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This paper is a theoretical introduction to the special issue on care, control, and surveillance. Drawing upon feminist ethics of care, this paper introduces a conceptualization of care that enables us to examine surveillance practices occurring in care relationships. We argue that care ethics is inherently performative and the conceptualization of care as good or bad is negotiated through specific care practices. In this theoretical overview, we adopt a non-ideal approach to care. This framework allows us, on the one hand, to recognize that power asymmetry and even abuse can occur in caring relationships, while on the other hand it still enables us to reject harmful and abusive practices. We argue that, in order to understand surveillance in care, we need a non-dyadic, processual, and relational understanding of care, within which the particular nature of care is constantly negotiated. We believe that vulnerability and autonomy are crucial in the dynamics of care and surveillance. Furthermore, they play a crucial role in defining what can be considered good or bad care: good care acknowledges the inherent vulnerabilities in care and should enhance the dignity and autonomy of care receivers. We conclude the paper by discussing whether and when surveillance and control can be part of good care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"The Right to Mental Autonomy: Its Nature and Scope" is an article that delves into the concept of the right to mental autonomy and its implications. The author presents a hypothetical scenario involving the use of technology to manipulate someone's mind and argues that this violates their right to bodily and mental autonomy. The article explores different perspectives on the nature and limits of the right to mental autonomy, highlighting real-world examples of violations. It suggests that the right to mental autonomy should be understood as the right to form attitudes based on reasons and discusses various scenarios where this right may be violated, such as through non-reason-giving advertising or nudging in public policy. The text concludes that mental autonomy is a complex concept that requires careful consideration in different contexts and that non-rational interference violates this right. [Extracted from the article]

INTRODUCTION: The gauge of a society is how it responds to women and children and, in settler colonial nations, how it responds to the Indigenous women and children. This includes how society upholds the rights and responsibilities of women's self-determination of body rights and reproductive Justice. Reproductive justice in the settler colonial environment of Aotearoa' is tightly tied to the experiences of wahine Māori and our lived realities across the colonial project. To give full rights and responsibilities to wähine as holders of whakapapa, birthing practices, and keepers of knowledge, we must be willing to assess and critique society and hold colonial systems to account. APPROACH: This article follows on from the companion literature analysis article "He Whare Takata: Wähine Māori reproductive justice in the child protection system", which provides a detailed description of pre- and post-colonial herstory, providing the reader with an extensive storying of wahine as leaders. Both articles accept a mana³ wähine foundational position that asserts the rakatirataka (leadership and self-determination) of wahine and the inherent rights of wahine as 'he whare takata", the house of humanity. CONCLUSIONS: Drawing on the groundwork laid in the companion article, this analysis examines the Oranga Tamariki (OT) practice and evidence centres, specifically auditing content produced following the "Hawkes Bay Uplifts for evidence of a shift of practice that incorporates wahine knowing, being and doing holding to the foundation of 'he whare takata'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I defend a deontological social contract justification of punishment for philosophers who deny free will and moral responsibility (FW/MR). Even if nobody has FW/MR, a criminal justice system is fair to the people it targets if we would consent to it in a version of original position deliberation where we assumed that we would be targeted by the justice system when the veil is raised. Even if we assumed we would be convicted of a crime, we would consent to the imprisonment of violent criminals if prison conditions were better than the state of nature but deterring enough to prevent the state of nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While increasing numbers of philosophers have argued for eliminating the retributivist elements of criminal justice systems, their arguments often fall short due to internal inconsistency. Some of the best known of these arguments — such as those provided by Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso — rely on the claim that there are moral grounds for rejecting retributivism. In defending this claim, these philosophers typically provide arguments seeking to undermine the type of agent responsibility that they believe is needed to justify retributivism. This is usually followed by an assertion that since the excessive suffering caused by retributivist punishment cannot be justified, it is therefore immoral to preserve remnants of it in our criminal justice systems. This paper — which opposes the moral case against retributivism provided by Pereboom and Caruso, and favors non-moral reasons that recommend rejecting a retributivist approach — is divided into three parts. In part one, I discuss why Pereboom and Caruso are correct in thinking that free will skepticism undercuts the moral justification for retributivism. Part two sets out to explain why their moral case against retributivism fails insofar as it runs afoul of the folk intuitions that are called upon to defend Pereboom’s account of free will skepticism. In part three, I provide a non-moral case against the retributivism that is founded on considerations of self-interest and empathy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Denialism concerning free will and moral responsibility combines, in its minimal form, the rejection of libertarian free will and the rejection of compatibilism. I will address the more ambitiously “happy” or “optimistic” version of denialism, which also claims that we are better off without belief in free will and moral responsibility, and ought to try to radically reform our moral, social and personal lives without such beliefs. I argue that such denialism involves, for various reasons, a dangerous gamble, which it would be morally irresponsible to follow. I conclude by reflecting upon the implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The aim of the study is to explore the basic paradoxes of Nietzsche's conception of freedom in Beyond Good and Evil from the perspective of Kant's philosophy of freedom. The analysis of selected aphorisms shows that Nietzsche's ambivalent statements regarding will and freedom are not expressions of inconsistency, but rather they outline a philosophy of freedom that takes the form of a liberating deconstruction of the idea of free will. At the same time, it turns out that in this philosophy one can read a radicalization of some Kantian motifs. These are scientistic criticism, the autonomy of human being and the ethos of free self-determination stemming from it. On the other hand, Nietzsche transcends Kant by rejecting two strictly distinct spheres, as well as by emphasizing the legitimate plurality of speech acts regarding freedom. As a result, he succeeds in thinking freedom as an expression of human being in this world. Nietzsche's philosophy of the will is often interpreted in a strictly naturalistic way. However, an interpretation of these Kantian features reveals the insufficiency of naturalistic interpretation of Nietzsche. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Dinbilimleri Journal is the property of Dinbilimleri Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article makes the case for the provision of access to assisted death in prisons, founded on the right to self-determination under Article 8(1) ECHR, in order to create equivalence between prisoners and non-prisoners. It considers possible State justifications for interferences with the right under Article 8(2) and whether they would meet the Convention standards of legality and proportionality. In relation to proportionality, it is argued that the foundational basis for restrictions on assisted dying imposed on both the general and prison populations derives from the concept of human dignity, a concept which is also fundamental to prisoners' rights. Under the banner of proportionality, from an initial presumption of equivalence of access to assisted dying, the article identifies certain conditions inherent in the prison situation that inevitably oppose human dignity and which provide a plausible basis for divergence. Ultimately, it is concluded that an absolute bar on provision of access to assisted dying in prisons cannot be justified, but that the factors that undermine dignity in prison could justify a degree of divergence from creation of equivalence between the prison and the non-prison populations in terms of such access. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This project explored dignity as a design principle for a service supporting formerly incarcerated students by helping them achieve their higher education goals and career ambitions. We highlight autonomy as the foundation of dignity and explore how autonomy and dignity are intertwined in the context of education. We conducted interviews with formerly incarcerated students and their educators to develop the "Future Self" service strategy. This service inspires the students to stay motivated by assisting them to design their future identities and connect with mentors who can serve as role models, and through income share agreement (ISA) financial plans to provide upfront funding, and ways of giving back to the community by empowering them to become mentors themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Freedom is understood in modern philosophy as autonomy and participation. But the first sense of freedom is predominant, for participation is for moderns only a means of guaranteeing autonomy. Autonomy is constituted as a "space". This space belongs to a "subject". But if these ideas seem transparent, there are some questions to which the answers usually remain confusing: "What kind of space is it that will be of autonomy?", "In what sense is it space of autonomy?", "Autonomy is the criterion of the construction of the subject space by reference to which focal point?" and "How should the subject that has this space of autonomy be defined?". I will attempt an answer to these questions, which starts from the idea that the space in question is a geometric place of rights. Then, I will try to analyze, based on the reconfiguration of the concept of space of autonomy, the right to be subject and the prohibition of dependence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to construct a conceptual proposal on governance from the perspective of the Pueblos del Centro (Colombia). Based on collaborative research tools, the aim is to recognize which are the main significant values for sovereignty and epistemic, cultural and political self-determination of 'other' knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Journal of Shanghai Physical Education Institute / Shanghai Tiyu Xueyuan Xuebao is the property of Shanghai Physical Education Institute and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Éducation et Francophonie is the property of Association Canadienne d'Education de Langue Francaise (ACELF) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In Ethiopia, the nationalities question has been the most contentious political force shaping politics, engendering conflicts and obstructing national integration. In this article, I provide a historical analysis of the emergence in the 1960s of two dominant positions, "ethionationalism" and ethnonationalism, which coalesced into competing political visions of the character of the Ethiopian state. I posit that advocates of the two positions wrested power and tried to shape the state, writing constitutions and introducing political systems for governing Ethiopia. I discuss the transformation of these political positions and realignments as those in power maneuvered to deny Oromo nationalists access to political power, rejecting the idea of self-determination as a solution to the nationalities question. I conclude that the competing nationalisms have failed, and that the only way to create a stable Ethiopian state remains the position that Oromo nationalism has enunciated for half a century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deals with the issue of human dignity with regard to its relationship to the idea of human rights. The study is based on Arendt's understanding of human dignity as a normative expression of the position of man as a member of the political order and analyzes the phenomenon of dignity and its transformation in the history of ideas, especially in connection with the concept of person. Special focus is on Kant's approach and on the challenges for the thus formulated concept of human dignity with regard to the de-transcendentalization of Kant's autonomy and freedom in Habermas's intention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Life is mine F eminism, self-determination and basic income Cristina Morini In this inter v ention I inv estigate the relationships betw een f eminist practic es, basic inc ome and the no tion of ' self-determination inc ome ', f ocusing on the Italian f eminist mo v ement Non Una di Meno. Moreo v er, ' self-determination' is understood b y Non Una di Meno no t only as the result or goal of the inc ome but also as its means, in that self-determination and emancipation stem from the v er y act of claiming it. All this oc curs through the paradigm of precarit y. This means that the labour of precarious w omen and men, mark ed b y the same fragmentation that has always defined f eminine labour, ends up being c onsidered onc e again as outside of citizenship, although this no w c onc erns the majorit y of the population, and no t only w omen. [Extracted from the article]

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The article discusses the capital valuation of contemporary art with a focus on the alleged role played by "anomalies" and "exceptionality" in the establishment of art value within the market economy. Marxian aesthetic theory is examined along with the sources of the social valuation of art and the social function of artistic autonomy.

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Higher Education is the property of Canadian Society for the Study of Higher Education and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In response to failures of central planning, the Chinese government has experimented not only with free-market trade zones, but with allowing non-profit foundations to operate in a decentralized fashion. A network study shows how these foundations have connected together by sharing board members, in a structural parallel to what is seen in corporations in the United States and Europe. This board interlocking leads to the emergence of an elite group with privileged network positions. While the presence of government officials on non-profit boards is widespread, government officials are much less common in a subgroup of foundations that control just over half of all revenue in the network. This subgroup, associated with business elites, not only enjoys higher levels of within-elite links, but even preferentially excludes government officials from the NGOs with higher degree. The emergence of this structurally autonomous sphere is associated with major political and social events in the state–society relationship. Cluster analysis reveals multiple internal components within this sphere that share similar levels of network influence. Rather than a core-periphery structure centered around government officials, the Chinese non-profit world appears to be a multipolar one of distinct elite groups, many of which achieve high levels of independence from direct government control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper identifies eight challenges faced by the Department of Defense (DoD) test and evaluation community in assuring the behavior of autonomous systems as well as test and evaluation requirements, processes, and methods needed to address these challenges. It also identifies gaps in requirements, processes, and methods, which will need to be addressed for adequate test and evaluation of autonomous systems. Finally, it calls out a number of challenges that require additional test research and addresses the ultimate difficulty with overcoming unknown challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the reinvention of young adult (YA) literature by Indigenous authors. Particular focus was given on the novel "Slash," by Okanagan author Jeannette Armstrong, which was the first recognized Indigenous studies due to its teen readership. Information regarding Indigenous autonomy, scholarships in YA literature, and the concept of nationalism, are also included.

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The article is focused on the professional ethics of social work in the context of the philosophy of education. The authors analyse its educational pitfalls seen as a possible tension of personal ethics and professional ethics. Analysing the altruism issue (one of the essential values in social work) the authors reflect on the relationship of autonomy and heteronomy of will (e.g. regulated by institutional codes) in moral acting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the variety of socio-material arrangements that enable older people to continue living independently. Drawing on a collection of ethnographic observations and interviews with telecare users I conducted at their homes in 2004 and 2008, I will analyse in detail how the process of adopting the service makes visible and puts to the test certain arrangements that already exist, providing room for their modification and the creation of new ones. Through the description of three types of arrangement resulting from this process, I will initially demonstrate how autonomy emerges as a materially heterogeneous and distributed attribute. I will then discuss literature on disability and ageing originating from the Science and Technology Studies (STS), which has strongly influenced this conception. By considering concern with these arrangements to be an ontological obligation, I propose approaching autonomy as the activity of constantly testing and attuning these arrangements. This will not only serve to problematise the notion of autonomy in active ageing policies, but also autonomy-enabling innovations. Rather than replacing existing arrangements with new solutions, I suggest maintenance infrastructures be devised to support the bounded and inalienable undertaking of caring for these arrangements which configure our autonomous, yet ageing lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers and criticizes criminal law's assumption of the moral autonomy of individuals, showing how that view rests on questionable and obscure Kantian commitments about the self, and proposes a naturalistic alternative developed through a synthetic reading of Adorno's and Bhaskar's account of the subject in relation to nature and society. As an embodied, emergent, changing subject whose practically rational powers are emergent, polymorphous, and contingent, the subject's moral autonomy is dependent on the conditions for experiences of solidarity in four-planar nature. This view makes criminal theory's Autonomy Assumption look deeply questionable; autonomy must be a complex, nuanced open question, not an abstract, a priori default assumption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uncovers difficulties with a widely-held account of the kind of agential unity required for autonomous action and offers an alternative account that avoids these difficulties. One influential approach to characterizing agency holds that autonomous action occurs only when an agent is wholeheartedly committed to the motivation on which he or she acts. The basic idea behind this approach (defended by Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard, among others) is that autonomous action is action that flows from motivations that are truly internal to the agent, and that it is an agent's wholehearted commitment to a motivation that makes it internal in the relevant sense. Reflection on the diachronic aspects of agency reveals some serious challenges for this approach. These challenges are diagnosed as stemming from a fundamental structural tension between two of its key elements; on the one hand the requirement of absolute wholeheartedness about our commitments, and on the other the claim that questions of agency and autonomy must take as their target the principles, plans, and projects that individual actions represent rather than the actions themselves. The article argues that this tension is unavoidable in the approach as usually defended and outlines a different strategy for characterizing agential unity that does not require wholeheartedness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article discusses the notion of autonomy held by philosopher Theodor W. Adorno in relation to his critique of the thought of philosopher Immanuel Kant. Topics include Adorno's views on psychoanalysis in contrast to the theory of psychologist Sigmund Freud, Adorno's approach to social critique, and the relevance of Adorno's views on autonomy for philosophy of education.

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Copyright of Cinta de Moebio is the property of Universidad de Chile, Facultad de Ciencas Sociales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)