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People convicted of crime are often treated as atomistic individuals by the criminal justice system, ignoring the fact that they are largely embedded in social networks. Research shows that family members are often negatively impacted by their relatives’ punishment despite not breaking any laws themselves. These detrimental effects of punishment on family are known as symbiotic harms. Most research on symbiotic harms, however, has focused on incarceration. We extend this research by describing how monetary sanctions harm the families of adults with legal debt. Our data come from semi-structured interviews with 140 people with legal debt and ninety-six court actors in Georgia and Missouri. We find evidence that family members are often coerced into paying their relatives’ fines and fees and that monetary sanctions increase the financial strain, emotional distress, and interpersonal conflict that relatives experience.

Native Americans are disproportionately affected by the criminal legal system, yet comparative analyses of criminal legal outcomes and experiences among racial and ethnic groups rarely center the experiences of Native Americans. This multimethod study examines how monetary sanctions are affecting Native American populations in Minnesota. Drawing on administrative criminal court data and qualitative fieldwork, we find that Native Americans are subject to among the largest overall legal financial obligations (LFOs) in criminal court and carry the largest average LFO debt loads relative to other racial and ethnic groups in Minnesota, particularly when proximal to tribal lands. Moreover, monetary sanctions exacerbate existing poverty and spatial isolation in rural areas, compounding and further entrenching historical, systemic disadvantages that Native communities already face. We contextualize these findings within the broader history of U.S. settler colonialism, resource extraction, and dispossession.

States increasingly look to incarcerated individuals as a source of revenue to alleviate the fiscal burden of incarceration, which results in suing prisoners for these costs. Through lawsuit complaints, states claim they have suffered damages and seek reimbursement from incarcerated individuals through pay-to-stay fees. Drawing from an original dataset consisting of 102 civil complaints from Illinois, we examine how the state constructs damage, harm, and willfulness through pay-to-stay lawsuits. We find that the state achieves this beneficial outcome by labeling incarcerated individuals as willful nonpayers and thereby morally responsible for what it terms damages suffered. Our empirical and theoretical contributions position civil lawsuits as part of imagining incarcerated individuals as fiscally responsible for their incarceration within a rent-seeking society, contextualizing the social linkages between willfulness, legal moralism, and perpetual indebtedness.

Monetary sanctions are an integral and increasingly debated feature of the American criminal legal system. Emerging research, including that featured in this volume, offers important insight into the law governing monetary sanctions, how they are levied, and how their imposition affects inequality. Monetary sanctions are assessed for a wide range of contacts with the criminal legal system ranging from felony convictions to alleged traffic violations with important variability in law and practice across states. These differences allow for the identification of features of law, policy, and practice that differentially shape access to justice and equality before the law. Common practices undermine individuals’ rights and fuel inequality in the effects of unpaid monetary sanctions. These observations lead us to offer a number of specific recommendations to improve the administration of justice, mitigate some of the most harmful effects of monetary sanctions, and advance future research.

Research on crimmigration—the intersection where criminal and immigration law meet—shows that immigrants are increasingly punished and deported as a consequence of a criminal conviction. We investigate how immigration status shapes the imposition of monetary sanctions. By drawing on interview and court observational data from four states, we demonstrate that the legal opaqueness at the intersection of the crimmigration system often results in crimmigration sanctions—enhanced financial and nonfinancial penalties that are the result of an undocumented immigrant’s liminal legality. Findings show that immigrants are financially exploited through gaps in criminal and immigration law that allow for crimmigration sanctions in the form of bail predation and the exchange of higher financial penalties for reduced or no jail time, lessening an undocumented immigrant’s risk of deportation. The implications of these practices for due process are discussed in detail.

Research on punishment and inequality finds that people with criminal records routinely avoid systems of surveillance. Yet scholarship on monetary sanctions shows that many people experiencing poverty with criminal legal system debt are also involved with the state in other domains of social life. How can these literatures be resolved? In this article, we posit that past research can be reconciled through a focus on financial double-dealing—disparate and contradictory economic entanglements that redistribute welfare resources from individuals to the criminal legal system and its institutional affiliates. Drawing on nationally representative survey data, as well as unique data collected on people with monetary sanctions in seven states, we find that individuals and families receiving cash and noncash public assistance are significantly more likely to owe monetary sanctions and are less likely to pay them. We discuss the implications of multiple-system involvement for ongoing surveillance.

Investigations in Ferguson, Missouri, revealed that many individuals, particularly Black people, entered the criminal justice system for relatively minor offenses, missed court appearances, or failure to pay fines. Municipal courts were focused on revenue generation, which led to aggressive enforcement of municipal codes. Although subsequent reforms were passed, little is known about whether and how the legislative changes influenced the law-in-action in the municipal courts. Using data from qualitative interviews with St. Louis area residents and regional court actors, as well as court observations, this article documents the legal structure of municipal courts in the region after Ferguson. We address how the parochial nature of municipal courts in St. Louis County perpetuates the financial marginalization of residents through the layering of punishment, and how the state legal structure further facilitates control, even after reform.

Low-level misdemeanor and traffic violations draw tens of millions of people into local courts to pay fines and fees each year, generating billions of dollars in revenue. We examine how standardized legal fines and fees for low-level charges induce disparate treatment and result in disparate impact. Using a mixed-methods approach that incorporates administrative court records as well as interviews with criminal defendants from Texas, we find that although the majority of defendants readily pay for and conclude their case, African American, Latinx, and economically disadvantaged defendants spend disproportionate amounts of money and time resolving theirs. Analysis of criminal case records illustrates the disparate impact of monetary sanctions through the accrual of debt and time spent resolving a charge. Interviews reveal irreconcilable tensions between American ideals of equality in sentencing and the meaning and value of money and time in an increasingly unequal society.

Monetary sanctions are a ubiquitous part of court systems. Previous studies have focused largely on these sanctions at the state level or solely on large urban jurisdictions. However, court systems differ considerably across communities of varying population size, composition, and density. This article examines how differences in court structure and organizational dynamics in communities across the rural-urban continuum lead to differences in how court actors consider the role of monetary sanctions. Using interviews with court actors and ethnographic observations in communities across four states, we find that the practical and symbolic nature of monetary sanctions varied by the acquaintanceship density of the court and community. These interpersonal dynamics influenced courtroom considerations, monetary sanctions’ relationship to local finances, and actors’ positioning toward state-level policy. These findings emphasize the importance of court and community context and structure in assessing the law-in-action both when conducting research and designing reform.

In this article, we explore the experiences of people who carry monetary sanction (or penal) debt across eight U.S. states. Using 519 interviews with people sentenced to fines and fees, we analyze the mental and emotional aspects of their experiences. Situating our analysis within research on the social determinants of health and the stress universe, we suggest that monetary sanctions create an overwhelmingly palpable sense of fear, frustration, anxiety, and despair. We theorize the ways in which monetary sanctions function as both acute and chronic health stressors for people who are unable to pay off their debts, highlight the mechanisms linking penal debt with mental and emotional burdens, and generalize our findings using national data from the U.S. Federal Reserve. We find that the system of monetary sanctions generates a great deal of stress and strain that becomes an internalized punishment affecting many realms of people’s lives.

This article proposes the centrality of procedural integrity—or fidelity to local norms of case processing—to the post-sentencing adjudication of monetary sanctions. We draw on insights gained from observations of more than 4,200 criminal cases in sixteen courts in New York and Illinois and find that procedural integrity becomes a focal point in the absence of monetary sanctions paid in full and on time. This examination of the interplay between the sociolegal context and workgroups within courtrooms brings to light how case processing pressure, mandatory monetary sanctions, defendants with pronounced financial insecurity, and judicial discretion inform the role monetary sanctions play in court operations.

Although men’s incarceration rates have declined in the United States, women’s have stayed steady and even risen in some areas. At the same time, courts have increased their use of monetary sanctions, especially for low-level offenses. We propose that women’s incarceration trends can be partially explained by county dependence on monetary sanctions as a source of revenue. We suggest that monetary sanctions expose female defendants to processes that increase their likelihood of incarceration, especially in counties more reliant on monetary sanctions as a source of revenue, and where women’s poverty rates are high. Using data from Washington State, we find county dependence on monetary sanctions is positively associated with rates of women sentenced to incarceration. Although rural counties’ rates are higher, they depend on monetary sanctions no more than nonrural counties do.

Probation is the most commonly imposed correctional sanction, is often accompanied by supplementary costs, and can be operated by the state or private companies. Private probation is a unique sanction used in lower courts, most often for misdemeanor offenses, and is managed by third-party actors. We focus on documenting the process and unique costs of private probation, including the rituals of compliance and proportionality of punishment. We use data from interviews with individuals on private probation and local criminal justice officials as well as evidence from court ethnographies in Georgia and Missouri. For individuals on private probation, payment of monetary sanctions is a crucial way of demonstrating compliance. Yet the financial burden of added costs for supervision and monitoring creates substantial challenges.

Legal scholars have long studied why laws are implemented differently across local court contexts. Key to understanding this localized variation is understanding how new laws are communicated, interpreted, and negotiated within the legal field. Few studies, however, have directly examined the process by which court actors interpret and negotiate new laws within the court. We explore these sensemaking processes through interviews and observations of court actors in Washington and Missouri after changes to monetary sanction laws. We identify three primary forms of sensemaking and analyze contextual factors that shape these processes. We find key differences in sensemaking based on differing levels of regulatory oversight but also that normative and cultural factors were still important in determining legal interpretation and implementation within each state. These findings have important implications for our theoretical understanding of courtroom communities and for policymakers seeking to enact reform.

Knowledge about legal financial obligations in American punishment has been largely confined to criminal law and the penal codes of a few states. Yet in the nation’s most populous state, California, there is reason to believe that a wider expanse of law beyond the penal code harbors the legal capacity to impose monetary punishments and indebtedness. A legal census of the entire corpus of California’s civil and criminal statutory law identifies the presence and distribution of monetary sanctioning statutes within each and across all of the state’s twenty-nine legislative code sections. Results show that one in twenty-three statutes in California law concern monetary sanctions and that they are dispersed throughout every section of the legislative code. Our investigation reveals that monetary sanctions are embedded within the broader architecture of state law, and that variations in the structure, as much as the substance, of statutory schemes must figure into empirical and theoretical accounts of racial disparity in the imposition of monetary punishments.

Research on court-imposed monetary sanctions has not yet fully examined the impact that processes used to manage court debt have on individuals' lives. Drawing from both interviews and ethnographic data in Illinois and Washington State, we examine how the court's management of justice-related debt affect labor market experiences. We conceptualize these managerial practices as procedural pressure points or mechanisms embedded within these processes that strain individuals' ability to access and maintain stable employment. We find that, as a result, courts undermine their own goal of recouping costs and trap individuals in a cycle of court surveillance.

Traffic stops and tickets often have far-reaching consequences for poor and marginalized communities, yet resulting fines and fees increasingly fund local court systems. This paper critically explores who bears the brunt of traffic fines and fees in Nevada, historically one of the fastest growing and increasingly diverse states in the nation, and one of thirteen US states to prosecute minor traffic violations as criminal misdemeanors rather than civil infractions. Drawing on legislative histories, we find that state legislators in Nevada increased fines and fees to raise revenues. Using descriptive statistics to analyze the 2012–2020 open arrest warrants extracted from the Las Vegas Municipal Court, we find that 58.6% of all open warrants are from failure to pay tickets owing to administrative-related offenses—vehicle registration and maintenance, no license or plates, or no insurance. Those issued warrants for failure to pay are disproportionately for people who are Black and from the poorest areas in the region. Ultimately, the Nevada system of monetary traffic sanctions criminalizes poverty and reinforces racial disparities.

During the late 20th century, imprisonment rates in the United States saw unprecedented growth, leading correctional systems across the country to face widespread overcrowding and underfunding. Subsequently, policy makers sought out alternatives to incarceration for certain categories of offenses. Community supervision, such as probation, emerged as a popular solution to both reduce prison and jail populations as well as to generate revenue to fund the rapidly expanding legal system. With the rise in community supervision came increases in the number of people on probation for lower-level and non-violent offenses. The expansion of legal financial obligations (LFO) placed additional burdens on these persons, who disproportionately sit in lower socio-economic status brackets. Using data from the 1995 Survey of Adults on Probation (SAP), the current study adds to the literature on probation and LFOs in an important way. The SAP data contain information on the amount, frequency, and type of LFO. Thus, this paper examines the distinct types of LFOs to determine the differential burden that each type of LFO has on people on probation. This paper finds that of all types of fees, those associated with victim restitution are most likely to lead to missed payments, while those that generate revenues do not contribute significantly to missed payments. This paper discusses the implications of this for procedural justice and fairness.

Monetary sanctions include fines, fees, restitution, surcharges, interest, and other costs imposed on people who are convicted of crimes ranging from traffic violations to violent felonies. We analyze how people in the court system theorize about monetary sanctions with regards to four kinds of justice: constitutional, retributive, procedural, and distributive justice. Drawing on qualitative interviews with sixty-eight people sentenced to pay monetary sanctions in Illinois, we identify five themes that illuminate how respondents think about these forms of justice: monetary sanctions are: (1) justifiable punishment, (2) impossible to pay due to poverty, (3) double punishment, (4) extortion, and (5) collected by an opaque and greedy state. We find that for defendants in the criminal justice system, monetary sanctions serve some retributive aims, but do not align with the other three domains of justice. We discuss the policy implications of these findings.

Many municipal governments have come to depend heavily on fines and fees generated by the criminal justice system. This essay uses data from all courts of limited jurisdiction (municipal and district courts) in Washington State between 2000 and 2014 to evaluate the relationships between local government finances, the Great Recession, and the imposition of debt through the criminal justice system. I find that municipalities issued more criminal justice debt during and after the recession across Washington, but that government finances as measured by tax receipts and expenditures per capita were weakly related to sentencing practices. These findings suggest that macroeconomic fiscal pressures may be drivers of enforcement and prosecutorial practices through increasing case volumes, but that macroeconomic pressures and local fiscal pressures did not appear to shift court sentencing practices in Washington during the Great Recession.

Although I have provided direct services and engaged in litigation related to municipal fines & fees in New York City, monetary sanctions are not my area of legal expertise. Bearing that in mind, I am offering these thoughts in my capacity as a scholar of law, race, and money, and more importantly, as an organizer for economic justice. I hope the essay facilitates constructive conversations about the frameworks we use to analyze the political economy of monetary sanctions and mass incarceration. I am grateful to the UCLA Criminal Justice Law Review and the organizers of “Progressing Reform of Fees and Fines: Towards A Research and Policy Agenda Conference”, hosted at Harvard Law School, for the opportunity to share these reflections.

Author(s): Shannon, Sarah; Huebner, Beth M.; Harris, Alexes; Martin, Karin; Patillo, Mary; Pettit, Becky; Sykes, Bryan; Uggen, Christopher | Abstract: Monetary sanctions have long been a part of the U.S. criminal justice system but have received increasing attention from the public as well as legal scholars and social science research in recent years. This essay describes initial findings from the Multi-State Study of Monetary Sanctions, a multi-method study designed to build on the prior research on legal financial obligations (LFOs) by examining the multi-tiered systems of monetary sanctions operating within eight states representing key regions of the United States (California, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Texas and Washington). Our research explores the constantly changing legal environment and documents how the law is practiced on the ground. We expand on prior research by engaging a large and diverse group of people who owe legal debt and criminaljustice stakeholders. We augment these data with systematic court observations across different jurisdiction sizes and court levels. In doing so, we fill important gaps in the current understanding of U.S. systems of monetary and provide findings that can be used for guiding policy.

В современном мире общество все чаще предпочитает альтернативные судебному разбирательству варианты разрешения споров, для обеспечения более гибкого процесса с более быстрыми результатами. Одна из самых узнаваемых форм альтернативного разрешения споров – это арбитраж. Основными преимуществами арбитража являются нейтральность места, завершенность процесса, гибкость, конфиденциальность, автономия сторон, эффективность затрат и времени и, наконец, общее признание. Однако в последнее время арбитраж критикуют за неоднократное продление сроков трибуналом, признание запоздалых доказательств, принятие нескольких поправок к письменным представлениям сторон и перенос слушаний путем согласия на запросы в последний момент. В статье акцентированы основные причины надлежащего судебного разбирательства с точки зрения как респондентов, так и арбитров. Кроме того, рассмотрены методы повышения эффективности арбитражного разбирательства и снижения затрат и задержек., In today’s world, society increasingly prefers alternative dispute resolution options to litigation in order to provide a more flexible process with faster results. One of the most recognized forms of alternative dispute resolution is arbitration. The main advantages of arbitration are place neutrality, completeness of the process, flexibility, confidentiality, party autonomy, cost and time efficiency, and finally, general acceptance. Recently, however, arbitration has been criticized for repeatedly extending time limits by the tribunal, admitting belated evidence, adopting several amendments to written submissions by the parties, and postponing hearings by agreeing to requests at the last moment. The article highlights the main reasons for due process from the point of view of both respondents and arbitrators. In addition, methods of increasing the efficiency of arbitration proceedings and reducing costs and delays are considered.

In the years since Officer Darren Wilson shot and killed Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, policymakers and advocates have pushed for reforms to both police practices and systems of fines and fees. The connection between fines and fees enforcement tactics and police violence remains an important focus for reforms. Police play a significant role in driving up the volume and amounts of fines and fees imposed, and they play a critical role in city and state collection efforts. The use of police as debt imposers and collectors creates opportunities for police violence—both physical use of force, as well as more nuanced forms of violence through the exertion of coercion, fear, and control. In this piece, I argue that specific policing tactics used to impose and collect fines and fees, and the wide latitude given to police via Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to engage in such tactics, facilitates conditions similar to those in Ferguson and results in unnecessary and oppressive police violence. To combat this, I argue that fines and fees reforms must focus on the role of law enforcement in such systems, and how that role must be greatly limited to prevent additional violence.

Monetary sanctions mandated in state statutes include fines, fees, restitution, and other legal costs imposed on persons convicted of crimes and other legal violations. Drawing on content analysis of current legislative statutes in Illinois pertaining to monetary sanctions, we ask three questions: What are defendants expected to pay for and why? What accommodations exist for defendants’ poverty? What are the consequences for nonpayment? We find that neoliberal logics of personal responsibility and carceral expansion suffuse these laws, establishing a basis for transferring public costs onto criminal defendants, offering little relief for poverty, and supporting severe additional penalties for unpaid debt. Statutory inequality legally authorizes further impoverishment of the poor, thereby increasing inequality. Major related organizing and advocacy work, however, has created an opening for significant changes toward greater fairness.

La repercusión de las consecuencias económicas de las sentencias dictadas por el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea al amparo del artículo 260 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea sobre los responsables materiales del incumplimiento presenta especial interés en el caso de los Estados compuestos. En España, aunque el Tribunal Constitucional avaló tempranamente el principio de la repercusión sobre las Comunidades Autónomas, durante tiempo la regulación del tema se confió a cláusulas sectoriales, alguna de las cuales también ha sido específicamente considerada constitucional. En la actualidad, el panorama normativo ha sido simplificado y existe ya una cláusula general en la Ley Orgánica 2/2012, de 27 de abril, de Estabilidad Presupuestaria y Sostenibilidad Financiera, que regula la responsabilidad por incumplimiento del Derecho de la Unión Europea, partiendo del principio de responsabilidad; esta cláusula ha sido desarrollada por el Real Decreto 515/2013, de 5 de julio, por el que se regulan los criterios y el procedimiento para determinar y repercutir las responsabilidades. Sin perjuicio de que esta normativa aporta certeza, en ella se observa un interés predominante en asegurar los intereses estatales, descuidando la imprescindible colaboración que debe existir con las Comunidades Autónomas., The passing along of the economic consequences arising from the judgements rendered by the European Union Court of Justice in reliance on Article 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union regarding those materially responsible for non-compliance is of special interest in the case of composite states. In Spain, although the Constitutional Court endorsed early on the principle of a passing along of sanctions to the autonomous communities, for some time the regulation of the matter was entrusted to sectoral clauses, some of which have also been specifically deemed to be constitutional. Today, the regulatory panorama has been simplified and there now exists a general clause in Implementing Act 2/2012, April 27, 2012, on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability, which regulates responsibility for non-compliance with EU Law on the basis of the principle of responsibility. This clause was further developed by Royal Degree 515/2013, July 5, 2013, regulating the criteria and procedures for determining and attributing responsibilities. Apart from the fact that these regulations do contribute certainty, one can observe therein a predominant interest in ensuring the interests of the central government, while overlooking the indispensable collaboration that should exist with respect to the autonomous communities., La repercussió de les conseqüències econòmiques de les sentències dictades pel Tribunal de Justícia de la Unió Europea, a l'empara de l'art. 260 del Tractat de Funcionament de la Unió Europea sobre els responsables materials de l'incompliment, té un interès especial en el cas dels estats compostos. A Espanya, encara que el Tribunal Constitucional va avalar aviat el principi de la repercussió sobre les comunitats autònomes, durant força temps la regulació del tema es va confiar a clàusules sectorials, alguna de les quals també ha estat considerada constitucional de forma específica. En l'actualitat, el panorama normatiu ha estat simplificat i hi ha una clàusula general en la Llei Orgànica 2/2012, de 27 d'abril, d'estabilitat pressupostària i sostenibilitat financera, que regula la responsabilitat per incompliment del dret de la UE, partint del principi de responsabilitat; aquesta clàusula ha estat desenvolupada pel Reial Decret 515/2013, de 5 de juliol, pel qual es regulen els criteris i el procediment per determinar i repercutir les responsabilitats. Sens perjudici del fet que aquesta normativa aporta certesa, s’hi observa un interès predominant a assegurar els interessos estatals i descuida la imprescindible col·laboració que hi ha d'haver amb les comunitats autònomes.

We provide lab data from four different games that allow us to study whether people have accurate expectations regarding monetary sanctions (punishment/reward) and non-monetary sanctions (disapproval/approval). Although the strength of the sanction is always predicted with some error (particularly in the case of monetary sanctions), we observe that (i) most subjects anticipate correctly the sign of the average sanction, (ii) expectations co-vary with sanctions, (iii) the average expectation is very often not significantly different than the average actual sanction, and (iv) the errors exhibit no systematic bias, except in those situations where rewards are frequent. In this line, we find some evidence that punishment is better anticipated than rewards., Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through the research project ECO2008-00510