151. The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power
- Author
-
Holger Herz, Ernst Fehr, Tom Wilkening, and University of Zurich
- Subjects
experiments and contracts, incentives, organizational behavior ,UBS UBS Center Working Paper Series ,experiments and contracts ,Economics and Econometrics ,Test ,incentives ,media_common.quotation_subject ,jel:D82 ,jel:D83 ,2002 Economics and Econometrics ,jel:D23 ,Macht ,Microeconomics ,Verhalten in Organisationen ,Power (social and political) ,ECON Department of Economics ,Experiment ,Politics ,Leistungsmotivation ,Business economics ,10007 Department of Economics ,0502 economics and business ,ddc:330 ,C92 ,Economics ,050207 economics ,Empirical evidence ,050205 econometrics ,media_common ,Organizational behavior ,jel:C92 ,Transaction cost ,050208 finance ,Delegation ,Public economics ,Autorität ,Organizational behavior, incentives, experiments and contracts ,05 social sciences ,Regret ,16. Peace & justice ,330 Economics ,D83 ,Incentive ,organizational behavior ,D23 ,11198 UBS Center for Economics in Society ,050203 business & management ,Anreiz - Abstract
Authority and power permeate political, social, and economic life, but empirical knowledge about the motivational origins and consequences of authority is limited. We study the motivation and incentive effects of authority experimentally in an authority-delegation game. Individuals often retain authority even when its delegation is in their material interest—suggesting that authority has nonpecuniary consequences for utility. Authority also leads to overprovision of effort by the controlling parties, while a large percentage of subordinates underprovide effort despite pecuniary incentives to the contrary. Authority thus has important motivational consequences that exacerbate the inefficiencies arising from suboptimal delegation choices. (JEL C92, D23, D82)
- Published
- 2013