1. Third-degree price discrimination versus uniform pricing
- Author
-
Francisco Castro, Gabriel Y. Weintraub, and Dirk Bergemann
- Subjects
FOS: Computer and information sciences ,TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS ,Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory ,Economics and Econometrics ,General Economics (econ.GN) ,Uniform pricing ,TheoryofComputation_GENERAL ,Price discrimination ,Space (commercial competition) ,Profit (economics) ,FOS: Economics and business ,Monotone polygon ,Market segmentation ,Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory ,Economics - Theoretical Economics ,Econometrics ,Economics ,Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) ,Monopoly ,Finance ,Economics - General Economics ,Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) - Abstract
We compare the profit of the optimal third-degree price discrimination policy against a uniform pricing policy. A uniform pricing policy offers the same price to all segments of the market. Our main result establishes that for a broad class of third-degree price discrimination problems with concave profit functions (in the price space) and common support, a uniform price is guaranteed to achieve one half of the optimal monopoly profits. This profit bound holds for any number of segments and prices that the seller might use under third-degree price discrimination. We establish that these conditions are tight and that weakening either common support or concavity can lead to arbitrarily poor profit comparisons even for regular or monotone hazard rate distributions., Comment: 26 pages, 5 figures
- Published
- 2022