups call into question the legitimacy of democracy? This danger has been discussed for three decades now, always in the run up to German Unity Day, which marks the reunification of Germany in 1990. Is there still a 'wall in people's minds', as postulated in the late 1990s? This article examines the question comparatively and over time: Do political cultures and their main political attitudes still differ between Western and Eastern Germany 30 years after reunification? And, if so, to what extent? Using an extended concept of political support, we analyse East–West differences by drawing on different data material from representative surveys. What we show that there is no deficit of legitimacy in Eastern Germany in terms of democracy. Nevertheless, there are consistent East–West differences in terms of people's satisfaction with democracy as it is currently practised. These differences can be explained neither by existing socio-economic and socio-structural inequalities between Eastern and Western Germany, and nor by feelings of nostalgia for socialism. Rather, they are due to a combination of feelings of disadvantage, of a lack of recognition, and corresponding narratives that can draw on objective manifestations of inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proportion of voters casting their votes by mail days or even weeks before election day has risen from initially five per cent to nearly thirty per cent in the 2017 German federal election. At the same time, the differences in election results between postal and election day voters are increasing, reaching a record at the Bundestag election in 2017. Against this background, it seems particularly surprising that there are only a small number of empirical studies on postal voting in Germany. For an evaluation (of the development) of postal voting, it is crucial to investigate the factors responsible for the different election results between the two voter groups. This requires more precise knowledge of postal voters and how they differ from voters who cast their ballots on election day. Using data from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), we investigate in how far composition effects – differences between the voter types in the composition of factors potentially relevant for party choice – and association effects – differences regarding their vote functions or criteria applied for vote choice – can help to explain the different electoral outcomes. We conclude that the voter types do not differ substantially from each other with regards to their decision criteria but that their composition differs with regards to certain characteristics relevant for party choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Election reforms have taken place in many German municipalities since the 1980s, leading to the implementation of complex systems that allow voters to cast more than one vote for a candidate ('cumulative voting') or to select candidates from different party lists ('vote splitting/panachage'). Although voting with open lists gives voters more influence on the composition of parliaments, it may also lead voters to discriminate against certain groups, such as women. Considering the persistently low proportion of women in German municipal councils, despite reforms to the electoral system, this study questions whether and how different mechanisms of the electoral system affect female representation at the municipal level. The data in this study allow us to investigate the outcomes of cumulative voting and vote splitting, both the prospects of success and sequential effects on the individual level of candidates ('order effects'). Our results show that women have a lower chance of success in open-list systems than in closed systems. Furthermore, women are elected 'downwards' in electoral systems with cumulative voting and vote splitting. Nevertheless, election mechanisms can only explain gender-specific differences to a limited extent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent years have witnessed major changes to German migration policy, including most notably policy concerning labour migration. The restrictive approach associated with the end of active recruitment in 1973 has been gradually abandoned. Since 2000, a variety of liberalisation measures have been pursued, facilitating legal labour migration and making German skilled migration provisions fairly liberal by international comparison. Though this would appear to mark a radical departure from the past, unlike the post-war era, the focus rests firmly on the recruitment of skilled immigrants. This article adopts a comparative political economy (CPE) angle in analysing recent policy developments, arguing that employer preferences typical of a coordinated market economy (CME) are being articulated and help shape the policy agenda. A brief comparison of the CMEs in Austria and Sweden is pursued to explore the promise of a CPE approach. In empirical terms, the article seeks to address the question in what fashion organised business manages to shape the agenda. In theoretical terms, the article seeks to assess the utility of a CPE-inspired approach for the study of migration policy making. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The role of partisanship in the Bundesrat, Germany's second chamber designed to represent the territorial interest of the 16 Länder, has been at the centre of debates for decades. In this contribution, we revisit the topic from a novel perspective, focusing on the Bundesrat's Finance Committee, a central, but so far overlooked actor in the realm of fiscal and financial policies in the Federal Republic. Based on around 1,300 roll call votes, we are able to analyse the voting behaviour of the committee members, the 16 Länder finance ministers and senators, on a large empirical basis. We find, first, that unanimity is an important feature of decision-making, reflecting the existence of joint policy perspectives among the finance ministers and senators. Nevertheless, there is, second, no 'consensus by default' as around 40 percent of the roll call votes are contested. The W-Nominate ideal point estimation thereby provides strong evidence that partisanship instead of territorial interests accounts for the conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The CDU/CSU/FDP coalition (2009–13) has witnessed the emergence of three important changes in the international security environment: the US ‘Asia Pivot’, the global financial crisis and the fallout from Germany's backseat role in the Libya crisis. This article examines how German defence policy has adapted to this changing context. It explores the reforms which have taken place to the Bundeswehr's structure and military capability procurement process under defence ministers Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg and Thomas de Mazière. The article also looks at German policy toward defence cooperation through CSDP and NATO. The article finds that while some important changes have been enacted to German defence policy, Germany is failing to properly adapt to the changing strategic environment. The article concludes by examining key defence policy challenges facing the government over the 2013–17 legislative period and the implications of the analysis for theoretical debates on German defence policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This contribution applies the theoretical framework developed by Schoeller and Falkner (this issue) to the case of Belgium. First, it examines Belgium's preferences and the status quo before and after the financial crisis, juxtaposed against Germany's preferred outcomes. Belgium has traditionally favoured more integration, leading to Belgium's strategy of co-shaping and pace-setting in regards to monetary integration through persuasion, cultivating alliances, and brokering compromises that satisfied Germany's interests in EMU versus those of the European Commission and France. The global financial crisis changed Belgium's strategy, as it became constrained by the effects of the crisis on its economy and the domestic political turmoil that ensued. Belgium went from a pre-crisis pace-setter to a fence-sitter, relying on the persuasion of its allies to convince Germany to agree to reform the architecture of euro area governance. Finally, this contribution considers the institutional fabric of Belgium's relation to the hegemon. This is relatively weak between Belgium and Germany, making multilateral settings the preferred forum rather than bilateral. Nevertheless, Belgium's famous capacity for forging compromises among disparate interests was demonstrated through the diplomacy of former Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy as the European Council's first full-time president. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between Austria and Germany is characterised by many political and cultural commonalities and strong economic interdependencies. Moreover, the asymmetry between the two countries, both in terms of economic size and political power, has long time characterised the relationship as one between 'leader' and 'follower'. Yet, despite these strong ties, Austria has assumed an increasingly independent role in recent EMU politics. Therefore, this article asks whether and why the close partnership of the two countries is slowly growing apart. Based on the analysis of three periods of EMU reform, the article shows that Austria followed Germany during the fast-burning phase of the euro crisis (2010–12), became more self-reliant in its slow-burning phase (2012–16), and even opposed German positions in post-crisis reform (2016–20). Converging economic preferences and the strong power asymmetry between the two countries can explain Austria's cooperative strategy until 2016. By contrast, Austria's shift from loyal followership towards more pronounced independence is largely caused by domestic developments. The reluctance of the Austrian government to share risks and build joint capacities in EMU reflects a Europe-wide trend, as an increasing 'constraining dissensus' at the national level makes it difficult for small state governments to compromise at the European level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite its traditional adherence to gender roles limiting women's responsibilities to Kinder, Küche, Kirche, the Christian Democratic Party itself has been ruled by three powerful females since 2018: Chancellor Angela Merkel, Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen, and CDU General-Secretary Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer. Despite occasional waves of conservative-hardliner resistance, all three women have helped to modernise the German gender regime while opening new doors for future women leaders across the party spectrum. Having exited the political stage after the 2021 elections, the Chancellor played a significant role in advancing the political fortunes of German women, beginning with von der Leyen, who now enjoys supranational prominence as EU Commission President, and Kramp-Karrenbauer, ostensibly descending the national power ladder despite her earlier successes. These diverging trajectories raise new questions as to the conditions under which we might expect women to prove 'effective' leaders. This article explores biographical parallels, stylistic differences, and the changing political landscape that may have facilitated or impeded each woman's ability to transfer the leadership skills she acquired at one level to the mastering of challenges at another. It concludes with reflections on Merkel's legacy in relation to 'gender and politics'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Angela Merkel served as Chancellor at a time when German society was quickly diversifying due to immigration. Her policy choices now shape the life chances of millions of immigrants and their descendants. These choices also set the terms on which Germans will decide which divisions and which forms of solidarity will characterise the society in the years to come. Merkel was more willing to accept the reality of immigration than earlier CDU leaders. And yet I argue that, faced with rapid societal change, the Merkel governments generally avoided deep reforms of existing institutions, even those that yield sharp disparities by immigration status and gender. I find that, although Merkel focused on economic integration and female labour force participation, immigrant-origin residents have made only slow progress in these areas, though educational disparities have narrowed. Additionally, millions of long-term residents still lack German citizenship and the right to vote, so that their voices are muted in debates over what it means to be German. Meanwhile support for anti-immigrant extremists has surged. I conclude that it is an open question whether Merkel's conservative approach will provide a stable basis for the economic, social, and political consolidation of a more diverse Germany. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a stark departure from the historical stance that Germany is "not a country of immigration", Angela Merkel has made it a priority to welcome and integrate newcomers into German society. Over the course of her four terms, various Merkel-led governments have paid increased attention to the integration of newcomers, and specifically to the integration of women and girls. Drawing on key documents, including the four coalition agreements, I identify three different phases in the incorporation of gender into German integration policy. I also find evidence of several different, yet at times overlapping frames which shape the ways in which gender is framed into the integration discourse. Drawing on two case studies, I then draw attention to the fact that the shifts in discursive and policy frames at the federal level, are not immediately evident in policy initiatives as. As such, barriers to the integration of women and girls remain, even though Merkel has made this a central priority in her governments [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What happens when governments that have benefited from 'solidarity' programs to redistribute money from richer to poorer states are faced with the prospect of being redefined as a 'richer state' themselves? After communism, such a situation has confronted the traditionally poorer states of Western Germany and the traditionally poorer nations of the European Union. Yet funding was far more generous in the East German case than in the Central and Eastern European case. Why? The strong institutional positions of the traditionally poorer states meant, in both cases, that the key factors shaping the outcomes were the electoral exposure of the respective central governments and the presence or absence of hard budget constraints on that political centre. High exposure and low constraint marked the German case while low exposure and high constraint characterized the EU case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Academic discussions have increasingly attested to the fact that state governments in the German Bundesrat represent partisan interests more than state-specific interests. This view seems to be confirmed by recent developments in which opposition parties exploit the Bundesrat to block the projects of the federal government. This contrasts with the behaviour of state governments in the earlier years of the Federal Republic, which were characterised to a greater extent by more heterogeneous interests. Using roll-call vote data in the Bundesrat, this article investigates to what extent preferences of the state governments are heterogeneous. More concretely, item response models are utilised to examine the dimensionality of the policy preference constellation. The results show that, besides the partisan left-right dimension, there was another dimension at work in the 1950s. The analysis of the roll-call data after German reunification shows, by contrast, the strong growth of relevance of the first partisan dimension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Considerable policy change has been initiated with the recent labour market reforms in Germany. Discussing these reforms, commentators focused on the national factors driving these changes, while the ‘European’ dimension of labour market policy-making was largely neglected. By contrast, in the literature on European social policy, the capacity of the European Employment Strategy (EES) to contribute to domestic policy change is much discussed. Accordingly, this article asks whether the neglect of the EES in the labour market policy literature results in incomplete explanations of policy change; or, put differently, did the EES possess the capacity to effectively Europeanise German labour market policy? It is concluded that the EES did not possess the capacity to Europeanise German labour market policy to any significant extent. Thus, its neglect appears to reflect the insignificance of the EES so far. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UK and Germany approached the Convention with rather closer positions on many key issues than popular image would have it, developed further common aims during the Convention, and both ended up relatively satisfied with the outcomes. Based on close observation of the Convention proceedings, this article explores this pattern of convergence, commencing with a discussion of the ‘visions’ that Joschka Fischer for Germany and Tony Blair for the UK brought to the debate, and developing the discussion through an analysis of how each government ‘played’ the Convention. Perhaps surprisingly the UK government was more adept at alliance-building, with the lead German representative, Fischer, seen as aloof and outflanked by Franco-German initiatives agreed by the respective heads of government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dissatisfaction with democracy is among the central determinants of voting for a populist radical right party, such as the German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). At the same time, elections have been shown to increase political satisfaction, especially when voters see themselves as winners of the election. In this article, we ask, first, whether voters of the AfD have partly been reconciled with democracy during the 2017 federal election in Germany in which the party entered the Bundestag for the first time since its foundation. Second, we investigate which individual level factors conditioned the change in democratic satisfaction among AfD voters. Our empirical analysis, which is based on panel survey data from the 2017 Germany Longitudinal Election Studies (GLES), shows that AfD voters experienced a stronger increase in support for the political regime than any other voter group. Moreover, policy congruence with the AfD on socioeconomic issues as well as identifying with a party other than the AfD enhanced this boost in satisfaction with democracy. Our findings point to the importance of political representation and opportunities for protest-based voting behaviour regarding public support and the legitimacy of democratic political systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces the questions that motivate this special issue: the growing divergence among Eurozone member states and the overall disappointing performance of the Eurozone as a whole. It justifies the choice of Germany and Italy as the two countries that can best exemplify what are considered, respectively, the northern and southern politico-economic models coexisting in the Eurozone and proposes an approach to these questions that deviates from the mainstream. It argues that comparing the performance of Eurozone member economies as if they were independent of one another prevents an accurate assessment of the externalities created by the common currency and claims that microeconomic solutions to macroeconomic problems have the effect of reinforcing the divergence, rather than attenuating it. Incorporating the insights drawn from the detailed analysis of the various aspects of the German and Italian models provided by the contributors to this special issue, it concludes by assessing the likely impact of the impending reform of EMU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically examines the main assumptions underlying the reforms embedded in EMU and European Semester recommendations. We proceed in three steps. First, we question the notion that Italy and Germany embody two distinctive politico-economic models and challenge the conclusion, drawn from this assumption, that structural rigidities are the primary cause of Italy's economic woes and that its lackluster performance since the 1990s is due to its insufficient determination to implement structural reforms. Rather we show, second, that both countries have undertaken remarkably similar reforms which, however, have yielded different results both because of the different public debt levels they started with and because the interdependence created by the euro and the hyper-financialised markets rewarded those countries with low, and penalises those with high, sovereign debt. Third, we contest the assumption that the two economies would converge towards a common growth path if only Italy could adapt to the requirements of a globalised economy like Germany has apparently done, which leads us, in conclusion, to question the appropriateness of the EU's current strategy for both. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]