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The year 2010 witnessed an escalation of tensions on the Korean peninsula through two military crises. The rise in tensions can be explained by neorealism as a shifting distribution of power in the region and a small state preserving its national security. The paper argues that neorealism is not sufficient to explain the patterns and routines of crisis escalation and crisis resumption on the Korean peninsula and the North East Asian region. By focusing on the causes of conflicts neorealism fails to identify the consequences of these inter-state tensions for the evolution of an anarchical society of states in the North East Asian region. The paper provides an alternative interpretation of recent inter-Korean crisis escalation and crisis resolution in the East Asian region through the work of Hedley Bull. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Indo-Pacific region is vital to the emerging countries' geostrategic and geo-maritime strategic competition. It is crucial for Japan's economic, political, and security interests. For the last few years, Japan has been promoting a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy to protect the region free from other countries' dominance and make a balance of power by countering China's hegemony. Despite the growing strategic involvement of Japan in the Indo-Pacific region, some literature focused on the people's perception of Japan. Thus, this study explores the public perception regarding Japan's strategic rise in the Indo-Pacific to fill the knowledge gap. Using a snowball sampling method, we conducted a descriptive cross-national study with 365 individuals in Bangladesh and Thailand. Most participants (88%) agreed that the strategic rise of Japan would promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Besides, they agreed (69.1%) that the FOIP could be the alternative to the Chinese BRI in this region. However, around 52.6% of respondents moderately supported Japan's FOIP and QUAD in the region not to provoke China. Participants in this multi-country research generally expressed optimism about Japan's strategic ascent and its implications for a balanced Indo-Pacific. Therefore, the findings of this study can assist policymakers in gaining a better understanding of public attitudes and preparing for future policy formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Cambodia's backing of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Having explored bilateral historical ties, the author concludes that Cambodia has pursued a bandwagoning policy with China for most of its post-colonial period since 1953. At present, Cambodia's bandwagoning policy with China has been manifested in the former's support of the latter's initiative. It begs a question as to why the kingdom has enthusiastically supported it. The article elucidates the motives behind Cambodia's bandwagoning policy on BRI applying John Spanier's three level of analytical framework. First, on the systemic level, it argues that China's bid to expand its influence, the change of balance of power in Southeast Asia, and the clean competition for influence between China and Japan in the Mekong Region have affected Cambodia's policy decision on the BRI. Second, at the nation-state level of analysis, Cambodia perceives BRI as another funding source of infrastructure projects, and a means to achieve its policy goal of becoming an economic hub in the region and to whip up domestic support of the ruling party. Finally, on the decision-making level, the backing of the BRI may stem from Prime Minister Hun Sen's pragmatic views of how to sustain his rule over the country. He might have viewed that economic growth would help to strengthen his ruling. The analysis concludes by identifying some negative repercussions Cambodia has encountered as a result of her support of the BRI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many middle powers in East Asia-particularly South Korea and Malaysia-are affected by the strategic relationship between the USA (hereafter the USA) and China. Therefore, I would like to examine the strategic behaviors of the middle powers in East Asia from a hedging strategy perspective. The hedging strategy extends the logic of the traditional balance of power theory while maintaining a strong emphasis on structural incentives, which critics have found lacking in the soft balance approach. Most East Asian states have calibrated their security measures and strategies in response to the changing US-China relationship. The purpose of this article is to compare the hedging strategies of South Korea and Malaysia, which are middle powers, that affect the East Asian security order. This article, thus, aims not simply to explain specific instances of the hedging strategies of middle powers but also, based on this theoretical foundation, to establish a new frame of analysis for the hedging strategies of middle powers through objective and critical assessment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a globalized world characterized by direct interactions among states of different capacities, regional relationships must be considered in terms of their broader global context. States cannot change their location; therefore, engagement with neighbors has a particular importance in terms of present relations, historical memories, and future prospects. States are more anxious in a multinodal world because of increased regional and global exposure. However, it would be imprudent for them to act aggressively or to self-isolate because such behavior limits the potential for future beneficial exchange. In a multinodal world, partnerships are more rational than alliances. In East Asia, relationships will be asymmetric as in the past, but they should also be based on sovereign equality and global inclusiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The shift of power engendered by the rise of China will not only change the current international configuration, but will likely lead to a shift of the power centre of the world from Europe to East Asia. Nevertheless, neither the change of the international configuration nor this transfer of the power centre of the world will inevitably bring about the change of the international system. The international system consists of three components including international actors, international configuration and international norms. If a qualitative change of one of these components were treated as a qualitative change of the system, it would not be possible to distinguish the difference between the components and the system nor to determine the relationship between them. A minimum of a qualitative change of at least two components must be observed to be defined as a qualitative change in the system. Because the rise of China is the main engine changing the international configuration, it will be faced with increasing pressure from the system. Thus, China has to adopt a foreign strategy in accordance with its international status and policy for wining more strategic partners and constructing new international norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Seventeenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), held on 15–21 October 2007 in Beijing, produced some interesting changes to the balance of power among different factional groups in Chinese politics. Compared to the balance of power among factional groups generated as a result of the Sixteenth National Congress of the CCP five years earlier, the four major factional groups had different experiences. In terms of power index, the Shanghai Gang, a factional group affiliated with Former General Secretary Jiang Zemin, declined substantially; the Qinghua Clique, graduates of the Qinghua University, also declined significantly; the Princelings, children of former high-ranking officials, however, increased a great deal; and the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) Group, a factional group closely associated with General Secretary Hu Jintao, witnessed substantial expansion. In terms of group cohesion index, both the Shanghai Gang and the Qinghua Clique shrank significantly; the Princelings increased somewhat; and the CCYL Group expanded substantially. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzes three models that explain for the peace in East Asia since the end of the Cold War. Discussion on the notion of geographic balance of power in the region; Examination on the notion of complexity of national interests in the post-Cold War era in the region; Nuclear deterrence in asymmetric power structure; Power relations between China and Russia and Japan and the U.S.; Regional security policy adopted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.