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Can outgroup attitudes improve in a repressive context? Existing literature highlights how shared victimization generated under repression facilitates recategorization of identity boundaries, thereby ameliorating exclusionary attitudes. We propose an alternative pathway through which outgroup attitudes can improve. We argue that individuals update their outgroup attitudes when they perceive outgroups as contributing to a shared goal. Rather than being an identity-based response, we suggest that this cognitive process involves instrumental considerations. We evaluate this theory using a web-based survey experiment carried out in post-coup Myanmar and examine attitudes toward the Rohingya, a severely marginalized group. We find that trust and support for Rohingya citizenship rights improve when the Rohingya people are framed as contributing to the pursuit of a shared goal. We also find that this is driven primarily by individuals who have more at stake in the overthrow of the coup regime compared to those with less at stake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing literature highlights an authoritarian sanction dilemma: Dictators must deter rent-seeking, yet in doing so they risk antagonizing factional allies. Using a new dataset of disciplinary investigations within the Chinese and Vietnamese Communist Party, I show that some dictators navigate this dilemma by tailoring the political protection they provide to their followers. Factional malleability, the extent to which a regime's factions are formed around mutable personal connections, moderates the choice of protection method. In China, where factions are rigid, factional allies' defection threat is non-credible. Thus, the dictator offers ex post protection, which is more desirable to him than to his subordinates, by giving delayed, lenient punishments to investigated officials in factionally-connected provinces. In contrast, under Vietnam's malleable factions, the dictator provides ex ante protection by excluding the same officials from investigations. The findings illuminate how authoritarian regimes with similar formal institutions produce divergent anti-corruption outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When are politicians willing to liberalize abortion laws? While restricted access to legal abortion affects millions of women around the world, there is relatively little understanding of the factors shaping the views of politicians who craft or uphold such restrictive laws. This study examines the impact of a public health framing commonly employed by activists to persuade politicians to reform abortion laws. We provide evidence that politicians' preferences toward abortion reforms are shaped by the intersection of gender and wealth. Drawing on a survey experiment conducted among more than 600 politicians in Zambia, we show that only women politicians from less wealthy backgrounds are more likely to support policy liberalization after being exposed to a public health framing. These findings underscore how economic inequalities can affect the substantive representation of women's interests and provide a baseline for further research on the use of framing strategies in other developing country contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do moral beliefs influence favorability to collective violence? In this article, I argue that, first, moral beliefs are influential depending on their salience, as harm avoidance is a common moral concern. The more accessible moral beliefs in decision-making, the more they restrain harmful behavior. Second, moral beliefs are influential depending on their content. Group-oriented moral beliefs can overturn the harm avoidance principle and motivate individuals to favor collective violence. Analysis is based on a representative survey in Mexico City and focuses on a proximate form of collective violence, locally called lynching. Findings support both logics of moral influence. Experimentally induced moral salience reduces favorability to lynching, and group-oriented moral beliefs are related to more favorability. Against existing theories that downplay the relevance of morality and present it as cheap talk, these findings demonstrate how moral beliefs can both restrain and motivate collective violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The post-WWII era saw junior military officers launch revolutionary coups in a number of post-colonial states. How did these events transform colonial-era state elites? We theorize that the inexperienced leaders of revolutionary coups had to choose between purging threats and delivering ambitious projects of state-led transformation, leading to a threat-competence calculation that patterned elite turnover. To illustrate our argument, we trace the careers of 674 high-ranking officials in Egypt following the Free Officers' seizure of power in July 1952. A multilevel survival analysis shows that officials connected to Egypt's deposed monarch and very senior officials were most vulnerable to being purged. Experienced bureaucrats and those with university education were more likely to be retained. This threat-competence calculation also informed which ministries experienced more purging. Qualitative triangulation with biographies, memoirs, newspaper reports, and speeches corroborates the mechanism. The findings show why radical state-led change often requires a degree of elite-level continuity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]