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We empirically determine whether a Ricardian or a non-Ricardian regime is more plausible for the euro area, following the research strategy of Canzoneri et al. (Am Econ Rev 91:1221–1238, 2001). A Vector AutoRegressive model for the primary government balance and the government debt is estimated for the period 1980q2–2013q4. Our model uses dummy interaction terms to account for the breaks due to the introduction of the Euro Convergence Criteria (ECC) and the start of the global financial crisis, respectively. No evidence is found in favour of either regime for the pre-ECC period. In the post-ECC period, a Ricardian regime is more plausible. Some evidence points in the direction of a non-Ricardian regime for the period after the start of the financial crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Cyprus debt crisis provides some unique lessons. By the time an assistance program was agreed with the Troika of international lenders, the problem had become so complex that a depositor bail-in was implemented to safeguard financial stability. The bail-in was an ad hoc solution applied for the first time in the eurozone but is now the blueprint for dealing with future banking crises. This paper examines the events for the 18-month period before the two eurogroup meetings on Cyprus in March 2013, and the resolution and restructuring of the two systemic banks of the country with depositor bail-in. We show how delays in dealing with the crisis exacerbated the problem but also how the tools brought into solve the problem had significant unintended consequences that fit the reflexivity principle. Available evidence questions the validity of confidential studies guiding the policy decisions on depositor haircut and supports the argument that the bail-in, as implemented in Cyprus, violated international principles of fairness. We use the analysis to draw some lessons on the use of bail-in for future crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many central banks have lowered their interest rates close to zero in response to the crisis since 2008. In standard monetary models the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint implies the existence of a second steady state in addition to the inflation-targeting steady state. Large scale asset purchases (APP) have been used as a tool for easing of monetary policy in the ZLB regime. I provide a theoretical discussion of these issues using a stylized general equilibrium model in a global nonlinear setting. I also review briefly the empirical literature about effects of APP's. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the standard Taylor rule, fiscal variables are absent and the central bank is assumed to respond in the same way to a given inflation-output gap outlook regardless of the stance of fiscal policy or the outlook for government debt. This paper puts that assumption to the test. Estimating Taylor rules for the ECB using real time data, we find that there is no direct response to the usual instrument of fiscal policy, the cyclical adjusted primary balance. But there is a clear response to the level of debt. Monetary policy tightens by 25 basis points for every 2.5 pp rise in the expected debt to GDP ratio. With ex-post data, we see the opposite: the ECB appears, unfairly since they didn't have the data, to have acted as if it loosened in periods with a forecasted debt build-up (i.e. in recessions), but tightened in response to past fiscal excesses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fiscal cost of the financial and economic crisis in Europe is huge. The paper provides provisional estimates of this cost and looks at its implications for the sustainability of public finances, taking into account also the impact of aging populations. The historical experience suggests that economic growth is persistently lowered in the aftermath of financial crisis, making fiscal consolidation more difficult yet all the more essential. Meanwhile the timing of the exit from fiscal stimulus and subsequent fiscal consolidation must reconcile sustainability and stabilisation goals-a delicate balancing act. The paper will argue in favour of structural reform to boost the economic growth potential alongside fiscal consolidation. The fiscal coordination framework in the EU, together with the Europe 2020 strategy, is seen to underpin this approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the macroeconomic consequences of alternative policy regimes in a closed economy where a central bank, a fiscal authority and a monopoly union interact via their effects on output and inflation. The analysis compares macroeconomic outcomes in a non-cooperative setting, where players may move sequentially or simultaneously, and in a regime of cooperation between the government and wage-setters. The cooperative regime captures a climate of accord among social parties that is finalised at common macroeconomic targets in the tradition of corporatism, as in the recent experience of “social pacts” in many European countries. The paper makes two main contributions. First, it shows that macroeconomic outcomes are suboptimal in the non-cooperative regime and may deliver extreme (undesirable) results even when all players share common ideal targets for output and inflation. All players would be better off with a less extreme value for output or inflation, yet they fail to reach a more advantageous allocation as long as there is an inherent conflict among their further objectives. Moreover, the result is robust to a change in the degree of central bank’s conservatism. Second, I find that cooperation between the government and the monopoly union towards common ideal targets for inflation, output and taxes enhances social welfare even in the absence of explicit coordination with the central bank. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aim of this paper is to assess empirically the sustainability of budgetary policy in Poland in years 1992–2006. Our results show that structural surplus did respond to fiscal shocks in a way that stabilizes debt. However, the debt-stabilizing mechanism relied entirely on the revenue side, while the expenditures moved independently from debt and in a way that is close to non-stationarity. Given numerous bounds on increasing fiscal revenues, such an asymmetric mechanism of ensuring sustainability of Polish public finances is likely to fail if pressure on increasing public expenditures remains high over prolonged periods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper extends a well-known macroeconomic stabilization game between monetary and fiscal authorities developed by Dixit and Lambertini ( American Economic Review 93: 1522–1542) to multiplicative (policy) uncertainty. We find that even if fiscal and monetary authorities share a common output and inflation target (i.e., the symbiosis assumption), the achievement of the common targets is no longer guaranteed; under multiplicative uncertainty, in fact, a time consistency problem arises unless policymakers’ output target is equal to the natural level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines economic policy interactions in the Economic and Monetary Union when the assessment of cyclical conditions in real time is surrounded by uncertainty. On the basis of a simple stylised model it shows that with a Nash-type of interaction different views about the output gap on the side of the policy players—the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the European Central Bank—can give rise to excessive activism with policy players pushing economic variables into opposite directions. It argues that the costs of such policy conflicts can be reduced by agreeing on a common assessment of the cycle, by constraining policy variables, and/or by increasing the weight of fiscally conservative institutions. An alternative option to sidestep policy conflicts ensuing from diverging views of the cycle is to take policy decisions sequentially, as is the case in a Stackelberg-type of interaction. The paper shows that for a given misperception of the cycle, the impact on the policy instruments and on output and inflation are generally smaller in the Stackelberg equilibrium as compared to a Nash outcome. Alternative allocations of roles—that is leader versus follower—are discussed and assessed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is quite often claimed by politicians that a common currency makes it beneficial to be also endowed with a common fiscal policy. However, if fiscal policy can reasonably be considered to be a source of shocks, national fiscal policies which are steered independently from each other are generally preferable because they allow the possibility to diversify macroeconomic risks. Abstracting from automatic stabilizers, this view is valid independent on whether the ECB targets money growth or interest rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper characterizes rules-based fiscal policy setting for G-3 and large EMS countries. We set up a simple fiscal policy rule and then infer on the policymakers’ reaction coefficients by testing with GMM. Our results qualify existing evidence on systematic fiscal policy in two respects. First, fiscal policy usually stabilizes public debt; and there is indeed substantial interaction between fiscal and monetary policies via the policy mix or the debt channel. Second, sustainability is achieved with a “stop–go” cycle of consolidation. Unless debt ratios are high, consolidation does not come at the cost of less cyclical stabilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]