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Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions Redux
- Source :
- Games and Economic Behavior. 104:78-91
- Publication Year :
- 2017
- Publisher :
- Elsevier BV, 2017.
-
Abstract
- In this paper, we revisit the two-bidder asymmetric all-pay auction of Amann and Leininger (1996) by allowing interdependent values and correlated signals. Both values and signals are distributed on continuous supports. We provide conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium (MPSE), and constructively characterize the MPSE when it exists. We find that given the marginal distributions of the signals, the equilibrium allocation is solely determined by how bidders' values depend on their signals. In particular, the equilibrium allocation does not depend on how bidders' signals are correlated.
- Subjects :
- TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
Economics and Econometrics
05 social sciences
TheoryofComputation_GENERAL
Redux
Interdependent valuations
Monotone polygon
0502 economics and business
Economics
Common value auction
Uniqueness
050207 economics
Marginal distribution
Mathematical economics
Finance
050205 econometrics
Subjects
Details
- ISSN :
- 08998256
- Volume :
- 104
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi...........1943cac460c41bf0cf331738cbdac66b