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This paper addresses the process of issue framing surrounding the environment and climate change in the Netherlands. The Dutch have gained the reputation of being a leader in environmental policies, and particularly those regarding climate change. However, recent events have served to distract the Dutch from their efforts. Consequently, this paper asks two broad questions. How have the Dutch defined the environment and thus their responses to it? How and why has their response changed over time? More specifically, this study seeks to uncover the actors, actions and structures that have defined the construction of climate change within the Netherlands. Within what contexts has the discourse taken place? What international and domestic norms have been influential? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to explain how institutional reputation is crucial to the OECD's influence on policy making. The first section argues that the OECD epitomises the modern form of the rational-legal bureaucracy. The second presents a conceptual discussion of reputation, advancing a sociological understanding in contrast to the conventional definition derived from game theory. Reputation is argued to be a relational concept rather than a property concept, intersubjective (a social fact) rather than subjective, and important in inverse rather than direct proportion to the amount of information available. The last section argues that the OECD achieves policy influence more because its outputs (models, statistics, reports, etc.) are infused with and valorised by its reputation, rather than succeeding on the basis of objective evaluation. However, the importance of how the OECD is perceived by others means that it must stay 'in character' as a rational-legal bureaucracy, limiting the organisation's ability to broker bargains or pursue coercive approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State violations of human rights norms are often newsworthy around the world, and certainly become topics of conversation among diplomatic circles. Given that their violations are sure to be noticed and discussed, what accounts for variation among states in their level of compliance with international norms, specifically human rights norms? In this paper, we suggest that a state will comply with international human rights norms when its international reputation is at stake. A state's international reputation is key for attaining and maintaining an adequate bargaining position within the international community, and for inclusion in the 'big leagues' of power play. In formulating their foreign policies, states consider their international reputations, and seek to improve them as much as possible. Given this, we suggest that states will comply with human rights obligations in order to improve their reputations in two primary instances. First, when there is a strong regional pressure to increase human rights commitment. This can occur either when a state is already a member of a regional organization which places strong emphasis on human rights and provides a mechanism for enforcement, or when a state seeks to join a regional organization which has compliance with human rights as a founding principle. Second, when a state seeks foreign assistance from a country or countries which place human rights conditionality on the receipt and maintenance of aid. We test these hypotheses using a new measure of level of compliance, incorporating both formal and informal compliance, and using state compliance with the Convention Against Torture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given that human rights violations affect the regard in which states are held, what accounts for variation among states in their level of compliance with international human rights norms? We suggest that a state will comply with international human rights norms when its international reputation is at stake, as reputation is key for maintaining an adequate bargaining position within the international community, and for inclusion in the 'big leagues' of power play. Given this, we suggest that states will comply with human rights obligations in order to improve their reputations under two primary conditions: first, when there is a strong regional pressure to increase human rights commitment; second, when a state seeks foreign assistance from a country or countries which place human rights conditionally on the receipt and maintenance of aid. We test these hypotheses using a new measure of level of compliance, incorporating both formal and informal compliance, by focusing on the Convention Against Torture. We find that 1. regional pressures matter only when a state belongs to a regional organization that has a human rights enforcement mechanism; and 2. foreign aid conditionality affects compliance in different ways, depending on where the aid is coming from. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does international law affect preferences and beliefs about foreign policy? I investigate this question by offering the first-ever experimental analysis of treaty commitments. The experiments, embedded in interviews with U.S. voters and British policymakers, reveal three patterns. First, international law changes preferences and expectations. Individuals are far more likely to oppose policies that would violate international law than to oppose otherwise identical policies that would not trammel upon the law. Moreover many observers, including expert policymakers, anticipate that signatories to treaties will behave differently from non-signatories. Second, these effects arise, at least in part, via a reputational mechanism. By publicizing international commitments and embedding them in a legal framework, treaties raise thereputational ante, making it more costly to renege. Third, the effect of international law is additive, not absolute. If the material or moral case for violating international law is sufficiently strong, large proportions of voters and policymakers will advocate breaking the law and will expect foreign leaders to do the same. Thus, the experiments reported here reveal both the power and the limits of international law. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the reputation of multinational corporations in an era of globalization. It states that multinational corporations are responsible for most of the world's trade and investment. According to the authors, multinational corporations have come under growing pressure to enhance their performance on social, political and environmental issues. Several strategies employed by corporations to improve their reputation in the community are cited, such as new corporate images and logos, ethical codes of conduct and targeted philanthropy.

Humanitarian arms control has become a prominent issue on the international agenda, bringing concerns for individuals' human security face-to-face with states' military security. Since 1997, states have concluded treaties banning anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions with widespread support. In addition, UN members voted in 2006 to begin a formal process to create a treaty regulating the transfer of small and major conventional arms to human rights violators and conflict zones - an initiative that many major supplier states' have come to endorse, despite strong opposition to such policies in the past. This paper asks why. Using in-depth case studies of two major exporters, France and the United States, it investigates the material, normative, and social incentives behind states' support of key UN humanitarian arms control initiatives leading up to the 2006 Arms Trade Treaty vote. States' commitment to international regimes is often attributed either to material interests or normative obligations. Yet the cases reveal both that states may decide to support new arms export standards absent either type of incentive, as in the case of France, and that they may oppose them despite their low material costs, as in the case of the United States. I find instead that states deeply embedded in and reliant on international institutions may support popular policies out of concern for their international reputations as a social incentive. In contrast to extant IR approaches to reputation, I argue that reputation can have a social dimension, with which states achieve recognition and standing from their peers in the international community. As a result, states may choose policies strategically to signal their reputations as "good international citizens," with reputation as not only a means to an end but also an end in and of itself that functions as a social incentive in international politics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In our paper, we theoretically and empirically examine success and failure in general deterrence. Most deterrence and bargaining studies have focused on the crises of immediate deterrence partly because of the typical selection bias problems in identifying deterrence success and failures. Moreover, our focus is on another (empirically often elusive) variableâ€"reputation for past behavior and its potential impact on general deterrence outcomes (our previous study is quite different: we have focused on immediate deterrence and conceptually restricted our analysis to Schelling’s approach to reputation). We first clarify multiple meanings of the notion of reputation and elaborate on potential selection bias problems in understanding its impact as a signaling tool. We also discuss several related issuesâ€"such as multiple audiencesâ€"that have generally been conflated and outline one of the possible alternatives to disentangle these issues for a better understanding of general deterrence success. We then empirically test the arguments with updated historical data on the cases of general deterrence failures among enduring rivals. The test controls for a possible confounding effect of factors such as interests and capabilities and is a “hard” test for the reputation argument. With our “least-likely” research design for reputational theory, we expect any confirmatory findings for the reputational effects to demonstrate their strong validity. Our initial results do provide some, but partial and conditional, support for reputation for past behavior and we discuss our findings in the context of deterrence theory, reputational and signaling arguments, and selection effects in analyzing bargaining success. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is growing consensus in IR that metaphors matter in international politics. Drawing on Liechtenstein?s experience, this paper shows that states? struggle with the challenges of globalisation has an important metaphorical dimension: Liechtenstein has long held the reputation of a financial haven, tax oasis and money-laundering paradise ? and enjoyed the economic benefits. However, at the end of the 1990s the country was put on blacklists by the OECD and FATF. The result was considerable reputational damage. To repair its image Liechtenstein hired PR-experts. They suggested to dump the old metaphors and view the country in the light of a new metaphor instead ? as a brand. In consequence, marketing and advertising methods became the central tools of Liechtenstein?s foreign policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I illustrate how perceptions of a state's reliability can influence the incidence of conflict. Using a series of 20th century conflicts, I show that states are more likely to be involved in conflicts when they perceive their allies to be reliable or perceive their opponent's allies to be unreliable. In contrast, states are more likely to try to avoid conflict when they perceive their own allies to be unreliable or perceive their opponent's allies to be reliable. The lesson here is not only that the perceptions of a state's reputation are useful for explaining conlict, but also that a state's reliability has both advantages and disadvantages; while a reliable reputation may deter others, it can also embolden an ally to threaten violence. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Balkans have been the principal test case for the EU's political aspiration to be an international security provider. After a disastrous start in the 1990s, the EU got its act together. In 2003, it deployed its first-ever CSDP mission. In short order, the mission was followed by further deployments in Macedonia, Bosnia and Kosovo. After some growing pains, the CSDP has become firmly embedded in the EU's governance of the region, which is driven by the enlargement perspective. The operations have contributed to maintaining peace in a traditionally volatile region. They have enabled the EU to catch up with the U.S. and NATO when it comes to shaping local security sector reform. They protect the EU against organised crime, human trafficking and other 'bads' originating in or transiting through the Balkans. Last but not least, the missions have helped to repair the international reputation of the EU. This said, a closer look at the missions reveals that they had their fair share of problems. Mission impact has been hampered by, among other things, institutional turf battles, logistical and mission support problems and the EU's inability to leverage fully the enlargement perspective to advance the governance of the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In extended immediate deterrence, when guarantors make a decision to intervene, they anticipate the possible outcomes of the current crisis as well as the possible consequences of their decision on their reputation as a reliable ally. For example, if guar ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do states benefit from resisting (conceding to) unilateral (multilateral) threats? In recent years, scholars have voiced skepticism about the significance of state reputation (Mercer 1996, Press 2005, Edelstein 2008), claiming that states do not consider ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]