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Unscheduled ship maintenance, known as voyage repairs, is a high priority for the U.S. Navy. Such repairs are sometimes beyond the capability of the ship's crew to perform; cannot be deferred; and must be made at a remote location. After the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommended closing the former Naval Ship Repair Facility, Guam, the Navy leased the property at that facility to the Guam Economic Development and Commerce Authority, which sub-leased the property to a private shipyard. DOD has since begun planning for a military buildup on Guam. In January 2007 the Navy recommended allowing the private shipyard's lease on Navy land to expire in 2012. Consequently, the House Armed Services Committee asked GAO to determine the extent to which the Navy has (1) identified future ship repair requirements at Guam, and (2) identified and assessed options to address those requirements. GAO reviewed documents related to ship maintenance and interviewed officials affiliated with private contractors, the Guam government, the Marine Corps, Military Sealift Command, and the Navy in conducting this review. The Navy has not identified voyage surface ship repair requirements for 2012 and beyond for vessels operating near Guam, although some information is available on which to base estimated requirements for planning. Navy officials stated that they cannot estimate such requirements because the Navy expects to change its force structure, the Marine Corps has not finalized its plans for any additional vessels associated with the buildup, and Military Sealift Command expects changes to its force structure at Guam. Although the Navy, Marine Corps, and Military Sealift Command have not made final force structure decisions or operational plans for vessels operating at or near Guam, information is available to support an estimation of ship repair requirements as part of the multiyear planning and budgeting process. Specifically, the Navy (1) knows the history of voyage repairs conducted on Guam; (2) can identify vessels likely to operate near Guam based on planned force structure realignments in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review; and (3) can identify ship repair capabilities available at other strategic locations in the Pacific area, including Yokosuka, Japan. Developing requirements is a prerequisite for planning, and without developing estimated repair requirements the Navy cannot adequately evaluate options for meeting them. Navy officials identified potential options for providing repairs in Guam, but have not fully assessed their viability or identified time-critical planning tasks. According to Navy officials, once the Navy identifies voyage ship repair requirements for the Guam area, they will choose from four options or a combination of options for providing voyage repairs. First, the Navy could try to expand existing organic repair capabilities to conduct voyage repairs. However, the existing ship maintenance capabilities... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1995, GAO designated Department of Defense (DOD) business systems modernization as a high-risk program, and the program remains on the high-risk list today. A key to successful systems modernization is having and using an enterprise architecture as an authoritative frame of reference, or blueprint, for system investment decisions. To assist DOD in modernizing its business systems, Congress passed legislation consistent with prior GAO recommendations for DOD to develop and implement a business enterprise architecture (BEA). In response, DOD developed a corporate BEA that it intends to federate, or extend, to the military departments and defense agencies. To support GAO's legislative mandate to review DOD's BEA, GAO evaluated the status of the Air Force, Navy, and Army architecture programs. To accomplish this, GAO used its Enterprise Architecture Management Maturity Framework and associated evaluation method. The enterprise architecture programs within the Departments of the Air Force, Navy, and Army have yet to advance to a level that can be considered fully mature. Specifically, all three departments are at the initial stage of GAO's architecture maturity framework. This means that they have not fully satisfied all the core elements associated with the framework's second stage (establishing the management foundation for developing, maintaining, and using the architecture) or any of the framework's higher stages: Stage 3 (developing the architecture), Stage 4 (completing the architecture), and Stage 5 (leveraging the architecture for organizational change). An organization generally needs to have achieved the fifth stage in the framework for it to have an effective architecture program because, at this stage, the management controls and structures are in place for using an approved architecture to guide and constrain system investments in a way that produces institutional results. Although each department is at Stage 1, the status of the programs vary considerably. Specifically, the Air Force far exceeds both the Navy and the Army, while the Navy generally exceeds the Army, in terms of the total percentage of core elements that are fully satisfied. Moreover, of the core elements that have not been fully satisfied by at least one of the three departments, most relate to architecture content, use, and measurement. Even though none of the departments have fully satisfied sufficient core elements to advance beyond Stage 1, the Air Force has at least partially satisfied all the core elements associated with Stages 2 and 3, as well as all but three core elements across all stages, and the Navy has at least partially satisfied all the core elements for Stage 2. In addition, the Air Force has made important progress in the last 2 years in maturing its architecture program, while the Navy's progress has been mixed, and the Army has not made any progress. Collectively, this means that DOD, as a whole, is not as well positioned as it... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To reduce the burden of the U.S. military presence on Japanese communities while maintaining a continuing presence of U.S. forces in the region, in 2005 and 2006 the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative outlined the effort to relocate American military units in Japan to other areas, including Guam. The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to move 8,000 Marines and an estimated 9,000 dependents from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam by the 2014 goal. GAO was asked to discuss the planning effort for the buildup of U.S. forces and facilities on Guam. Accordingly, this testimony addresses (1) DOD's planning process for the military buildup on Guam, (2) potential challenges for DOD and the government of Guam associated with the buildup, and (3) the status of planning efforts by the government of Guam to meet infrastructure challenges caused by the buildup. This testimony is based largely on findings of a September 2007 GAO report on DOD's overseas master plans and prior work on issues related to the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. It is also based, in part, on preliminary observations from an ongoing GAO review of DOD's planning effort to address the challenges associated with the military buildup on Guam and on other GAO work on the effects of DOD-related growth on surrounding communities in the continental United States. GAO is not making recommendations at this time. DOD has established a framework for the military buildup on Guam; however, many key decisions remain, such as the final size of the military population, which units will be stationed there, and what military facilities will be constructed. This part of the planning process is ongoing, along with the development of a required environmental impact statement, currently expected to be issued in 2010. However, DOD will submit budget requests for fiscal year 2010 prior to that date, and thus may not know the full extent of its facility requirements before asking Congress to provide the associated funding. Officials of the Navy's Joint Guam Program Office told us that immediately after the environmental impact statement is completed, DOD will commence construction of facilities in efforts to meet the 2014 goal discussed in the Defense Policy Review Initiative. However, other DOD and government of Guam officials believe that this is an optimistic schedule considering the possibility that the environmental impact statement could be delayed, the complexities of moving thousands of Marines and their dependents to Guam, and the need to obtain sufficient funding from the governments of United States and Japan to support the move. DOD and the government of Guam face several significant challenges associated with the proposed military buildup on Guam. DOD's challenges include obtaining adequate funding and meeting operational needs, such as mobility support and training capabilities. There are also challenges in addressing the effects of military and civilian growth on Guam's community... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global mobility is a key component of U.S. national security. Since the end of the Cold War, senior decision makers have relied upon Department of Defense (DOD) mobility studies to provide insights they need to build and maintain the right mix of mobility capabilities. The most recent study, the Mobility Capabilities Study, identified the mobility support needed for the full range of strategic operations in the context of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the global war on terror, and DOD's evolving global defense posture, all in support of the National Military Strategy. According to DOD officials, the department plans to issue the next mobility study--the Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study--in the spring of 2009. The 2005 mobility study also assessed requirements for two overlapping war fights, DOD support to homeland defense, civil support, lesser contingency operations, sustainment of forward-deployed forces, and national strategic missions. In accomplishing these missions, DOD depends on its airlift force. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 mandated a requirements-based study on alternatives for the proper size and mix of the airlift force to meet the needs of the National Military Strategy to be done by a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC). The Act specifically defined what the study plan should include and set time frames for the completion of various events. The FFRDC was to submit a study plan to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Comptroller General 60 days after the enactment of the Act. The Act required us to review the study plan to determine if it is complete and objective and whether it has any flaws or weaknesses in scope or methodology and report to the Secretary of Defense and the FFRDC within 30 days. It also required us to include in the report any recommendations that the Comptroller General considers appropriate for improvements to the study plan. DOD selected the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to accomplish the study and signed a task order with IDA outlining the study framework. On March 28, 2008, IDA delivered the draft Size and Mix of Airlift Force Study Plan to DOD, congressional committees, and us. The draft study plan comprises 34 pages of bulleted information, graphs, and diagrams. The seven major sections are introduction, background, scope, objective, study management, staged approach, and schedule. The single objective of the study is to address the numerous airlift issues identified in the Act and to report to the Secretary of Defense and to the Congress by January 10, 2009. We assessed the draft Size and Mix of Airlift Force Study Plan that IDA delivered on March 28, 2008, for completeness, but we were unable to evaluate objectivity or identify flaws or weaknesses in scope or methodology. We also commented on another ongoing airlift-related study, the Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study, because it... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The high use of National Guard (Guard) forces for overseas missions has raised questions about its ability to support civil authorities in the event of a catastrophic incident. GAO was asked to assess two alternatives for providing funding and authority specifically for the Guard's civil support missions. Congress subsequently enacted a new approach for the Guard's civil support needs, which GAO also included in this assessment. GAO determined: (1) the extent to which planning to identify the Guard's civil support requirements has been undertaken, (2) the current funding approach for the Guard's civil support capabilities and how three approaches--modeled after the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), the Coast Guard, and that in the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act--could be applied to the Guard; (3) guiding principles to consider when developing and implementing funding alternatives, and (4) the extent to which the existing and alternative approaches are consistent with these principles. GAO synthesized guiding principles for military and civil support effectiveness from the literature and discussed alternatives with defense and homeland security analysts. Comprehensive planning has not been undertaken, by the states or federal agencies, to identify the Guard's requirements for responding to large-scale, multistate civil support missions, such as Hurricane Katrina, because responsibilities for conducting this planning have been unclear. While such events are likely to be state-led, federal funds are likely to be used to fund the Guard's response. The efficiency and effectiveness of response efforts can be facilitated by planning that assigns responsibilities, develops requirements, identifies gaps, and prioritizes investments. The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act addresses planning responsibilities to some extent by directing the Department of Defense (DOD) to (1) plan for the Guard's response to natural disasters and acts of terrorism and (2) plan for and fund the unique capabilities DOD needs to provide during civil support missions. Most of the Guard's capabilities have been funded through DOD appropriations to equip, staff, and train for its warfighting missions. The states rely on these capabilities for civil support missions when available. However, alternative funding approaches could provide specific funding for the Guard's civil support role. Under a SOCOM-like approach, the National Guard Bureau could be given funding and authority to provide Guard forces with unique civil support capabilities not already funded by DOD. Under a Coast Guard-like approach, DOD would fund the Guard's warfighting needs, but the Department of Homeland Security could identify needs for and fund the Guard's civil support-unique capabilities. The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act directed DOD to develop a funding request for certain capabilities DOD needs to provide civil support. GAO identified seven guiding... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been 5 years since the Department of Defense (DOD) established U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to conduct homeland defense and civil support missions in the United States. Planning operations in the United States poses unique challenges for traditional military planning. GAO was asked to assess (1) the status of NORTHCOM's plans and the challenges it faces in planning and conducting operations, (2) the number, experience, and training of planning personnel, and (3) the extent to which NORTHCOM coordinates with other federal agencies. To do this, GAO reviewed available NORTHCOM plans, compared them to joint operational planning criteria, compared planning staff with those at other commands, and reviewed documentation and mechanisms for interagency coordination. NORTHCOM has completed--or is in the process of revising--all of the major plans it is required to prepare for its homeland defense and civil support missions, but it faces a number of challenges in planning for and conducting these missions. NORTHCOM has completed its nine required plans. However, NORTHCOM does not know whether supporting plans that must be developed by other DOD organizations to assist NORTHCOM are complete because it has only recently begun to develop a process to track and assess these plans. NORTHCOM faces challenges in three key planning areas. First, NORTHCOM has difficulty identifying requirements for capabilities it may need in part because NORTHCOM does not have more detailed information from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or the states on the specific requirements needed from the military in the event of a disaster. Second, NORTHCOM has few regularly allocated forces and few capabilities allocated to its plans. DOD could allocate forces to NORTHCOM and assign specific forces to the command's plans, but this would not guarantee that those forces would not have to be deployed elsewhere. However, it would provide DOD and the NORTHCOM commander with a better basis on which to assess the risk that the command would be unable to successfully execute one or more of its missions. Third, NORTHCOM has difficulty monitoring the readiness of military units for its civil support mission because its plans do not specify mission tasks against which units can be assessed. NORTHCOM has undertaken mitigation efforts to address each challenge, and new national planning guidance may further assist NORTHCOM and DOD in addressing the challenges. Nevertheless, NORTHCOM and DOD can take additional actions to reduce the risk from these gaps and reduce the risk due to the overall uncertainty that stems from the nature of its mission. NORTHCOM has an adequate number of planning personnel, and the command is pursuing opportunities to expand the experience and training for staff needed to perform the command's planning function. NORTHCOM's planning staff is filled at over 96 percent of its authorized positions. NORTHCOM's military planning staff receives... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) established U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to conduct homeland defense and civil support missions on U.S. soil. It is particularly important that NORTHCOM coordinate with the National Guard Bureau (NGB), because NGB has experience dealing with state and local authorities during incidents and functions as NORTHCOM's formal link to the states. GAO was asked to (1) determine the extent to which NORTHCOM has ongoing efforts to coordinate with the states and NGB in planning, exercises and other preparedness activities and (2) identify the extent to which there are any gaps in this coordination. To do this, GAO surveyed the state adjutants general, the highest ranking guardsman in each state, and received a 100 percent response rate, and reviewed interagency coordination plans and guidance. NORTHCOM has several ongoing efforts to improve coordination with the states and NGB in planning for its missions and responding to requests for civil support. For example, during hurricane season NORTHCOM facilitates weekly conferences with the relevant local, state, and federal emergency management officials, through which it has begun to build more productive relationships. NORTHCOM also conducted two large-scale exercises and participated in over 25 smaller regional, state, and local exercises annually to help responders prepare for man-made and natural disasters. In addition, NORTHCOM has been informally including NGB in reviewing its plans. We identified gaps in coordination between NORTHCOM, the states, and NGB in three areas: (1) NORTHCOM officials minimally involved the states in the development of its homeland defense and civil support plans. Less than 25 percent of the state adjutants general reported that they were involved in developing and reviewing these plans. For civil support, NORTHCOM officials told us that they are reaching out directly to states to better understand states' plans and capabilities, but for homeland defense, they rely on NGB to provide states perspectives. (2) NORTHCOM was not familiar with state emergency response plans and has no process for obtaining this information. Fifty-four percent of the state adjutants general reported that they believed that NORTHCOM was not at all or only slightly familiar with their states' emergency response plans. This may be attributable, in part, to the fact that NORTHCOM does not have an established and thorough process for cooperating and interacting with the states. By not obtaining and using information on states' plans and capabilities, NORTHCOM increases the risk that it will not be prepared to respond to an incident with the needed resources to support civil authorities. (3) A 2005 agreement, which is intended to provide the procedures by which NORTHCOM and NGB interact, does not fully or clearly define each agency's roles and responsibilities for planning for homeland defense and civil support. The lack of clearly defined roles... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1995, the Department of Defense (DOD) began an effort to implement a standard departmentwide travel system, the Defense Travel System (DTS). This testimony is based on previously issued GAO reports and testimonies that highlighted challenges confronted by DOD in the implementation of DTS. More specifically, today's testimony focuses on prior GAO reporting concerning (1) the lack of quantitative metrics to measure the extent to which DTS is actually being used, (2) weaknesses with DTS's requirements management and system testing, and (3) two key assumptions related to the estimated cost savings in the September 2003 DTS economic analysis were not reasonable. Today's testimony also highlights some actions that DOD could explore to help streamline its administrative travel processes such as using a commercial database to identify unused airline tickets. Overhauling the department's antiquated travel management practices and systems has been a daunting challenge for DOD. In several prior reports and testimonies, GAO identified several key implementation issues regarding DOD's ability to make DTS the standard travel system for the department. Specifically, GAO reported that DTS was not being used to the fullest extent possible, and DOD lacked comprehensive data to effectively monitor its utilization. At the time of GAO's 2006 review, DOD's utilization data were based on a model that was developed in calendar year 2003. However, the model had not been completely updated to reflect actual DTS usage at that time. The lack of up-to-date utilization data hindered management's ability to monitor progress toward the DOD vision of DTS as the standard travel system. Additionally, the continued use of the department's legacy travel systems resulted in the underutilization of DTS and adversely affected the expected savings that DTS could achieve. Furthermore, GAO previously reported weaknesses in DTS's requirements management and system testing practices. GAO found that DTS's requirements were still inadequate. GAO noted that until DOD improves DTS's requirements management practices, the department will not have reasonable assurance that DTS can provide the intended functionality. Additionally, GAO's 2006 report of the September 2003 DTS economic analysis found that the two key assumptions used to estimate annual net savings were not based on reliable information. Two cost components represented the majority of the over $56 million in estimated net savings--personnel savings and reduced commercial travel office fees. GAO's analysis found that $24.2 million in personnel savings related to the Air Force and the Navy were not supported. Air Force and Navy DTS program officials stated that they did not anticipate a reduction in the number of personnel, but rather the shifting of staff from the travel function to other functions. The Naval Cost Analysis Division stated that the Navy will not realize any tangible personnel cost savings from the... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The high pace of overseas operations is taking a heavy toll on Army equipment. Harsh combat and environmental conditions over sustained periods of time have exacerbated equipment repair, replacement, and recapitalization problems. The Army has also taken steps to restructure its forces before implementing its longer term transformation to the Future Combat System. To support ongoing operations and prepare for the future, the Army has embarked on four key initiatives: (1) restructuring from a division-based force to a modular brigade-based force, (2) expanding the Army by adding about 74,000 people and creating new units, (3) repairing, replacing, and recapitalizing new equipment through its reset program, and (4) replacing equipment borrowed from its pre-positioned equipment sets around the world. Since 2004, Congress has provided billions of dollars to support the Army's equipping needs. GAO has issued many reports on the Army's efforts to equip modular units, expand the Army, reset equipment, and manage and replace prepositioned equipment. This statement, which draws largely on these reports, will address (1) the equipment-related cost of these initiatives, and (2) the management challenges facing the Army and the actions needed to improve its implementation of these initiatives. GAO is issuing a separate statement today on the Future Combat System (GAO-08- 638T). Restructuring and rebuilding the Army will require billions of dollars for equipment and take years to complete; however, the total cost is uncertain. Based on GAO's analysis of Army cost estimates and cost data, it appears that the Army's plans to equip modular units, expand the force, reset equipment, and replace prepositioned equipment are likely to cost at least $190 billion dollars through fiscal year 2013. However, these estimates have some limitations and could change. Further, the Army has stated it plans to request additional funds to address equipment shortfalls in modular units through fiscal year 2017. Several factors are contributing to the uncertainties about future costs. First, the Army's $43.6 funding plan for equipping modular units was based on preliminary modular unit designs and did not fully consider the needs of National Guard units. Second, the Army expects to need $18.5 billion for equipment to expand the force but has not clearly documented this estimate. Third, costs to reset equipment may total at least $118 billion from fiscal years 2004-2013 but may change because they are dependent on how much equipment is lost, damaged, or worn beyond repair during continuing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and how long these operations continue. Fourth, the Army believes it will need at least $10.6 billion to replace pre-positioned equipment that was taken out of storage to support ongoing operations, but this amount is an estimate and DOD's overall strategy for prepositioned equipment has not yet been issued Given the magnitude of these initiatives... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Military physicians and other health care professionals are needed to support operational forces during war or other military conflicts and to maintain the well-being of the forces during nonoperational periods. These professionals also provide health care services to military retirees and dependents. The Department of Defense (DOD) acquires its health care professionals primarily through two programs--the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program and the Financial Assistance Program--with which it recruits and trains military health care providers who fill medical specialty positions. These programs offer participants reimbursement for tuition, books, fees, other education expenses, and a stipend, which is a fixed amount of money given to the participants on a monthly basis, in return for an active duty service obligation. Recruiting and retaining highly qualified health care professionals, however, is becoming more challenging for each of the military services. The added stresses of repeated deployments and the general perceptions of war, along with the potential for health care providers to earn significantly more money outside of DOD, have caused some professionals to choose to separate themselves from military service, even after DOD has paid for all or part of their medical education. Because DOD medical training programs can take years and are a costly investment, DOD is negatively affected both financially and operationally when individuals do not fulfill their active duty obligations. The Conference Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed the Comptroller General of the United States to report to the congressional defense committees by April 1, 2008, on the number of Health Professions Scholarship Program or Financial Assistance Program participants who do not enter active duty following completion of the program of studies for which they were enrolled, including the extent to which the military services have sought and received reimbursement for stipends or annual grants paid. Accordingly, we examined the extent to which (1) participants in the Health Professions Scholarship Program or Financial Assistance Program fail to enter active duty service, as obligated; (2) DOD has procedures in place to recoup expenditures paid under the Health Professions Scholarship Program or Financial Assistance Program to participants who failed to meet their contractual obligations; and, (3) DOD has specifically sought and received reimbursement for stipends. Only a small percentage of the participants in the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program and Financial Assistance Program have failed to complete their education or serve their active duty service obligation. Our analyses of service and DFAS data showed that, for fiscal years 2003 through 2007, fewer than 1 percent (171) of the total number of participants (19,921) withdrew from the programs or, alternatively,... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Department of Defense (DOD) is simultaneously implementing a number of force realignments that contribute to personnel growth at military installations throughout the United States. DOD plans to execute over 800 actions from the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, which entail relocating over 123,000 personnel. Concurrent with its BRAC 2005 actions, DOD is also implementing or planning to implement other extensive worldwide transformation initiatives, which include relocating about 50,000 soldiers primarily from Europe and Korea to the United States; transforming the Army's force structure from an organization based on divisions to more rapidly deployable, brigade-based units (known as Army modularity); and increasing its active duty end strength by 92,000, all of which will affect DOD's facilities infrastructure. These force realignments will result in dramatic growth at some DOD installations across the United States. Based on data provided by the services, the DOD Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) had identified, as of January 2008, 20 locations where expected growth as a result of force realignments in fiscal years 2006 through 2012 will adversely affect surrounding communities. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 mandated that we assess the impact on military installations caused by an increase in assigned forces or civilian personnel as a result of the 2005 BRAC or other force realignments. Our specific objectives were to (1) determine whether military facility requirements (including quality-of-life projects) will be met before the arrival of assigned forces and (2) determine whether DOD has programmed sufficient funding to mitigate community traffic congestion in accordance with the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program. While DOD has made progress in initiating construction of military facilities to accommodate growth, it is too early to determine whether all required facilities will be constructed prior to arrival of assigned forces because contracts must still be let, the progress of construction may affect timelines for the arrival of forces, and the services are still requesting or expecting to request $6.4 billion in funding. At the 11 installations we reviewed, representing over 85 percent of expected population growth, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have received about $7.3 billion for fiscal years 2006 through 2008 for growth-related construction projects, which is approximately 54 percent of the total estimated funding requirement for growth related construction at those installations through 2011. As of March 2008, at the 11 installations we reviewed contracts have been awarded for approximately $4.1billion--about 56 percent of the available funds--and base officials plan to award contracts for most of the remaining funds in fiscal year 2008. The services have requested or plan to request just under $6.4 billion in funding to implement remaining growth: the services have... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Department of Defense (DOD) relies heavily on petroleum-based fuel for mobility energy--the energy required for moving and sustaining its forces and weapons platforms for military operations. Dependence on foreign oil, projected increases in worldwide demand, and rising oil costs, as well as the significant logistics burden associated with moving fuel on the battlefield, will likely require DOD to address its mobility energy demand. GAO was asked to (1) identify key efforts under way to reduce mobility energy demand and (2) assess the extent to which DOD has established an overarching organizational framework to guide and oversee these efforts. GAO reviewed DOD documents, policies, and studies, and interviewed agency officials. OSD, the Joint Staff, and the military services have undertaken efforts to reduce mobility energy demand in weapons platforms and other mobile defense systems. For example, OSD created a departmentwide Energy Security Task Force in 2006 that is monitoring the progress of selected energy related research and development projects. The Joint Staff updated its policy governing the development of capability requirements for new weapons systems to selectively consider energy efficiency as a key performance parameter--a characteristic of a system that is considered critical to the development of an effective military capability. The Army is addressing fuel consumption at forward-deployed locations by developing foam-insulated tents and temporary dome structures that are more efficient to heat and cool, reducing the demand for fuel-powered generators. The Navy has established an energy conservation program to encourage ships to reduce energy consumption. The Air Force has developed an energy strategy and undertaken initiatives to determine fuel-efficient flight routes, reduce the weight on aircraft, optimize air refueling, and improve the efficiency of ground operations. The Marine Corps has initiated research and development efforts to develop alternative power sources and improve fuel management. While these and other efforts are under way and DOD has identified energy as one of its transformational priorities, DOD lacks elements of an overarching organizational framework to guide and oversee mobility energy reduction efforts. In the absence of an overarching organizational framework for mobility energy, DOD cannot be assured that its current efforts will be fully implemented and will significantly reduce its reliance on petroleum-based fuel. GAO found that DOD's current approach to mobility energy lacks (1) a single executive-level OSD official who is accountable for mobility energy matters; sets the direction, pace, and tone to reduce mobility energy demand across DOD; and can serve as a mobility energy focal point within the department and with Congress and interagency partners; (2) a comprehensive strategic plan for mobility energy that aligns individual efforts with DOD-wide goals and priorities,... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Department of Defense (DOD) is the single largest U.S. energy consumer. About three-fourths of its total consumption consists of mobility energy--the energy required for moving and sustaining its forces and weapons platforms for military operations. GAO was asked to discuss DOD's efforts to manage and reduce its mobility energy demand. This testimony addresses (1) energy issues that are likely to affect DOD in the future, (2) key departmental and military service efforts to reduce demand for mobility energy, and (3) DOD's management approach to guide and oversee these efforts. This testimony is based primarily on work conducted for a report that GAO issued today (GAO-08-426) on DOD's management of mobility energy. Several issues, such as rising fuel costs, worldwide energy demand, and the high fuel burden during operations, underscore the importance of energy to DOD. Fuel costs for DOD are substantial and the volatility of world oil prices will likely continue to affect the department--which may require DOD to make difficult trade-offs such as redirecting funds from ongoing programs to pay for needed fuel. Other energy issues that are likely to affect DOD in the future are the increased U.S. dependence on foreign oil, projected increases in the worldwide demand for oil, and uncertainties about world oil supplies. Furthermore, DOD's high fuel requirements on the battlefield can place a significant logistics burden on military forces, limit the range and pace of operations, and add to mission risks, including exposing supply convoys to attack. Given these issues, DOD must be well positioned to effectively manage energy demands for military operations. DOD has initiatives under way to reduce mobility energy demand. At the department level, OSD created a task force to address energy security concerns. In addition, the Deputy Secretary of Defense included energy in DOD's list of the top 25 transformational priorities for the department as part of its initiative to pursue targeted acquisition reforms. Each of the military services also has its own initiatives under way. The Army is addressing fuel consumption at forward-deployed locations by developing foam-insulated tents and temporary dome structures that are more efficient to heat and cool, reducing the demand for fuel-powered generators. The Navy has established an energy conservation program to encourage ships to reduce energy consumption. The Air Force has developed an energy strategy and undertaken initiatives to determine fuel-efficient flight routes, reduce the weight on aircraft, optimize air refueling, and improve the efficiency of ground operations. The Marine Corps has initiated research and development efforts to develop alternative power sources, such as hybrid power, and improve fuel management. While these and other mobility energy reduction efforts are under way, DOD lacks elements of an overarching organizational framework to guide and oversee these efforts.... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2001, Congress has appropriated nearly $700 billion for the global war on terrorism. The majority of these funds have supported U.S. efforts in Iraq. Congressional oversight is crucial to improve performance, ensure accountability, and protect U.S. programs from fraud, waste, and abuse. Since 2003, GAO has issued nearly 130 Iraq-related reports and testimonies. This testimony addresses (1) factors contributing to poor contracting outcomes and accountability, (2) long-standing issues in the Department of Defense's (DOD) management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces, and (3) efforts to improve the capacity of the Iraqi government. GAO reviewed U.S. agency documents and interviewed officials from State, DOD, and other agencies; the United Nations (UN); and the Iraqi government. We also made multiple trips to Iraq. U.S. efforts in Iraq have relied extensively on contractors to undertake reconstruction projects and provide support to U.S. forces. However, a lack of well-defined requirements, poor business arrangements, and inadequate oversight and accountability have negatively affected reconstruction and support efforts. For example, in a July 2007 report, GAO found that DOD completed negotiation for task orders on an oil contract more than 6 months after the work commenced and most costs were incurred. DOD paid nearly all of the $221 million in costs questioned by auditors. Also in July 2007, GAO found that unclear DOD guidance, inadequate staff, and insufficient technology resulted in poor accountability over more than 190,000 weapons provided to Iraqi forces. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation to determine what DOD accountability procedures apply or should apply to the program. However, as of March 2008, DOD had not made a determination. The need to effectively manage and oversee contractors supporting deployed forces is equally important. DOD pays billions of dollars each year for contracted goods and services in locations such as Iraq and elsewhere. However, several long-standing and systemic problems continue to hinder DOD's management and oversight of contractors at deployed locations, including the failure to follow planning guidance, provide an adequate number of contract oversight personnel, systematically collect and distribute lessons learned, and provide predeployment training for military commanders and contract oversight personnel on the use and role of contractors. GAO's work has identified instances where poor oversight and management of contractors led to negative financial and operational impacts. GAO has made a number of recommendations aimed at strengthening DOD's management and oversight of contractor support at deployed locations, and the department has agreed to implement many of those recommendations. However, GAO has found that DOD has made limited progress in implementing some key recommendations. The United States has made available nearly $6 billion to rebuild Iraq's energy... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The federal government, including the Department of Defense (DOD), is increasingly relying on contractors to carry out its missions. Governmentwide spending on contractor services has more than doubled in the last 10 years. DOD has used contractors extensively to support troops deployed abroad. The department recently estimated the number of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan to be about 196,000. DOD also relies heavily on contractors for various aspects of weapon system logistics support. While contractors, when properly used, can play an important role in helping agencies accomplish their missions, GAO has identified long-standing problems regarding the appropriate role and management of contractors, particularly at DOD. This testimony highlights the challenges federal agencies face related to the increased reliance on contractors and the specific challenges DOD has had in managing its increased reliance on contractors who support deployed troops and who provide logistics support for weapons systems. This testimony also highlights some of the recommendations GAO has made over the past several years to improve DOD's management and oversight of contractors, as well as DOD's actions in response to those recommendations. While there are benefits to using contractors to perform services for the government--such as increased flexibility in fulfilling immediate needs--GAO and others have raised concerns about the increasing reliance on contractors to perform agency missions. GAO's body of work shows that agencies face challenges with increased reliance on contractors to perform core agency missions, and these challenges are accentuated in contingency operations such as Iraq, in emergency situations such as Hurricane Katrina, or in cases where sufficient government personnel are not available. In making the decision to use contractors, agencies have experienced challenges such as: determining which functions and activities should be contracted out and which should not to ensure institutional capacity; developing a total workforce strategy to address the extent of contractor use and the appropriate mix of contractor and government personnel; identifying and distinguishing the roles and responsibilities of contractors and civilian and military personnel; and ensuring appropriate oversight, including addressing risks, ethics concerns, and surveillance needs. DOD's increased reliance on contractors to support forces deployed for military operations and to perform maintenance and other logistic support for weapon systems has highlighted challenges that DOD faces in managing this component of its total force. With regard to contractor support for deployed forces, DOD's primary challenges have been to provide effective management and oversight, including failure to follow planning guidance, an inadequate number of contract oversight personnel, failure to systematically capture and distribute lessons learned, and a lack of comprehensive... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A fundamental principle of military readiness is that the military must train as it intends to fight, and military training ranges allow the Department of Defense (DOD) to accomplish this goal. According to DOD officials, heightened focus on the application of environmental statutes has affected the use of its training areas. Since 2003, DOD has obtained exemptions from three environmental laws and has sought exemptions from three others. This report discusses the impact, if any, of (1) environmental laws on DOD's training activities and military readiness, (2) DOD's use of statutory exemptions from environmental laws on training activities, (3) DOD's use of statutory exemptions on the environment, and (4) the extent to which DOD has demonstrated the need for additional exemptions. To address these objectives, GAO visited 17 training locations; analyzed environmental impact and readiness reports; and met with officials at service headquarters, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, federal regulatory agencies, and nongovernmental environmental groups. Compliance with environmental laws has caused some training activities to be cancelled, postponed, or modified, and DOD has used adjustments to training events, referred to as "workarounds," to accomplish some training objectives while meeting environmental requirements. Some DOD trainers instruct units to pretend restricted training areas are holy grounds, mine fields, or other restricted areas in theater, simulating the need to avoid specific areas and locations when deployed. GAO's review of readiness data for active duty combat units did not confirm that compliance with environmental laws hampers overall military readiness. Since 2006, the Navy has twice invoked the Marine Mammal Protection Act exemption to continue using mid-frequency active sonar in training exercises that would otherwise have been prevented. DOD's exemption from the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, authorizing the taking of migratory birds, eliminated the possibility of having to delay or cancel military training exercises, such as Navy live-fire training at the Farallon de Medinilla Target Range. The exemption to the Endangered Species Act, which precludes critical habitat designation on DOD lands, enables DOD to avoid potential training delays by providing greater autonomy in managing its training lands. On the basis of meetings with officials within and outside DOD and visits to 17 training ranges, GAO found no instances where DOD's use of exemptions from the Endangered Species Act or Migratory Bird Treaty Act has adversely affected the environment, but the impact of the Marine Mammal Protection Act exemption has not yet been determined. The services employ a variety of measures and conservation activities to mitigate the effects of training activities on the natural resources located on DOD lands. Additionally, regulatory officials GAO spoke to said DOD has done an effective job protecting and preserving... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In January 2007 the President announced an initiative, referred to as Grow the Force, to increase the end strength in the Army by more than 74,000 by 2013 and the Marine Corps by 27,000 personnel by 2011 to enhance U.S. forces, reduce stress on deployable personnel, and provide necessary forces for success in the Global War on Terrorism. The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that it will need more than $17 billion for facilities to accommodate the planned personnel increases. GAO was asked to review (1) the process the Army and Marine Corps used to develop construction projects associated with Grow the Force, (2) the extent to which the projects submitted in DOD's budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 support the initiative, and (3) whether the Army and Marine Corps plan to use temporary facilities while construction projects are completed. GAO reviewed the construction projects associated with Grow the Force in DOD's budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, reviewed stationing documents, and interviewed officials at Army and Marine Corps headquarters and six installations on the process used to develop projects. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with GAO's assessment that 1 Army project and 12 Marine Corps projects do not support Grow the Force but did not provide sufficient documentation that existing capacity issues would be exacerbated by additional personnel. The Army and Marine Corps followed their typical process to develop construction projects when they developed the Grow the Force projects submitted in DOD's budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008; however, the process was compressed due to the short period of time between the announcement of the initiative and submission of budget requests. For example, the active duty Army took about 2 months and the Marine Corps took 6 months to develop projects submitted in DOD's budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008; the typical process takes about 2 years. Nearly all of the military construction projects submitted as Grow the Force projects in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 supported the Grow the Force initiative. GAO found that 68 of the 69 projects submitted by the Army and Army National Guard, totaling more than $2.3 billion, and 37 of the 49 projects submitted by the Marine Corps, totaling more than $665 million, supported Grow the Force. However, GAO found that 1 Army project and 12 Marine Corps projects did not support Grow the Force because they addressed existing deficiencies and were needed regardless of whether Grow the Force occurred or they supported another initiative. For example, the Marine Corps included a $7 million wastewater system modification project at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, in its fiscal year 2008 budget request to address environmental issues. Officials said the project was already planned for a future budget request and would be needed regardless of whether Grow the Force had occurred. Additionally,... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tens of thousands of military personnel and civilians were potentially exposed to chemical or biological substances through Department of Defense (DOD) tests since World War II. DOD conducted some of these tests as part of its Project 112 test program, while others were conducted as separate efforts. GAO was asked to (1) assess DOD's efforts to identify individuals who were potentially exposed during Project 112 tests, (2) evaluate DOD's current effort to identify individuals who were potentially exposed during tests conducted outside of Project 112, and (3) determine the extent to which DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) have taken action to notify individuals who might have been exposed during chemical and biological tests. GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from DOD, VA, the Department of Labor, and a veterans service organization. Since 2003, DOD has stopped actively searching for individuals who were potentially exposed to chemical or biological substances during Project 112 tests, but did not provide a sound and documented basis for that decision. In 2003, DOD reported it had identified 5,842 servicemembers and estimated 350 civilians as having been potentially exposed during Project 112, and indicated that DOD would cease actively searching for additional individuals. However, in 2004, GAO reported that DOD did not exhaust all possible sources of information and recommended that DOD determine the feasibility of identifying additional individuals. In response to GAO's recommendation, DOD determined continuing an active search for individuals had reached the point of diminishing returns, and reaffirmed its decision to cease active searches. This decision was not supported by an objective analysis of the potential costs and benefits of continuing the effort, nor could DOD provide any documented criteria from which it made its determination. Since June 2003, however, non-DOD sources--including the Institute of Medicine--have identified approximately 600 additional names of individuals who were potentially exposed during Project 112. Until DOD provides a more objective analysis of the costs and benefits of actively searching for Project 112 participants, DOD's efforts may continue to be questioned. DOD has taken action to identify individuals who were potentially exposed during tests outside of Project 112, but GAO identified four shortcomings in DOD's current effort. First, DOD's effort lacks clear and consistent objectives, scope of work, and information needs that would set the parameters for its efforts. Second, DOD has not provided adequate oversight to guide this effort. Third, DOD has not fully leveraged information obtained from previous research efforts that identified exposed individuals. Fourth, DOD's effort lacks transparency since it has not kept Congress and veterans service organizations fully informed of the progress and results of its efforts. Until DOD addresses these limitations,... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

U.S. military forces, and ground forces in particular, have operated at a high pace since the attacks of September 11, 2001, including to support ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Between 2001 and July 2007, approximately 931,000 U.S. Army and Marine Corps servicemembers deployed for overseas military operations, including about 312,000 National Guard or Reserve members. To support ongoing military operations and related activities, Congress has appropriated billions of dollars since 2001, and through September 2007, the Department of Defense (DOD) has reported obligating about $492.2 billion to cover these expenses, of which a large portion are related to readiness. In addition, DOD's annual appropriation, now totaling about $480 billion for fiscal year 2008, includes funds to cover readiness needs. GAO was asked to testify on (1) the readiness implications of DOD's efforts to support ongoing operations; and (2) GAO's prior recommendations related to these issues, including specific actions that GAO believes would enhance DOD's ability to manage and improve readiness. This statement is based on reports and testimonies published from fiscal years 2003 through 2008. GAO's work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. While DOD has overcome difficult challenges in maintaining a high pace of operations over the past 6 years and U.S. forces have gained considerable combat experience, our work has shown that extended operations in Iraq and elsewhere have had significant consequences for military readiness, particularly with regard to the Army and Marine Corps. To meet mission requirements specific to Iraq and Afghanistan, the department has taken steps to increase the availability of personnel and equipment for deploying units, and to refocus their training on assigned missions. For example, to maintain force levels in theater, DOD has increased the length of deployments and frequency of mobilizations, but it is unclear whether these adjustments will affect recruiting and retention. The Army and Marine Corps have also transferred equipment from nondeploying units and prepositioned stocks to support deploying units, affecting the availability of items for nondeployed units to meet other demands. In addition, they have refocused training such that units train extensively for counterinsurgency missions, with little time available to train for a fuller range of missions. Finally, DOD has adopted strategies, such as relying more on Navy and Air Force personnel and contractors to perform some tasks formerly handled by Army or Marine Corps personnel. If current operations continue at the present level of intensity, DOD could face difficulty in balancing these commitments with the need to rebuild and maintain readiness. Over the past several years, GAO has reported on a range of issues related to military readiness and made numerous recommendations to enhance DOD's ability to manage and... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Army considers modular force transformation its most extensive restructuring since World War II. The Army has estimated that restructuring units from a division-based force to a more agile and responsive modular brigade-based force will require a significant investment through fiscal year 2011. To facilitate this transformation, Public Law No. 109-163 Section 353 directs the Army to develop and implement a training strategy for the modular brigades. This law also directs GAO to report on the implementation of the strategy. This report discusses (1) the extent to which the Army's training strategy addresses the five elements specified in the public law and (2) the actions the Army has taken to implement its training strategy and the implementation challenges it faces. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed Army training strategy documentation and interviewed Army training personnel. While the Army's training strategy addresses each of the five elements specified in the public law to some extent, additional work needs to be done to fully develop the strategy. Section 353 of Public Law No. 109-163 requires the Army's training strategy for modular brigades to include five elements: (1) purpose; (2) performance goals, including specific performance goals for live, virtual, and constructive training; (3) metrics; (4) a reporting process; and (5) a funding model. GAO's analysis indicated that the Army articulated the purpose of its strategy, but the remaining elements require further development. While an overarching performance goal has been established, the Army has not completed development of specific goals for live, virtual, and constructive training. Moreover, neither constructive training events nor the goals for them are clearly articulated. The Army also has not developed objective metrics to measure performance against its goal, but relies on a commander's professional experience to make a subjective assessment. In addition, the reporting process does not provide detailed collective training status and the funding model does not realistically estimate training costs. Until the Army fully develops the required elements in its training strategy, it will not be in a sound position to assess if it can achieve the long-term institutional benefits of having a consistently trained force, measure how well units have been trained, and accurately determine training costs. The Army has taken some actions to implement its training strategy, but key implementation challenges remain, such as the availability of forces, limited capacity of the Army's training centers, and the availability of training personnel. While the Army is developing guidance to implement its strategy, commitments to ongoing operations have limited the availability of forces to train as envisioned. The strategy is designed to support a model built on the assumption that a third of the Army's active duty brigade combat teams are deployed at one time; however,... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to develop Iraqi security forces. The Department of Defense (DOD) recently requested an additional $2 billion to continue this effort. Components of the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), including the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), are responsible for implementing the U.S. program to train and equip Iraqi forces. This report (1) examines the property accountability procedures DOD and MNF-I applied to the U.S. train-and-equip program for Iraq and (2) assesses whether DOD and MNF-I can account for the U.S.-funded equipment issued to the Iraqi security forces. To accomplish these objectives, GAO reviewed MNSTC-I property books as of January 2007 and interviewed current and former officials from DOD and MNF-I. As of July 2007, DOD and MNF-I had not specified which DOD accountability procedures, if any, apply to the train-and-equip program for Iraq. Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq outside traditional security assistance programs, providing DOD a large degree of flexibility in managing the program, according to DOD officials. These officials stated that since the funding did not go through traditional security assistance programs, the DOD accountability requirements normally applicable to these programs did not apply. Further, MNF-I does not currently have orders that comprehensively specify accountability procedures for equipment distributed to the Iraqi forces. DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for Iraqi forces' receipt of U.S.-funded equipment. Two factors led to this lapse in accountability. First, MNSTC-I did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment distributed to Iraqi forces before December 2005. At that time, MNSTC-I established a property book system to track issuance of equipment to the Iraqi forces and attempted to recover past records. GAO found a discrepancy of at least 190,000 weapons between data reported by the former MNSTC-I commander and the property books. Former MNSTC-I officials stated that this lapse was due to insufficient staff and the lack of a fully operational distribution network, among other reasons. Second, since the beginning of the program, MNSTC-I has not consistently collected supporting records confirming the dates the equipment was received, the quantities of equipment delivered, or the Iraqi units receiving the items. Since June 2006, the command has placed greater emphasis on collecting the supporting documents. However, GAO's review of the January 2007 property books found continuing problems with missing and incomplete records. Further, the property books consist of extensive electronic spreadsheets, which are an inefficient management tool given the large amount of data and limited personnel to maintain the system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In June 2006, the Navy completed a feasibility assessment of both the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS)--the Marine Corps' integrated personnel and payroll system--and the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System DIMHRS. Based on the results of this assessment, the Navy expressed a preference to deploy MCTFS instead of DIMHRS. In August 2006, the Defense Business Systems Management Committee (DBSMC) made a business decision to accept the Navy's plan to proceed with the development and implementation of MCTFS. However, the Department of Defense (DOD) had already committed to deploy DIMHRS to provide a joint, integrated, standardized military personnel and pay system across all military components. According to the department, as of September 2006, it had spent over $668 million on the program. The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, 324 (2006) directed the Secretary of the Navy to prepare a report about MCTFS, including (1) an analysis of alternatives to MCTFS, including a comparison between the costs of deploying and operating MCTFS within the Navy and the cost of including the Navy in DIMHRS; (2) a business case analysis of the costs and benefits to both the Navy and DOD of the alternatives to MCTFS considered in the first objective; and (3) an analysis of the compatibility of MCTFS with the department's business enterprise architecture. The Navy concluded in its report--which we received on April 25, 2007--that (1) either MCTFS or DIMHRS could provide basic personnel and pay capability for the Navy uniformed force at approximately equivalent cost; (2) the DIMHRS alternative has substantially higher risks on cost, schedule, and function because MCTFS is already operational; and (3) MCTFS is fully compatible and compliant with the department's business enterprise architecture. The Act directs the DBSMC to determine--not sooner than 120 days after April 25, 2007--whether the deployment of MCTFS by the Navy is in the best interest of DOD. The Act directed us to review the Navy's report and provide a written assessment to the congressional defense committees and the Chairman of the DBSMC within 90 days of our receipt of the Navy's report. Specifically, we determined whether the Navy in its congressionally mandated report has justified its decision to invest in MCTFS. As part of our review, we also determined whether the department's business enterprise architecture was sufficient to guide and constrain the acquisition of MCTFS. In its report, the Navy has not adequately justified its decision to invest in MCTFS. Specifically, the analysis of alternatives and the business case analysis of both MCTFS and DIMHRS were unreliable, because the cost and benefit estimates used in these analyses were not sufficiently comprehensive, accurate, documented, or credible. The Navy's analysis shows that MCTFS is sufficiently compatible with DOD's evolving business enterprise... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An influenza pandemic could impair the military's readiness, jeopardize ongoing military operations abroad, and threaten the day-to-day functioning of the Department of Defense (DOD) due to a large percentage of sick or absent personnel. GAO was asked to examine DOD's pandemic influenza planning and preparedness efforts. GAO previously reported that DOD had taken numerous actions to prepare departmentwide, but faced four management challenges as it continued its efforts. GAO made recommendations to address these challenges and DOD generally concurred with them. This report focuses on DOD's combatant commands (COCOM) and addresses (1) actions the COCOMs have taken to prepare and (2) management challenges COCOMs face going forward. GAO reviewed guidance, plans, and after-action reports and interviewed DOD officials and more than 200 officials at the 9 COCOMs. COCOMs have taken numerous management and operational actions to prepare for an influenza pandemic, and the COCOMs' efforts are evolving. Each of DOD's nine COCOMs has established or intends to establish a working group to prepare for an influenza pandemic. Additionally, eight of the nine COCOMs have developed or are developing a pandemic influenza plan. Half of the COCOMs have conducted exercises to test their pandemic influenza plans and several are taking steps to address lessons learned. Five of the nine COCOMs have started to use various media, training programs, and outreach events to inform their personnel about pandemic influenza. Each of the geographic COCOMs has worked or plans to work with nations in its area of responsibility to raise awareness about and assess capabilities for responding to avian and pandemic influenza. Although COCOMs have taken numerous actions, GAO identified three management challenges that may prevent the COCOMs from being fully prepared to effectively protect personnel and perform missions during an influenza pandemic, two of which are related to issues GAO previously recommended that DOD address. First, the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of key organizations relative to others involved in DOD's planning efforts remained unclear in part due to the continued lack of sufficiently detailed guidance from the Secretary of Defense or his designee. As a result, the unity and cohesiveness of DOD's efforts could be impaired and the potential remains for confusion and gaps or duplication in actions taken by the COCOMs relative to the military services and other DOD organizations, such as in completing actions assigned to DOD in the Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza. Second, GAO identified a disconnect between the COCOMs' planning and preparedness activities and resources, including funding and personnel, to complete these activities, in part, because DOD's guidance does not identify the resources required to complete these activities. The continued lack of a link between planning and preparedness activities... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Combatant commanders carrying out ongoing operations rank the need for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities as high on their priority lists. The Department of Defense (DOD) is investing in many ISR systems, including unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), to meet the growing demand for ISR assets to support the warfighter. GAO was asked to evaluate DOD's efforts to integrate UAS into ongoing operations while optimizing the use of all DOD ISR assets. Specifically, this report addresses the extent that (1) DOD has taken steps to facilitate the integration of UAS into combat operations, and (2) DOD's approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets considers all available ISR capabilities, including those provided by UAS. GAO also reviewed the extent that DOD evaluates the performance of its ISR assets, including UAS, in meeting warfighters' needs. To perform this work, GAO analyzed data and guidance on the use of ISR assets, and interviewed DOD officials, including those supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of UAS into combat operations; however, further steps are needed to coordinate the deployment of these assets. For example, DOD developed guidance for the tactical employment of UAS and a Joint UAS Concept of Operations. This guidance is an important first step but does not address coordinating UAS and other ISR assets prior to deploying them to ongoing operations, which U.S. Central Command recognized is a critical factor in integrating UAS into combat operations. Until DOD addresses the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may continue to face challenges in successfully integrating UAS and other ISR assets into combat operations and may exacerbate integration challenges such as limited bandwidth. DOD's approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets, including UAS, hinders its ability to optimize the use of these assets because it does not consider the capabilities of all available ISR assets. The command charged with recommending how theater-level DOD ISR assets should be allocated to support operational requirements does not have awareness of all available ISR assets because DOD does not have a mechanism for obtaining this information. Similarly, the commander responsible for coordinating ongoing joint air operations does not have information on how assets controlled by tactical units are being used or what missions they've been tasked to support. Nor do tactical units have information on how theater-level assets and ISR assets embedded in other units are being tasked, which results in problems such as duplicative taskings. This lack of visibility occurs because DOD does not have a mechanism for tracking the missions both theater- and tactical-level ISR assets are supporting or how they are being used. Without an approach to allocation and tasking that includes a mechanism for considering all ISR... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army and the Marine Corps experienced problems with the delivery of supplies to the warfighter. Such problems highlight long-standing weaknesses in the Department of Defense's (DOD) supply chain management. DOD has identified joint theater logistics as a key effort aimed at improving distribution and supply support. GAO was asked to examine DOD's efforts to develop and implement joint theater logistics. GAO assessed (1) the extent to which DOD's approach to managing joint theater logistics departmentwide encompasses sound management principles and (2) the progress DOD has made in implementing joint theater logistics initiatives. GAO reviewed DOD documents and interviewed officials from the Joint Staff, services, agencies, and geographic combatant commands. DOD has not developed a coordinated and comprehensive management approach to guide and oversee implementation of joint theater logistics across the department. Efforts to develop and implement joint theater logistics initiatives have been fragmented among various DOD components due largely to a lack of specific goals and strategies, accountability for achieving results, and outcome-oriented performance measures--key principles of sound management. Further complicating DOD's ability to adopt a coordinated and comprehensive management approach to joint theater logistics are the diffused organization of DOD's logistics operations, including separate funding and management of resources and systems, and changes in DOD's overall logistics transformation strategy. DOD is currently testing a new approach to managing joint capabilities and is considering a realignment of capabilities in its long-term logistics strategy, which could affect the future of joint theater logistics. Without a more coordinated and comprehensive approach to managing joint theater logistics, DOD lacks assurance that it is on the right path toward achieving this capability and that individual initiatives will collectively address gaps in logistics capabilities. Further, DOD will have difficulty achieving improvements in theater distribution and asset visibility associated with joint theater logistics. DOD components have made progress developing and implementing joint theater logistics initiatives in the areas of distribution and supply support, but the department faces challenges that hinder its ability to realize the full benefits of these efforts. For example, while Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Centers have been established in each geographic combatant command to help manage supplies moving across the distribution system, senior commanders in Kuwait said achieving asset visibility has been difficult because of a lack of interoperability among information technology systems. Initiatives being developed to improve the coordination of surface transportation assets theaterwide also face challenges with issues of command and control, the availability of information... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The availability of spare parts and other critical items provided through the Department of Defense's (DOD) supply chains affects the readiness and capabilities of U.S. military forces. Since 1990, GAO has designated DOD supply chain management as a high-risk area. In 2005, DOD developed a plan aimed at addressing supply chain problems and having GAO remove this high-risk designation. DOD's plan focuses on three areas: requirements forecasting, asset visibility, and materiel distribution. GAO was asked to provide its views on (1) DOD's progress in developing and implementing the initiatives in its plan, (2) the results of recent work relating to the three focus areas covered by the plan, and (3) the integration of supply chain management with efforts to improve defense business operations. GAO also addressed broader issues of logistics governance and strategic planning. This testimony is based on prior GAO reports and analysis. To determine whether to retain the high-risk designation for supply chain management, GAO considers factors such as whether DOD makes substantial progress implementing improvement initiatives; establishes a program to validate the effectiveness of the initiatives; and completes a comprehensive, integrated strategy. The most recent update to DOD's plan shows that DOD has made progress developing and implementing its supply chain management improvement initiatives. DOD is generally staying on track for implementing its initiatives, although there have been delays in meeting certain milestones. However, the long-term time frames for many of these initiatives present challenges to the department in sustaining progress toward substantially completing their implementation. The plan also lacks outcome-focused performance measures for many individual initiatives and the three focus areas, limiting DOD's ability to fully demonstrate the results achieved through its plan. Increasing DOD's focus on outcomes will enable stakeholders to track the interim and long-term success of its initiatives and help DOD determine if it is meeting its goals of more effective and efficient supply chain management. GAO's recent work has identified problems related to the three focus areas in DOD's plan. In the requirements area, the military services are experiencing difficulties estimating acquisition lead times to acquire spare parts for equipment and weapon systems, hindering their ability to efficiently and effectively maintain spare parts inventories for military equipment. Challenges in the asset visibility area include lack of interoperability among information technology systems, problems with container management, and inconsistent application of radio frequency identification technology, which make it difficult to obtain timely and accurate information on assets in theater. In the materiel distribution area, challenges remain in coordinating and consolidating distribution and supply support within a theater. Improving defense... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has frequently been involved in stability and/or reconstruction operations that typically last 5 to 8 years and surpass combat operations in the cost of human lives and dollars. A 2005 presidential directive requires DOD and State to integrate stability activities with military contingency plans. GAO was asked to address (1) DOD's approach to enhance stability operations capabilities, and challenges that have emerged in implementing its approach; (2) DOD planning for stability operations and the extent of interagency involvement; and (3) the extent to which DOD is applying lessons learned in future plans. To address these issues, GAO assessed DOD policy and planning documents, reviewed planning efforts at three combatant commands, and evaluated DOD's use of lessons learned. GAO is also conducting a related study of the Department of State's efforts to lead and coordinate stability operations. DOD has taken several steps to improve planning for stability operations, but faces challenges in developing capabilities and measures of effectiveness, integrating the contributions of non-DOD agencies into military contingency plans, and incorporating lessons learned into future plans. These challenges may hinder DOD's ability to develop sound plans. Since November 2005, the department issued a new policy, expanded its military planning guidance, and defined a joint operating concept to help guide DOD planning for the next 15-20 years. These steps reflect a fundamental shift in DOD's policy because they elevate stability operations as a core mission comparable to combat operations and emphasize that military and civilian efforts must be integrated. However, DOD has yet to identify and prioritize the full range of capabilities needed for stability operations because DOD has not provided clear guidance on how and when to accomplish this task. As a result, the services are pursuing initiatives to address capability shortfalls that may not reflect the comprehensive set of capabilities that will be needed by combatant commanders to effectively accomplish stability operations in the future. Similarly, DOD has made limited progress in developing measures of effectiveness because of weaknesses in DOD's guidance. DOD is taking steps to develop more comprehensive military plans related to stability operations, but it has not established adequate mechanisms to facilitate and encourage interagency participation in its planning efforts. At the combatant commands, DOD has established working groups with representatives from several key organizations, but these groups and other outreach efforts by the commanders have had limited effect. Three factors cause this limited and inconsistent interagency participation in DOD's planning process: (1) DOD has not provided specific guidance to commanders on how to integrate planning with non-DOD organizations, (2) DOD practices inhibit sharing of planning... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendation to establish fleet readiness centers was expected to yield more savings than any other of the 2005 BRAC recommendations. To achieve these savings the Navy plans to integrate civilian depot personnel to complete some repairs at intermediate maintenance departments to reduce aviation maintenance costs. This report, prepared under the Comptroller General authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, is one in a series of reports related to the 2005 BRAC recommendations. GAO's objectives were to (1) analyze the reasons for changes in costs and savings estimates since the recommendation was approved, and (2) identify challenges in implementing this BRAC recommendation. GAO analyzed Navy and BRAC Commission costs and savings estimates and interviewed officials at the Naval Air Systems Command and at three fleet readiness centers. The Navy has increased onetime costs, decreased onetime savings and increased annual recurring savings expected from the fleet readiness centers recommendation, but GAO believes the savings are likely overstated. In preparing a detailed business plan for implementing the recommendation, the Navy increased onetime costs by $31 million or 96 percent because of costs associated with relocating employees and inflation. The Navy also decreased expected onetime savings from reduced inventory levels by $594 million or 92 percent because Navy officials believed earlier estimates were too optimistic. GAO's analysis of inventory levels for a sample of aviation items indicates that the majority of the revised savings estimate will not occur during the 6-year BRAC implementation period and the amount of such savings are uncertain at this time. GAO believes the annual recurring savings are overstated by about $53 million or 15 percent because the Navy's estimate includes $28 million in savings from eliminating military personnel, which may be assigned elsewhere rather than taken out of the force structure, and $25 million in onetime savings that was erroneously reported as recurring savings. While projected savings would remain substantial, they are still subject to some uncertainties and further efforts will be required to assess actual savings as this recommendation is implemented. The Navy faces challenges in ensuring projected savings are realized and faces some workforce challenges in implementing the recommendation. Since the Navy has already included projected BRAC savings in its budget for fiscal years 2007 through 2011, it will be important for the Navy to monitor the extent to which these savings are actually achieved to prevent adverse affects on naval aviation readiness or the need for additional funding. The Navy also faces workforce challenges, such as identifying and moving about 150 depot artisans with the right skills to various intermediate maintenance departments and integrating a primarily civilian depot workforce with the military... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the Air Force, the Kaiserslautern Military Community Center (KMCC), an over 800,000 square-foot facility, is currently the Department of Defense's largest single-facility project under construction. It is intended to provide lodging, dining, shopping, and entertainment for thousands of U.S. military and civilian personnel and their families in the Kaiserslautern, Germany, area. Initial costs for the KMCC were estimated at about $150 million, with funding coming from a variety of appropriated and nonappropriated fund sources. The construction for the project, which began in late 2003, was originally scheduled to be completed in early 2006. This testimony discusses GAO findings to date related to the KMCC. The testimony describes (1) current problems facing the KMCC, (2) causes for identified problems, and (3) the effect of problems identified and their implications for future projects in Germany. To address our objectives, we interviewed officials from the U.S. Air Force, Army and Air Force Exchange Service, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and German government. We also conducted a site visit and reviewed relevant KMCC documents. We plan to continue our work and make recommendations to the Air Force as appropriate. The KMCC project has encountered cost, schedule, and performance problems. Currently neither Landesbetrieb Liegenschafts- und baubetreuung's office in Kaiserslautern (LBB-Kaiserslautern), the German government construction agency in charge of the project, nor the Air Force have a reliable estimated completion date or final cost for the project. Problems facing KMCC include construction flaws, vandalism of property, repeated work stoppages and slowdowns by contractors, and ongoing criminal investigations. Because of financial problems facing the project, the number of workers on-site has dwindled from several hundred to less than 50, which will likely further delay completion of the project. In addition, the KMCC's multimillion dollar "green" roof is experiencing water leaks, and will likely require the Air Force to spend millions of dollars for its replacement. The KMCC faced a high level of risk from its inception, which was not effectively mitigated by the Air Force. Increased risks included an overseas project controlled by LBB-Kaiserslautern with financial risks borne by the Air Force and its funding partners. Unfortunately, LBB-Kaiserslautern did not effectively manage the design and construction of the project. Rather than increase controls to mitigate project risks, the Air Force provided minimal oversight and in some cases circumvented controls to expedite the invoice payment process in an attempt to complete the project. Because this project is funded primarily with nonappropriated funds, the likely substantial cost increases in the project will be borne by military servicemembers, civilians and their families. Further, absent better Air Force controls, future projects may experience the same types... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Special Operations Command's (SOCOM) duties have greatly increased since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Today, Special Operations Forces are at work in Afghanistan and Iraq, and SOCOM has been assigned to lead U.S. efforts in the Global War on Terrorism. SOCOM's acquisitions budget has also greatly increased in this period--more than doubling from $788 million in 2001 to approximately $1.91 billion in 2006. In light of SOCOM's expanded duties, Congress requested that GAO review SOCOM's management of its acquisition programs. GAO's evaluation includes an assessment of: the types of acquisition programs SOCOM has undertaken since 2001 and whether the programs are consistent with its mission; the extent to which SOCOM's programs have progressed as planned; and the challenges SOCOM faces in managing its acquisition programs. SOCOM has undertaken a diverse set of acquisition programs that are consistent with the command's mission to provide equipment that addresses the unique needs of the Special Operations Forces. SOCOM has committed to spend about $6 billion on these programs. About 88 percent of the programs are relatively small, have short acquisition cycles, and use modified commercial off-the-shelf and nondevelopmental items or modify existing service equipment and assets. SOCOM's acquisition plans--as reflected in its current 5-year plan--continue to focus on relatively small-scale, short-cycle programs with modest development efforts. Overall, SOCOM's acquisition program performance has been mixed. About 60 percent of the acquisition programs SOCOM has undertaken since 2001 have progressed as planned, staying within the original cost and schedule estimates. Included in this grouping are programs that had cost increases because of the need to buy additional quantities of equipment for ongoing combat operations. The other 40 percent of SOCOM's acquisition programs have not progressed as planned and experienced modest to, in a small number of cases, significant cost increases and schedule delays because of a range of technical and programmatic issues. Although fewer in number, the programs that experienced problems comprise about 50 percent of acquisition funding because they tend to be the larger and costlier, platform-based programs that SOCOM is acquiring and those where SOCOM depends on one of the military departments for equipment and program management support. SOCOM faces management and workforce challenges to ensure its acquisition programs are consistently completed on time and within budget. Urgent requirements to support SOCOM's ongoing combat missions have and will continue to challenge SOCOM's ability to balance near- and long- term needs against available funding resources. In addition, SOCOM has difficulty tracking progress on programs where it has delegated management authority to one of the military departments and has not consistently applied a knowledge-based acquisition approach in executing programs,... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, a number of reports and newspaper articles have cited concerns regarding the level of protection and the available amounts of body armor to protect deployed service members. As part of GAO's efforts to monitor the Department of Defense's (DOD) and the services' action to protect ground forces, GAO reviewed the Army and Marine Corps's actions to address these concerns. On April 26, 2007, GAO issued a report regarding the Army and the Marine Corps's individual body armor systems. Today's testimony summarizes the report's findings regarding the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps (1) have met the theater requirements for body armor, (2) have the controls in place to assure that the manufacturing and fielding of body armor meet requirements, and (3) have shared information regarding their efforts on body armor ballistic requirements and testing. The report also included additional information concerning whether contractors or non-DOD civilians obtain body armor in the same way as U.S. forces and DOD civilians given the number of contractors and non-DOD civilians in Central Command's (CENTCOM) area of operation. GAO did not make recommendations in the report. DOD officials did not provide written comments on the report but technical comments were incorporated as appropriate. Army and Marine Corps body armor currently meets theater ballistic requirements and the required amount needed for personnel in theater, including the amounts needed for the surge of troops into Iraq. The Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) consists of an outer tactical vest with ballistic inserts or plates that cover the front, back, and sides. The vest and inserts currently meet the theater ballistic requirements. The vest provides protection from 9mm rounds, while the inserts provide protection against 7.62mm armor-piercing rounds. CENTCOM requires that all U.S. military forces and all DOD civilians in the area of operations receive the body armor system. Currently, service members receive all service-specific standard components of the body armor system prior to deploying. The Army and the Marine Corps provide the DOD civilians with components of the armor system. The Army and Marine Corps have controls in place during manufacturing and after fielding to assure that body armor meets requirements. Both services conduct quality and ballistic testing prior to fielding, and lots (a grouping of items varying in number) are rejected if the standards are not met. They also conduct formal testing on every lot of body armor (vests and protective inserts) prior to acceptance and issuance to troops. During production, which is done at several sites, the lots of body armor are sent to a National Institute of Justice-certified laboratory for ballistic testing and to the Defense Contract Management Agency for quality testing (size, weight, stitching) prior to issuance to troops. Although not required to do so, after the systems have been used in the field,... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Department of Defense (DOD) built the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center located near Colorado Springs, Colorado, in the early 1960s to withstand a multimegaton-yield-weapon strike and to provide protection against chemical and biological warfare. The mission of the Cheyenne Mountain Directorate is to monitor, process, and interpret air, missile, and space events that could threaten North America or have operational effects on U.S. forces or capabilities. This mission is conducted at five major centers--the Command Center, Air Warning, Missile Correlation, Operations Intelligence Watch, and Space Control--all currently located within Cheyenne Mountain. Elements of United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and Air Force Space Command are also located in Cheyenne Mountain. The Air Force's modernization of the attack warning systems within Cheyenne Mountain will cost more than $700 million from fiscal years 2000 through 2006. DOD officials have stated that they no longer need to continue operating in this hardened facility considering that the threat of an intercontinental ballistic missile strike in today's environment is low. In July 2006, the former Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM announced plans to move certain functions from Cheyenne Mountain and create an integrated command center at Peterson Air Force Base, which he projected at that time would save between $150 million and $200 million per year. Additionally, USSTRATCOM announced plans to relocate its missile warning mission from Cheyenne Mountain to Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, and Air Force Space Command is in the process of moving the Space Control Center from Cheyenne Mountain to Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and USNORTHCOM officials told us that after these functions have been moved, Cheyenne Mountain will be used as an alternate command center, a continuity of operations relocation facility, and a training center. You asked us to determine (1) the estimated costs, savings, and benefits associated with moving functions from Cheyenne Mountain to other locations; and (2) how DOD evaluated the security implications associated with moving the functions, and what these implications are. NORAD and USNORTHCOM could not provide documentation to support the $150 million to $200 million savings projected by the former Commander from moving functions from Cheyenne Mountain to Peterson Air Force Base. As of April 2007, NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials have identified at least $41.7 million in onetime costs and $5.5 million in recurring costs related to the move; however, the full costs will not be determined until the completion of ongoing security assessments. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, NORAD and USNORTHCOM allocated $26.7 million for conducting studies, purchasing needed equipment related to the relocation, and renovating the command center at Peterson Air Force Base. Renovation of the command center is... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendations affected 62 percent of the flying units in the Air National Guard (ANG) with 14 units losing their flying mission, and others converting from one type of aircraft to another, or increasing or decreasing assigned aircraft. To implement the recommendations, ANG must relocate hundreds of aircraft and retrain or recruit about 15,000 personnel by 2011. In this report, GAO addresses the status of efforts to implement the ANG BRAC actions. GAO's objectives were to determine (1) the process to provide replacement missions to units losing flying missions, (2) the progress and challenges in implementing the BRAC actions, and (3) changes to the cost and savings estimates. This report, prepared under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, is one in a series of reports related to 2005 BRAC recommendations. GAO conducted its work at the Air Force, ANG headquarters, and in 11 states affected by BRAC 2005 Through a consultative process that involved key stakeholders, the Air Force identified and ANG assigned 30 replacement missions for affected units that supported either the future force structure or the National Guard goal to maximize flying missions. On the basis of consultation with its major commands and the combatant commanders, the Air Force developed a prioritized list of potential mission areas for ANG, but let ANG, with input from state leadership, decide which missions to assign to specific units. ANG assigned affected units 23 missions from the prioritized list. ANG also assigned 7 new flying missions to affected units on the basis of its leadership goal to have at least 1 flying mission per state and to maximize the number of flying missions where possible. ANG is making progress in planning to implement the BRAC recommendations, but lacks a strategy to address implementation challenges. Without such a strategy, several challenges could delay when some units are able to perform their new missions. ANG has developed programming plans for the BRAC-related actions affecting the ANG and a plan to move hundreds of aircraft. However, ANG faces challenges in managing the timing and sequencing of many actions required to implement BRAC, such as developing manning documents that provide the specific skill mixes required, and in ensuring there is sufficient space in Air Force schools to accommodate personnel requiring training. For example, ANG projects that about 3,000 personnel need to be trained for intelligence missions, but the school can currently accommodate only a portion of this requirement. ANG has worked with the Air Force to develop potential solutions, but these have yet to be fully implemented. There may also be delays in obtaining security clearances for personnel due to the lengthy clearance process. Further, bridge missions have not been identified for some units that will face a gap between old and new missions. ANG also... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Department of Defense (DOD) is experiencing a growing demand for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to provide vital information in support of military operations. Over the next 7 years, DOD plans to invest over $28 billion in existing and new airborne ISR acquisition systems. This represents a marked increase over prior ISR investments. Given the significant investments, GAO was asked to (1) evaluate various ISR platforms for potential synergies and assess their cost and schedule status and the impact of any increases or delays on legacy systems and (2) assess the effectiveness of ISR investment decisions. To assess cost and schedule status, we reviewed programmatic and budget documentation. To evaluate investment decisions, we collected information on system capability, mission, and concept of operation and analyzed the data for similarities. DOD plans to invest over $28 billion over the next 7 years to develop, procure, and modernize 20 major airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems. Nearly all of the systems in development have experienced cost growth or schedule delays. These problems have delayed the fielding of a warfighting capability and have resulted in program restructuring, cancellation, or unplanned investments in older legacy ISR systems. For example, problems in developing the Aerial Common Sensor affected three legacy programs, increasing their collective budgets by 185 percent, or nearly $900 million. In many cases, GAO found that the newer ISR programs lacked a solid business case or a knowledge-based acquisition strategy before entering the development process. A good business case requires the manager to match the system requirements with mature technologies and a system design that can be built. This requires sufficient knowledge about the system gained through basic system engineering concepts and practices. Although it fights jointly, DOD does not always procure new systems jointly. Instead, each service typically develops and procures systems independently. Opportunities exist for different services to collaborate on the development of similar weapon systems as a means for creating a more efficient and affordable way of providing new capabilities to the warfighter. GAO identified development programs where program managers and services are working together to gain these efficiencies and other programs that have less collaborative efforts and could lead to more costly stovepiped solutions. For example, the Navy and Army have collaborated successfully on the Fire Scout, but in contrast, the Air Force and Army have not been as collaborative on the Predator and Warrior systems, as they each currently plan unique solutions to their similar needs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In March 2003, a U.S.-led multinational force began operations in Iraq. At that time, 48 nations, identified as a "coalition of the willing," offered political, military, and financial support for U.S. efforts in Iraq, with 38 nations other than the United States providing troops. In addition, international donors met in Madrid in October 2003 to pledge funding for the reconstruction of Iraq's infrastructure, which had deteriorated after multiple wars and decades of neglect under the previous regime. This testimony discusses (1) the troop commitments other countries have made to operations in Iraq, (2) the funding the United States has provided to support other countries' participation in the multinational force, and (3) the financial support international donors have provided to Iraq reconstruction efforts. This testimony is based on GAO's prior work and data collected for this hearing. Although we reviewed both classified and unclassified documents, the information in this statement is based only on unclassified documents. We completed this work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. As of May 2007, 25 countries were contributing 12,600 troops to multinational forces in Iraq. Compared with 145,000 U.S. troops, coalition countries represent about 8 percent of multinational forces in Iraq. From December 2003 through May 2007, the number of coalition troops decreased from 24,000 to 12,600; the number of coalition nations contributing troops decreased from 33 to 25. The United Kingdom, Poland, and Republic of Korea are responsible for leading operations in three of seven security sectors in Iraq. In addition, coalition troops have performed humanitarian, medical, and reconstruction missions. Some have provided combat capabilities, such as infantry and explosive ordinance capabilities. The United States has spent about $1.5 billion to transport, sustain, and provide other services for military troops from 20 countries other than the United States and Iraq. The United States used about $1 billion of the $1.5 billion to feed, house, and equip these countries. In terms of allocation by country, about $988 million, or 66 percent, was used to support Poland and the countries under its command, and $300 million, or 20 percent, supported Jordan for border operations and other activities. In addition to support for operations in Iraq, the United States, through the State Department, has provided about $1.9 billion in security assistance for military training and equipment to 10 coalition members and Jordan since 2003. As of April 2007, international donors had pledged about $14.9 billion for reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Some countries exceeded their pledges by an additional $744 million for a total of $15.6 billion. About $11 billion, or 70 percent, of these pledges are loans, with the remaining $4.6 billion in the form of grants. As of April 2007, Iraq had accessed about $436 million in loans and $3 billion in grants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since combat operations began in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have been subjected to frequent and deadly attacks from insurgents using various weapons such as improvised explosive devices (IED), mortars, rocket launchers, and increasingly lethal ballistic threats. Since 2003, to provide protection from ballistic threats, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which is responsible for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and other areas, has required service members and Department of Defense (DOD) civilians in its area of operations to be issued the Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) system. Used by all U.S. military service members and DOD civilians in the area of operations, the IBA consists of an outer tactical vest with ballistic inserts or plates that cover the front, back, and sides. As the ballistic threat has evolved, ballistic requirements have also changed. The vest currently provides protection from 9mm rounds, while the inserts provide protection against 7.62mm armor-piercing rounds. Additional protection can also be provided for the shoulder, throat, and groin areas. Concerns also regarding the level of protection and amount of IBA needed to protect U.S. forces have occurred in recent years, prompted by a number of reports, newspaper articles, and recalls of issued body armor by both the Army and the Marine Corps. In May 2005, the Marine Corps recalled body armor because it concluded that the fielded body armor failed to meet contract specifications, and in November 2005, the Army and Marine Corps recalled 14 lots of body armor that failed original ballistic testing. Additionally, in April 2005, we reported on shortages of critical force protection items, including individual body armor. Specifically, we found reasons for the shortages in body armor were due to material shortages, production limitations, and in-theater distribution problems. In the report, we did not make specific recommendations regarding body armor, but we did make several recommendations to improve the effectiveness of DOD's supply system in supporting deployed forces for contingencies. DOD agreed with the intent of the recommendations and cited actions it had or was taking to eliminate supply chain deficiencies. Congress has expressed strong interest in assuring that body armor protects ground forces. Additionally, as part of our efforts to monitor DOD's and the services' actions to protect deployed ground forces, we reviewed the Army and Marine Corps's actions to address concerns regarding body armor to determine if they had taken actions to address these concerns. Because of broad congressional interest in the adequacy of body armor for the ground forces, we prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. Our objectives for this review were to determine to what extent the Army and Marine Corps (1) are meeting the theater requirements for body armor, (2) have the controls in place to assure that the... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At a time when U.S. military forces and their equipment are in high demand, effective management of the Department of Defense's (DOD) inventory is critical to ensure that the warfighter has the right items at the right time. The Air Force is the largest contributor to DOD's total on-hand inventory on the basis of inventory value. Under the statutory authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, GAO determined the extent to which (1) the Air Force's on-order and on-hand inventory reflect the amount of inventory needed to support required inventory levels from fiscal years 2002 through 2005, and (2) the Air Force had shortages in its inventory needed to support required levels during this period. To address these objectives GAO analyzed Air Force secondary inventory data (spare parts such as engines and guided missiles) from fiscal years 2002 through 2005. More than half of the Air Force's secondary inventory (spare parts), worth an average of $31.4 billion, was not needed to support required on-hand and on-order inventory levels from fiscal years 2002 through 2005, although increased demand due to ongoing military operations contributed to slight reductions in the percentage of inventory on hand and the number of years of supply it represents. DOD regulations provide guidance for developing materiel requirements based on customer expectations while minimizing inventories. However, the value of Air Force on-order inventory not needed to support required inventory levels increased by about 7.8 percent, representing an average of 52 percent ($1.3 billion) of its on-order inventory. The Air Force has continued to purchase unneeded on-order inventory because its policies do not provide incentives to reduce the amount of inventory on order that is not needed to support requirements. When the Air Force buys these items it may obligate funds unnecessarily, which could lead to not having sufficient obligation authority to purchase needed items and could negatively impact readiness. In addition, although the percentage of the Air Force on-hand inventory was reduced by 2.7 percent due to increases in demand, about 65 percent ($18.7 billion) of this inventory was not needed to support required inventory levels. GAO calculated that it costs the Air Force from $15 million to $30 million annually to store its unneeded items. Of the Air Force's inventory items not needed to support required inventory levels, 79 percent had no recurring demands (such as engines and airframe components), resulting in a potentially infinite supply of those items. The Air Force has continued to retain this unneeded inventory with no recurring demands, in part, because the Air Force has not performed a comprehensive assessment to revalidate the need to continue to retain these items. For the remaining 21 percent of items that had recurring demands, increasing demands resulted in a reduction in the number of years of supply that... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In light of the broad congressional interest in Iraq, we have undertaken this engagement under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations at his own initiative to provide information on the status and challenges of developing Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) support capabilities. Specifically, our objectives were to determine (1) the current state of the logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense; and (2) the current state of the logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities of the Ministry of Interior. Additionally, during the course of our work Coalition officials provided us with information on the status of coordination and communication between and within the ministries. On March 7, 2007, we issued a classified report to Congress containing our preliminary observations. This report is the unclassified version of that classified report. Certain specific information and data about the current state of ISF's logistical, command and control and intelligence capabilities was classified as secret. On March 9, 2007, we testified before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, on the development of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior's logistical capabilities for the Iraqi army and police. We expect to provide a follow-up report later that will examine in more detail the progress in the development of these capabilities, the level of U.S. support being provided to the ISF, and the linkage between the development of the ISF's support capabilities and the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq. This report is one of a series of products that GAO has produced since June 2004 addressing the security situation in Iraq and Iraqi security forces. Progress has been made in developing the logistics and command and control capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD). For example, there is a logistical concept in place for the MOD, and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) is fielding many of the units required by the concept. Furthermore, the Coalition and MOD have established a training base at Taji, where Iraqi logistical and communications specialists are being trained. However, significant challenges remain in order for the MOD to achieve self-sufficiency. For example, although the ministry has a logistical concept, implementing that concept is hampered by a lag in the development of national and regional logistics centers, impediments to training of Iraqi logisticians and mechanics, and maintenance shortfalls. Similarly, the establishment of a command and control capability in the MOD faces training challenges as well as a shortage of military leadership; the lack of a communications doctrine; and the lack of clearly defined policies and procedures at the ministerial level have further undermined efforts to develop this capability. Progress has also been made toward developing... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In November 2005, the President issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. According to the strategy, victory will be achieved when Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terror. To help Iraq achieve this, the U.S. is, among other efforts, helping strengthen the capabilities of the Iraq Ministries of Defense and Interior (police forces) so they can assume greater responsibility for the country's security. The United States has provided about $15.4 billion to develop Iraqi security forces and institutions. In this testimony, GAO discusses preliminary observations on (1) U.S. and Iraqi funding to develop and sustain the Iraqi security forces, and (2) key challenges the United States and Iraq face in improving the security ministries' operations and management. This statement is based on prior GAO reports, recent fieldwork in Iraq and Department of Defense, U.S. Treasury and Embassy budget documents. GAO added information to this statement in response to comments from Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq. We completed the work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In March 2007, DOD reported that Iraq will increase its 2007 security budget from $5.4 billion to $7.3 billion (a 37-percent increase). DOD states this increase provides evidence of the country's growing self-sufficiency and commitment to security. However, our analysis shows that some of this increase is due to the appreciation of the Iraqi dinar against the dollar. Using a constant exchange rate, Iraq's 2007 security budget grows by 15 percent. Also, Iraq faced problems spending its 2006 security budget. As of November 2006, the Iraq Ministry of Defense had spent only about 1 percent of its capital goods budget for weapons, ammunition, and vehicles. DOD has requested $5.8 billion in additional U.S. funds to help purchase these items for Iraq and provide assistance to its security ministries. The United States and Iraq face personnel and logistical challenges in developing ministries that can sustain Iraq's growing security forces. For example, the ministries have inadequate systems to account for personnel and inexperienced staff with limited budgeting and technology skills. Also, both security ministries have difficulties acquiring, distributing, and maintaining weapons, vehicles, and equipment. The U.S.-led coalition has provided significant resources to develop Iraq's security forces and has 215 military and civilian advisors at the ministries. The United States signed a foreign military sales agreement with Iraq that, according to U.S. officials, allows Iraq to bypass its ineffective procurement systems to purchase equipment directly from the United States. Iraq has deposited $1.9 billion into its account for foreign military sales. However, it is unclear whether this program will help improve the ministries' procurement and... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

GAO is releasing a report today on lessons learned concerning the need for security over conventional munitions storage sites which provides the basis for this testimony. Following the invasion of Iraq in March 2003--known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)--concerns were raised about how the Department of Defense (DOD) secured Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites during and after major combat operations. This testimony addresses (1) the security provided by U.S. forces over Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites and (2) DOD actions to mitigate risks associated with an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites for future operations on the basis of OIF lessons learned. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed OIF war plans, joint doctrine and policy, intelligence reports, and interviewed senior-level DOD officials. The overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq combined with certain prewar planning assumptions that proved to be invalid, resulted in U.S. forces not adequately securing these sites and widespread looting, according to field unit, lessons learned, and intelligence reports. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq's conventional munitions varied significantly, with the higher estimate being 5 times greater than the lower estimate. Conventional munitions storage sites were looted after major combat operations and some remained vulnerable as of October 2006. According to lessons learned reports and senior-level DOD officials, the widespread looting occurred because DOD had insufficient troop levels to secure conventional munitions storage sites due to several OIF planning priorities and assumptions. DOD's OIF planning priorities included quickly taking Baghdad on a surprise basis rather than using an overwhelming force. The plan also assumed that the regular Iraqi army units would "capitulate and provide internal security." According to an Army lessons learned study, this assumption was central to the decision to limit the amount of combat power deployed to Iraq. GAO analysis showed that the war plan did not document risk mitigation strategies in case assumptions were proven wrong. Furthermore, DOD did not have a centrally managed program for the disposition of enemy munitions until August 2003, after widespread looting had already occurred. According to officials from Multi-National Coalition-Iraq, unsecured conventional munitions continue to pose a threat to U.S. forces and others. Not securing these conventional munitions storage sites has been costly, as government reports indicated that looted munitions are being used to make improvised explosive devices (IED) that have killed or maimed many people, and will likely continue to support terrorist attacks in the region. As of October 2006, the Multi-National Coalition-Iraq stated that some remote sites have not been revisited to verify if they pose any residual risk nor have they been physically secured. DOD has taken many actions in... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the invasion of Iraq in March 2003--known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)--concerns were raised about how the Department of Defense (DOD) secured Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites during and after major combat operations. Because of the broad interest in this issue, GAO conducted this work under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations. This report examines (1) the security provided by U.S. forces over Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites and (2) DOD actions to mitigate risks associated with an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites for future operations on the basis of OIF lessons learned. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed OIF war plans, joint doctrine and policy, and intelligence reports, and interviewed senior-level DOD officials. The overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq, combined with certain prewar planning assumptions that proved to be invalid, resulted in U.S. forces not adequately securing these sites and widespread looting, according to field unit, lessons learned, and intelligence reports. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq's conventional munitions varied significantly, with the higher estimate being five times greater than the lower estimate. Conventional munitions storage sites were looted after major combat operations and some remained vulnerable as of October 2006. According to lessons learned reports and senior-level DOD officials, the widespread looting occurred because DOD had insufficient troop levels to secure conventional munitions storage sites due to several OIF planning priorities and assumptions. DOD's OIF planning priorities included quickly taking Baghdad on a surprise basis rather than using an overwhelming force. The plan also assumed that the regular Iraqi army units would "capitulate and provide internal security." GAO analysis showed that the war plan did not document risk mitigation strategies--such as branch plans as recommended by joint planning doctrine--in case assumptions were proven wrong. Not securing these conventional munitions storage sites has been costly, as government reports indicated that looted munitions are being used to make Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) that have killed or maimed many people, and will likely continue to support terrorist attacks in the region. As of October 2006, the Multi-National Coalition-Iraq stated that some remote sites have not been revisited to verify if they pose any residual risk nor have they been physically secured. However, DOD does not appear to have conducted a theaterwide survey and assessment of the current risk unsecured conventional munitions represent to U.S. forces and others. DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, such as setting up the Joint IED Defeat Organization to develop a more strategic approach to countering IEDs, which typically are made using looted munitions. However, our review of DOD doctrine, policy,... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, issued in November 2005, implies a conditions-based linkage between the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the size and shape of the U.S. presence there. The Department of Defense (DOD) reported to Congress in November 2006 that although the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior had about 323,000 trained and equipped forces, there was a serious shortcoming for both Ministries in the planning and executing of their logistics and sustainment requirements. According to DOD, without a developed logistical system the ISF will require continued Coalition support. Today's testimony addresses (1) the current state of the ISF's logistical capabilities, and (2) the challenges the ISF is facing to achieve logistical self-sufficiency. This testimony contains unclassified portions of a classified report that was issued on March 7, 2007. GAO's preliminary observations are based on audit work performed from January 2006 through March 2007. Although the Ministry of Defense has an approved logistics concept in place, the implementation of that concept has been hampered by numerous challenges. For example, the development of national and regional logistics centers has lagged behind the development of other logistics formations because of manpower shortages, security issues, inadequate fuel stocks, poor maintenance, and funding procurement issues. DOD has asked for a total of $339.2 million to build and develop maintenance, warehouse, and base support facilities at the National Depot and for $73 million to build and outfit 58 dining facilities on Garrison Support Units and Regional Support Units. Coalition logisticians have emphasized to us that the development of all echelons of logistics units is crucial in order for the Ministry of Defense to become capable of independently sustaining its forces. Furthermore, the policies and procedures intended to guide implementation of the logistics concept have not been effectively distributed. In addition, the training of Iraqi logisticians and mechanics has been hindered by an insufficiency in the supply of Arabic-literate students, of fuel needed to power generators, and of cadre qualified to serve as faculty at the logistics schools. Finally, maintenance of the vehicle fleet poses challenges because of its diversity, the shortage of trained mechanics, and the Ministry's failure to budget for and maintain an authorized stockage level for equipment. As of December 2006, the Ministry of Interior has not approved the draft logistics concept that has been proposed by the Coalition. The reason for this is unclear. What is clear, however, is that since the summer of 2006, the Ministry has experienced significant challenges in its warehousing and supply, and maintenance activities. For instance, in July 2006, the Coalition was procuring and distributing equipment, vehicles, and weapons for the Ministry, in addition to funding a contractor to... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq articulates the desired end-state for U.S. operations in Iraq: a peaceful, united, stable, and secure Iraq, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism. Developing capable Iraqi security forces is a critical component in U.S. efforts to achieve this important goal. Since 2003, the United States has provided $15.4 billion to develop Iraqi military and police forces. DOD has also asked for an additional $5.8 billion in its fiscal year 2007 supplemental request and fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror budget request to continue U.S. efforts to develop Iraq forces and transition security responsibilities to them. This testimony discusses the (1) results of U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi security forces, and (2) factors that affect the development of effective Iraqi security forces. This testimony is based on GAO's issued reports and ongoing work on U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq. Although we reviewed both classified and unclassified documents, the information in this statement is based only on unclassified documents. As of February 2007, DOD reported that it had trained and equipped 327,000 Iraqi security forces--a substantial increase from the 142,000 reported in March 2005. The Iraqi security force level is double that of the 153,000-strong U.S.-led coalition currently in Iraq. While the Iraqi security forces are increasingly leading counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, they and the coalition have been unable to reduce the levels of violence throughout Iraq. Enemy-initiated attacks per day have increased from about 70 in January 2006 to about 160 in December 2006. Several factors affect the development of effective Iraqi security forces and help explain why the reported growth in Iraqi security forces has not decreased violence. First, the Iraqi security forces are not a single unified force with a primary mission of countering the insurgency in Iraq. About 40 percent of the Iraqi security forces have a primary mission of counterinsurgency--specifically, the Iraqi army. The other major component--the Iraqi police--has civilian law enforcement as its primary mission. Second, high rates of absenteeism and poor ministry reporting result in an overstatement of the number of Iraqi security forces present for duty. The Ministry of the Interior does not maintain standardized reports on personnel strength. As a result, DOD does not know how many coalition-trained police the ministry still employs or what percentage of the 180,000 police thought to be on the payroll are coalition trained and equipped. Third, sectarian and militia influences have divided the loyalties of Iraqi security forces. In November 2006, for example, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency stated that the Ministry of Interior and the police were heavily infiltrated by militia members of the Badr Organization and Mahdi Army. According to the 2007 National... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) is a key Department of Defense (DOD) support organization that, among other things, generates reports for defense organizations such as the military services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff. External organizations such as GAO and federally funded research and development centers also rely on DMDC for quantitative data and analyses pertaining to a wide variety of issues, including the numbers of DOD personnel in specified occupations or demographic groups, servicemembers' attitudes, and compensation. DMDC reports to DOD's Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. In describing its databases, DMDC states that it maintains the largest archive of personnel, manpower, training, and financial data in DOD. It also notes that the personnel data are broad in scope and extend back to the early 1970s covering all services, all components of the total force (active duty, guard, reserve, and civilian), and all phases of the personnel life cycle (accession, separation, and retirement). DMDC data serve as the basis for DOD's annual Population Representation in the Military Forces which, among other things, provides information on the numbers of officers who were accessed into the military from each service's various commissioning programs: military academies, Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), Officer Candidate Schools (OCS: for the Army, Navy, and Air Force) and Officer Training School (OTS: for the Air Force). On January 19, 2007, we issued a report on officer accessions, retention, and foreign language training. The purpose of this report is to bring to your attention reliability issues with DMDC data that we encountered while preparing our report and to provide you with our recommendations to address these issues. We found the information that DMDC provided to us on the number of officers accessed from DOD's various commissioning programs to be insufficiently reliable for use in our January 2007 report. Government auditing standards, which are applicable to all federal agencies including DOD, require that data be valid and reliable when the data are significant to the auditor's findings. More specifically, federal internal control standards require that data control activities, such as edit checks, verification, and reconciliation, be conducted and documented to help provide reasonable assurance that agency objectives are being met. We found discrepancies when we compared the DMDC-provided information on the number of officers accessed from DOD's commissioning programs (the academies, ROTC, and OCS/OTS) to information provided by the services. In the most extreme example of a discrepancy, DMDC-provided information indicated that 17 officers were accessed from the Marine Corps' ROTC program in fiscal year 2005, but Marine Corps-supplied information indicated that 160 officers were assessed. DMDC also provided us with information on the... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

GAO has identified the Department of Defense's (DOD) management of its inventory as a high-risk area since 1990 due to ineffective and inefficient inventory systems and practices. Management of inventory acquisition lead times is important in maintaining cost-effective inventories, budgeting, and having material available when needed, as lead times are DOD's best estimate of when an item will be received. Under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, GAO analyzed the extent to which (1) DOD's estimated lead times varied from actual lead times, and (2) current management actions and initiatives have reduced lead times as compared to past years. To address these objectives, GAO computed the difference between the components' actual and estimated lead times, and compared component initiatives to reduce lead times for 1994-2002 to 2002-2005. The military components' estimated lead times to acquire spare parts varied considerably from the actual lead times experienced. The effect of the lead time underestimates was almost $12 billion in spare parts arriving more than 90 days later than anticipated, which could negatively affect readiness rates because units may not have needed inventory. If orders had been placed earlier, readiness rates could potentially have been improved. While having spare parts arrive earlier than estimated could potentially improve readiness, the effect of lead time overestimates resulted in obligating almost $2 billion more than 90 days earlier than necessary. The Army underestimated lead times, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) overestimated lead times, and the Air Force and Navy both overestimated and underestimated lead times. The variances were due to problems such as miscoding late deliveries as not representative of future delivery times, lack of recorded lead time data, data input errors, estimates that did not reflect improvements made in actual lead times, and the use of standard default data instead of other data that may have been obtainable. Absent actions to address these problems, lead time estimates will continue to vary from actual lead times and will contribute to inefficient use of funds and potential shortages or excesses. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) and the components' actions and initiatives to reduce lead times from 2002 to 2005 were less effective overall than previous efforts from 1994 to 2002. From 2002 to 2005, DOD-wide lead times were reduced by an average of 0.9 percent annually as compared to an average reduction of 5.6 percent annually from 1994 to 2002, potentially leading to an additional $2.7 billion in lead time requirements, tying up money that could have been obligated for other needs. The higher rate of reduction from 1994 to 2002 can be attributed to three areas of focus: streamlining internal administrative processes, oversight from USD (AT&L), and developing strategic... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accessing and retaining high-quality officers in the current environment of increasing deployments and armed conflict may be two of the all volunteer force's greatest challenges. The military services use three programs to access officer candidates: (1) military academies, (2) the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), and (3) Officer Candidate Schools (OCS). In addition to accessing new officers, the services must retain enough experienced officers to meet current operational needs and the services' transformation initiatives. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which the services are accessing and retaining the officers required to meet their needs. GAO also identified steps that the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services have taken and the impediments they face in increasing officers' foreign language proficiency. For this report, GAO examined actual accession and retention rates for officers in fiscal years (FYs) 2001, 2003, and 2005 as well as projections for later years. Also, GAO reviewed documents on foreign language training and plans. The services generally met most of their overall accession needs for newly commissioned officers, but the Army faces challenges accessing enough officers to meet its needs. The Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force met their overall FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005 officer accession needs, but are experiencing challenges accessing specific groups, like flight officers and medical professionals. Moreover, the Army did not meet its needs for officers in FY 2001 and FY 2003 and expects to struggle with future accessions. To meet its officer accession needs, the Army's traditional approach has been to rely first on its ROTC and academy programs and then compensate for shortfalls in these programs by increasing its OCS accessions. Between FYs 2001 and 2005, the Army nearly doubled the number of OCS commissioned officers due to (1) academy and ROTC shortfalls, (2) decreased ROTC scholarships, and (3) a need to expand its officer corps. But OCS is expected to reach its capacity in FY 2007, and resource limitations such as housing and classroom space may prevent further expansion. In addition, the Army's three accession programs are decentralized and do not formally coordinate with one another, making it difficult for the Army, using its traditional approach, to effectively manage risks and allocate resources across programs in an integrated, strategic fashion. Without a strategic, integrated plan for determining overall annual accession goals, managing risks, and allocating resources, the Army's ability to meet its future mission requirements and to transform to more deployable, modular units is uncertain. All of the services except the Army generally met their past overall officer retention needs. The Army, which continues to be heavily involved in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, faces many retention challenges. For example, the Army is experiencing a shortfall of mid-level officers,... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the military to operate in environments contaminated by chemical and biological warfare agents, the Department of Defense (DOD) has developed collective protection equipment to provide a protected environment for group activities. GAO previously reported persistent problems in providing collective protection for U.S. forces in high threat areas overseas. In this report, GAO examined (1) current intelligence assessments of chemical and biological threats, (2) the extent to which DOD has provided collective protection at critical overseas facilities and major expeditionary warfighting assets, and (3) DOD's framework for managing installation protection policies and prioritizing critical installations for funding. In conducting this review, GAO developed criteria to identify critical sites in the absence of a DOD priority listing of such sites in overseas high threat areas--areas at high risk of terrorist or missile attack. The intelligence community is struggling with the changing security environment and communicating the uncertainties in the quality of chemical and biological threat information. Generally, the two key chemical and biological threats facing DOD forces are from hostile nations using missiles, or terrorist groups (e.g., Al Qaeda) using devices to release chemical or biological agents. DOD expects these threats to grow. The intelligence community has recognized the need to communicate more candidly about the uncertainties in intelligence regarding the type and amount of agents, the number of missiles likely armed with chemical and biological warheads, and the method of dissemination. Communicating these uncertainties helps in understanding the actual threat posed by our adversaries and in making risk management decisions on investments. However, while the intelligence community, under the Director of National Intelligence, has issued a new 2006 intelligence estimate regarding the uncertainties in the biological warfare threat, it has not issued an update on the chemical warfare threat since 2002 due to evolving assessment and communication policies. Despite the growing threat, collective protection at both critical overseas facilities and in some major expeditionary warfighting assets (e.g., infantry units, naval vessels, and medical units) is limited and inconsistent. Nearly 80 percent of overseas sites identified as critical by combatant commanders based on criteria GAO provided them, did not have collective protection equipment--including about two-thirds of the critical sites in high threat areas. At the same time, GAO found problems such as often vague and inconsistent guidance on the use of collective protection. DOD guidance encourages the use of collective protection but does not prescribe specific standards to guide strategic decisions on its use. Military service guidance, except the Air Force, was also vague and inconsistent on key issues such as (1) whether decisions on the need for the equipment... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Coast Guard's Deepwater program is a 25-year, $24 billion plan to replace or modernize its fleet of vessels and aircraft. While there is widespread acknowledgment that many of the Coast Guard's aging assets need replacement or renovation, concerns exist about the acquisition approach the Coast Guard adopted in launching the Deepwater program. From the outset, GAO has expressed concern about the risks involved with the Coast Guard's acquisition strategy, and continues to review Deepwater program management. This statement discusses (1) the Coast Guard's acquisition approach for the Deepwater program; (2) previous GAO recommendations to the Coast Guard on Deepwater, highlighting the importance of Integrated Product Teams; and (3) operational challenges the Coast Guard is facing because of performance and design problems with Deepwater patrol boats. In 2001, we described the Deepwater project as "risky" due to the unique, untried acquisition strategy for a project of this magnitude within the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard used a system-of-systems approach to replace deteriorating assets with a single, integrated package of aircraft, vessels, and unmanned aerial vehicles. The Coast Guard also used a system integrator--which can give the contractor extensive involvement in requirements development, design, and source selection of major system and subsystem subcontractors. The Deepwater program is also a performance-based acquisition, meaning that it is structured around the results to be achieved rather than the manner in which the work is performed. If performance-based acquisitions are not appropriately planned and structured, there is an increased risk that the government may receive products or services that are over cost estimates, delivered late, and of unacceptable quality. GAO's reported concerns and related recommendations in 2004 and in subsequent assessments in 2005 and 2006 have centered onthree main areas: program management, contractor accountability, and cost control through competition. In the area of program management, GAO's prior work has found that Integrated Product Teams--the Coast Guard's primary tool for managing the program and overseeing the contractor--have struggled to carry out their missions effectively. We have ongoing work reviewing Deepwater implementation and contract oversight and will continue to monitor the Coast Guard's implementation of our recommendations. In addition to these management issues, the Coast Guard is facing operational challenges because of performance and design problems with Deepwater patrol boats. Specifically, problems with the conversion of 110-foot patrol boats to 123-foot patrol boats ultimately led the Coast Guard to suspend all normal operations of its converted 123-foot patrol boats on November 30, 2006; the Coast Guard is now exploring options to address the resulting operational gaps. In February 2006, the Coast Guard suspended design work on the Fast Response Cutter... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. Coast Guard's Deepwater program was designed to upgrade or replace its aging legacy aircraft and vessels with assets focusing on the Coast Guard's traditional at-sea roles. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Coast Guard took on additional security missions, resulting in revisions to the Deepwater plan. GAO's prior work raised concerns about Coast Guard's efforts to upgrade or acquire assets on schedule, and manage and effectively monitor the system integrator. This testimony provides GAO's preliminary observations on (1) events and issues surrounding the Coast Guard's bridging strategy to convert the legacy 110-foot patrol boats to 123-foot patrol boats; (2) the status of the Coast Guard's efforts to acquire new or upgraded Deepwater assets; and (3) the Coast Guard's ability to effectively manage the Deepwater program, hold contractors accountable, and control costs through competition. GAO's preliminary observations are based on audit work performed from August 2006 to February 2007. Numerous events since January 2001 led up to the failure of the Coast Guard's bridging strategy to convert its legacy 110-foot patrol boats into 123-foot patrol boats. These converted boats were removed from service on November 30, 2006 because of operational and safety concerns. According to the Coast Guard Commandant, actions are being taken to mitigate the impact of the removal of these patrol boats on mission activities. For example, patrol hours of some 110-foot patrol boats have been increased through the addition of crews from the 123-foot patrol boats, and other Coast Guard vessels have been deployed to assist in carrying out missions. The delivery record for the 10 classes of upgraded or new Deepwater aircraft and vessels is mixed. Specifically, 7 of the 10 asset classes are on or ahead of schedule. Among these, 5 first-in-class assets have been delivered on or ahead of schedule; 2 others remain on time but their planned delivery dates are in 2009 or beyond; therefore, delays could still potentially occur. Three Deepwater asset classes are currently behind schedule due to various problems related to designs, technology, or funding. For example, the Fast Response Cutter (a new vessel), which had been scheduled for first-in-class delivery in 2007, has been delayed by at least 2 years in part because work on its design was suspended until technical problems can be addressed. From the program's outset, GAO has raised concerns about the risks involved with the Coast Guard's acquisition strategy. In 2004, GAO reported that program management, contractor accountability, and cost control were all challenges, and made recommendations in these areas. Insufficient staffing, ineffective performance measures, and the Coast Guard's lack of knowledge about the extent to which the contractor was using competition have contributed to program risk. The Coast Guard has taken some actions to address these issues. GAO plans to continue... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The high use of the National Guard for federal overseas missions has reduced equipment available for its state-led domestic missions, at the same time it faces an expanded array of threats at home. The massive state-led, federally funded response to Hurricane Katrina illustrates the Guard's important role in responding to the effects of large-scale, multistate events as well as the difficulty of working with multiple state and federal agencies. To address congressional interest in the Guard's domestic preparedness, GAO assessed the extent to which (1) the Guard's domestic equipment requirements have been identified, (2) the Department of Defense (DOD) measures and reports to Congress the equipment readiness of non-deployed Guard forces for domestic missions, and (3) DOD actions address the Guard's domestic equipping challenges. GAO examined the National Guard's plans and equipment status and included case studies in California, Florida, New Jersey, and West Virginia. The types and quantities of equipment the National Guard needs to respond to large-scale terrorist events and natural disasters have not been fully identified because the multiple federal and state agencies that would have roles in responding to such events have not completed and integrated their plans. The Homeland Security Council has developed 15 catastrophic scenarios to guide federal and state governments in planning their response activities. While DOD is responsible for equipping the Guard for its federal missions and states plan for the National Guard's activities within their borders, neither is comprehensively planning for the Guard's role in responding to events like the national planning scenarios that may involve more than one state and be federally funded. Such planning has not been completed primarily because there is no formal mechanism for facilitating planning for the Guard's role in large-scale events. As a liaison between the Army, the Air Force, and the states, the National Guard Bureau is well positioned to facilitate state planning for National Guard forces. The bureau has facilitated some limited interstate planning for multistate events, although neither its charter nor its civil support regulation identifies this activity as its responsibility. Until the bureau's charter and its civil support regulation are revised to define its role in facilitating state planning for multistate events, such planning for the National Guard's role in these events may remain incomplete, and the National Guard may not be prepared to respond as efficiently and effectively as possible. DOD does not routinely measure or report to Congress the equipment readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic missions. DOD's legacy readiness reporting system and its annual National Guard equipping report to Congress address warfighting readiness but do not address the Guard's domestic missions. While DOD has recognized the need for greater visibility over the... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]