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This paper proposes a re-interpretation of the idea of Body in Nietzsche's philosophy to distinguish it from two important perspectives of Nietzsche-studies in Spanish: The first one maintains that the Body is comparable with Nature, and the second one, states that the Body is a cause of subjectivity. Analyzing part of Nietzsche's work after 1885 --published and unpublished-- shows that the idea of the Body works as a methodology that allows Nietzsche to accomplish a new task of his philosophy, such as the task of self-knowledge. In this way, the Body in Nietzsche's philosophy, besides being an innovative and redeemable concept, is a performative tool that establishes new dimensions "in-between" human knowing and bodily experimentation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central aim of this paper will be to consider the role assigned to the body in contemporary discussions about emotions. I will particularly examine the metaphor of the emotions in the theater of the body, presented by A. Damásio, with the purpose of raising doubts about two dominant models of embodiment of emotions --an externalist or behaviorist and an internal or neurobiological --which remain trapped in several difficulties. So I will reject the general concept of body these models are committed with, and I will suggest an alternative understanding of emotions along the line of a bodily and motor phenomenon. To do that, I will deepen the analysis of the relationship between movement and emotion by considering it under the theoretical framework provided by the Phenomenology of Body developed by M. Merleau-Ponty and his followers. Thus, my alternative proposal will be to take emotions as a bodily performance which can provide us a way to avoid both the dualist and the reductionist standpoint commonly held on emotions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we evaluate the impact of Leibniz’s defense of relativity of motion on his metaphysics. We argue that the abandonment of the absolutist position makes void his first notion of corporeal substance. First, we analyze Leibniz’s conception of body and movement in his youth (1663-1672) and explain how the assumption of absolute motion during these years plays a role in his notion of corporeal substance. Second, we examine his arguments in favor of relativity of motion during the Parisian period (1672-1676) and show the repercussion on his first conception of the corporeal substance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper has two main purposes. First, I recall a relevant methodological reservation that concerns our reading of the Homeric poems (is it right to take one of our modern concepts, namely "body", as point of departure for our study of an ancient text?). Second, I try to explain how something like our common body-mind dualism could emerge from what originally was a single reality (in order to grasp the meaning of a Greek word like phrénes the modern reader would have to put his dualistic language aside in some way); nevertheless, it is also true that in the Homeric poems, especially in the Odyssey, phrénes seems to be one of the names for that peculiar space we would nowadays call "the innerness of the mind or thought". Finally, I suggest that this original single reality is related to Nietzsche's criticism of Metaphysics by means of the reference to the Ancient Greece. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we expose a comparison, regarding differences and coincidences, between the philosophies of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Luc Nancy, focusing in their conceptions of the body, as a central way, in both of them, for an arrival to ontology of existence in the broadest sense. Finally, we evaluate their promises since the perspective of the recent philosophical movement of the new realism (speculative realism or ontological realism) observing in which aspects Merleau-Ponty and Nancy are preparing this movement and in which aspects their philosophies need to be corrected or redefined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]