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This paper examines how Georgia politics have changed over the last 50 years as Republicans emerged in the south and eventually became the majority party within the region and the state of Georgia. How did the development of a competitive two party system change legislative majorities within the State House? This paper begins to answer that question by measuring the frequency of conflict in Georgia House roll call votes along partisan, racial and urban/rural cleavage lines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This project attempts to explain what drives media coverage of international disputes. The coverage of disputes is very important in determining the salience of foreign policy by providing information to the general public of foreign events. In this paper I argue that there are three factors driving the amount of coverage a dispute receives. The first issue is the intensity of the dispute, particularly whether or not the dispute involves fatalities. The higher levels of intensity results in a greater amount of coverage. The second issue is the states that are involved in the dispute. The final issue is whether or not the United States was the initiator or the target in the dispute. The findings generally illustrate that intensity does drive the coverage but there is significant randomness in the amount of coverage a dispute receives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I examine the effects of interstate and domestic armed conflict on bilateral trade levels. Almost all current research on the relationship between trade and conflict examines only the direct influence of conflict on trade. I argue that this research underestimates the effects of armed conflict on trade and show how both conflict and the belief among economic actors that conflict is likely in the future should depress trade levels. Within a gravity model of bilateral trade, armed violence increases the costs of production and exchange to firms, which reduces the profits of traders. If one also assumes firms are strategic actors that maximize both current and future returns from trade and rational forecasters of future armed conflicts, rational expectations of domestic and interstate conflict will limit bilateral trade among states even in the absence of overt violence. Expectations of future conflicts by firms increase the transportation, transaction, and production costs of trade, reducing the supply of goods to foreign markets. Thus, I propose that contemporaneous trade levels will be negatively related to expectations about future domestic and interstate conflicts as well as existing armed conflict. Using bilateral trade data from 1950-2000, I conduct empirical tests of the hypotheses that domestic and interstate armed conflicts, and expectations of these conflicts, deter bilateral trade. The results provide support for my hypotheses; extant armed conflict and the expectation of future conflict have a statistically significant negative influence on trade levels. Therefore, this research advances our understanding of the trade-conflict relationship by demonstrating both theoretically and empirically how higher expectations about future conflicts can reduce bilateral trade levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, scholars have turned to examining non-material determinants of conflict outcomes; however, their studies are limited in that these determinants are discussed only at war level, and accordingly, the importance of the art of war at battle level is overlooked. In this respect, Biddle's (2004) attempt to overcome such a lacuna in the literature is of critical importance. "Modern system force employment", he argues, affects the outcome of battles by damping the effects of numerical and technological superiority. However the empirical test of this argument was limited largely because of the unavailability of battle-level data. Thus, I compile a new battle data set, which I call BMW (Battles of Modern Warfare). Using the BMW data set, this paper finds that when an attacker using modern system force employment fights against a defender not using it, the attacker/defender loss exchange ratio (LER) decreases. On the contrary, if an attacker without employing modern system force employment assaults against a defender using it, the LER increases. (This latter finding is not statistically significant, though.) In short, using modern system force employment helps to reduce the loss of either attacker or defender. This pilot study contribute to our understanding of military effectiveness and conflict outcomes by shedding light on the importance of human factors using tactics and operational arts in battlefield outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For Edward Hallett Carr in his seminal work, The Twenty Years' Crisis (1939), "the true problem of peaceful change is, in national politics, how to effect necessary and desirable change without revolution and, in international politics, how to effect such changes without war." This work will establish a 'power-benefits ratio' which reflects the changing dynamics of international power created by differing rates of economic growth among great powers. When the rising and increasing power of one political entity, relative to other members of an international system, is not adequately reflected in an increase in benefits conferred, that power tends toward dissatisfaction. Left without recourse to address a perceived injustice, the rising power, given the differential in economic rates of growth, soon becomes powerful enough to force change. Hence, as the rising power becomes dissatisfied and now in possession to do something about it, the probability of systemic conflict increases. A hypothesis is that the creation of a peaceful mechanism for international change begins with the acknowledgement of the changing power-benefits ratio and the need for effective and peaceful adjustment. A stable international system requires what E. H. Carr called 'a common feeling of what is right,' and as a result establishing morality as a guiding principle of the newly emerging global order. Necessary, but for Carr insufficient, the nature and significance of power must also be incorporated into the peaceful change mechanism. Incorporating these ideas, the paper will present a political policy spectrum based on power transition theory and leading toward the establishment of a mechanism for effective change in global politics and security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How will the People's Republic of China respond to the unification of Korea? This study proceeds from the assumption that some sort of reconciliation process, leading ultimately to reunification, will take place on the Korean Peninsula over the next decade. Under this scenario, Korean union would occur without an armed conflict that would poison relations between North and South, and it would leave the peninsula under the control of Seoul. Unification would give birth to a middleweight power, whether measured by population, industrial capacity, or military capability, virtually overnight. Viewed from Beijing, a united Korea, especially one that played host to U.S. military and naval forces, could cast a long shadow over China's seaborne commerce, the wellspring of economic vitality for northern China. In recent years it has become abundantly clear that Beijing will play a crucial role in the future of Korea. Despite the intellectual and policy attention accorded China's role on the peninsula, one factor remains woefully unexplored: the influence of geopolitics on Chinese strategic thought. This essay argues that geopolitics is alive and well in East Asia. China's history will shape its attitude toward Korean unification and impart a distinct geographical hue to its foreign-policy calculations. Beijing will resist the emergence of a pro-American Korea that could imperil China's access to East Asian and Pacific waterways. It will shape its regional policy and maritime strategy accordingly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the potential risk effects of alliance commitments on dispute onset and escalation. This issue is theoretically framed as a moral hazard problem from the economic literature: if one party (agent) pledges a particular commitment to another party (principal), the moral hazard for the agent arises if the principal's behavior (e.g. a reckless move) raises the risk for an agent to act on its behalf due to its contractual commitment to the principal. In international relations, alliance commitments might pose such a moral hazard risk in the context of extended deterrence. That is, how much can the protege's behavior vis-a-vis another state actually entrap its ally ("defender") into a conflict? I separate an answer to this question into two specific issues: (1) whether states with alliance commitments from others are more likely to initiate conflicts than other states without such alliance provisions; (2) given that a conflict is initiated between the protege and its opponent, whether the protege is likely to get an aid from its ally and at what escalation level. After the conceptual and theoretical discussion, the paper proceeds with a quantitative empirical analysis and draws conclusions for current U.S. policies in cases of its relations with Taiwan in East Asia, India and Pakistan in South Asia, and Israel in the Middle East. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper advances a realist based argument to explain the allied-rival relationship between Greece and Turkey. It analyzes Greek-Turkish relations over the past fifty years against propositions derived from neoliberal institutionalism, constructivism, and our proposed alignment model. An examination various episodes of cooperation and non-cooperation reveals that in general cooperation tended to occur when mutual abandonment fears were high and complex abandonment fears were low or when alternative exit options were limited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

IR scholars have recently begun to examine how political institutions impact a state's decision to initiate interstate conflict. One school of thought, led by Leblang and Chan (2003), has found that certain electoral system characteristics (i.e., proportional representation systems[PR]) are associated with more pacifist behavior because PR systems often produce a greater number of actors that are involved in the policymaking process which leads to consensus-building and more risk averse foreign policies. Specifically, we argue that candidate-centered electoral systems lead elected leaders to develop more pacific foreign policies. In this study we contend that politicians are more accountable individually in candidate-centered electoral system which impacts a state's decision to initiate interstate conflict. We test our argument using a time-series cross-sectional analysis on 50 democracies from 1975-2001. The results provide strong support for the hypothesis that candidate-centered electoral systems result in less conflict initiation than party-centric systems due to higher levels of individual accountability for democratic leaders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increasing rivalries between China and U.S. starting from economic issues, diffusing to political and military dimensions, reassure the rational solutions presumed by power transition theory. By examining the combined effects of international systemic structure, international context, the impact of Chinese democratization, Taiwan Issue, the changing share of national capability, Chinese nationalism, and domestic politics, the paper builds an empirical model to analyze how these factors shape the patterns of Sino-American Conflict over time. The model identifies a new pattern of conflict due to the increasing interdependence of economy and specifies that comprehensive engagement enhances rather than threats to U.S. leading power. Therefore the model predicts more cooperation than confrontation in Sino-U.S. relations in the near future. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the relationship between domestic public opinion and international relations between two or more independent states from the perspective of international relations scholars and Americanists. It takes a closer look at the impact of decisions made by American presidents on their approval ratings. It offers a hypothesis that contends that the outcomes of international disputes impact public opinion in predictable ways beyond those best articulated in the simple rallying effect thesis.

The article examines the influence of international conflict involvement on the development of national democracy. The argument that international conflict involvement will undermine democracy of target states due to the negative impact of external threats on development is explored. The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method and diverse datasets concerning international conflict have been employed.

The article examines the reasons why one or both parties in an international conflict decide to negotiate a solution to the rivalry. It is argued here that a state leader is most likely to revise the state's bargaining position and pursue negotiation when faced with a failure in foreign policy and domestic unrest. This is so because state leaders want to retain their power. It is noted that an electorate of population is generally unconcerned about foreign policy, unless they think that it affects the domestic situation.

After years of vacillating on Palestinian national aspirations, the majority of Americans have come to favor "the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza strip." Reflecting that shift in public opinion, through the "roadmap," President George W. Bush has committed US foreign policy to that end, calling for "establishing two independent states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side within secure and recognized borders." Consequently, the main question asked by Arab Lobby and US Foreign Policy is why the US has shifted from an "Israel only" position toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to supporting an "Israel and Palestine" formula for peace. In order to address this question, American public opinion, the pro-Israel lobby, and the pro-Arab lobby were examined for interactions with US decision-making toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict before and after the end of the Cold War, specifically from the Camp David period of the late 1970s until the invasion and occupation of Iraq during the mid 2000s. Arab Lobby and US Foreign Policy concludes that while international factors such as the end of the Cold War cannot be overlooked, changes in domestic public opinion and lobbying had significant impacts on the US led international community's efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with two states. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]