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This paper explores the reasons why states occasionally do not adhere to the behavioural expectations as prescribed by their foreign policy master roles. To that end, it proposes four potential drivers for such 'role violations', namely: exogenous pressure, political survival, lack of issue salience and ensuing bureaucratic decision-making, and unclear role demands in ambiguous decision contexts. Empirically, the paper examines the plausibility of those drivers for the case of Germany's abstention in the United Nations Security Council vote on resolution 1973 on Libya. It suggests that in that particular case considerations of political survival made civilian power Germany act out of character. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the third-largest exporting country in the world, Germany is a clear beneficiary and proponent of free trade. Few, therefore, expected the magnitude of contention that emerged within Germany during the negotiations between the EU and the United States for a transatlantic trade deal (TTIP). This paper explores the politicisation process of TTIP within the context of the broader transformations of German politics including not only the entry of new issues and new players in the electoral and protest arenas but also the increased hybridisation of forms of protest. Theoretically, we draw on the 'Players and Arenas' framework to put forward a sequential, strategic interactionist approach to the unfolding process of politicisation, in which various types of players face dilemmas when interacting with each other over time. Applying this analytical framework to the politicisation of TTIP in Germany, we reveal previously overlooked players, interactions and dilemmas, while opening up multiple opportunities for empirical analysis of cases beyond this area. We show how the politicisation of TTIP brought about an important intensification of relations between Germany's protest and electoral arenas, and confronted all players involved with choices with long-lasting consequences for both mobilisation and coalition building dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the socio-demographic attributes and political attitudes of protesters in Germany. In doing so, the paper studies participation at demonstrations, one of the key forms of non-electoral political participation in Germany and a central political arena in which to negotiate political and cultural conflicts. Methodologically, we draw on original data from nine protest surveys collected between 2003 and 2020. The demonstrations under scrutiny address a wide variety of issues such as peace, climate change, global justice, immigration, international trade and social policy. Analysing protesters' profiles, we focus on differences both within and across demonstrations. We show that demonstrators' socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics diverge considerably across the surveyed demonstrations. In particular, we identify two clusters of demonstrations, differing most prominently regarding participants' political trust, satisfaction with democracy, and perceptions of self-efficacy – the 'disenchanted critics' and the 'confident critics'. Based on a regression analysis across all nine demonstrations, we further show that the distinction of these two demonstration clusters is not the result of the presence or absence of certain groups of demonstrators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most observers point to the importance of short-time work (Kurzarbeit) as one of the key explanations for Germany's stellar employment performance during the economic downturn in 2008–09. In this paper, I reveal previously unidentified causal mechanisms that have led to the widespread application of Kurzarbeit: the Christian Democrats' embrace of the Social Market Economy, the formation of an 'informal' neo-corporatist alliance, the well-functioning communication channels within the public employment service and social partner organisations, and the 'watch dog' role of firm-level metal labour unions. This paper also reflects on the state of Germany's coordinated market economy despite the neoliberal discourse at European level, its labour market responses to the Corona pandemic of 2020, and the possible lessons for the Italian case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explains the extent to which the export-led growth strategies deployed in Germany and Italy turn out to be self-defeating. The problem lies in the impact of those strategies on the banking systems of the two countries. The German banks become more international; the Italian banks become more locally oriented. In turn, these changes create tensions that cannot be reconciled easily within the institutional framework that made the export-led growth model successful in the first place. The paper also seeks to explain why tensions in export-led growth models today do not always resemble those it experienced in the past – and it examines what are the implications both for how the two countries responded to the economic and financial crisis and how they are responding to the economic consequences of the novel coronavirus pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the Covid-19 pandemic hit internationally in March 2020, governments and political incumbents received exceptionally high approval ratings. Such a sudden spike of public support in times of crisis is often explained as the 'rally 'round the flag' effect. This paper has three goals: first, to examine whether a rally effect indeed occurred; second, to analyse whether and how much it is related to (i) affectedness, i.e. the occurrence of infections on individual and aggregate level, and (ii) fear of Covid-19; and third, to examine an assumed moderating effect of partisanship. We merged individual survey data from an online survey conducted in September 2020 as part of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) with infection rates on the state level (Bundesländer) published by the Robert Koch Institute. We detect a striking rally effect in all partisan camps. Furthermore, we identify fear of Covid-19 as the driving mechanism while there is no evidence that affectedness is a major force behind the rally effect. Furthermore, we show that partisanship takes on a moderating role for fear of Covid-19 regarding satisfaction with government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While communication generally embodies an essential part of public leadership, this is even more true in times of crisis when uncertainty prevails, and the public expects the leader not only to take adequate measures to mitigate the crisis, but also to justify and explain these measures. In the COVID-19 pandemic, Angela Merkel's communication differed from other Western political leaders who strongly relied on a war narrative. This paper focuses on the framing by the German Chancellor during the first phase of the COVID-19 pandemic (March--July 2020). We examine Merkel's crisis communication in three different public arenas: her public speeches, her press conference appearances and her weekly podcasts. Based on a qualitative content analysis, our study provides three relevant insights. First, it proves that the claim for solidarity -- national as well as European solidarity - represents the crucial element of Merkel's meaning-making narrative. Second, the study shows that both statements on the protection of public health and of economy strongly resonate in her communication, but that the prioritisation shifted over time. Finally, our analysis manifests how Merkel's framing differs in the three communicative arenas. Additionally, our findings indicate that Merkel followed a modified leadership style during the COVID- 19 crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How should an excessively large parliament be effectively reduced in size without violating constitutional principles? This is a question that the German Bundestag has discussed since the introduction of the 2013 electoral reform measure. Facing a Bundestag consisting of 709 members and some public dissatisfaction, a reform measure to decrease the parliament's size was adopted in 2020. However, the 20 Bundestag, elected in September 2021, again increased in size to 735 members. The newly adopted electoral law still uses plurality voting to select the directly elected lawmakers. It is widely known that selection using the plurality rule is flawed because it violates the principle of majority decision. Aside from this aspect, this paper demonstrates that the plurality rule itself contributes to the excessive size of the parliament. By removing the flaws caused by the plurality rule and replacing this voting scheme with a Condorcet method (simple-majority rule), the targeted reduction of the size of the Bundestag can be achieved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies party-movement interactions in Germany, focusing on Die Linke and the AfD, the two most recent additions to Germany's multi-party system. The electoral rise of both challenger parties went along with mass protests, opposition to Hartz IV in the mid-2000s and anti-Islamic PEGIDA mobilisation in the mid-2010s. We shift the emphasis from how social movements turn into political parties, including significant organisational and personal overlap, to more indirect ways of how protest and electoral politics interact. Specifically, we identify a process composed of two interrelated mechanisms: an external politicisation spiral and an intra-party innovation spiral. We show how mass protest triggers both discursive shifts in the public sphere and internal strategic realignment, providing an opportunity for parties to ride the wave, secure their competitive advantages, and mobilise on the protestors' grievances in the electoral arena. In such a way, challenger parties can take advantage of street protests even when they do not directly emerge from a movement. Methodologically, the article is based on a paired comparison, relying on survey data and an original protest event analysis that provides novel data on anti-Hartz IV and PEGIDA protest mobilisation in Germany. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines why the German Free Democratic Party (FDP) failed to gain electoral success in 2013 despite being well positioned in terms of left–right ideology. Indeed, its vote share dropped from its highest ever point in 2009 (14.6 per cent of the national vote) to its lowest ever in 2013 (4.8 per cent of the vote). The paper shows that the FDP’s valence dropped dramatically between 2009 and 2013. In addition, voting simulations show that the FDP was positioned close to its vote-maximising positions on policy and ideology. However, given the FDP’s extremely low valence it could not have taken any set of policy positions that would have significantly increased its vote share. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Recent studies of economic voting suggest that beyond the traditional valence conception of voters rewarding or punishing incumbent administrations for economic performance, there are patrimonial (assets) and positional (economic policy) dimensions to the economic vote too. To date, investigations of economic voting in Germany have primarily concentrated on the valence model. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 4 component included in the 2013 German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), our paper examines the multifaceted nature of economic voting in Germany. Our analysis reveals there are patrimonial and positional economic dimensions to the vote in Germany, implying that the compleat economic voter is also a German phenomenon. Beyond contributing to studies of German voting behaviour, our paper breaks new ground by unpacking individual heterogeneity associated with patrimonial and positional economic voting. We demonstrate political sophistication moderates to some extent the prevalence of asset motivated and economic policy voting. Patrimonial voting is somewhat more likely among the less politically sophisticated, while positional economic voting is somewhat more probable among highly sophisticated citizens. Our study confirms the multidimensionality of economic voting and also highlights the conditionality of patrimonial and positional economic voting is an individual level phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ever since the beginning of the European integration process, Germany’s role within the EU has been a contentious topic in political and intellectual debate. Following German unification, this has been further exacerbated by various crises. On the one hand, many have expressed concerns about power politics aimed at establishing a ‘German Europe’ or a ‘European Germany’, as Thomas Mann declared in 1953. On the other hand, voices across Europe have criticised Germany for its lack of more forceful power politics. At the same time, German leaders have repeatedly pledged to assume greater responsibility after being accused of showing insufficient commitment, no doubt borne out of pacifist sentiments, reflecting the dark shadow of Germany’s history. In this paper, we examine not only how the coalition government under Chancellor Olaf Scholz that came into office in 2021 has articulated a tacit and increasingly explicit claim for leadership, but also how the Chancellor has transformed his narrative in line with the ‘Zeitenwende’ following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. We argue that the key to understanding Germany as a driving force is its remarkable shift from a federalist narrative to an adapted geopolitical, security-driven master narrative covering a broad set of policy fields. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 not only put the public health system under considerable pressure, but it also posed a huge challenge for established routines of intergovernmental coordination in Germany. As the Länder are responsible for implementing infection prevention measures, the most senior intergovernmental council, the minister presidents' conference (MPK), became the central body for pandemic crisis management. In light of high uncertainty, time pressure and public attention, drastic actions were taken to contain the dissemination of the corona virus. Against this background, our paper investigates how party politics impacted on horizontal coordination in times of crisis. The analysis shows that indeed territorial party politics interferes with routines of intergovernmental coordination. While congruence between the federal and Länder governments promotes homogenous implementation of joint MPK resolutions, increasing coalition size and intense party competition make deviations more likely. Finally, partisan ideology plays a key role as parties pursue clearly distinct pandemic management strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares the evolution of critical characteristics of the party systems in Eastern and Western Germany since unification. While the institutionalisation hypothesis implies that the party system in Eastern Germany should adjust towards its Western German counterpart, the ongoing dealignment suggests a loosening of party-voter-linkages and, ultimately, non-institutionalisation in Eastern Germany and party system de-institutionalisation in Western Germany. However, both hypotheses predict a convergence. Against the backdrop of persisting regional differences in party strengths, a third hypothesis assumes that Eastern and Western Germany still have two distinct party systems thirty years after reunification. Using election results and survey data since the 1990s, we inspect the development of five indicators of party systems – volatility, vote-switching, electoral availability, fragmentation, and differences in vote shares – in light of the hypotheses. There are three main results: First, most of the indicators point to party system institutionalisation in Eastern Germany and convergence to Western Germany in the 1990s. Second, for the last 20 years or so, the indicators point to parallel developments of dealignment and partial party system de-institutionalisation. Third, regarding the specific parties and their vote shares, there has been no convergence between Eastern and Western Germany. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Electoral systems are a fundamental feature of any democratic system, and the design of an electoral system can have a tremendous impact on party-, candidate-, and voter-behaviour. However, in order to use all features of an electoral system as intended, voters must have a clear understanding of how their electoral system actually works. While earlier studies have already shown that many German voters have limited knowledge about the characteristics of their electoral systems, we shift the focus to the more fundamental understanding of electoral systems' objectives. Therefore, this paper addresses the question of how competent voters are in understanding and applying six core functions of electoral systems: (1) proportionality, (2) minority representation, (3) party system concentration, (4) personalisation, (5) legitimacy, and (6) comprehensibility. Based on an original representative survey of German citizens, we demonstrate that only a minority of the electorate is competent enough to capture these functions. We further demonstrate how education and political interest influence voters' understanding of electoral systems. While the political logic of compromises in electoral reforms tends to create electoral systems of growing complexity, our findings strongly suggest policymakers must bear in mind voters' limited resources and capabilities to fully understand electoral systems' functions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the financial crisis at the end of the last decade, Germany is regarded again as a successful coordinated market economy. However, a closer look at labour and working conditions reveals disturbing phenomena like an increase of psychical stress, growing shares of low wage employment or the erosion of collective bargaining or works councils' coverage. Finance capitalism has become the most popular concept among German sociologists to explain why and how industrial relations and working conditions have been put under pressure in the last one or two decades. But how coherent is the finance capitalism story? This question is tackled in the paper, based on literature review and empirical findings. The paper argues that the concept is overexpanded and that, first, financial market capitalism is refractured by agency and actors on different instituitonal levels and that, second, there are other and independent developments influencing industrial relations like globalisation or the deregulation of labour markets that have to be taken into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As one of the founding states of the European Union (EU) and a long-standing member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Germany has made significant contributions to both organisations and to European security. Despite being frequently accused as a free rider, this article claims that Germany takes the position of balancer in the EU-NATO relationship whereby it facilitates cooperation through mediating between both organisations and their member states. This article analyses Germany's role and conceptualises it as balancer in interorganisational relations. As a member of both organisations, the debates concern how Germany can make effective use of its geographical, cultural and economic positions to contribute to European security. It takes a 'midstream' position in which it balances between the EU and NATO and among other member states. This article argues that due to its expansive network of bilateral and minilateral relations, Germany emphasises its role as balancer by using its diplomatic skills to broker among fellow member states. A well-working and amicable EU-NATO relationship is indispensable for its own interests. This paper therefore takes into account its particular position and capabilities as well as its multilateral linkages to examine how Germany positions itself as balancer in the EU-NATO relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the connection between economic context, voters’ individual assessment of the economy, and party identification, taking the German national elections of 2009 as an example. Based on the results of multinomial and multilevel regression models, the article shows that partisanship moderates how the economy affects the vote. In cases of increasing unemployment in the constituency, voters are less likely to vote for the Social Democrats instead of the CDU and the opposition. This effect is particularly strong amongst voters who report that they identify with the Social Democrats. Regarding the effect of voters’ assessment of the national economy, the results are different. In this case, a better evaluation of the regional economy increases the probability to vote for right-wing parties – notably amongst voters without partisanship. These findings suggest that the moderating effect of partisanship on the economy’s impact on voting behaviour should not be overestimated. What is more, this analysis implies that research on economic voting should always account for both contextual factors and voters’ personal assessment of the economy, as these measures reveal different dimensions of economic voting. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since the beginning of Angela Merkel's chancellorship, German care policy changed considerably. Social policy has gained in prominence and this has affected people with caring responsibilities. Against this background, this paper compares childcare and elderly care policies in terms of gender equality. We focus on policy measures introduced and implemented during the Merkel era and we consider Chancellor Merkel's role in shaping these policies. Based on interviews with parents of young children as well as male and female elderly carers, our analysis discusses the impacts of Merkel-era care policies on lived experiences. We concentrate on effects on caregivers' employment status (maintaining, reducing, or leaving gainful employment for caring). Furthermore, we focus on gender equality effects depending on socio-economic status (SES). The comparison of both policy fields shows that gender in/equality and the gendered division of labour are essentially moderated by Merkel's way of facilitating reconciliation policies. We argue that recent childcare and elderly care policies particularly address middle-class caregivers. In both fields, care policies offer a framework that is used, interpreted, and negotiated differently by individuals, couples, and families, depending on their SES and existing gender norms. Consequently, Merkel-era care policies can reinforce or mitigate gender inequalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Marriage Equality Act (2017) provides an example for Chancellor Angela Merkel's strategy of 'leading from behind' in the form of evolved facilitation as she changed her stance from publicly resisting to enabling this policy. Merkel's objections against marriage equality were shared by large parts of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU): A draft version of the bill was postponed for two years in the justice committee due to internal conflicts in the CDU/CSU. Scholars argue that Merkel's shift from blocking to enabling the reform has been influenced by international as well as domestic developments. The focus of this paper is on a domestic factor that has been neglected so far, namely interactions between the far right and the conservative camp. Based on data from a case study on 'anti-gender' mobilisations against marriage equality in Germany and their influence on the parliamentary process, this article analyses shifts in the conservative camp. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I present an election forecasting approach to predict the vote share of the governing coalition in German national elections. The model is composed of two independent prediction components: the first is based on poll data, the second on fundamental variables. Both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages when used in isolation. The basic idea is to use both and find a better informed overall forecast. The predictions are combined using a shrinkage estimator, where the predictions are weighted by their respective prediction uncertainty. The uncertainty of the poll prediction is modelled time-dependent. The result is a dynamic model allowing for predictions longer before the elections highly relying on fundamental variables. With the elections coming closer predictions rely more and more on the polling data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European research has largely ignored the role that religion has played in the recent growth of right-wing populist (RWP) parties. In this paper we focus on how religiosity affects electoral support for RWP parties in Germany. Based on a tripartite concept of religiosity (religious practice, religious affiliation, and religious beliefs), we assume that the effect of religiosity is mediated by two intervening determinants of RWP support, namely, anti-immigrant attitudes and party identification. The existing studies have not covered Germany because until recently no significant RWP party existed. To test our hypotheses, we use pooled data from the Long-term Online Tracking of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES). The results show that anti-immigrant attitudes are strongly correlated with RWP support and that citizens with party identification are less likely to vote for an RWP party. More importantly, religiosity influences the RWP vote because, first, church attendance is negatively correlated with anti-immigrant attitudes, and, second, all dimensions of religiosity are positively associated with identification with established parties. Our results confirm the thesis that religiosity tends to indirectly 'immunise' citizens against voting for RWP parties. We conclude that the recent success of RWP parties in East Germany is partly due to advanced secularisation in this part of the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last two decades, the German political economy has increasingly relied on export specialisation as a strategy for economic recovery. This export-led development strategy turned out to be a mixed blessing. While, on the one hand, specialisation in high-quality manufactured goods has preserved Germany’s competitive edge vis-à-vis many other industrialised countries, it has, on the other hand, led to an increasing dependency on exports as the engine for growth. There has been no equally strong evolution of a domestic service economy beyond manufacturing-related services. The issue of export dependency becomes increasingly important in light of the financial crisis and global imbalances, vis-à-vis Greece and the Eurozone but also globally. Weak aggregate demand depresses both domestic employment and endangers the still fragile construction of the Eurozone. The paper argues that Germany finds itself in an export-dependency trap due to imbalances between domestic services and export-driven manufacturing. It analyses three sources for the over-reliance on export-oriented manufacturing and weak employment in domestic services: firstly, the industrial relations system, secondly, the social insurance financing of the welfare state and thirdly, fiscal federalism. All three are fundamental pillars of the German political economy and locked into political coalitions that are not easily changed. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article examines the impact of organised interests on the passage of legislation in the German Bundestag through an empirical analysis of the position papers presented in the public hearings of its standing committees in 2011. These committees are the most important forums to revise legislative proposals. Drawing on resource dependency theory, we employ GLM regression analyses to study if interest groups act as change agents that bring legislation closer to their own policy preferences. Controlling for institutional and bill characteristics, we discuss two major findings that shed light on the role of interest groups in legislation. First, business groups' opposition to government bills triggers legislative changes because their members control the means of production and make investment decisions. In contrast, fundamental opposition of non-business groups has no impact. Second, bills debated and opposed by a greater number of interest groups undergo more changes pointing to the importance of the density of interest groups and balance of opinions on a proposal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Banking union is arguably the most important EU reform since the Maastricht Treaty, transferring substantial authority to European regulators and taking a significant step toward fiscal union. However, it remains incomplete, as Germany has repeatedly blocked progress on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). This opposition contrasts with German support for an expansive Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and limited Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). This paper explains the inconsistent German position on banking union's components by examining the interests of the different elements of the German banking industry in a multi-level governance perspective. While the savings banks and cooperatives have staunchly opposed any form of banking union, preferring local regulation, the commercial banks' position is more complex. They saw the SSM as a way to eliminate their competitors' national or local regulatory advantages both within Germany and elsewhere in Europe. The SRM similarly offered benefits for large banks by ensuring that resolution was funded at the European level. However, EDIS threatened their private deposit insurance scheme, so they joined with the other German banks in opposing its development. In doing so, they blocked completion of banking union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1989 the building of new Polish-German relations has been carried out in the dimensions of both time (historical reconciliation) and space (reintegration eastern and western parts of Europe). This determines their fundamental importance for contemporary Europe. This article presents an analysis of Polish-German relations from the perspective of issue salience. The source base of this paper comprises Addresses by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (AMFAs), i.e. annual speeches given by foreign ministers presenting the major goals of Poland's foreign policy. It makes it possible to adopt a long-term perspective (1990-2018). The quantitative analysis was based on the rules of the Comparative Manifesto Project. Its results allowed the author to determine the position of Germany in Poland's foreign policy; to identify the major periods in mutual relations; to indicate the main concepts of the Polish governments concerning Polish-German relations; and to specify the major problematic issues in mutual relations. The performed analysis shows that relations with Germany play the dominant role in the structure of Polish foreign policy, and particularly European policy. This stands in stark contrast to the ambivalence of the Polish political elites, especially those on the right side of the political spectrum, towards the western neighbour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do political parties position themselves neutrally on policy issues for strategic reasons and, if so, why? We conceptualise neutral position-taking as strategic responses made by parties to reconcile several conflicting political objectives simultaneously and theorise why these actors should take such a position. The empirical focus lies on the Christian Democratic Union's (CDU) position-taking on the policy topic of agricultural biotechnology at the federal and regional levels (Thuringia) in Germany. The results show that parties take neutral positions and do this for various reasons. The federal CDU took a neutral position in 2017 in order to reconcile its moderate GMO agenda with its objective of forming a coalition with the Greens and to respond to the increasingly diverging policy preferences of its regional branches. The Thuringian CDU took neutral positions from 1999 to 2009 in order to reconcile its pro-GMO agenda with its aspirations for forming coalitions with the SPD and to reduce electoral losses that might result from anti-GMO sentiment. The paper shows that neutral position-taking represents a real phenomenon of partisan activity. Hence, rather than ignoring supposed non-positions, scholars should consider the possibility that these may actually represent neutral stances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on the characterisation of the European Council as an arena for 'integrative bargaining', the paper shows the importance of two factors that influence whether a country can act as 'first among equals' or ('Primus Inter Pares') in a system designed to respect national sovereignty: alignment among the 'Big Three', and 'voice opportunities' for smaller member states. We support this argument with view of Germany's divergent role in two recent international crises - the 2011 uprisings in Libya and the violent protests in Ukraine in 2014/2015. On the basis of these findings, we conclude that the ability to create consent among all Member States is both a key prerequisite and a serious challenge for effective leadership in EU foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the height of the migration crisis (between autumn 2015 and summer 2016), Germany's role in EU migration policy and EU-Turkey affairs went through a period of change. Searching for effective instruments, the German government attempted to lead European policies, managing the crisis first through an 'open door' approach and then through an agreement with Turkey. The notion of 'Merkel's migration deal' and a 'German Alleingang' became prominent in political, public and academic debate. With the aim of assessing whether or not these terms correctly describe Germany's role, this article unpacks the complex Ankara-Berlin-Brussels triangle. It examines how structural and institutional power influenced the German role. We argue that, under extreme time pressure, Germany took refuge in a constrained type of leadership. Positions of other EU member states and institutions, as well as domestic factors (social tension, public opinion and the rise of the far right) inhibited the leadership potential. Additionally, the paper elaborates on differences between the EU's internal and external crisis management. In external migration policy, German leadership took the form of a flexible 'institutional directoire', through which Germany successfully negotiated an EU-Turkey statement on migration, in consultation with EU institutions and selected national leaders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For most of her political career Angela Merkel has been perceived as a pragmatic political leader, avoiding tough and divisive decisions wherever possible, and joining decision-making coalitions on contested issues when they emerged. To some extent, this remarkable ability appears to explain her extended hold on the German chancellorship. In the midst of her third term, however, her behaviour changed suddenly and unexpectedly, or so it seemed. When in July 2015 the euro crisis flared up again due to the standoff between Greece and its EU partners on the second bail-out, Merkel let her European convictions prevail and backed another support package against the wishes of many in her party. Moreover, when Germany was hit by a wave of refugees only a few months later, Merkel became the torch-bearer of a 'culture of welcome' and defended her 'open-door' policies with a measure of conviction that few observers would have considered possible. This paper looks at Merkel's leadership performance during her third term through the lens of the concept of 'conviction leadership', and inquires if, or to what extent, Merkel can be meaningfully considered a 'conviction leader'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While political parties in Germany have been steadily losing members for more than two decades, there has been no sign of a breakdown in their day-to-day grass-roots activities. Despite many prophecies of doom, the 'party on the ground' does not seem to be dead yet. There is some evidence that the declining number of party members is compensated for by an increasing share of party activists. The question is how the erosion of the political parties' member-ship base affects their levels and types of activity. This paper aims to describe and explain these two dimensions of activity in German political parties, using data from German party membership studies from 1998 and 2009. The analyses show that parties are partly able to compensate for membership losses via an increased activity of the remaining members, but at the same time, it is possible that changes in the social profile and motivations of the most active group of members may lead to future difficulties in coping with party work and canvassing new members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In modern representative democracies political parties are the main institutions responsible for providing linkage between citizens and the state. One way to do this is through organizational linkage mechanisms, especially the representation of a party's voters through the party membership. This paper tries to describe the attitudinal representativeness of German party memberships in terms of left-right positions using data from two party membership studies from 1998 and 2009. In a second step, the determinants of divergent attitudes of party members from the position of the parties' voters are analyzed on an individual level, testing four possible explanations for this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State elections are one of the most prominent features of Germany's multi-level political system. The prevailing view is that the standing of the national governing parties has a major influence on the results of state elections. Still, two perspectives on the nexus between national party preferences and state election results have so far received less scholarly attention: First, it remains unclear if short-term changes in the national government's popularity also have an effect on state election results. Second, do results of state elections also influence the standing of the national government? A reason for this might be that short-term factors are becoming more important for government evaluation and vote choices. This paper responds to these two questions by examining the nexus between state elections and the standing of the national government in a long-term perspective from 1977 to 2005 and by means of cross-sectional and time-series analyses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contrast to national elections, both parties and voters are assumed to think that ‘less is at stake’ in European elections: Campaigns are less intense, turnout is lower, and citizens are more inclined to ‘vote with their hearts’. The latter should be reflected in differing rationales of voting – party choice should not be based on identical determinants in national and European elections. However, this hypothesis has not been sufficiently tested and most of the research is based on the analysis of aggregated data while causal explanations are located on the micro level. This paper compares vote functions of individuals in regard to the 2009 European Parliament election as well as the 2009 German Federal election. Using data from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), comparison of explanatory models shows that party choice on both levels is neither fundamentally different nor does it fit into the pattern of second-order electoral behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the influences of candidate perceptions on Germany's spring 2016 Länder election results. It takes a comparative approach, using a modified Michigan model on the data collected simultaneously in three Lnder (Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Saxony-Anhalt). It explains why the Green party was successful in Baden-Württemberg but not in the other Länder, the impact of the major candidates, and what distinguishes the influences of the current prime ministers running for these elections. Whereas Winfried Kretschmann's (Green party, Baden-Württemberg) high impact on the election results was driven mainly by a warmth dimension (sympathy), Malu Dreyer (SPD, Rhineland-Palatinate) was viewed as being competent. Both candidates were assets to their parties and co-responsible for the results. In comparison, in Saxony-Anhalt, none of the candidates were as important to the outcomes of the electoral success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In mixed-member proportional systems with closed party lists, such as the German Bundestag election, candidates’ electoral fate is widely determined by their placement on party lists. Despite its importance for the final composition of parliaments, candidates’ list placement in such systems is still under-researched. The literature on political careers has revealed a number of prevalent recruitment factors, but how these factors actually affect candidates’ placement on party lists has rarely been tested. This paper puts forward the question of what recruitment factors affected candidates’ chances to be allocated viable list positions in the 2013 German Bundestag election. The findings suggest that in particular candidates’ incumbency status, their number of prior candidacies and district nominations play key roles in shaping candidates’ electoral viability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do natural disasters affect electoral participation? The existing social science literature offers contradictory predictions. A considerable body of research in sociology and psychology suggests that traumatic events can inspire pro-social behaviour, which might increase turnout. Yet, political science has long held that even minor changes to participation costs of low benefit activities can lead to considerable drops in civic engagement. Consequently, natural disasters should reduce electoral participation. We show how these distinct views can be jointly analysed within the Riker-Ordeshook model of voting. This paper then reports results on the impact of the 2002 and 2013 floods in Germany on turnout in federal and state elections in Saxony and Bavaria, conducted few weeks after the floods. Analysing community level turnout data, and drawing on a difference-in-differences framework, we find that flood exposure has a consistent negative effect on turnout. This indicates that the increase in the costs of voting outweighed any increase in political engagement in our case and stands in contrast to findings from developing contexts, where flood management was convincingly linked to electoral participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

German governments and European Union (EU) member states forming the New Hanseatic League (HL) have had very similar preferences on EU / Eurozone financial support mechanisms. We would expect German and HL governments to be close allies on these matters. However, empirically, we detect differences. German governments have repeatedly resisted participating in HL joint positions on EU financial support mechanisms and accepted compromises with France. In order to explain this divergence we consider the relative explanatory merit of economic preferences, based on both material interests and economic ideas—here ordoliberalism—on the one hand, and norms of cooperation—here Franco-German 'embedded bilateralism'—and geo-strategic interests on the other hand. We disentangle economic preference formation and the choice in favour of a political strategy to pursue these preferences. Economic preferences are one factor explaining the extent of concessions made by Germany to the HL countries and France. However, norms of cooperation and geostrategic interests explain the choice of German governments on how and with whom best to pursue their preferences. German governments have performed a balancing act between the HL and France, skewed towards the latter. The presence of economic crises increases the degree to which this balancing act is skewed towards France. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How has the Netherlands sought to influence the redesign of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since the financial crisis? Based on the case studies of the 'New Hanseatic League' and the 'Frugal Four' this study finds, firstly, that the Netherlands chooses strategies of foot-dragging when initiatives are brought up to deepen integration when the Dutch prefer the status quo. Secondly, its strategy is more bargaining-based but at times also persuasion-based; the bargaining occurs in part because the Netherlands builds occasional alliances with like-minded member states to counterbalance the asymmetry of power between it and Germany. Finally, the Netherlands oscillates between trying to influence Germany directly and bypassing it by reaching out to like-minded member states on various dossiers and tempting them to declare their positions in advance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The large influx of refugees into Germany in late 2015 gave rise to a period of intensified party competition over a single issue: refugees. This paper examines German parties’ reactions to this issue suddenly becoming highly important and voter preferences shifting to a more restrictive stance. It does so by analysing the parties’ positions on the issue from August to November 2015 based on statements from more than 1000 quality newspaper articles. The analysis shows that there was no uniform shift in line with the change in public opinion but a pattern of polarisation. Moreover, converging party position changes sparked intra-party criticism that was in turn followed by divergence – a pattern observable for the Green Party as well as for the Christian Democrats. Altogether, these findings suggest that policy motives, which induce intra-party dissent, impede parties opportunistically trying to follow shifts in public opinion in the short term. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Despite a growing convergence in the attitudes and behaviours of voters in the unified Germany, research shows that eastern and western German voters continue to differ over general ideological issues. How well does the party system in the unified Germany represent this ideological diversity? To answer this question, this paper analyses the extent to which (1) parties-in-electorates, (2) parties-in-parliament and (3) parties-in-government agree ideologically with voters from both regions between 1980 and 2013. Hypothetically, a lop-sided representation pattern, where the ideological location of parties converges primarily with those of western voters, suggests that existing ideological differences become institutionalised. Contrary to this scenario, we find that the German party system effectively articulates the ideological preferences of western and eastern voters. The same applies to parliaments and governments where the election outcome rather than any institutional bias affects the distance of parties to voters in the East and the West. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper addresses the assertion that preferences for a comprehensive welfare state hamper and delay the emergence of a liberal-democratic culture in East Germany. Two questions are explored: first, has the impact of welfare-state values on support of the German democratic regime declined in East Germany since re-unification and adapted to the lower levels observed in West Germany? Second, are attitudes towards different welfare-state programmes equally important for citizens’ approval of the German democratic regime? Empirical analyses on the basis of representative public opinion surveys conducted between 1991 and 2012 confirm that the effect of welfare-state values in East Germany has converged to the smaller effect size observed in West Germany. Furthermore, attitudes to welfare-state programmes aimed at reducing income inequalities turn out to be a significant determinant of regime support in both parts of Germany. It is the higher demand for inequality-reducing governmental activities which still restrains the approval of the liberal-democratic regime among citizens in East Germany. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This study explores the financialisation of sovereign debt through an in-depth study of institutional change in German debt management. Between 1998 and 2006, the Ministry of Finance fundamentally altered the management of federal public debt by not only disempowering the Bundesbank and Federal Debt Administration as debt managers and outsourcing this task to a new agency, the Federal Finance Agency; moreover, the conservative debt strategy was replaced by strict market orientation. Conceptualising this change as institutional innovation, the paper argues that the Ministry of Finance played a leading role in the reform process. It shows that the arrival of the Euro brought with it a power struggle between the Ministry and the Bundesbank. The evidence fits better the concept of institutional innovation as a result of entrepreneurship than approaches which conceptualise institutional innovations as consequences of profit maximisation or layering and displacement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Household surveys such as the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) tend to underestimate income and wealth inequality. The research methodology developed by Thomas Piketty et al. therefore analyses official tax statistics in order to more accurately determine the inequality between the people at the top of the income and wealth distribution scale and the rest of the population. However, Piketty's methodology underestimates the rise in inequality in Germany since the turn of the millennium due to the fact that companies are retaining a significant percentage of their rising profits which are therefore not recorded as private household income. We show how the specific pattern of income distribution in Germany has contributed to the country's large and persistent current account surplus, thereby contributing to macroeconomic instability at the international level. We note that addressing economic inequality in Germany politically through wealth and inheritance taxes faces the resistance of powerful lobby groups including family-owned businesses (the German Mittelstand). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Bundestag is a key institution in the parliamentary democracy of Germany. Assessing its role in the Covid-19 crisis considers how it adapted to secure parliamentary continuity. Comparing the activities during the pandemic to the year before shows institutional stability and high continuity of legislation and oversight activities but severe challenges to parliamentary communication. To properly understand the role of the Bundestag in the Covid-19 crisis, this analysis draws upon both quantitative and qualitative data and considers formal and informal paths of parliamentary influence. It reveals that a more nuanced assessment of the Bundestag's role in policymaking throughout the Covid-19 pandemic is in order, and that claims of Parliament having subordinated itself to the Executive appear overly alarmist and unsubstantiated by the available evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Covid-19 pandemic is a major global crisis the impact of which is likely to exceed the upheavals caused by the last financial and economic crisis of 2008/2009. Germany as an export-oriented economy faces tremendous economic threats in the aftermath of the pandemic such as the collapse of global supply chains, the lockdown of economic sectors and impending job losses. As a reaction, the German government adopted, much as in the previous financial crisis, fiscal stimulus packages as part of a Keynesian-style public spending programme to stabilise its economy. Yet, in addition, the German government explicitly conceptualised its reactions as part of a 'Package for the Future' (Zukunftspaket), interlinking it with the second big global challenge: climate change and environmental degradation. We evaluate the German stimulus package on both these goals by comparing it with stimulus packages passed in other G20 countries. Based on a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) added by a case study of Germany, we identify the driving determinants behind the fiscal policy reactions with regard to the size of the stimulus package as well as its contribution to adopt long-term environmental transformations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The policy field of energy and climate policy has been shaped by a profound polarisation in recent years. On the one hand, young people in urban centres across Germany and beyond are protesting in the streets, demanding more effective political action and greater responsibility regarding climate change. On the other hand, citizens in rural areas are increasingly rejecting specific projects to implement the energy transition. These distinct poles are diametrically opposed and form clusters of people sharing the same mindsets regarding the issue of climate and energy policy. We conduct a qualitative analysis to describe these shared mindsets and collective identities of these clusters and their specific conceptualisation of the 'others'. Although the shared mindsets of the clusters are distinct, some narratives overlap, e.g. the ambition to serve the common good, the strong reliance on science and experts and the attachment to nature and the environment. Both poles recognise each other as their respective counterpart, but the external perception is mostly negative and distorted thus leading to additional tension. Finally, we conclude that it is worthwhile for future research to investigate if this polarisation integrates into existing cleavages or whether it should be discussed beyond this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this Special Issue, we show that the study of civil society, social movements, and protest is central for assessing the current state of German politics. First, moving beyond political parties and electoral politics delivers crucial insights into the ideological, affective, and organisational structuring of emerging polarisation and cleavages. Second, the transformations in electoral politics are closely interrelated with dynamics in civil society. Building on these perspectives, the contributions to the Special Issue underline that, due to the emergence of new cleavages, Germany, like other European countries, has seen a double transformation of its landscape of political contestation: 'New contentious politics' is on the rise, marked by new issues and claims as well as hybrid organisational forms and close interactions between protest and electoral politics. Importantly, in contrast to long-held assumptions, protest is not the exclusive terrain of 'progressive' forces and not shaped by increasingly differentiated arenas of mobilisation. Based on a broad range of cases and methods, the contributions take stock of social movement and civil society activism in Germany since the 2000s, i.e. in an era of multiple crises and increasing polarisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do political parties respond to street protest by political outsiders widely considered to be 'pariahs' (i.e. radical or extremist actors)? Bridging the literature on responses to 'populist' radical right parties with insights from social movement studies, we propose a theoretical model that conceptualises potential party responses to pariah protest. Innovatively, our typology distinguishes between a set of formal and substantive responses to street mobilisation. Empirically, we apply this model by providing the first systematic study of how political parties have responded to the 'anti-Corona' protests of Querdenken, contributing to social science research on the politics of the COVID-19 pandemic. Analysing the critical case of Germany, we underline the stark difference between how the populist radical right AfD and all other Bundestag parties respond to anti-Corona mobilisation, showing how political protest may sharpen the polarisation of party politics. Moreover, we highlight the more nuanced but still important differences in responses by established German parties. Theoretically, the article provides an analytical framework valuable in times of increasing street mobilisation by radical and extremist actors. Methodologically, our analysis relies on a systematic media analysis of articles from two major German newspapers. Empirically, it contributes to our understanding of the difficult but crucial relationship between the German protest and party arena during the COVID-19 pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is uncontested that political trust is highly relevant in democratic political systems. Although scholars have begun to study to a larger extent political trust in new democracies, this latter interest has faded away in recent times. To reinvigorate awareness of this area, thirty years after German reunification, we take stock of political trust in East and West Germany. Drawing on ESS data from 2002 to 2018 (ESS 1–9), we study empirically the convergence hypothesis in view of both the levels of political trust and the particular quality of citizens' trust in its democratic institutions. Our findings show that we can still not speak of a convergence of the mere levels of trust in East and West Germany: East Germans do still display lower levels of trust in both representative and regulatory institutions. Regarding the quality of political trust, however, the gap between East and West is less pronounced. These findings are highly relevant for both research on the social and psychological underpinnings of trust and the assessment of the consequences of the undemocratic heritage for the German political system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]