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The article examines the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Jack Daniel's Properties v. VIP Products, which highlighted the complexities of trademark law in relation to First Amendment rights, especially regarding the use of parody in artistic expressions. Topics include the implications of the Jack Daniel's decision on trademark and speech, the limitations of current trademark law in protecting expressive uses, and the necessity for a broader fair use defense in trademark dispute.

The article examines the implications of the U.S.Supreme Court's 2023 decision in Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, which marks the Court's first ruling on fair use in visual art in 29 years, emphasizing the challenges courts face in interpreting the "meaning" of art within fair use doctrine. Topics include the difficulties courts encounter in determining art's meaning, the inadequacy of reducing visual art to stable messages.

The article presents the discussions from the first panel of the Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal Symposium, focusing on the implications of the Warhol v. Goldsmith decision for copyright law, particularly the evolving interpretation of fair use. Topics include the role of commerciality in transformative use, the significance of particular uses in fair use analysis, and the broader impact of the decision on existing and new markets for copyrighted works.

The article "Textile Makerspace: Digital Humanities Meets Craft" explores the intersection of textile craft, storytelling, and data in a unique makerspace at Stanford University. The Textile Makerspace provides a space for various crafts like sewing, knitting, and embroidery, attracting students and staff. The author delves into using textile methods for data visualizations and storytelling, as well as merging weaving with legal advocacy in digital humanities. The article also discusses a petition by the Authors Alliance to expand an exemption for text and data mining, showcasing the potential of computational text analysis through craft-based visualizations. Lastly, a Data Visualization with Textiles course at Stanford encourages interdisciplinary collaboration and experimentation to break traditional modes of scholarship in the humanities. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the issue of copyright protection for AI-generated content and suggests that alternative dispute resolution tactics may be able to address this issue until the law catches up with rapidly developing technology. It highlights cases where the United States Copyright Office and courts have rejected federal copyright protection for AI-generated artwork, emphasizing the requirement of human authorship for copyright protection. The article argues that protecting AI-generated works does not align with the original purpose of copyright law, which is to incentivize human creativity. It suggests that alternative dispute resolution methods, such as mediation and arbitration, may be more suitable for resolving disputes related to AI-generated content. The article also discusses the benefits of early neutral evaluation in providing business-oriented solutions and the importance of ADR in international copyright disputes. It presents ADR as an efficient and effective solution to fill the gap in copyright law related to AI-generated content. [Extracted from the article]

The article focuses on the intersection of copyright law and generative AI (artificial intelligence), particularly in relation to the concepts of fairness and fair use.

The document titled "Comparative Parasitology Policies and Instructions for Authors" provides guidelines for authors submitting manuscripts to the journal Comparative Parasitology. The journal focuses on comparative research in parasite taxonomy, systematics, ecology, and biogeography. The document outlines the conditions for publication, including author participation and consent, originality of the work, and formatting requirements. It also provides instructions for manuscript preparation, including headings, citations, taxonomic descriptions, acknowledgments, and the literature cited section. The document emphasizes the importance of accuracy and consistency in formatting and offers options for color figures in the online and print editions. [Extracted from the article]

Over the last few years, due largely to breakthroughs in deep learning technologies, artificial intelligence (AI) has begun to step into the shoes of human content generators and make valuable creative works at scale. Before the end of the decade, a significant amount of art, literature, music, software, and web content will likely be created by Al rather than traditional human authors. Yet the law lags behind this technological evolution by prohibiting copyright protection for AI-generated works. The predominant narrative holds that even if AI can automate creativity, this activity is not the right sort of thing to protect, and that protection would even harm human artists. AI-generated works challenge beliefs about human exeeptionalism and the normative foundations of copyright law, which until now have offered something for everyone. Copyright can be about ethics and authors and protecting the sweat of a brow and personality rights. Copyright can also be about the public interest and offering incentives to create and disseminate content. But copyright cannot have it all with AI authors-there is valuable output being generated, but by authors with no interests to protect. This Article argues that American copyright law is, and has traditionally been, primarily about benefiting the public interest rather than benefiting authors directly. As a result, AI-generated works are precisely the sort of thing the system aims to protect. Protection will encourage people to develop and use creative Al which will result in the production and dissemination of new works. Taken further, attributing authorship to Al that functionally does the work of a traditional author will promote transparency, efficient allocations of rights, and even counterintuitively protect human authors. AI-generated works also promise to radically impact other fundamental tenets of copyright law such as infringement, protection of style, and fair use. How the law should respond to AI activity has lessons more broadly for thinking about what rules should apply to people, machines, and other sorts of artificial authors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the importance of attribution, especially in the context of the Supreme Court decision regarding the artist Andy Warhol's use of a copyrighted photograph. It reports that the proper attribution is crucial for transparency, provenance, and respecting the moral rights of creators, while also highlighting the need for transparency in the age of artificial intelligence and derivative works.

The right to criticize or parody has always been a fundamental human right. In today's world of technology and the Internet, parodies or caricatures of someone's work are not uncommon. Technology has become so readily available that anyone can create a parody or caricature of another person's work. The main task of the nowadays researchers is find balance between one person's right to the inviolability of his property and the right of other persons to imitate it. The aim of this article is to analyze the concept of parody and caricature, as well as the case law of different countries - exploring how case law assesses whether an imitated work can be defined as a parody, or whether it is an "unsuccessful" imitation. Where is the line where an author has created a parody or has already infringed the rights of another author?. The methodological basis of this article is based on general scientific approaches (analysis and synthesis, deduction and induction, comparison, analogy and a systemic and structural-functional approach). The article also draws on court decisions, legislation, legal literature, publications and doctrine. Conclusions are drawn using the method of scientific induction and deduction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article argues that Nintendo could not restrict The Big House annual Super Smash Bros. Melee (SSBM) video game tournament series from using the emulator Dolphin and game modification Project Slippi but could restrict them from streaming their tournament on websites under the fair use doctrine of the Copyright Act of 1976. Topics include the history of Nintendo's disputes with SSBM, a background on Dolphin and Slippi, and an explanation of the Copyright Act of 1976 and its fair use doctrine.

Copyright of Romanian Journal of Intellectual Property Law / Revista Română de Dreptul Proprietăţii Intelectuale is the property of Universul Juridic Publishing House and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on various novel legal strategies that libraries could use to restore copyright's intended balance, including antitrust, preemption, misuse, and unconscionability. It mentions legal theory and, when applicable, suggests specific data-gathering initiatives for libraries, library organizations, and public interest–focused research organizations. It also mentions addition to fair use, libraries and archives have a unique public role in copyright.

The article reports that number of legal decisions concerning copyright law and the application of the Fair Use Doctrine has led to confusion and uncertainty. Topics include fact-intensive inquiries involved in making a copyright infringement determination, courts have made inconsistent decisions, leaving uncertainty and confusion in their wake; and examine earlier applications of copyright law and the Fair Use Doctrine.

This paper aims to shed light on the question of whether musical appropriation is ethically unobjectionable. James Young (2021) has recently advanced a position on this topic, according to which, whereas the appropriation of a whole work is uncontroversially nonpermissible, the appropriation of parts of a work is usually permissible. He grounds this view in ontological matters and in a criterion of fair use in terms of economic harm to the source work's composer. I argue that, pace Young, we cannot make general ethical claims about musical appropriation because their truth is sensitive to the musical genres that the involved works belong to. First, I clarify the scope of musical appropriation by means of considerations on musical practices and ontology. This will reveal that versions and covers are not genuine cases of musical appropriation. In a second step, I consider a specific kind of musical appropriation: using the first measures of a source work as the first measures of a secondary work. I show that, even if we assume Young's ontological framework and his criterion on fair use, the instances of this kind of musical appropriation count as fair or unfair depending on the musical genres of the involved works due to their normative implications for the composition and appreciation of those works. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores drawing from the Beliefs for Integrating Technology into the English Language Arts Classroom, as well as prior scholarship on digitally mediated communication, rhetorical studies and composition, assessment, and digital literacies, this theoretical article presents a framework for creating and assessing digital multimodal compositions.

Copyright infringement doctrine currently overprotects copyright owners against the perceived wrong of copying, failing to adequately countenance copying as an essential part of the authorial creative process. Drawing on existing infringement doctrine in the United States and Canada, this Article will offer an interpretation of "substantial similarity" that opens up (or at least better safeguards) space for creative copying-that is to say, copying that substantially transforms the original copied work and, in doing so, advances the public interest goals of the copyright system. Part I lays the groundwork by briefly presenting a dialogic vision of authorship that complicates conventional assumptions around creativity, originality, and copying. Part II offers an overview of the ways in which existing copyright doctrine can accommodate the realities of dialogic authorship, first through the fair use doctrine, and then turning to the potential role of a more rigorous substantial similarity doctrine to better mediate the copying/creativity divide. Part III explores divergent approaches to substantiality determinations, contrasting a holistic comparison approach that takes into account a work's "total concept and feel" with a more granular approach that "dissects" the copyright work into protectable and unprotectable elements. Overprotection of the plaintiff's work is the obvious risk of the holistic approach, failing as it does to adequately circumscribe the boundaries of the copyright owner's claim to exclusivity. The holistic comparison test also contains within it, however, the possibility of a greater appreciation of the dialogic relationship between the two works. As Part IV argues, reorienting copyright's holistic "total concept and feel" test could provide the necessary space in copyright infringement doctrine to permit transformative copying of protected works without requiring resort to the fair use defense. It turns out that courts holistically comparing the "total concept and, feel" of works may have been asking the right question all along-albeit typically for the wrong reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews U.S. copyright laws, focusing on two legal doctrines, the work for hire doctrine and the fair use doctrine, and their implications for distance learning. The article also explores ethical and pedagogical issues arising from distance learning and the involvement of higher education unions. The paper concludes with directions for future policies and research pertaining to faculty intellectual property rights in the context of online delivery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Paper explores the role of copyright's fair use doctrine as a limit on the moral right of integrity. The moral right of integrity gives an author the right to prevent any distortion, modification, or mutilation of their work that prejudices their honor or reputation. Actions that have been found to violate an author's moral right of integrity include, for instance, altering a mural by painting clothing over nude figures, selling separated panels of a single work of art, and displaying sculptures with holiday ribbons. At the same time, copyright's fair use doctrine allows follow-on creators to transform original works by altering the original work with new expression, meaning, or message. While the federal Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) includes language explicitly making the right of integrity "[sjubject to " copyright's fair use doctrine under 107, there have been no decisions in the United States interpreting how the doctrine might apply to a moral right of integrity claim. The lack of case law interpreting how courts might balance an author's moral right of integrity with the public's rights to expression is particularly troubling in light of the ongoing discussion to expand moral rights in the United States. If moral rights are to be expanded, most interest- or industry-groups and commentators agree that those rights must be subject tofair use. However, without any guidance from courts, and with commentators and legislative history doubting the compatibility of fair use with the right of integrity, how can the United States expand moral rights with the assumption that fair use would provide the proper balance between authors ' rights and the public's rights? This Paper illustrates different contexts in visual art where a follow-on creator distorts, mutilates, or modifies an author 's work in order to make an artistic, social, or political statement, and how the doctrine of fair use might limit the moral right of integrity in those contexts. It argues that copyright's fair use doctrine can serve as a limitation on an author's moral right of integrity and illustrates how the four fair use factors in 107 may be used to balance the author's right of integrity with the public's rights to find fair use where a follow-on creator modifies, distorts, or mutilates an author's work to transform the work and give the work new meaning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trustees are subject to two important rules which do not attract frequent attention. First, a trustee must not purchase trust property and second, a trustee must not purchase a beneficiary’s beneficial interest in the trust. These rules are known, respectively, as the “self-dealing” rule and the “fair-dealing" rule. This article begins with a brief introduction to those rules. The focus of this article, however, concerns the limitation period for claims based on contraventions of those rules by an express trustee. Surprisingly, this issue has not been the subject of any Australian decision until recently. The article concludes by suggesting that an action for breach of the self-dealing rule is likely to have either no statutory limitation period, or a 12-year limitation period, depending on the jurisdiction (except in Western Australia where the limitation period is likely to be six years), whereas an action for breach of the fair-dealing rule, in the absence of fraud, is likely to have a six-year limitation period (except in the Northern Territory where the limitation period is likely to be three years). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article argues that U.S. copyright law provides a competitive advantage in the global race for innovation policy because it permits researchers to conduct computational analysis -- text and data mining -- on any materials to which they have access. Amendments to copyright law in Japan, and the European Union's recent addition of limitations on copyright to legalize some TDM research, implicitly acknowledge the competitive benefits provided by the fair use provision of U.S. copyright law. Focusing only on U.S. law, this Article makes two general contributions to the literature on fair use: (1) in cases involving archiving, the user's security precautions are relevant under the first fair use factor and should not be treated as an unenumerated factor or as part of the market harm analysis; and (2) good faith should not be a factor in fair use analysis, but even if courts do consider good faith, TDM research conducted on infringing sources, such as Sci-Hub, is still lawful because the research provides transformative benefits without causing harm to the markets that matter. This Article also revisits the issue of temporary copies to argue that certain steps in TDM research do not make copies that "count" under U.S. law and that it is possible to design cloud-based TDM research that does not implicate U.S. copyright law at all. This Article addresses the needs of many audiences including policymakers, courts, university counsel, research libraries, and legal scholars who seek a thorough legal analysis to support this argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study tracks changes in behavior and attitude among visual arts professionals after the development of a code of best practices in the copyright doctrine of fair use. A survey of 2,400 professionals fielded only months after its publication demonstrated broad awareness of the code, informing practice and inspiring efforts to spread awareness. The greatest degree of awareness and change was among editors, several of whose publications altered their copyright policies. Professional and social networks were critical to spreading awareness. Despite a continuing lack of confidence in interpreting the law among individual professionals, the existence of a code contributed to significant change in norms and practices via institutional adoption. This study demonstrates that codes of best practices can affect field behavior, but that change depends on publicity, formal education, continuing support for early adopters, and institutional policy changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The protection of fair use in the arts has become an inflexible binary. Either artist Shepard Fairey has permission to use the Associated Press photograph of Barack Obama to create the Hope Poster, or he has stolen the image in violation of copyright. This legal framework is rigid, inaccurate, and creatively unsafe. Yet it is the interpretation, not the doctrine itself that needs shifting. The copyright statute already includes an overlooked "value" test that can more accurately reflect collaboration and sampling in the digital age. And yet instead, some scholars have responded to digital copying by suggesting we throw out the copyright of art altogether. This suggestion is dangerous. It ignores both the economic contingency of artistic labor and the constitutional mandate to incentivize creativity. The fair use test for art does not need wholesale abandonment but rather careful attention. This analysis requires us to address two errors: to refocus on the artist's, not the judge's, point of view, and to look clearly at a bias in the case law that has created unequal treatment of visual and verbal creativity. Then, an "added value" analysis--that is, adapting the game-theory tool of asking what happens if one actor is subtracted out--can support the legal test of "transformative use " while also framing the relative contributions of the various makers. This analysis of shared value helps everyone: It relieves judges of their awkward tour of duty as art critics. It makes artists feel safe in the moment of creativity, before value is known. It accomplishes the same outcome of so many cases--"The parties ultimately settled--without the costs of litigation or the losses to society. Newer technologies such as blockchain make shared ownership possible. Such systems offer robust economic complements to copyright that protect speech without impeding innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act's "notice and takedown" process is increasingly referred to as a model solution for content removal mechanisms worldwide. While it has emerged as a process capable of producing relatively consistent results, it also has significant problems--and is left open to different kinds of abuse. It is important to recognise these issues in order to ensure that they are not repeated in future legislation. To that end, this article examines the DMCA with reference to its historical context, and the general issues surrounding the enforcement of copyright infringement claims. It then goes on to discuss the notice and takedown process in detail--along with its advantages, disadvantages, criticisms and praise. Specific examples of the kinds of abuse reported by online service providers are outlined, along with explanations of the statutory construction that allows these situations to continue. To finish, the viability of potential alternatives and proposed changes are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article closely examines the transplant of the fair use model in U.S. copyright law on to foreign soil. It begins by reviewing the literature concerning paradigm shift, in particular Thomas Kuhn's seminal work. The Article then documents a growing trend toward the worldwide adoption of the U.S. fair use model and a countertrend toward the retention of the status quo. The juxtaposition of these two trends explain why jurisdictions that set out to transplant U.S.-style fair use ended up adopting a hybrid model. The second half of this Article interrogates the different primary causes behind such a paradigm evolution. While many possible factors exist within and outside the legal system, the discussion focuses on those relating to intellectual property law, international and comparative law, and the legislative process. The Article concludes with recommendations concerning future efforts to broaden copyright limitations and exceptions in the United States and across the world. Specifically, it outlines six courses of action that seek to improve these reform efforts. It further identifies three modalities of evolution that can help tailor the transplanted fair use paradigm to local needs, interests, conditions, and priorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The primary goal of copyright law is to benefit the public. By rewarding authors with exclusive rights, such as the power to enforce copyright infringement, copyright protection is the means through which copyright law accomplishes this goal. Another way that copyright law pursues its goal is through the fair use doctrine--an invaluable utilitarian limit on copyright protection. However, fair use is, among other things, vague. The current application of fair use as an affirmative defense magnifies the doctrine's problems and makes copyright law hospitable to abusive copyright litigation. Current proposals in this area of reform target either fair use or abusive copyright litigation. This Note targets both problems with a single solution: applying fair use as a right. Applying fair use as a right alleviates some of the doctrine's inherent problems and is the best long-term solution for eliminating abusive litigation from copyright law. As a right, fair use protects copyright's core values and goals, alleviates the burden on courts, and cultivates creation. A review of the motivation behind fair use reveals that as a right, fair use is best able to serve the purpose for which it was designed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digital communication continues to transform our world, and information is shared continuously faster because of exponential technological advances. For example, due to an immense online audience, many companies now use GIF images containing short movie or song clips to advertise their business on social media. This has apparently been an effective advertising tool. New information-sharing techniques inevitably birth new copyright implications. Our societal increase in digital communication poses new challenges for copyright jurisprudence and for the courts, because in some instances--such as GIF advertising--it is unclear how current copyright law would distribute certain ownership and usage rights. This Note explores the background and history of U.S. copyright law, including the fair use doctrine, the codification of that doctrine, and the Supreme Court's development of the "transformative use" doctrine. The complex ambiguity of the fair use doctrine is discussed at length, which is emphasized by the inconsistent application of the four fair use factors among the federal circuits. Given the impending confrontation between GIFs and copyright holders, as well as the current ambiguity in fair use doctrine, this Note argues in favor of the Seventh Circuit's return to more traditional copyright values through its appraisal of the "market effects" factor as the most important of the four statutory considerations for determining fair use listed in Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some years ago, case law on trademark parodies and similar unauthorized "speech " uses of trademarks could have led one to conclude that the law had no sense of humor. Over time, however, courts in the U.S. and elsewhere began to leaven likelihood of confusion analyses with healthy skepticism regarding consumers' alleged inability to perceive a joke. These decisions did not always expressly cite the copyright fair use defense, but the considerations underlying the copyright doctrine seemed to inform trademark analysis as well. The spillover effect may indeed have been inevitable, as several of the cases in which the fair use defense prevailed coupled copyright and trademark claims. Just as copyright law has influenced the development of trademark doctrine in the U.S, so has trademark law evolved a reciprocal relationship with copyright, potentially extending the protection of certain copyrighted works, notably cartoon characters, beyond the copyright term. This essay will first address how the U.S. copyright fair use doctrine has allowed U.S. federal judges in trademarks cases to connect with their inner comic impulses. Second, / will consider the conflict between trademark law's potentially eternal duration and copyright's constitutionally mandated limited times, particularly in the context of visual characters such as Mickey Mouse. Looking to EU law, I will also offer some additional considerations regarding the use of expired copyrighted works as trademarks. While those analyses address trademarks and copyright as potential antagonists where exercise o f trademark rights threatens to frustrate copyright policies, there is another side of the coin. To an increasing extent, we are seeing trademark symbols become characters and acquire value not only as source-indicators, but also as artistic (or audiovisual) works. I will conclude by considering the value that copyright protection might add to registered trademarks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This comment considers Global Yellow Pages Ltd v Promedia Directories Pte Ltd, an important decision on copyright in compilation works by the highest appellate court in Singapore in 2017 which rejects the "sweat of the brow " approach, following developments in the US, Europe and Australia. It also considers the applicability of the American fair use defence, in particular the transformative use doctrine, to Singapore. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright provides broad protection for artists and creators, but these rights are not without limit. In the United States, for instance, the U.S. Copyright Act permits the "fair use" of copyrighted works without infringement under certain circumstances. Other nations overwhelmingly employ the comparable concept of "fair dealing." Drawing the line between fair use and infringement has proven tricky for the courts, and technology has not made their task any easier. In an effort to help guide both reviews of copyright law abroad and the judicial consideration of fair use disputes, we construct an economic model to derive an optimal level of fair use (or fair dealing). This model is rooted in the purpose of copyright and informed by judicial precedent. Among other things, we find that optimal fair use should be stricter when: (1) the cost of the original work is high; (2) the size of the market for the original work is small; (3) piracy and other forms of leakages, which simply reduce the market potential for the original work, are large; (4) the cost of distributing secondary works is lower; (5) small amounts of transformation matter a lot to consumers; and (6) the fixed cost of producing secondary works are smaller. These findings suggest that legislatures and courts should adopt a stricter interpretation of fair use in the Digital Age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]