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Startle modulation paradigms, namely habituation and prepulse inhibition (PPI), can offer insight into the brain's early information processing mechanisms that might be impacted by regular meditation practice. Habituation refers to decreasing response to a repeatedly-presented startle stimulus, reflecting its redundancy. PPI refers to response reduction when a startling stimulus "pulse" is preceded by a weaker sensory stimulus "prepulse" and provides an operational measure of sensorimotor gating. Here, we examined habituation and PPI of the acoustic startle response in regular meditators (n = 32), relative to meditation-naïve individuals (n = 36). Overall, there was no significant difference between meditators and non-meditators in habituation or PPI, but there was significantly greater PPI in meditators who self-reported being able to enter and sustain non-dual awareness during their meditation practice (n = 18) relative to those who could not (n = 14). Together, these findings suggest that subjective differences in meditation experience may be associated with differential sensory processing characteristics in meditators., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2024 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

The level-of-processing (LoP) hypothesis postulates that transition from unaware to aware visual stimuli is either graded or dichotomous depending on the depth of stimulus processing. Humans can be progressively aware of the low-level features, such as colors or shapes, while the high-level features, such as semantic category, enter consciousness in an all-or none fashion. Unlike in vision, sounds always unfold in time, which might require mechanisms dissimilar from visual processing. We tested the LoP hypothesis in hearing for the first time by presenting participants with words of different categories, spoken in different pitches near the perceptual threshold. We also assessed whether different electrophysiological correlates of consciousness, the auditory awareness negativity (AAN) and late positivity (LP), were associated with LoP. Our findings indicate that LoP also applies to the auditory modality. AAN is an early correlate of awareness independent of LoP, while LP was modulated by awareness, performance accuracy and the level of processing., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2024 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Previous work has established a link between executive attention ability and mind wandering propensity, these studies typically collapse thought reports into a single category of task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs). We have shown that these TUTs can be differentiated by the emotional valence of their content. Awareness of TUTs might also be an important to consider, yet little work has been done on this front. The current study conceptually replicated and extended previous work by investigating the relationship between individual differences in executive attention, emotional valence and awareness of TUTs. Latent variable models indicated that Executive Attention was differentially correlated with emotional valence TUTs. However, only Attention Control was related to frequency of mind wandering with awareness. Intra-individual analyses indicated that negatively valenced TUTs and TUTs that occurred without awareness were associated with worse performance. Considering different dimensions of TUTs can provide a more complete picture of individual differences in mind wandering., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2024 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Conscious visual experiences are enriched by concurrent auditory information, implying audiovisual interactions. In the present study, we investigated how prior conscious experience of auditory and visual information influences the subsequent audiovisual temporal integration under the surface of awareness. We used continuous flash suppression (CFS) to render perceptually invisible a ball-shaped object constantly moving and bouncing inside a square frame window. To examine whether audiovisual temporal correspondence facilitates the ball stimulus to enter awareness, the visual motion was accompanied by click sounds temporally congruent or incongruent with the bounces of the ball. In Experiment 1, where no prior experience of the audiovisual events was given, we found no significant impact of audiovisual correspondence on visual detection time. However, when the temporally congruent or incongruent bounce-sound relations were consciously experienced prior to CFS in Experiment 2, congruent sounds yielded faster detection time compared to incongruent sounds during CFS. In addition, in Experiment 3, explicit processing of the incongruent bounce-sound relation prior to CFS slowed down detection time when the ball bounces became later congruent with sounds during CFS. These findings suggest that audiovisual temporal integration may take place outside of visual awareness though its potency is modulated by previous conscious experiences of the audiovisual events. The results are discussed in light of the framework of multisensory causal inference., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2024 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Dream lucidity, the awareness of consciousness in dreams, is linked to functions that support reality monitoring in differentiating between internally and externally generated memories. However, lucid dreams have been argued to result from thin reality-fantasy boundaries that lead to reality monitoring errors. To examine the relationship between dream lucidity and reality monitoring, we recruited 31 college students to rate their dream lucidity for 7 days and then complete a reality monitoring test in Experiment 1, observing a positive correlation between dream lucidity and reality monitoring. In Experiment 2, 109 participants rated dream lucidity and the memory characteristics of perceived and imagined events. Dream lucidity was negatively correlated with differences in sensory details between the memories of perceived and imagined events. The findings indicate that individuals with high dream lucidity have a superior ability to discriminate between externally and internally generated events that are susceptible to reality monitoring errors., Competing Interests: Declaration of Competing Interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Forcing is usually described as the effect in which stage magicians covertly influence decisions made by spectators. The phenomenon has been subject to a number of recent articles and is typically placed within the context of social influence, priming, decision making, awareness, free will, and the science of magic. In the present paper I will argue that forcing researchers, when framing and describing the phenomenon, have exaggerated what magicians typically achieve with the technique. Specifically, the magician is said to influence and manipulate the spectator's decision when in fact the vast majority of forces do not include any such influence. The consequence of this misrepresentation is that psychologists will be led to believe that the forcing phenomenon has more to contribute to priming and the psychology of influence than it actually does., Competing Interests: Declaration of Competing Interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

The first decade of event-related potential (ERP) research had established that the most consistent correlates of the onset of visual consciousness are the early visual awareness negativity (VAN), a posterior negative component in the N2 time range, and the late positivity (LP), an anterior positive component in the P3 time range. Two earlier extensive reviews ten years ago had concluded that VAN is the earliest and most reliable correlate of visual phenomenal consciousness, whereas LP probably reflects later processes associated with reflective/access consciousness. This article provides an update to those earlier reviews. ERP and MEG studies that have appeared since 2010 and directly compared ERPs between aware and unaware conditions are reviewed, and important new developments in the field are discussed. The result corroborates VAN as the earliest and most consistent signature of visual phenomenal consciousness, and casts further doubt on LP as an ERP correlate of phenomenal consciousness., Competing Interests: Declaration of Competing Interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Background: The integration of various domains or levels of analysis (clinical, neurobiological, genetic, etc.) has been a challenge in schizophrenia research. A promising approach is to use the core phenomenological features of the disorder as an organising principle for other levels of analysis. Minimal self-disturbance (fragility in implicit first-person perspective, presence and agency) is emerging as a strong candidate to play this role. This approach was adopted in a previously described theoretical neurophenomenological model that proposed that source monitoring deficits and aberrant salience may be neurocognitive/neurobiological processes that correlate with minimal self-disturbance on the phenomenological level, together playing an aetiological role in the onset of schizophrenia spectrum disorders. The current paper presents full cross-sectional data from the first empirical test of this model., Methods: Fifty ultra-high risk for psychosis patients, 39 first episode psychosis patients and 34 healthy controls were assessed with a variety of clinical measures, including the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE), and neurocognitive and neurophysiological (EEG) measures of source monitoring deficits and aberrant salience., Results: Linear regression indicated that source monitoring (composite score across neurocognitive and neurophysiological measures), with study group as an interaction term, explained 39.8% of the variance in EASE scores (R 2  = 0.41, F(3,85) = 14.78, p < 0.001), whereas aberrant salience (composite score) explained only 6% of the variance in EASE scores (R 2  = 0.06, F(3,85) = 1.44, p = 0.93). Aberrant salience measures were more strongly related to general psychopathology measures, particularly to positive psychotic symptoms, than to EASE scores., Discussion: A neurophenomenological model of minimal self-disturbance in schizophrenia spectrum disorders may need to be expanded from source monitoring deficits to encompass other relevant constructs such as temporal processing, intermodal/multisensory integration, and hierarchical predictive processing. The cross-sectional data reported here will be expanded with longitudinal analysis in subsequent reports. These data and other related recent research show an emerging picture of neuro-features of core phenomenological aspects of schizophrenia spectrum disorders beyond surface-level psychotic symptoms., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Libet's experiment is an influential classical study, which does not stop provoking heated debates. However, a full-scale replication has not been carried out to this day. Libet-style studies have usually focused on isolated ideas and concepts and never on the whole experiment in all its complexity. This paper presents detailed methodological description and results of a complex replication study. The methodology follows Libet's directions closely in most cases; when it does not, the differences are described and elaborated. The results replicate Libet's key findings, but substantial differences were found in some of the results' categories, such as the introspective reports or the number of readiness-potentials found. The discussion also addresses some current problems pertaining the methodology of the Libet-style experiments and provides some recommendations based on a detailed process evaluation., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Poor disease awareness ('anosognosia') is often observed in patients with various disabilities caused by brain damage. The lack of disease awareness can be due to the disruption of specific cognitive mechanisms and the development of psychodynamic mechanisms of denial. The aim of this paper is to review how these phenomena were discovered and evolved over time and to consider the relationships between them and the right hemisphere dominance for emotions. It is not clear whether the term 'anosognosia' refers to a basic mechanism that can explain similar awareness defects in different behavioural domains or whether it must be viewed as a multifaceted phenomenon in which both the disruption of cognitive or sensorimotor mechanisms and the emergence of motivational factors can play different roles in various forms of disease unawareness and in different kinds of 'anosognosic' patients., (Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the occipital and parietal cortices can induce phosphenes, i.e. visual sensations of light without light entering the eyes. In this paper, we adopted a TMS-EEG interactive co-registration approach with a patient (AM) showing altitudinal hemianopia. Occipital and parietal cortices in both hemispheres were stimulated while concurrently recording EEG signal. Results showed that, for all sites, neural activity differentially encoding for the presence vs. absence of a conscious experience could be found in a cluster of electrodes close to the stimulation site at an early (70ms) time-period after TMS. The present data indicate that both occipital and parietal sites are independent early gatekeepers of perceptual awareness, thus, in line with evidence in favor of early correlates of perceptual awareness. Moreover, these data support the valuable contribution of the TMS-EEG approach in patients with visual field defects to investigate the neural processes responsible for perceptual awareness., (Copyright © 2017. Published by Elsevier Inc.)

Introspection and language are the cognitive prides of humankind, but their interactions in healthy cognition remain unclear. Episodes of mind-wandering, where personal thoughts often go unnoticed for some time before being introspected, offer a unique opportunity to study the role of language in introspection. In this paper, we show that inner speech facilitates awareness of mind-wandering. In two experiments, we either interfered with verbal working memory, via articulatory suppression (Exp. 1), or entrained it, via presentation of verbal material (Exp. 2), and measured the resulting awareness of mind-wandering. Articulatory suppression decreased the likelihood to spontaneously notice mind-wandering, whereas verbal material increased retrospective awareness of mind-wandering. In addition, an ecological study using smartphones confirmed that inner speech vividness positively predicted mind-wandering awareness (Exp. 3). Together, these findings support the view that inner speech facilitates introspection of one's thoughts, and therefore provides empirical evidence for a positive relation between language and consciousness., (Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

A reply to the Bachmann and Aru (2015) critique of our paper (Mack, Erol, & Clarke, 2015) in which we rebut their criticisms and argue once again that our results support our view that iconic memory requires attention., (Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

In a recent paper (Mack et al., 2015) the effect of attentional manipulations on partial report performance was investigated. The results were interpreted in favor of the stance that an attention-free phenomenal iconic store does not exist. Therefore, the authors argue that consciousness requires attention. Here we question their conclusions both on the methodological and conceptual grounds., (Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Are individuals responsible for behaviour that is implicitly biased? Implicitly biased actions are those which manifest the distorting influence of implicit associations. That they express these 'implicit' features of our cognitive and motivational make up has been appealed to in support of the claim that, because individuals lack the relevant awareness of their morally problematic discriminatory behaviour, they are not responsible for behaving in ways that manifest implicit bias. However, the claim that such influences are implicit is, in fact, not straightforwardly related to the claim that individuals lack awareness of the morally problematic dimensions of their behaviour. Nor is it clear that lack of awareness does absolve from responsibility. This may depend on whether individuals culpably fail to know something that they should know. I propose that an answer to this question, in turn, depends on whether other imperfect cognitions are implicated in any lack of the relevant kind of awareness. In this paper I clarify our understanding of 'implicitly biased actions' and then argue that there are three different dimensions of awareness that might be at issue in the claim that individuals lack awareness of implicit bias. Having identified the relevant sense of awareness I argue that only one of these senses is defensibly incorporated into a condition for responsibility, rejecting recent arguments from Washington & Kelly for an 'externalist' epistemic condition. Having identified what individuals should - and can - know about their implicitly biased actions, I turn to the question of whether failures to know this are culpable. This brings us to consider the role of implicit biases in relation to other imperfect cognitions. I conclude that responsibility for implicitly biased actions may depend on answers to further questions about their relationship to other imperfect cognitions., (Copyright © 2014. Published by Elsevier Inc.)

In their paper, Takarangi, Strange, and Lindsay (2014) showed in two experiments that participants who had witnessed a shocking film frequently "mind-wandered without awareness" about the content of the film. More importantly, they equated this effect with the occurrence of traumatic intrusions. In this commentary, we argue that the authors adhered to conceptually ambiguous terms, and thereby unintentionally contribute to an already existing conceptual blur in the trauma-memory field. We postulate that clear definitions are urgently needed for phenomena such as intrusions, flashbacks, and mind-wandering, when using them in the context of trauma memory. Furthermore, our proposal is that these phenomena can fall under a spectrum of different involuntary memory instances. We propose that by adopting stricter definitions and viewing them as separate, but interrelated phenomena, different lines of trauma-memory research can be reconciled, which would considerably advance the field., (Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Blindsight is a kind of residual vision found in people with lesions to V1. Subjects with blindsight typically report no visual awareness, but they are nonetheless able to make above-chance guesses about the shape, location, color and movement of visual stimuli presented to them in their blind field. A different kind of blindsight, sometimes called type 2 blindsight, is a kind of residual vision found in patients with V1 lesions in the presence of some residual awareness. Type 2 blindsight differs from ordinary visual experience in lacking the particularity, transparency and fine-grainedness often taken to be essential to visual experience, at least in veridical cases. I argue that the case of type 2 blindsight provides a counterexample to the view that these characteristics are essential to veridical visual experience and that this gives us reason to resist the view that visual experience is essentially a perceptual relation to external objects. In the second part of the paper I argue that the case of type 2 blindsight yields important insights into the effects of attentional modulation on perceptual content and that cases of attentional modulation of appearance are not at odds with the view that the phenomenology of visual experience flows from its content., (Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Type-2 blindsight is often characterised as involving a non-visual form of awareness that blindsight subjects experience under certain presentation conditions. This paper evaluates the claim that type-2 awareness is non-visual and the proposal that it is a cognitive form of awareness. It is argued that, contrary to the standard account, type-2 awareness is best characterised as visual both because it satisfies certain criteria for being visual and because it can accommodate facts about the phenomenon that the cognitive account cannot. The conclusion is made that type-2 blindsight is best characterised as involving a form of abnormal, degraded visual awareness., (Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Recent research exploring phenomena such as change blindness, inattentional blindness, attentional blink and repetition blindness has revealed a number of counterintuitive ways in which apparently salient visual stimuli often go unnoticed. In fact, large majorities of subjects sometimes predict that they would detect visual changes that actually are rarely noticed, suggesting that people have strong beliefs about visual experience that are demonstrably incorrect. However, for other kinds of visual metacognition, such as picture memory, people underpredict performance. This paper describes two experiments demonstrating that both these overpredictions of change detection, and underpredictions of visual memory can be linked with intuitions about the visual experience of different kinds of agents. Subjects predicted more visual change detection and poorer visual memory for mechanical representational systems (e.g. computer programs) when these were anthropomorphized using intentional terminology., (Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

This paper investigates the time it takes unconscious vs. conscious knowledge to form by using an improved "no-loss gambling" method to measure awareness of knowing. Subjects could either bet on a transparently random process or on their grammaticality judgment in an artificial grammar learning task. A conflict in the literature is resolved concerning whether unconscious rather than conscious knowledge is especially fast or slow to form. When guessing (betting on a random process), accuracy was above chance and RTs were longer than when feeling confident (betting on the grammaticality decision). In a second experiment, short response deadlines only interfered with the quality of confident decisions (betting on grammaticality). When people are unaware of their knowledge, externally enforced decisions can be made rapidly with little decline in quality; but if given ample time, they await a metacognitive process to complete. The dissociation validates no-loss gambling as a measure of conscious awareness., (Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

This paper focuses on the development of explicit self-awareness in children. Mirror self-recognition has been the most popular paradigm used to assess this ability in children. Nevertheless, according to Rochat (2003), there are, at least, three different levels of explicit self-awareness. We therefore designed three different self-recognition tasks, each corresponding to one of these levels (a mirror self-recognition task, a picture self-recognition task and a masked self-recognition task). We observed a decrease in performance across the three tasks. This supports a developmental scale in self-awareness. Besides, the masked self-recognition performance makes it possible to assess the final and the most sophisticated level of self-awareness, i.e. the external self. To our best knowledge, this task is the first attempt to evaluate the external self in preverbal children. Our results indicate that 22-month old children show awareness of their external self or, at least, that this ability is in the process of being acquired., (Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

This paper explores the meaning and the development of consciousness in the human child. The idea of a self is made up of at least two major aspects. These can be referred to as the machinery of the self and the mental state of the idea of "me". The machinery of the self involves all unconscious, unreferenced action of the body, including its physiology and its processing of information that in turn includes cognitions and emotional states, which are unavailable to consciousness. The mental state or the idea of "me" is that part of the self that makes reference to itself. This mental state develops over the first 2 years of life and is a function of both brain maturation processes as well as socialization., (Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

This paper proposes a third meditation-category--automatic self-transcending--to extend the dichotomy of focused attention and open monitoring proposed by Lutz. Automatic self-transcending includes techniques designed to transcend their own activity. This contrasts with focused attention, which keeps attention focused on an object; and open monitoring, which keeps attention involved in the monitoring process. Each category was assigned EEG bands, based on reported brain patterns during mental tasks, and meditations were categorized based on their reported EEG. Focused attention, characterized by beta/gamma activity, included meditations from Tibetan Buddhist, Buddhist, and Chinese traditions. Open monitoring, characterized by theta activity, included meditations from Buddhist, Chinese, and Vedic traditions. Automatic self-transcending, characterized by alpha1 activity, included meditations from Vedic and Chinese traditions. Between categories, the included meditations differed in focus, subject/object relation, and procedures. These findings shed light on the common mistake of averaging meditations together to determine mechanisms or clinical effects., (Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

What has the self to be like such that introspective awareness of it is possible? The paper asks if Descartes's idea of an inner self can be upheld and discusses this issue by invoking two principles: the phenomenal transparency of experience and the semantic compositionality of conceptual content. It is assumed that self-awareness is a second-order state either in the domain of experience or in the domain of thought. In the former case self-awareness turns out empty if experience is transparent. In the latter, it can best be conceived of as a form of mental quotation. Various proposed analyses of direct and indirect quotation are discussed and tested regarding their applicability to thought. It is concluded that, on the assumption of compositionality, the inner self is only insofar accessible to awareness as it has an accessible phonological (or otherwise subsymbolic) structure, as apparently only inner speech does., (Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

This paper argues that self-awareness emerges in organisms whose brains have a sufficiently integrated, complex ability for associative learning and memory. Continual sensory input of information related to the organism leads to the formation of a set of associations that may be termed an organismal "self-image". After providing the basic mechanistic basis for the emergence of an organismal self-image, this paper proceeds to go through a representative list of behaviors associated with self-awareness, and shows how associative memory and learning, combined with an organismal self-image, leads to the emergence of these various behaviors. This paper also discusses various tautologies that invariably emerge when discussing self-awareness. We continue with various speculations on manipulating self-awareness, and discuss how concepts from set and logic theory may provide a useful set of tools for understanding the emergence of higher cognitive functions in complex organisms.

Ecological and sensorimotor theories of perception build on the notion of action-dependent invariants as the basic structures underlying perceptual capacities. In this paper we contrast the assumptions these theories make on the nature of perceptual information modulated by action. By focusing on the question, how movement specifies perceptual information, we show that ecological and sensorimotor theories endorse substantially different views about the role of action in perception. In particular we argue that ecological invariants are characterized with reference to transformations produced in the sensory array by movement: such invariants are transformation-specific but do not imply motor-specificity. In contrast, sensorimotor theories assume that perceptual invariants are intrinsically tied to specific movements. We show that this difference leads to different empirical predictions and we submit that the distinction between motor equivalence and motor-specificity needs further clarification in order to provide a more constrained account of action/perception relations.

Theories of thought insertion have tended to favour either the content of the putatively alien thought or some peculiarity within the experience itself as a means of explaining why the subject differentiates one thought from another in terms of personal ownership. There are even accounts that try to incorporate both of these characteristics. What all of these explanations share is the view that it is unexceptional for us to experience thought as our own. The aim of this paper is to consider the means by which this awareness of the myness of thought occurs. Why is it that I, as the subject of thought, typically experience a thought as mine? Using research which investigates the development of a child's awareness of the act of thinking, I will evaluate leading explanations of thought insertion. It is my contention that by understanding the means by which the awareness of one's ownership of thought develops, we can better assess explanations of thought insertion; and whilst, at present, no theory is fully able to explain the condition, the incorporation of developmental research suggest that we should favour one in particular.

This paper uses the Process Dissociation Procedure to explore whether people can acquire unconscious knowledge in the serial reaction time task [Destrebecqz, A., & Cleeremans, A. (2001). Can sequence learning be implicit? New evidence with the Process Dissociation Procedure. Psychonomic Bulletin &Review, 8, 343-350; Wilkinson, L., & Shanks, D. R. (2004). Intentional control and implicit sequence learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 30, 354-369]. Experiment 1 showed that people generated legal sequences above baseline levels under exclusion instructions. Reward moved exclusion performance towards baseline, indicating that the extent of motivation in the test phase influenced the expression of unconscious knowledge. Experiments 2 and 3 revealed that even with reward, adding noise to the sequences or shortening training led to above-baseline exclusion performance, suggesting that task difficulty and the amount of training also affected the expression of unconscious knowledge. The results help resolve some current debates about the role of conscious awareness in sequence learning.

In a recent paper in Psychological Science, Kouider and Dupoux reported obtaining unconscious Stroop priming only when subjects had partial awareness of the masked distractor words (i.e., could consciously perceive subword features that enabled reconstruction of whole words). Kouider and Dupoux conjectured that semantic priming occurs only when such partial awareness is present. The present experiments tested this conjecture in an affective categorization priming task that differed from Kouider and Dupoux's in using masked distractors that subjects had practiced earlier as visible words. Experiment 1 showed priming from practiced words when subjects had no partial awareness of those words. Experiment 2 showed that, in the absence of partial awareness, practiced words yielded priming but not-practiced words did not. Experiment 3 corroborated Experiment 1 and 2s results using a different test of partial awareness. These results suggest that unconscious processing (rather than partial awareness) of subword elements drives masked semantic priming by practiced words.

In the first part of this paper I characterize a minimal form of self-consciousness, namely pre-reflective self-consciousness. It is a constant structural feature of conscious experience, and corresponds to the consciousness of the self-as-subject that is not taken as an intentional object. In the second part, I argue that contemporary cognitive neuroscience has by and large missed this fundamental form of self-consciousness in its investigation of various forms of self-experience. In the third part, I exemplify how the notion of pre-reflective self-awareness can be of relevance for empirical research. In particular, I propose to interpret processes of sensorimotor integration in light of the phenomenological approach that allows the definition of pre-reflective self-consciousness.

The purpose of this paper is to show through the concrete example of epileptic seizure anticipation how neuro-dynamic analysis (using new mathematical tools to detect the dynamic structure of the neuro-electric activity of the brain) and "pheno-dynamic" analysis (using new interview techniques to detect the pre-reflective dynamic micro-structure of the corresponding subjective experience) may guide and determine each other. We will show that this dynamic approach to epileptic seizure makes it possible to consolidate the foundations of a cognitive non pharmacological therapy of epilepsy. We will also show through this example how the neuro-phenomenological co-determination could shed new light on the difficult problem of the "gap" which separates subjective experience from neurophysiological activity.

Quite a few recent models are rapidly introducing new concepts describing different levels of consciousness. This situation is getting confusing because some theorists formulate their models without making reference to existing views, redundantly adding complexity to an already difficult problem. In this paper, I present and compare nine neurocognitive models to highlight points of convergence and divergence. Two aspects of consciousness seem especially important: perception of self in time and complexity of self-representations. To this I add frequency of self-focus, amount of self-related information, and accuracy of self-knowledge. Overall, I conclude that many novel concepts (e.g., reflective, primary, core, extended, recursive, and minimal consciousness) are useful in helping us distinguish between delicate variations in consciousness and in clarifying theoretical issues that have been intensely debated in the scientific literature--e.g., consciousness in relation to mirror self-recognition and language.

A substantial body of research has established that even when we are not consciously aware of the faces of others we are nevertheless sensitive to, and impacted by their facial expression. In this paper, we consider this body of research from a new perspective by examining the functions of unconscious perception revealed by these studies. A consideration of the literature from this perspective highlights that existing research methods are limited when it comes to revealing possible functions of unconscious perception. The critical shortcoming is that in all of the methods, the perceived facial expression remains outside of awareness. This is a problem because there are good reasons to believe that one important function of unconsciously perceived negative faces is to attract attention so that they are consciously perceived; such conscious perception, however, is never allowed with existing methodologies. We discuss recent studies of emotional face perception under conditions of visual search that address this issue directly. Further, we suggest that methodologies that do not examine cognitive processes as they occur in more natural settings may result in fundamental misunderstandings of human cognition.

In previous studies, we found that bodily symptoms can be learned in a differential conditioning paradigm, using odors as conditioned stimuli (CSs) and CO2-enriched air as unconditioned stimulus (US). However, this only occurred when the odor CS had a negative valence (a selective conditioning effect), and tended to be more pronounced in persons scoring high for Negative Affectivity (NA). This paper considers the necessity and/or sufficiency of awareness of the CS-US contingency in three studies using this paradigm. The relation between contingency awareness and the selective conditioning effect, and between contingency awareness and NA was also considered. Both self reported symptoms and respiratory physiology served as dependent variables. A learning effect on symptoms was found only for participants aware of the CS-US contingency, but not all participants reporting contingency awareness showed a learning effect. No conditioning effects appeared on the physiological measures. Also contingency awareness did not account for the selective conditioning effect, and did not interact with NA. Overall, the necessity but insufficiency hypotheses can only be withhold for group data and not for individual data.

Whoever paid the bill at the restaurant last night, will clearly remember doing it. Independently from the type of action, it is a common experience that being the agent provides a special strength to our memories. Even if it is generally agreed that personal memories (episodic memory) rely on separate neural substrates with respect to general knowledge (semantic memory), little is known on the nature of the link between memory and the sense of agency. In the present paper, we review results from two experiments investigating the effects of agency on both explicit and implicit memory traces. Performance of normal subjects is compared to that of schizophrenic patients in order to explore the role of awareness of action on memory. It is proposed that reliable first-person information is necessary to create a stable and coherent motor memory trace.

Threshold- and signal-detection-based models have dominated theorizing about recognition memory. Building upon these theoretical frameworks, we have argued for a dual-process model in which conscious recollection (a threshold process) and familiarity (a signal-detection process) contribute to memory performance. In the current paper we assessed several memory models by examining the effects of levels of processing and the number of presentations on recognition memory receiver operating characteristics (ROCs). In general, when the ROCs were plotted in probability space they exhibited an inverted U shape; however, when they were plotted in z space they exhibited a U shape. An examination of the ROCs showed that the dual-process model could account for the observed ROCs, but that models based solely on either threshold or signal-detection processes failed to provide a sufficient account of the data. Furthermore, an examination of subjects' introspective reports using the remember/know procedure showed that subjects were aware of recollection and familiarity and were able to consistently report on their occurrence. The remember/know data were used to accurately predict the shapes of the ROCs, and estimates of recollection and familiarity derived from the ROC data mirrored the subjective reports of these processes.

This paper discusses the ways in which anesthetic agents can be used to investigate the role of awareness in learning and memory. It reviews research into learning during light, subclinical anesthesia, termed hypesthesia. This research suggests that the effects of anesthetics on implicit and explicit memory are roughly comparable, although implicit memory for simple stimuli may resist the effects of very low doses of anesthetic. In addition, this paper reports experimental data demonstrating that long-term retention of information is prevented by doses of anesthetic that are low enough to permit awareness and even shortterm memory of auditory stimuli. Overall, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis (e.g., Caseley-Rondi, 1996) that frontal lobe function is particularly sensitive to anesthetics. They raise theoretical and practical questions about the necessity of consciousness for learning and about interpretation of the evidence for learning during surgery under general anesthesia.

A tacit assumption since the 19th Century has been that the neocortex serves as the "seat of consciousness." An unexpected challenge to that assumption arose in 1949 with the discovery that high-frequency EEG activation associated with an alert state requires the intactness of the brainstem reticular formation. This discovery became the impetus for nearly three decades of research on what came to be known as the reticular activating system. By the 1970s, however, methodological and philosophical controversies led to the general abandonment of subcortical theories of attention and consciousness, with a return to an almost exclusive focus upon the cortex. With recent advances in the neurosciences the focus is shifting once more, this time to the unique contributions of cortical, thalamic, and brainstem structures in mediating selective attention and perceptual awareness. This paper offers a nontechnical review of the history of these developments up to contemporary interest in the putative role of oscillatory EEG patterns in the integration of perceptual features of experience. It puts forward the thesis that a key to understanding attention and consciousness is an appreciation of the contributions of the thalamus to these cognitive processes.