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The article wants to show the connection between the enriched personal papers of Emil von Behring (1854-1917) in the Behring archives in Marburg (established in 1927) and the history of the first biography of the scientist, which was published by Heinz Zeiss and Richard Bieling during Nazi era in 1940. One focus is placed on Behring's widow Else von Behring (1876-1936), who was active in arranging Behring's papers in proper order and in searching a biographer of her husband's life. The paper also presents new discoveries from the Behring Works archives in Marburg which show Behring - founder of the serum therapy and first winner of the Nobel Prize for medicine in 1901 - as an entrepreneur who was fighting for control and influence in the field of science and of business: maybe another narration of Behring's life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Linus Pauling's work was intrinsically linked to visualizations. While his use of three- and two-dimensional inscriptions has been the focus of much scholarly research, the production of visualizations remains a rather poorly studied subject. This article focuses on the cooperation between Pauling and Roger Hayward, an architect by profession who came to scientific illustration in the late 1920s. By concentrating on the papers of Pauling and Hayward I describe the workflow between scientist and illustrator. Although Hayward's visualizations were epistemically indispensable and economically profitable, they were never fully acknowledged as such. This was due to the ongoing conflicts caused by the economic strategies pursued by Pauling and his publisher, Hayward's personal style, and science's general disregard for images as epistemic instruments. I suggest that these contentious relationships between scientist, illustrator, and publisher are paradigmatic for the history of scientific visualization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Berichte zur Wissenschafts-Geschichte is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper discusses diverse understandings of ‘responsible science’ in heated political debates. It takes a current public debate around a German law amendment draft concerning the use of novel forensic genetic techniques, namely DNA‐phenotyping and biogeographical ancestry analysis, as an example. A distinction is being made between an understanding that emphasizes scientific debate and precision, and another one that focuses on political agency. The paper also addresses the question whether and how science studies scholars, given their depth of expertise in the analysis of complex problems spanning disciplinary boundaries, should contribute to national debates in policy fields where no such dialogue exists yet. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Berichte zur Wissenschafts-Geschichte is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine is awarded annually to a maximum of three laureates. Not surprisingly, the number of nominees is much larger. Drawing on Nobel Prize nominations in the Nobel archives in Sweden, the core of this paper deals with the nomination letters for the physiologist Wilhelm Roux to discuss competition and some controversies among German physiologists around 1900 in this particular context. The paper (1) elucidates the arguments brought forward to portray Roux as a scientist who had conferred “the greatest benefit to mankind” in the field of physiology or medicine (as stipulated in Alfred Nobel's will); (2) examines some other runners‐up, and (3) reconstructs why Roux as well as some of his peers were not awarded the Nobel Prize. On a more general level, we argue that an analysis of Nobel Prize nominations contributes to a broader history of excellence in science and medicine in the twentieth century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The German immunologist Emil von Behring (1854–1917) is the first Nobel Prize laureate in physiology or medicine. Behring received the award in 1901 “for his work on serum therapy, especially its application against diphtheria” (official prize motivation). Behring's name was strongly connected with progress in the field of diphtheria research through various publications. This study contextualizes the awarding of Behring and shows that not only significant scientific and practical results made him primus inter pares in the eyes of the Nobel committee, but also factors like Behring's representation in the daily press and the broad public interest in diphtheria research. After the beginning of the industrial serum production in 1894, Behring was not only a “visible scientist” (Massimiano Bucchi), he was also portrayed as the “savior of the children” and so ranked among the “great men” (Michael Gamper) of his era. The paper argues that his public visibility and the popularity of “Behring's Diphtherie‐Heilmittel” became a strong argument in favor of Behring during the selection process of the first Nobel laureate. The first part of the paper discusses the Nobel Prize nomination procedure from the views of the scientific community. Drawing on personal papers of the extended Behring Archives, the second part focusses on Behring from a private perspective and sheds light on the meaning and importance of the award for Behring and his family. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Berichte zur Wissenschafts-Geschichte is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Berichte zur Wissenschafts-Geschichte is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Berichte zur Wissenschafts-Geschichte is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper argues that Ernst Mach's conception of the thought experiment from 1897/1905 holds a singular position in the lively discussions and repeated theorizations that have continued up to the present in relation to this procedure. Mach derives the thought experiment from scientific practice, and does not oppose it to the physical experiment, but, on the contrary, endows it with a robust relation to the facts. For Mach, the thought experiment is a reliable means of determining empiricism, and at the same time a real, because open and unbiased, experimenting. To shed light on this approach, the paper carries out a close reading of the relevant texts in Mach's body of writings (in their different stages of revision) and proceeds in three steps: first, Mach's processual understanding of science will be presented, which also characterizes his research and publication practice (I. 'Aperçu' and 'Sketch'. Science as Process and Projection); then in a second step the physiological and biological justification and valorization of memory and association will be examined with which Mach limits the relevance of categories such as consciousness and will (II. The Biology of Consciousness. Or The Polyp Colony); against this background, thirdly, the specific empiricism can be revealed that Mach inscribes into the thought experiment by on the one hand founding it in the memory and association, and on the other by tracing it back to geometry, which he deploys as an experimenting oriented to experience (III. Thinking and Experience. The Thought Experiment). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the end of the eighteenth century, people who became notorious for their excessive engagement in legal proceedings started being labeled as 'querulents' or 'paranoid litigants'. The term 'querulents' first appeared in the General Order of the Court for the Prussian States ( Allgemeine Gerichtsordnung für die Preußischen Staaten) from July 6, 1793. From there on, the spectrum of juridical measures undertaken against the so-labeled litigators included classifying these persons as ineligible for legal action and psychiatric hospitalization. The paper discusses to what extent Hermann Bahr rearranges psychiatric and legal knowledge about this special type of the complainer in his tragicomedy Der Querulant, premiered in 1914. This concerns, first, the theatricality of the body and speech, secondly, the use of cultural techniques of writing and, thirdly, conflicting notions of justice. Therefore, the paper analyzes the aesthetic function of querulous behavior in the dramatic structure of the play from the point of view of both media theory and literary theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I want to argue that the Vienna School of Medicine and especially the Viennese Brain Anatomy had an impact on the formation of the Austrian positivism. I argue that Carl von Rokitansky's (1804–1878) doctrine that psychological phenomena must be translated into anatomical facts and Theodor Meynert's (1833–1892) theory of brain functions served as one basis for the formation of the Austrian positivism. In this sense, two of the main early positivistic thinkers, Ernst Mach (1838–1916) and Richard Wahle (1857–1935), used Meynert's brain theory to argue for a bundle view of the Self. Friedrich Jodl (1849–1914) also thought about his theory, and even Moritz Schlick (1882–1936) who demanded a 'reduction of the psychology to the brain physiology' grappled with this approach. Meynert, a scholar of Rokitansky, the founder of the Vienna School of Medicine, was a leading figure in the history of neurology and has made several significant contributions to this discipline. He argues that the Self does not exist from an anatomical point of view. As Richard Wahle tells us, Meynert's theory of the brain functions was widely accepted under the brain researchers by the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century. He makes clear that brain researchers did in common refer to Meynert's theory to explain psychical functions as brain functions. He says from their point of view there was no doubt about it. Mach talks about Meynert's theory in Erkenntnis und Irrtum. There he says that Meynert's brain theory explains the nature and conditions of the consciousness. Michael Hagner argues that Mach's "Das Ich ist unrettbar" is hardly imaginable without the cerebral embedding of the mental functions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Berichte zur Wissenschafts-Geschichte is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Berichte zur Wissenschafts-Geschichte is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Berichte zur Wissenschafts-Geschichte is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Berichte zur Wissenschafts-Geschichte is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper explores the relations between economy and ecology in the last quarter of the 20th century with the example of biodiversity. From its definition in the 1980s, the concept of biodiversity responded not only to conservational concerns but also to hopes and demands of economic profitability. The paper argues that archival systems of inventorying and surveying nature, the biodiversity database and the biodiversity portfolio, changed the view on nature from a resource to an investment. The paper studies the alliances of ecologists and environmental economists in managing nature according to economic principles of successful asset management, 'diversification', with the aim to distribute risk, minimize ecological loss and maximize overall ecosystem performance. Finally, the paper discusses the assumptions and the consequences of transferring principles from financial risk management to landscape management. How has the substitution of the existential values of nature by shareholder value affected the relations between ecology, environment, and ecosystem conservation? Who gains and who looses in exchanging natural capital and financial capital, yields, and profits? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Berichte zur Wissenschafts-Geschichte is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Berichte zur Wissenschafts-Geschichte is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Berichte zur Wissenschafts-Geschichte is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Philosophy of the Art of Science. Historical Remarks on the Significance of Rules in Scientific Language. This paper undertakes first steps toward a 'Philosophy of the Art of Science' from a History of Science and Philosophy of Language perspective. Traditionally it is understood that Philosophy of Science assesses science as to the validity of its methods and to the question of how it is that we hold its claims to be true. However, the range of presuppositions here is considerable: Roughly, it spans from Gottlob Frege's 'The True' (das Wahre) as the aim of scientific inquiry on the one end, to Paul Feyerabend's pluralistic understanding of science in a democratic society on the other. Despite this profound difference, however, we can nonetheless detect some similarity between them. Both hold science to be a normative endeavor: Frege thinks we ought to strive for true thoughts as somewhat independent ontological entities; Feyerabend thinks we ought to strive for a pragmatic humanism that takes the historicity of our knowledge into account. But while Frege ventured to show that natural language can benefit from insights drawn from the normative logic of formalized languages, Feyerabend discounted the idea of formalized language altogether, but with no less normative verve in regard to our scientific concept formation. Hence the combining question is whether scientific concept formation is indeed a rule-governed behavior, or, put more generally, whether semantic content as such is normative. Guided by this question, the present paper draws a line from Frege through Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, and Quine, to those authors who follow or refute Saul Kripke's Wittgensteinian notion of semantic normativity in the most recent discussion of today. However, the paper does not proceed chronologically, but rather thematically along the major lines of argument. Hence after a brief survey of Feyerabend's philosophy of scientific concept formation (I), we explore Frege and his legacy on semantic normativity (II), and investigate the route that eventually led to present day semantic rule-skepticism (III). We conclude with Carnap's 'Principle of Tolerance' combined with Feyerabend's notion of Science as an Art, parallels of which we can even find in Kant's third Critique (IV). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Lectureships for Swedish in Germany in the Context of Cultural Diplomacy 1917-1930. During the Weimar Republic a significant number of lectureships for Swedish was established at German universities. This paper attempts to explain this development through an analysis of the political and academic context of these establishments. Focussing on the actors involved the lectureships are linked to the emerging interest of the German state for public diplomacy emerging after World War I and the following reactions of German academia. The paper also treats the importance of the main Swedish actor, namely the association for the preservance of Swedishness abroad for the establishments of the lectureships. At the end the different actors working for Swedish lectureships in Germany are placed in a broader European context and questions concerning the relationship between universities and cultural diplomacy are raised and answered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to many authors, the treatise on cancer written by Theodor Boveri in 1914 demonstrates astonishing foresight with respect to contemporary cancer research, in particular with respect to the genomic instability of tumors. In some recent publications, however, it has been claimed that not Boveri but primarily David von Hansemann deserves credit for these chromosomal theories of cancer origin. The claim seems to be unjustified because there are great differences, both in conception and in argumentation, between both opinions. In addition, it has been ignored that von Hansemann himself said that his views 'were corrected and developed further by Boveri'. In this paper two obviously unknown comments regarding Boveri's theory by von Hansemann are presented as examples. Furthermore, the paper points out that the pathologist von Hansemann was engaged in the formal genesis of tumors using descriptive methods. By contrast, the embryologist Boveri developed his hypotheses on the basis of the experimentally founded chromosome theory of inheritance in an attempt to explain the etiology or causal genesis of tumors. Thus, it can be concluded that Boveri developed the first genetic cancer theory in the history of medicine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The frequent use of biological metaphors in descriptions of society is well known and has already been investigated. Even the traces of biological theory in sociology have been explored. In this field of science, studies of social insects play an important role, because ants, bees, and termites have been considered to be genuinely political animals and founders of societies. Like men, social insects exist only in collectives; thus, the entomologist's research directs him from the individual insect, its morphology and taxonomy to the analysis of insect societies. Entomologists like Wheeler or Wilson become sociologists and develop methods to deal with a society whose members are dumb, soulless, without reason, rational choice, or motives. Tools invented to describe the evolution of insect societies have been picked up by sociological founders of systems theory like Parsons or Luhmann, who were busy building a theory of a society, which for heuristic reasons is not composed of men (individuals with souls, motives, consciousness and so on) but rather of communications, media, or codes. My paper treats 1.) the genealogy of this discursive mixture of problems, methods, and focuses on 2.) the rhetorical dimension of this entomological-sociological passage. I will sketch certain 'evident' pictures of society, which function as media of a subliminal crossing of entomological and sociological premises, models, and assumptions. Both can be found in novels like Wilson's Anthill, which this paper analyzes with respect to the concepts of society implied by them, that is, concepts whose blueprints are based on models of an ant society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In January 1850, Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894) published a short report about his measurements concerning the propagation speed of 'stimulations' in the living nerve. Historians of science such as Frederic Holmes and Kathryn Olesko have reconstructed the 'investigative pathway' that led Helmholtz from his initial work on muscle action to the striking study of nervous time. Against the background of new archival findings, this paper argues that Helmholtz's investigative pathway also constituted a 'semiotic pathway,' i. e. an arcade of signs that would capture and transmit his findings in appropriate ways. Drawing in particular on the curve recordings and the corresponding written explanations he sent to the Paris Academy of Science in September 1851, the paper shows that Helmholtz's graphical recordings were not meant as measurements. From the start, Helmholtz had carried out his time measurements by using an electromagnetic timing method suggested by the French physicist Claude Pouillet (1791-1868). In his 1850 report, Helmholtz had failed, however, to explain the physiological application of this method, even though his colleague and friend, Emil du Bois-Reymond (1818-1896) had revised the report when translating it into French. In this situation, Helmholtz's curves served to illustrate the basic procedure of his previous experiments. In other words, they were indeed 'images of precision' (Holmes and Olesko) but not precise images. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Berichte zur Wissenschafts-Geschichte is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Berichte zur Wissenschafts-Geschichte is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Berichte zur Wissenschafts-Geschichte is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

„She [Noether] then appeared as the creator of a new direction in algebra and became the leader, the most consistent and brilliant representative, of a particular mathematical doctrine – of all that is characterized by the term ,Begriffliche Mathematik‘.“ The aim of this paper is to illuminate this “new direction”, which can be characterized as a conceptual [begriffliche] perspective in mathematics, and to comprehend its roots and trace its establishment. Field, ring, ideal, the core concepts of this new direction in mathematical images of knowledge, were conceptualized by Richard Dedekind (1831– 1916) within the scope of his number theory research and associated with an understanding of a formation of concepts as a “free creation of the human spirit”. They thus stand for an abstract perspective of mathematics in their entirety, described as ‘modern algebra’ in the 1920s and 1930s, leading to an understanding of mathematics as structural sciences. The establishment of this approach to mathematics, which is based on “general mathematical concepts” [allgemein-mathematische Begriffe], was the success of a cultural movement whose most important protagonists included Emmy Noether (1882– 1935) and her pupil Bartel L. van der Waerden (1903– 1996). With the use of the term ‘conceptual’, a perspective is taken in the analysis which allows for developing connections between the thinking of Dedekind, the “working and conceptual methods” [Arbeits- und Auffassungsmethoden] of Noether as well as the methodological approach, represented through the thought space of the Noether School as presented under the term “conceptual world” [Begriffswelt] in the Moderne Algebra of van der Waerden. This essay thus makes a contribution to the history of the introduction of a structural perspective in mathematics, a perspective that is inseparable from the mathematical impact of Noether, her reception of the work of Dedekind and the creative strength of the Noether School. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The complex concept of 'light quanta' which made its first appearance in Albert Einstein's 1905 paper on a 'heuristic point of view' to cope with the photoelectric effect and other forms of interaction of light and matter, has a rich history both before and after 1905. Some of its semantic layers lead as far back as Newton and Kepler, others are only fully espoused several decades later, yet others initially increased, then diminished in importance and finally vanished. Two historiographic approaches are discussed and exemplified: a) my own model of conceptual development as a series of semantic accretions, and b) Mark Turner's model of 'conceptual blending'. Both of these models are shown to be useful and will be further explored in my own efforts to come to grips with the complex process of concept formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thought experiments are an important element in Ernst Mach's epistemology: They facilitate amplifying our knowledge by experimenting with thoughts; they thus exceed the empirical experience and suspend the quest for immediate utility. In an economical perspective, Mach suggested that thought experiments depended on the production of an economic surplus based on the division of labor relieving the struggle for survival of the individual. Thus, as frequently emphasized, in Mach's epistemology, not only the 'economy of thought' is an important feature; instead, also the socioeconomic conditions of science play a decisive role. The paper discusses the mental and social economic aspects of experimental thinking in Mach's epistemology and examines those within the contemporary evolutionary, physiological, and economic contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Max Weber's remarks on his colleague Eduard Meyer regarding counterfactual reasoning in history reflects a significant shift during the Methodenstreit around 1900. The question of attributing historical change strictly to either individual causes or abstract general laws has been tackled in a new way: By counterfactual reasoning a historian should be able to detect the most significant (and therefore meaningful) cause, event, or action for a certain historical outcome. Following Fritz Ringer, this paper argues that given the predominating methods of the natural sciences, scholars of the humanities conducted historical research by counterfactual thought experiments. This way, Weber pried open contemporary narratives (e.g. historicism), and by employing a unique historical causal analysis he made way for refined concepts to offer a model of interpretation that gave hope for a more feasible, practice-oriented approach to historical research than the epistemological discussions had hitherto offered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the second half of the nineteenth century, clinical demonstrations became the dominant teaching method in psychiatry, playing a key role in medical-professional disputes, as well. This paper traces this widely used though historiographically neglected practice of knowledge implementation and mediation, as demonstrated in the psychiatric clinic of the Berlin Charité (Psychiatrische und Nervenklinik der Berliner Charité) from 1881 to 1927. Documentation of this practice, found within individual medical records, forms the basis of this research. The concept of 'theatricality' assists in uncovering the dramatic quality of the clinical demonstration: Psychiatric knowledge was not simply disseminated through such a practice; rather, such knowledge was first performatively created through the very logic of its presentation of exemplary patient histories, as well as through the examination and diagnostic positioning of its patients. The 'success' of such presentations depended on many variables, related to staff, time, place, and other situational factors. These include the presence of appropriate lecture halls, the availability and calculated selection of patients, and the employment of specific performative techniques by doctors for the sake of producing desired results. As one effect, clinical demonstrations also encouraged patients to both learn and rehearse behavior considered relevant to the particular diagnosis that was to be demonstrated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper relates stage performances of dada artists to war neurosis and shell shock as sociocultural phenomena. The leitmotif of this investigation is the notion of simulation, as dada artists were referred to as malingerers (simulators) of madness by the press at the time. I hypothesize that the performers imitate/simulate with drums, shouting and 'bruitist' sound poems, the noises of war, staging themselves as war neurotics in a kind of shocking clinical demonstration. Both discourses intersect in the fact that many dadaists try to dodge the draft by simulating madness. The scandalizing anti-art of dada will be understood as contagious anti-pedagogy, trying to vaccinate against the madness of the era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although part of the medical fold since the 1870s, hypnosis was long relegated to the margins, recognised and used by only a relatively small group of medical professionals. In the decades around 1900 hypnotic techniques were monopolised as a form of medical treatment through a long and in no way linear process. Hypnosis of laymen was vehemently opposed, however, denounced as being far too dangerous. And yet, medical participation in the aura of spectacular intervention into the human psyche garnered support. The medium of both documentary and instructional film served an important function in this regard, conveying popular interest in acknowledging hypnosis as a scientific method. On the basis of four medically accredited films on hypnosis from 1920 to 1936, this paper attempts to investigate how medical experts and these genres, as part of their effort to claim hypnosis from the realm of public spectacle and parapsychological experimentation, worked to stabilise hypnosis as a purified form of medical and psychiatric practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do the earth sciences mediate between the natural and social world? This paper explores the question by focusing on the history of nonfuel mineral resource appraisal from the late nineteenth to the mid twentieth century. It argues that earth sciences early on embraced social scientific knowledge, i. e. economic knowledge, in particular, when it came to determining ore deposits and estimating the magnitude of mineral reserves. After 1900, assessing national and global mineral reserves and their 'life span' or years of supply became ever more important, scaling up and complementing traditional appraisal practices on the level of individual mines or mining and trading companies. As a consequence, economic methods gained new weight for mineral resource estimation. Natural resource economics as an own field of research grew out of these efforts. By way of example, the mineral resource appraisal assigned to the U.S. Materials Policy Commission by President Harry S. Truman in 1951 is analyzed in more detail. Natural resource economics and environmental economics might be interpreted as a strategy to bring down the vast and holistically conceived object of geological and ecological research, the earth, to human scale, and assimilate it into social matters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Berichte zur Wissenschafts-Geschichte is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

'Growth' or 'Revolution'? Ernst Cassirer and History of Science. Ernst Cassirer's contributions to history of science have been long time neglected. The aim of this paper is to show the historical and philosophical framework of Cassirer's engagement in this field, starting from his seminal work about the problem of knowledge in science and philosophy of the modern age. Moreover the author suggests that Cassirer's late studies about Galilei and the origins of mathematical science are of some interest in order to comprehend both his commitment to contemporary history of science (from Burtt to Koyré) and his intellectual heritage for our agendas in a post-Kuhnian era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Around the turn of the twenty-first century a new practice in international politics became established: representatives of political, economic and religious organisations apologised for the historical and political crimes of their own collectives, addressing the victims or the victims' descendants. At a public event in Juni 2001, a formal apology of this kind was made by the president of the Max Planck Society (MPS), who had previously launched an extensive programme of research into the National Socialist history of what was then the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. The majority of the eight invited survivors of human experimentation in Nazi concentration camps refused forgiveness. Instead, they called for the MPS not to content itself with historical research and analysis, but to ensure the continued remembrance of the victims and their suffering. Starting from this 2001 ritual of repentance, the paper examines the participants' diverse views of how to deal with the medical crimes of National Socialism, and asks about possibilities of going beyond historical retrospection to fulfil the imperative of remembrance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper attempts to reconstruct the writing of published case histories. Due to the establishment of a scientific classification system in psychiatry there were at the Charité several changes from the late 1870s onwards: (1) Not only was the documentation in the clinical records altered significantly, but also (2) the archive was reorganized into a double filing system and (3) the casuistic made a development from describing seldom or sensational cases into a mode which aimed to unfold psychiatric theory through 'typical cases'. Original medical records, the internal documentation of psychiatric observation, will be compared to their published version. Both, the narrative of a case study and the documentation in the clinical records reveal performative processes of observation and documentation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article introduces this issue of the journal, which contains papers presented at a symposium of the Gesellschaft für Wissenschaftsgeschichte (Society for the History of Science) in 2013 in Marbach am Neckar, Germany, and discusses themes such as the personal archives of scientists, the role of literary narrative in the scientific process, and scientist and autobiographer Carl Djerassi.

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Arguably, few things have shaped the historiography of the mid-twentieth century psy-sciences (and indeed, of the life sciences and science/technology/intellectual life quite generally) more profoundly than the story of cybernetics. This essay aims to undermine this technofuturistic picture of epistemological upheavals, of cyborg regimes of knowing, and of the incipient post-human, by reinserting back into the story the rather dull and unspectacular lives (and occupations) of the great majority of British, 'diverted' biologists during World War II. Instead of Ratio Clubbers or Macy-Conference frequenters, this essay is concerned with a much larger population of would-be biologists and their most pedestrian appropriations of, and exposures to, electronics. What I argue is that the prevalence and systematicity of such exposures in the course of the personnel-hungry radio-war points to a very different - low-key - picture of the war/technology-induced deflections of biological science at mid-century. As an example of how deeply at odds narrations of cybernetic's ascent tend to sit with developments on ground level, special attention will be devoted to the physiologists-turned-radar-scientists Alan Hodgkin and Andrew Huxley, and their war-time, or more properly, spare-time investigations into the biophysics of nerve. The latter - technical, difficult, and utterly unphilosophical - while absent from the cyber-theme-focused historiography, provided the basis for the tremendous impact Hodkgin and Huxley would in fact have on the mainstream, disciplinarily conservative physiological sciences; the larger aim however is to weave these far from peculiar biographical trajectories into a somewhat bigger picture of the intersections between radar electronics and biological science: a picture which does not centre on sensational discourses but on mundane electronic practices; and thus, on the generational experience of those who were known at the time as 'ex radar folk with biological leanings'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Berichte zur Wissenschafts-Geschichte is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)